Chapter XI: Part 11

Montebello had, however, one singular result: both sides fell back and took defensive measures. The French headquarters were already meditating, if they had not actually resolved upon, a transfer of all their forces from right to left, to be followed by a march on Milan (a scheme inspired by Jomini). But the opening of the movement was suspended until it became quite certain that Stadion's advance meant nothing, while Gyulai (impressed by Forey's aggressive tactics) continued to stand fast, and thus it was not until the 28th that the French offensive really began.[8] The infantry of the French III. corps was sent by rail from Pontecurone to Casale, followed by the rest of the army, which marched by road. To cover the movement D'Autemarre's division of Prince Napoleon's corps (V.) was posted at Voghera and one division of the king's army remained at Valenza. The rest of the Piedmontese were pushed northward to join Cialdini's division which was already at Vercelli. The emperor's orders were for Victor Emmanuel to push across the Sesia and to take post at Palestro on the 30th to cover the crossing of the French at Vercelli. This the king carried out, driving back outlying bodies of the enemy in spite of a stubborn resistance and the close and difficult character of the country. Hearing of the fighting, Gyulai ordered the recapture of Palestro by the II. corps, but the Sardinians during the night strengthened their positions and the attack (31st) was repulsed with heavy loss. These two initial successes of the allies, the failures in Austrian tactics and leadership which they revealed, and the fatigues and privation to which indifferent staff work had exposed his troops, combined to confirm Gyulai in his now openly expressed intention of "basing his defensive on the Quadrilateral." And indeed his only alternatives were now to fall back or to concentrate on the heads of the French columns as soon as they had passed the Sesia about Vercelli. Faithful to his view of the situation he adopted the former course (1st June). The retreat began on the 2nd, while the French were still busied in closing up. Equally with the Austrians, the French were the victims of a system of marching and camping that, by requiring the tail of the columns to close up on the head every evening, reduced the day's net progress to 6 or 7 m., although the troops were often under arms for fourteen or fifteen hours. The difference between the supreme commands of the rival armies lay not in the superior generalship of one or the other, but in the fact that Napoleon III. as sovereign knew what he wanted and as general pursued this object with much energy, whereas Gyulai neither knew how far his government would go nor was entire "master in his own house."

Austrian retreat.

French advance to the Ticino.

The latter became very evident in his retreat. Kuhn, the chief of staff, who was understood to represent the views of the general staff in Vienna, had already protested against Gyulai's retrograde movement, and on the 3rd Hess appeared from Vienna as the emperor's direct representative and stopped the movement. It was destined to be resumed after a short interval, but meanwhile the troops suffered from the orders and counter-orders that had marked every stage in the Austrian movements and were now intensified instead of being removed by higher intervention. Meanwhile (June 1-2) the allies had regrouped themselves east of the Sesia for the movement on Milan. The IV. corps, driving out an Austrian detachment at Novara, established itself there, and was joined by the II. and Guard. The king's army, supported by the I. and III. corps, was about Vercelli, with cavalry far out to the front towards Vespolate. From Novara, the emperor, who desired to give his troops a rest-day on the 2nd, pushed out first a mixed reconnaissance and then in the afternoon two divisions to seize the crossing of the Ticino, Camou's of the Guard on Turbigo, Espinasse's of the II. corps on San Martino. Further the whole of the Vercelli group was ordered to advance on the 3rd to Novara and Galliate, where Napoleon would on the 4th have all his forces, except one division, beyond Gyulai's right and in hand for the move on Milan. The division sent to Turbigo bridged the river and crossed in the night of the 2nd/3rd, that at San Martino (on the main road) occupied the bridge-head and also the river bridge itself, though the latter was damaged. Espinasse's division here was during the night replaced by a Guard division and went to join a growing assembly of troops under General MacMahon, which established itself at Turbigo and Robecchetto on the morning of the 3rd. Lastly, in order to make sure that no attack was impending from the direction of Mortara, Napoleon sent General Niel with a mixed reconnoitring force thither, which returned without meeting any Austrian forces--fortunately for itself, if the fate of the "reconnaissance in force" at Montebello proves anything.

The centre of gravity was now at Buffalora, a village on the main
Milan road at the point where it crosses the Naviglio Grande. Here, on
the night of the 1st, Count Clam-Gallas, commanding the Austrian I.
corps (which had just arrived in Italy and was to form part of the
future I. Army) had posted a division, with a view to occupying the
bridge-head of San Martino. On inspecting the latter Clam-Gallas
concluded that it was indefensible, and, ordering the San Martino road
and railway bridges to be destroyed (an order which was only
partially executed), he called on Gyulai for support, sent out
detachments to the right against the French troops reported at
Turbigo, and prepared to hold his ground at Buffalora. On receipt of
Clam-Gallas's report at the Austrian headquarters, Hess ordered the
resumption of the retreat that he had countermanded, but it was
already late and many of the troops did not halt for the night till
midnight, June 3rd/4th. Gyulai promised them the 4th as a rest-day,
but fortune ordered it otherwise. This much at least was in favour of
the Austrians, that when the troops at last reached their assigned
positions four-fifths of them were within 12 m. of the battlefield.
But, as before, the greater part of the army was destined to be
chained to "supporting positions" well back from the battlefield.

Battle of Magenta.

When day broke on the 4th, the emperor of the French was still
uncertain as to Gyulai's whereabouts, and his intention was therefore
no more than to secure the passage of the Ticino and to place his army
on both sides of the river, in sufficient strength to make head
against Gyulai, whether the latter advanced from Mortara and Vigevano
or from Abbiategrasso. He therefore kept back part of the French army
and the whole of the Sardinian. But during the morning it became known
that Gyulai had passed the Ticino on the evening of the 3rd; and
Napoleon then ordered up all his forces to San Martino and Turbigo.
The battlefield of Magenta is easily described. It consists of two
level plateaux, wholly covered with vineyards, and between them the
broad and low-lying valley of the Ticino. This, sharply defined by the
bluffs of the adjoining plateaux, is made up of backwaters, channels,
water meadows and swampy woods. At Turbigo the band of low ground is
1(1/2) m. wide, at Buffalora 2(1/2). Along the foot of the eastern or
Austrian bluffs between Turbigo and Buffalora runs the Grand Canal
(Naviglio Grande); this, however, cuts into the plateau itself at the
latter place and trending gradually inwards leaves a tongue of high
ground separate from the main plateau. The Novara-Milan road and
railway, crossing the Ticino by the bridge of San Martino, pass the
second obstacle presented by the canal by the New Bridges of Magenta,
the Old Bridge being 1000 yards south of these. The canal is bridged
at several points between Turbigo and Buffalora, and also at Robecco,
1(1/2) m. to the (Austrian) left of the Old Bridge. Clam-Gallas's main
line of defence was the canal between Turbigo and the Old Bridge,
skirmishers being posted on the tongue of high ground in front of the
New Bridges, which were kept open for their retreat. He had been
joined by the II. corps and disposed of 40,000 men, 27,000 more being
at Abbiategrasso (2(1/2) m. S. of Robecco). Of his immediate command,
he disposed about 12,000 for the defence of the New Bridges, 12,000
for that of Buffalora, 8000 at Magenta and 8000 at Robecco; all
bridges, except the New Bridges, were broken. Cavalry played no part
whatever, and artillery was only used in small force to fire along
roads and paths.

Napoleon, as has been mentioned, spent the morning of the 4th in
ascertaining that Gyulai had repassed the Ticino. Being desirous
merely of securing the passage and having only a small force available
for the moment at San Martino, he kept this back in the hope that
MacMahon's advance from Turbigo on Magenta and Buffalora would
dislodge the Austrians. MacMahon advanced in two columns, 2 divisions
through Cuggiono and 1 through Inveruno. The former drove back the
Austrian outposts with ease, but on approaching Buffalora found so
serious a resistance that MacMahon broke off the fight in order to
close up and deploy his full force. Meantime, however, on hearing the
cannonade Napoleon had ordered forward Mellinet's division of the
Guard on the New Bridges and Buffalora. The bold advance of this
_corps d'elite_ carried both points at once, but the masses of the
allies who had been retained to meet a possible attack from Mortara
and Vigevano were still far distant and Mellinet was practically
unsupported. Thus the French, turning towards the Old Bridge, found
themselves (3.30 P.M.) involved in a close fight with some 18,000
Austrians, and meantime Gyulai had begun to bring up his III. and VII.
corps towards Robecco and (with Hess) had arrived on the field
himself. The VII. corps, on its arrival, drove Mellinet back to and
over the New Bridges, but the French, now broken up into dense swarms
of individual fighters, held on to the tongue of high ground and
prevented the Austrians from destroying the bridges, while the
occupants of Buffalora similarly held their own, and beyond them
MacMahon, advancing through orchards and vineyards in a line of battle
2 m. long, slowly gained ground towards Magenta. The III. Austrian
corps, meanwhile, arriving at Robecco spread out on both sides of the
canal and advanced to take the defenders of the New Bridges in rear,
but were checked by fresh French troops which arrived from San Martino
(4 P.M.). The struggle for the New and Old Bridges continued till 6
P.M., more and more troops being drawn into the vortex, but at last
the Austrians, stubbornly defending each vineyard, fell back on
Magenta. But while nearly all the Austrian reinforcements from the
lower Ticino had successively been directed on the bridges, MacMahon
had only had to deal with the 8000 men who had originally formed the
garrison of Magenta. The small part of the reinforcing troops that had
been directed thither by Gyulai before he was aware of the situation,
had in consequence no active role defined in their orders and
(initiative being then regarded as a vice) they stood fast while
their comrades were beaten. But it was not until after sunset that the
thronging French troops at last broke into Magenta and the victory was
won. The splendid Austrian cavalry (always at a disadvantage in Italy)
found no opportunity to redress the balance, and their slow-moving and
over-loaded infantry, in spite of its devotion, was no match in broken
country for the swift and eager French. The forces engaged were 54,000
French (one-third of the allied army) to 58,000 Austrians (about half
of Gyulai's total force). Thus the fears of Napoleon as regards an
Austrian attack from Mortara-Vigevano neutralized the bad distribution
of his opponent's force, and Magenta was a fair contest of equal
numbers. The victory of the French was palpably the consequence not of
luck or generalship but of specific superiority in the soldier. The
great result of the battle was therefore a conviction, shared by both
sides, that in future encounters nothing but exceptional good fortune
or skilful generalship could give the Austrians victory. The
respective losses were: French 4000 killed and wounded and 600
missing, Austrians 5700 killed and wounded, 4500 missing.

Melegnano.

While the fighting was prolonged to nightfall, the various corps of the Austrian army had approached, and it was Gyulai's intention to resume the battle next day with 100,000 men. But Clam-Gallas reported that the I. and II. corps were fought out, and thereupon Gyulai resolved to retreat on Cremona and Mantua, leaving the great road Milan-Brescia unused, for the townsmen's patriotism was sharpened by the remembrance of Haynau, "the Hyena of Brescia." Milan and Pavia were evacuated on the 5th, Hess departed to meet the emperor Francis Joseph (who was coming to take command of the united I. and II. Armies), and although Kuhn was still in favour of the offensive Gyulai decided that the best service he could render was to deliver up the army intact to his sovereign on the Mincio. On the 8th of June Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel made their triumphal entry into Milan, while their corps followed up rather than pursued the retreating enemy along the Lodi and Cremona roads. On the same day, the 8th of June, the I. and II. French corps, under the general command of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers, attacked an Austrian rearguard (part of VIII. corps, Benedek) at the village of Melegnano. MacMahon with the II. corps was to turn the right flank, the IV. the left of the defenders, while Baraguay attacked in front. But MacMahon, as at Magenta, deployed into a formal line of battle before closing on the village, and his progress through the vineyards was correspondingly slow. The IV. corps was similarly involved in intricate country, but Baraguay, whose corps had not been present at Magenta, was burning to attack, and being a man _aussi dur a ses soldats qu'a lui-meme_, he delivered the frontal attack about 6 P.M. without waiting for the others. This attack, as straightforward, as brusque, and as destitute of tactical refinements as that of the Swiss on that very ground in 1515 (Marignan), was carried out, without "preparation," by Bazaine's division _a la baionnette_. Benedek was dislodged, but retreated safely, having inflicted a loss of over 1000 men on the French, as against 360 in his own command.

After Melegnano, as after Magenta, contact with the retiring enemy was lost, and for a fortnight the story of the war is simply that of a triumphal advance of the allies and a quiet retirement and reorganization of the Austrians. Up to Magenta Napoleon had a well-defined scheme and executed it with vigour. But the fierceness of the battle itself had not a little effect on his strange dreamy character, and although it was proved beyond doubt that under reasonable conditions the French must win in every encounter, their emperor turned his attention to dislodging rather than to destroying the enemy. War clouds were gathering elsewhere--on the Rhine above all. The simple brave promise to free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic" became complicated by many minor issues, and the emperor was well content to let his enemy retire and to accelerate that retirement by manoeuvre as far as might be necessary. He therefore kept on the left of his adversary's routes as before, and about the 20th of June the whole allied army (less Cialdini's Sardinian division, detached to operate on the fringe of the mountain country) was closely grouped around Montechiaro on the Chiese. It now consisted of 107,000 French and 48,000 Sardinians (combatants only).

Austrians on the Mincio.

The Austrians had disappeared into the Quadrilateral, where the emperor Francis Joseph assumed personal command, with Hess as his chief of staff. Gyulai had resigned the command of the II. Army to Count Schlick, a cavalry general of 70 years of age. The I. Army was under Count Wimpffen. But this partition produced nothing but evil. The imperial headquarters still issued voluminous detailed orders for each corps, and the intervening army staff was a cause not of initiative or of simplification, but of unnecessary delay. The direction of several armies, in fact, is only feasible when general directions (_directives_ as they are technically called) take the place of orders. All the necessary conditions for working such a system--uniformity of training, methods and doctrine in the recipients, abstention from interference in details by the supreme command--were wanting in the Austrian army of 1859. The I. Army consisted of the III., IX. and XI. corps with one cavalry division and details, 67,000 in all; the II. Army of the I., V., VII. and VIII. corps, one cavalry division and details or 90,000 combatants--total 160,000, or practically the same force as the allies. The emperor had made several salutary changes in the administration, notably an order to the infantry to send their heavy equipment and parade full-dress into the fortresses, which enormously lightened the hitherto overburdened infantryman. At this moment the political omens were favourable, and gathering the impression from his outpost reports that the French were in two halves, separated by the river Chiese, the young emperor at last accepted Hess's advice to resume the offensive, in view of which Gyulai had left strong outposts west of the Mincio, when the main armies retired over that river, and had maintained and supplemented the available bridges.

The possibility of such a finale to the campaign had been considered but dismissed at the allied headquarters, where it was thought that if the Austrians took the offensive it would be on their own side, not the enemy's, of the Mincio and in the midst of the Quadrilateral. Thus the advance of the French army on the 24th was simply to be a general move to the line of the Mincio, preparatory to forcing the crossings, coupled with the destruction of the strong outpost bodies that had been left by the Austrians at Solferino, Guidizzolo, &c. The Austrians, who advanced over the Mincio on the 23rd, also thought that the decisive battle would take place on the third or fourth day of their advance. Thus, although both armies moved with all precautions as if a battle was the immediate object, neither expected a collision, and Solferino was consequently a pure encounter-battle.

Battle of Solferino.

Speaking generally, the battlefield falls into two distinct halves,
the hilly undulating country, of which the edge (almost everywhere
cliff-like) is defined by Lonato, Castiglione, Cavriana and Volta, and
the plain of Medole and Guidizzolo. The village of Solferino is within
the elevated ground, but close to the edge. Almost in the centre of
the plateau is Pozzolengo, and from Solferino and Pozzolengo roads
lead to crossing places of the Mincio above Volta (Monzambano-Salionze
and Valeggio). These routes were assigned to the Piedmontese (44,000)
and the French left wing (I., II. and Guard, 57,000), the plain to the
III. and IV. corps and 2 cavalry divisions (50,000). On the other side
the Austrians, trusting to the defensive facilities of the plateau,
had directed the II. Army and part of the I. (86,000) into the plain,
2 corps of the I. Army (V. and I.) on Solferino-Cavriana (40,000), and
only the VIII. corps (Benedek), 25,000 strong, into the heart of the
undulating ground. One division was sent from Mantua towards Marcaria.
Thus both armies, though disposed in parallel lines, were grouped in
very unequal density at different points in these lines.

The French orders for the 24th were--Sardinian army on Pozzolengo, I.
corps Esenta to Solferino, II. Castiglione to Cavriana, IV. with two
cavalry divisions, Carpenedolo to Guidizzolo, III. Mezzane to Medole
by Castel Goffredo; Imperial Guard in reserve at Castiglione. On the
other side the VIII. corps from Monzambano was to reach Lonato, the
remainder of the II. Army from Cavriana, Solferino and Guidizzolo to
Esenta and Castiglione, and the I. Army from Medole, Robecco and
Castel Grimaldo towards Carpenedolo. At 8 A.M. the head of the French
I. corps encountered several brigades of the I. Army in advance of
Solferino. The fighting was severe, but the French made no progress.
MacMahon advancing on Guidizzolo came upon a force of the Austrians at
Casa Morino and (as on former occasions) immediately set about
deploying his whole corps in line of battle. Meanwhile masses of
Austrian infantry became visible on the edge of the heights near
Cavriana and the firing in the hills grew in intensity. Marshal
MacMahon therefore called upon General Niel on his right rear to
hasten his march. The latter had already expelled a small body of the
Austrians from Medole and had moved forward to Robecco, but there more
Austrian masses were found, and Niel, like MacMahon, held his hand
until Canrobert (III. corps) should come up on his right. But the
latter, after seizing Castel Goffredo, judged it prudent to collect
his corps there before actively intervening. Meantime, however,
MacMahon had completed his preparations, and capturing Casa Morino
with ease, he drove forward to a large open field called the Campo di
Medole; this, aided by a heavy cross fire from his artillery and part
of Niel's, he carried without great loss, Niel meantime attacking Casa
Nuova and Robecco. But the Austrians had not yet developed their full
strength, and the initial successes of the French, won against
isolated brigades and battalions, were a mere prelude to the real
struggle. Meanwhile the stern Baraguay d'Hilliers had made ceaseless
attacks on the V. corps at Solferino, where, on a steep hill
surmounted by a tower, the Austrian guns fired with great effect on
the attacking masses. It was not until after midday, and then only
because it attacked at the moment when, in accordance with an often
fatal practice of those days, the Austrian V. corps was being relieved
and replaced by the I., that Forey's division of the I. corps,
assisted by part of the Imperial Guard, succeeded in reaching the
hill, whereupon Baraguay stormed the village and cemetery of Solferino
with the masses of infantry that had gradually gathered opposite this
point. By 2 P.M. Solferino was definitively lost to the Austrians.

During this time MacMahon had taken, as ordered, the direction of
Cavriana, and was by degrees drawn into the fighting on the heights.
Pending the arrival of Canrobert--who had been alarmed by the reported
movement of an Austrian force on his rear (the division from Mantua
above mentioned) and having given up his cavalry to Niel was unable to
explore for himself--Niel alone was left to face the I. Army. But
Count Wimpffen, having been ordered at 11 to change direction towards
Castiglione, employed the morning in redistributing his intact troops
in various "mutually supporting positions," and thus the forces
opposing Niel at Robecco never outnumbered him by more than 3 to 2.
Niel, therefore, attacking again and again and from time to time
supported by a brigade or a regiment sent by Canrobert, not only held
his own but actually captured Robecco. About the same time MacMahon
gained a foothold on the heights between Solferino and Cavriana, and
as above mentioned, Baraguay had stormed Solferino and the tower hill.
The greater part of the II. Austrian Army was beaten and in retreat on
Valeggio before 3 P.M. But the Austrian emperor had not lost hope, and
it was only a despairing message from Wimpffen, who had suffered least
in the battle, that finally induced him to order the retreat over the
Mincio. On the extreme right Benedek and the VIII. corps had fought
successfully all day against the Sardinians, this engagement being
often known by the separate name of the battle of San Martino. On the
left Wimpffen, after sending his despondent message, plucked up heart
afresh and, for a moment, took the offensive against Niel, who at
last, supported by the most part of Canrobert's corps, had reached
Guidizzolo. In the centre the Austrian rearguard held out for two
hours in several successive positions against the attacks of MacMahon
and the Guard. But the battle was decided. A violent storm, the
exhaustion of the assailants, and the firm countenance of Benedek,
who, retiring from San Martino, covered the retreat of the rest of the
II. Army over the Mincio, precluded an effective pursuit.

The losses on either side had been: Allies, 14,415 killed and wounded
and 2776 missing, total 17,191; Austrians, 13,317 killed and wounded,
9220 missing, total 22,537. The heaviest losses in the French army
were in Niel's corps (IV.), which lost 4483, and in Baraguay
d'Hilliers' (I.), which lost 4431. Of the total of 17,191, 5521 was
the share of the Sardinian army, which in the battle of San Martino
had had as resolute an enemy, and as formidable a position to attack,
as had Baraguay at Solferino. On the Austrian side the IX. corps,
which bore the brunt of the fighting on the plain, lost 4349 and the
V. corps, that had defended Solferino, 4442. Solferino, in the first
instance an encounter-battle in which each corps fought whatever enemy
it found in its path, became after a time a decisive trial of
strength. In the true sense of the word, it was a soldier's battle,
and the now doubly-proved superiority of the French soldier being
reinforced by the conviction that the Austrian leaders were incapable
of neutralizing it by superior strategy, the war ended without further
fighting. The peace of Villafranca was signed on the 11th of July.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866

In the seven years that elapsed between Solferino and the second battle of Custozza the political unification of Italy had proceeded rapidly, although the price of the union of Italy had been the cession of Savoy and Nice to Napoleon III. Garibaldi's irregulars had in 1860 overrun Sicily, and regular battles, inspired by the same great leader, had destroyed the kingdom of Naples on the mainland (Volturno, 1st-2nd October 1860). At Castelfidardo near Ancona on the 18th of September in the same year Cialdini won another victory over the Papal troops commanded by Lamoriciere. In 1866, then, Italy was no longer a "geographical expression," but a recognized kingdom. Only Rome and Venetia remained of the numerous, disunited and reactionary states set up by the congress of Vienna. The former, still held by a French garrison, was for the moment an unattainable aim of the liberators, but the moment for reclaiming Venetia, the last relic of the Austrian dominions in Italy, came when Austria and Prussia in the spring of 1866 prepared to fight for the hegemony of the future united Germany (see SEVEN WEEKS' WAR).

The new Italian army, formed on the nucleus of the Sardinian army and led by veterans of Novara and Solferino, was as strong as the whole allied army of 1859, but in absorbing so many recruits it had temporarily lost much of its efficiency. It was organized in four corps, of which one, under Cialdini, was detached from the main body. Garibaldi, as before, commanded a semi-regular corps in the Alpine valleys, but being steadily and skilfully opposed by Kuhn, Gyulai's former chief of staff, he made little or no progress during the brief campaign, on which indeed his operations had no influence. The main Austrian army, still the best-trained part of the emperor's forces, had been, up to the verge of the war, commanded by Benedek, but Benedek was induced to give up his place to the archduke Albert, and to take up the far harder task of commanding against the Prussians in Bohemia. It was in fact a practically foregone conclusion that in Italy the Austrians would win, whereas in Bohemia it was more than feared that the Prussians would carry all before them. But Prussia and Italy were allied, and whatever the result of a battle in Venetia, that province would have to be ceded in the negotiations for peace with a victorious Prussia. Thus on the Austrian side the war of 1866 in Italy was, even more than the former war, simply an armed protest against the march of events.

Second Battle of Custozza.

The part of Hess in the campaign of Solferino was played with more success in that of Custozza by Major-General Franz, Freiherr von John (1815-1876). On this officer's advice the Austrian army, instead of remaining behind the Adige, crossed that river on the 23rd of June and took up a position on the hills around Pastrengo on the flank of the presumed advance of Victor Emmanuel's army. The latter, crossing the Mincio the same day, headed by Villafranca for Verona, part of it in the hills about Custozza, Somma-Campagna and Castelnuovo, partly on the plain. The object of the king and of La Marmora, who was his adviser, was by advancing on Verona to occupy the Austrian army (which was only about 80,000 strong as against the king's 120,000), while Cialdini's corps from the Ferrara region crossed the lower Po and operated against the Austrian rear. The archduke's staff, believing that the enemy was making for the lower Adige in order to co-operate directly with Cialdini's detachment, issued orders for the advance on the 24th so as to reach the southern edge of the hilly country, preparatory to descending upon the flank of the Italians next day. However, the latter were nearer than was supposed, and an encounter-battle promptly began for the possession of Somma-Campagna and Custozza. The king's army was unable to use its superior numbers and, brigade for brigade, was much inferior to its opponents. The columns on the right, attempting in succession to debouch from Villafranca in the direction of Verona, were checked by two improvised cavalry brigades under Colonel Pulz, which charged repeatedly, with the old-fashioned cavalry spirit that Europe had almost forgotten, and broke up one battalion after another. In the centre the leading brigades fought in vain for the possession of Custozza and the edge of the plateau, and on the left the divisions that had turned northward from Valeggio into the hills were also met and defeated. About 5 P.M. the Italians, checked and in great disorder, retreated over the Mincio. The losses were--Austrians, 4600 killed and wounded and 1000 missing; Italians, 3800 killed and wounded and 4300 missing. The archduke was too weak in numbers to pursue, his losses had been considerable, and a resolute offensive, in the existing political conditions, would have been a mere waste of force. The battle necessary to save the honour of Austria had been handsomely won. Ere long the bulk of the army that had fought at Custozza was transported by rail to take part in defending Vienna itself against the victorious Prussians. One month later Cialdini with the re-organized Italian army, 140,000 strong, took the field again, and the 30,000 Austrians left in Venetia retreated to the Isonzo without engaging.

In spite of Custozza and of the great defeat sustained by the Italian navy at the hands of Tegetthof near Lissa on the 20th of July, Venetia was now liberated and incorporated in the kingdom of Italy, and the struggle for unity, that had been for seventeen years a passionate and absorbing drama, and had had amongst its incidents Novara, Magenta, Solferino and the Garibaldian conquest of the Two Sicilies, ended in an anti-climax.

Three years later the cards were shuffled, and Austria, France and Italy were projecting an offensive alliance against Prussia. This scheme came to grief on the Roman question, and the French chassepot was used for the first time in battle against Garibaldi at Mentana, but in 1870 France was compelled to withdraw her Roman garrison, and with the assent of their late enemy Austria, the Italians under Cialdini fought their way into Rome and there established the capital of united Italy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The war of 1848-49 has been somewhat neglected by
modern military historians, but the following are useful: _Der Feldzug
der osterr. Armee in Italien 1848-49_ (Vienna, 1852); Gavenda,
_Sammlung aller Armeebefehle u.s.w. mit Bezug auf die Hauptmomente des
Krieges_ 1848-49; Major H. Kunz, _Feldzuge des F. M. Radetzki in
Oberitalien_ (Berlin, 1900), and Major Adams, _Great Campaigns_. Both
the French and the Austrian governments issued official accounts
(_Campagne de Napoleon III en Italie 1859_, _Der Krieg in Italien
1859_) of the war of 1859. The standard critical work is _Der
italienische Feldzug 1859_ by the German general staff (practically
dictated by Moltke). Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, who had
many friends in the Austrian army, deals with the Magenta campaign in
vol. i. of his _Letters on Strategy_. General Silvestre's _Etude sur
la campagne de 1859_ was published in 1909. In English, Col. H. C.
Wylly, _Magenta and Solferino_ (1906), and in German General Cammerer,
_Magenta_, and Major Kunz, _Von Montebello bis Solferino_ should be
consulted.

For the Italian campaign of 1866 see the Austrian official history,
_Osterreichs Kampfe 1866_ (French translation), and the Italian
official account, _La Campagna del 1866_, of which the volume dealing
with Custozza was published in 1909. A short account is given in Sir
H. Hozier's _Seven Weeks' War_, and tactical studies in v. Verdy's
_Custozza_ (tr. Henderson), and Sir Evelyn Wood, _Achievements of
Cavalry_. (C. F. A.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Several of the French generals--Lamoriciere, Bedeau, Changarnier
and others--who had been prominent in Algeria and in the 1848
revolution in France had been invited to take the command, but had
declined it.

[2] Students of Napoleonic strategy will find it interesting to
replace Ramorino by, say, Lannes, and to post Durando at
Mortara-Vigevano instead of Vespolate-Vigevano, and from these
conditions to work out the probable course of events.

[3] Ramorino's defence was that he had received information that the
Austrians were advancing on Alessandria by the south bank of the Po.
But Alessandria was a fortress, and could be expected to hold out for
forty-eight hours; moreover, it could easily have been succoured by
way of Valenza if necessary.

[4] The Sardinians, at peace strength, had some 50,000 men, and
during January and February the government busied itself chiefly with
preparations of supplies and armament. Here the delay in calling out
the reserves was due not to their possible ill-will, but to the
necessity of waiting on the political situation.

[5] The Volunteer movement in England was the result of this crisis
in the relations of England and France.

[6] As far as possible Italian conscripts had been sent elsewhere and
replaced by Austrians.

[7] The movements of the division employed in policing Lombardy
(Urban's) are not included here, unless specially mentioned.

[8] The advantages and dangers of the flank march are well summarized
in Colonel H. C. Wylly's _Magenta and Solferino_, p. 65, where the
doctrinaire objections of Hamley and Rustow are set in parallel with
the common-sense views of a much-neglected English writer (Major
Adams, _Great Campaigns_) and with the clear and simple doctrine of
Moltke, that rested on the principle that strategy does not exist to
avoid but to give effect to tactics. The waste of time in execution,
rather than the scheme, is condemned by General Silvestre.

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