Chapter VII: Part 7

Again, I know I am exhibiting my mental grossness. But again, _Ich kann nicht anders._ I show my feelings; why _will_ they not show theirs? I know they _have_ a personal feeling about the through-and-through universe, which is entirely different from mine, and which I should very likely be much the better for gaining if they would only show me how. Their persistence in telling me that feeling has nothing to do with the question, that it is a pure matter of absolute reason, keeps me for ever out of the pale. Still seeing a _that_ in things which Logic does not expel, the most I can do is to _aspire_ to the expulsion. At present I do not even aspire. Aspiration is a feeling. What can kindle feeling but the example of feeling? And if the Hegelians _will_ refuse to set an example, what can they expect the rest of us to do? To speak more seriously, the one _fundamental_ quarrel Empiricism has with Absolutism is over this repudiation by Absolutism of the personal and aesthetic factor in the construction of philosophy. That we all of us have feelings, Empiricism feels quite sure. That they may be as prophetic and anticipatory of truth as anything else we have, and some of them more so than others, can not possibly be denied. But what hope is there of squaring and settling opinions unless Absolutism will hold parley on this common ground; and will admit that all philosophies are hypotheses, to which all our faculties, emotional as well as logical, help us, and the truest of which will at the final integration of things be found in possession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the best divining power?

FOOTNOTES:

[140] [Reprinted from _Mind_, vol. IX, No. 34, April, 1884.]

[141] [In 1884.]

[142] ["Life and Mechanism," _Mind_, vol. IX, 1884.]

[143] [_Cf._ P. Janet and G. Seailles: _History of the Problems of Philosophy_, trans. by Monahan, vol. II, pp. 275-278; 305-307. ED.]

INDEX

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM: 46, 60, 99,
102, 134, 195, 256 ff., Essay XII.

ACTIVITY: x, Essay VI.

AFFECTIONAL FACTS: 34 ff., Essay
V, 217 ff.

AGNOSTICISM: 195.

APPRECIATIONS. _See_ AFFECTIONAL
FACTS.

BERGSON, H.: 156, 188.

BERKELEY: 10-11, 43, 76, 77, 212,
232.

BODE, B. H.: 234 ff.

BODY: 78, 84 ff., 153, 221.

BRADLEY, F. H.: 60, 98, 99, 100,
107 ff., 157, 162.

CAUSE: 163, 174, 181 ff.

CHANGE: 161.

COGNITIVE RELATION: 52 ff. _See
also_ under KNOWLEDGE.

CONCEPTS: 15 ff., 22, 33, 54 ff.,
65 ff.

CONJUNCTIVE RELATIONS: x, 44 ff.,
59, 70, 94, 104, 107 ff., 117 ff.,
163, 240.

CONSCIOUSNESS: xi, Essay I, 75,
80, 127 ff., 139 ff., 154, 184, Essay
VIII.

CONTINUITY: 48 ff., 59, 70, 94.

DEMOCRITUS: 11.

DESCARTES: 30.

DEWEY, J.: 53, 156, 191, 204, 247,
260.

DISJUNCTIVE RELATIONS: x, 42 ff.,
105, 107 ff.

DUALISM: 10, 207 ff., 225, 257.

EMPIRICISM: iv-v, vii-xiii, 41, 46-47,
Essay XII. _See also_ under
RADICAL EMPIRICISM.

EPISTEMOLOGY: 239. _See also_ under
KNOWLEDGE.

ETHICS: 194.

EXPERIENCE: vii, xii, 8 ff., 53, 62,
ff., 71, 80, 87, 92, 216, 224, 233,
242, 243. _See also_ under PURE
EXPERIENCE.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS: 110 ff. _See
also_ under RELATIONS, and
DISJUNCTIVE.

FEELING. _See_ under AFFECTIONAL
FACTS.

FREE WILL: 185.

HALDANE, J. S.: 266 ff.

HEGEL: 106, 276, 277.

HERBART: 106.

HOBHOUSE, L. T.: 109.

HODDER, A. L.: 22, 109.

HODGSON, S.: ix, 48.

HOEFFDING, H.: 238.

HUMANISM: 90, 156, Essay VII,
Essay XI.

HUME: x, 42, 43, 103, 174.

IDEALISM: 39, 40, 134, 219, 241,
256.

IDEAS: 55 ff., 73, 177, 209.

IDENTITY, Philosophy of: 134,
197, 202.

INDETERMINISM: 90, 274.

INTELLECT: 97 ff.

JOSEPH, H. W. B.: 203, 244 ff.

KANT: 1, 37, 162, 206.

KIERKEGAARD: 238.

KNOWLEDGE: 4, 25, 56 ff., 68 ff.,
87-88, 196 ff., 231. _See also_ under
COGNITIVE RELATION, OBJECTIVE
REFERENCE.

LIFE: 87, 161.

LOCKE: 10.

LOGIC: 269 ff.

LOTZE: 59, 75, 167.

MATERIALISM: 179, 232.

MILL, J. S.: x, 43, 76.

MILL, JAMES: 43.

MILLER, D.: 54.

MINDS, their Conterminousness:
76 ff., Essay IV.

MONISM: vii, 208, 267 ff.

MOORE, G. E.: 6-7.

MUENSTERBERG, H.: 1, 18-20, 158.

NATORP, P.: 1, 7-8.

NATURALISM: 96.

NEO-KANTISM: 5-6.

OBJECTIVE REFERENCE: 67 ff.

OBJECTIVITY: 23 ff., 79.

PANPSYCHISM: 89, 188.

PARALLELISM: 210.

PERCEPTION: 11 ff., 17, 33, 65, 78,
82 ff., 197, 200, 211 ff.

PERRY, R. B.: 24.

PHYSICAL REALITY: 14, 22, 32, 124
ff., 139 ff., 149 ff., 154, 211 ff.,
229, 235.

PITKIN, W. B.: 241 ff.

PLURALISM: 89, 90, 110.

PRAGMATISM: iv, x, xi-xii, 11, 72,
97 ff., 156, 159, 176, 242, 261.

PRIMARY QUALITIES: 147.

PRINCE, M.: 88.

PRINGLE-PATTISON, A. S.: 109.

PSYCHOLOGY: 206, 209 ff.

PURE EXPERIENCE: 4, 23, 26-27,
35, Essay II, 74, 90, 93 ff., 96.
121, 123, 134, 135, 138, 139, 160,
193, 200, 226 ff., 257.

RADICAL EMPIRICISM: iv-v, vii,
ix-xiii, 41 ff., 47, 48, 69, 76, 89,
91, 107, 109, 121, 148, 156, 159,
182, 235, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242.

RATIONALISM: 41, 96 ff., 237, 266.

REALISM: 16, 40, 76, 82 ff.

REHMKE, J.: 1.

RELATIONS: x, 16, 25, 42 ff., 71, 81,
Essay III, 148, 268. _See also_ under
CONJUNCTIVE and DISJUNCTIVE.

RELIGION: xiii, 194.

RENOUVIER: 184-185.

REPRESENTATION: 61, 196 ff., 212
ff. _See also_ under SUBSTITUTION.

ROYCE, J.: 21, 158, 186-187, 195.

SANTAYANA, G.: 143, 218.

SCHILLER, F. C. S.: 109, 191, 204,
249, 260.

SCHUBERT-SOLDERN, R. V.: 2.

SCHUPPE, W.: 1.

SECONDARY QUALITIES: 146, 219.

SELF: 45, 46, 94, 128 ff.

SENSATION: 30, 201.

SIDIS, B.: 144.

SOLIPSISM: Essay IX.

SPACE: 30-31, 84, 94, 110, 114.

SPENCER, H.: 144.

SPINOZA: 208.

SPIR, A.: 106.

STOUT, G. F.: 109, 158.

STRONG, C. A.: 54, 88, 89, 188.

SUBJECTIVITY: 23 ff., 234 ff., 251 ff.

SUBSTITUTION: 62 ff., 104, 201.

TAINE: 20, 62.

TAYLOR, A. E.: 111.

TELEOLOGY: 179.

THINGS: 1, 9 ff., 28 ff., 37, Essay
III, 209.

THOUGHT: 1, 22, 28 ff., 37, 213.
_See also_ under KNOWLEDGE.

TIME: 27, 94.

TRANSCENDENTALISM: 39, 52, 67,
71, 75, 239.

TRUTH: 24, 98, 192, 202 ff., 247 ff.

WARD, J.: 157, 162.

WILL: 165, 184.

WOODBRIDGE. F. J. E.: 196.

WORTH: 186-187.

WUNDT, W.: 152.

The Riverside Press

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Transcriber's note:

The following changes were made to the text.

Page 98:
Yet when so broken it is less consistent then ever.
Changed to
Yet when so broken it is less consistent than ever.

Page 180:
some comtemptibly small process on which success depends.
Changed to
some contemptibly small process on which success depends.

Note 93:
XXV aud XXVI
Changed to
XXV and XXVI

Note 101:
'Does Consciousuess Exist?'
Changed to
'Does Consciousness Exist?'

Note 109:
either as a syuonym for 'radical empiricism'
Changed to
either as a synonym for 'radical empiricism'

Note 109:
For other discussions of 'humauism,'
Changed to
For other discussions of 'humanism,'

Note 130:
'Humanism and Truth' first appeared iu
Changed to
'Humanism and Truth' first appeared in