Chapter II: Front Matter (2)

LII. It is true, that where the law is obscure, we have authority to interpret and construe it in a benign sense; but in this construction, we should not lose sight of the exigence of the public safety, nor the dictates of natural equity: and acting in this manner, is not clemency but justice. We may also in virtue of the principle which is called Epeikeyan, that allows of a wise and moderate interpretation of the law, lessen, or even in many cases omit, the penalties which the law decrees. This also is not lenity but justice, because upon such occasions, we are rather obliged to conform to the intention of the legislature, than the letter of the law; and such cases frequently occur in small offences, because, upon an examination of the nature of these things, it often appears to the eye of Prudence, that greater inconveniences would attend the punishing, than the tolerating them. Following the letter of the penal law, without admitting any exceptions, even in those cases where the legislature could not intend, nor prudence suppose it was meant to bind, is what is called justice in extreme, or _summum jus_, which with great reason is termed extreme injustice; therefore, acting contrary to the letter of the law in these instances, is likewise not clemency, but justice. Aristotle, who very well understood the nature of things appertaining to Ethics, judges the Epiekeyan, to be a principle, or part of justice. From all that has been said, it may be inferred, that requesting favour or compassion of a Judge, or supposing him capable of shewing any in the discharge of his duty, is an absurdity, and calling things by improper names; for if he acts according to the law, reasonably and rightly understood, he does justice; if contrary to it, he does injustice. In what are called _casos omissos_, and when the law is obscure, there are general rules for interpreting it and supplying the defects, which interpretations have the force of laws; so that there is no middle path between justice and injustice, for a Judge to walk in; because there are no means, by which he can act conformable to law, and contrary to law. God keep you.

ON THE IMPUNITY OF LYING.

SECT. I.

I. Two common errors present themselves to me with respect to the subject-matter of this discourse, the one theoretical, the other practical. The theoretical is derived from lying among men being reputed as infamous, or as a vice nearly bordering upon infamy. Let us admit, for argument’s sake, the divisions the theologians make of a lie, into officious, jocose, and pernicious. Let us admit also, that a pernicious lie is reputed in the common opinion as it deserves to be reputed, and that it is treated with all possible abhorrence, so that those who are noted for telling lies to the prejudice of their neighbours, are generally considered as the pests of society; but notwithstanding all this, my remarks will be principally confined to officious and jocose lies; that is, to such as are not intended to injure a third person, but are only told to entertain, or because they may be of some utility to a man’s self, or to some other person. I must also premise, that I mean to treat this point more as a politician, than as a moral theologian. The theologians estimate officious, and jocose lies, as venal sins; nor should I or any one else in a moral light, represent them blacker. But if viewed in a political light, my sentiment is, that the common opinion is excessively favourable and indulgent to this species of vice.

II. And what is the reason of this excessive indulgence? Why the reason is, because this sort of lie is not considered as an affront offered to any man. The being noted for an officious or jocose liar, does not take from any man the honour, which in other respects is thought due to him. A gentleman, let him tell as many of these sort of lies as he will, is still looked upon as a gentleman; a nobleman also, notwithstanding his being remarked for this vice, is considered as a nobleman, and a prince as a prince. But this appears to me repugnant to all reason. Lying is infamous, bad, and vile; and a liar is unworthy of human society; he is an impostor, who traiterously avails himself of the good faith of other men, in order to deceive them. The most precious intercourse among men, is that of a frank and reciprocal communication of their souls; with which, they in conversation lay open and disclose to each other, the affections of their wills, the sentiments of their mind, and all that is treasured up in their memories. Now what is a liar, but a solemn circumventor of this inestimable commerce? what, but a deceiver, who imposes on us delusions for realities? what but a circulator of false money, who passes the iron of a lie for the gold of truth? and finally, what can there be found in this man, that should excuse him from being discarded and rejected by all others, as a nuisance to company, a vile contaminator of conversation, and as a detestable falsifier of all intelligence and information?

SECT. II.

III. I cannot help remarking a monstrous contradiction, that is very frequent in this matter. If a man of any rank or figure in the world, is told to his face that he lies, he considers himself as very seriously injured, and according to the cruel laws of human honour, is esteemed as having put up with a very gross affront, if he does not demand of the man who told him so, a very sanguinary satisfaction; but I would be glad to know, how telling a man he lies, can be a very serious injury, if lying is not esteemed a very serious defect in him who is addicted to it; or how a man can be considered as affronted, because he is told he lies, if the action of lying is not scandalous or unworthy. The degree of reproach annexed to a vice, is generally estimated according to the light in which that vice is considered by the world at large. If the vice is not held to be such a one, as tarnishes a man’s honour, his honour will not be deemed wounded by the commission of it; and it may be said of a man in such a case, that his honour is not injured. This being a notorious fact, the inference I would draw from the before-mentioned observation, is, that the frequency of lying, lessens in the generality of mankind, the abhorrence, which natural reason left to itself, has of this vice; but notwithstanding this custom, it has not diminished so thoroughly, but that there still remains in the soul of man, a clear conviction, that lying is a baseness.

IV. I am confirmed in this opinion, by the observation, that a man’s denying what he has said, is looked upon as an opprobrium to him. And why is this? why because it amounts to a confession that he had before told a lie. The opprobrium cannot lie in the truth of what he now confesses; and therefore must consist in the lie which he told before. Confessing that he has lied, is a mark of sincerity, and no one need blush for having been sincere; therefore all the ignominy must be annexed to the lie. This, I say, makes it manifest to me, that their native sentiment of this matter is not so obscured in mankind, but that it represents a lie to them as a most unworthy and a vile thing.

SECT. III.

V. The practical error in this matter, is derived from a lie’s going unpunished, and from the laws not having prescribed any punishment for liars. Why is there no bridle to curb the propensity men have to deceive one another? and why should a man be allowed to lie to what amount he pleases at free cost? Although men are not contented with enjoying a total indemnity in this case, but frequently glory in what they have done, and go on to insult those they have imposed on, and to treat the sincerity of other men as imprudence; is not this an abominable offence, and such a one as deserves to be punished?

VI. I may be told, that human laws do not attend to deterring by the fear of punishment, people from committing any other crimes, except such as are prejudicial to the public, or injurious to a third person; and that officious or jocose lies, which are those we are discoursing of at present, hurt no body, for if they had been found to be injurious, they would before this, have been classed among, and deemed as pernicious offences.

VII. Against this remark, solid as it may appear, I have two very notable replies to make. The first is, that although every officious or jocose lie considered by itself, is injurious to nobody; still, the frequency and impunity with which they are told, have a pernicious effect on the public; for they deprive the generality of mankind of a very valuable benefit. To make my meaning more clearly understood, I must beg every man to contemplate the inconveniencies that would arise from a doubt or distrust, whether whatever is told us be true or false; which distrust is unavoidable, and founded on prudence, if we advert to the frequency with which people lie. Upon hearing any piece of intelligence, in which our wishes, or our conveniencies are interested, we remain in a state of perplexity, whether to believe or disbelieve it; and this perplexity is generally attended with a very disagreeable agitation of the mind, that sets a man at variance as it were with himself, and causes him to halt between two opinions, and to remain in a disagreeable state of suspence, whether to reject as false, or assent to the intelligence he hears as true. Those to whom the rumour that is propagated may be serviceable, either with regard to their communicating it, or on account of the use it may be of to illustrate any thing they have been writing, and are about to publish, are set on the tenters by reason of this uncertainty. They would give any thing to ascertain the reality of a curious event, that was applicable to, and would tend to embellish the subject they had been writing upon, but cannot take a step towards informing themselves, without meeting with a stumbling block in their way. Some affirm the truth of the thing, others deny it; here they tell the story in one way, and there they relate it in another; and all this while, the pen of the author is obliged to stand still, and to continue for a long time in a disagreeable and violent state of suspence.

VIII. But although the perplexity that may attend our doubting whether we shall give our assent to what we hear, may be productive of these evils, the mischief that would result from our giving easy faith and credit to all we are told, would be much greater; for if we reflect, we shall find, that the altercations, disputes, and disturbances which arise in conversation, are produced for the most part by easy credulity. Different people, hear different accounts of the same thing, and because each believed what he heard; they afterwards altercate furiously, each persisting, that the account he had heard of the matter was the true one. Reflect how many people have made themselves ridiculous, by believing what they should have rejected as fabulous. Reflect also, that human society, which is the sweetest boon of life, or which would be so if mankind were to behave to each other with truth and candour, is made ungrateful and disgusting at every turn, by the distrust which is occasioned, in consequence of our experiencing how much people are addicted to lie.

IX. In order to comprehend how great a good we are deprived of by this distrust, let us figure to ourselves a republic, although I fear there never was such a one in the world, where either from the generous influence of their soil and climate, men were more noble-minded; or from the fear of a lie being punished with great severity, all the individuals who compose it, were strict observers of the truth; I say admitting this, my imagination represents to me, that such a community would be a sort of Heaven upon earth. What brotherly love would there prevail in it! and how sweet and savoury would the confidence between man and man be, and how grateful the satisfaction, with which they talked and listened to each other, free from the suspicion of not being believed, or the fear of being deceived! There we should survey at every step, the most pleasing spectacle the world can afford, that of a man’s opening the whole theatre of his soul to another. I do not think that Heaven adorned with all its splendor, or the spring embellished with all its flowers, could furnish a more delightful picture to the eyes of man, than that which would be presented to human curiosity, by the exposure of a variety of sentiments, affections, and passions, of those with whom we converse. In such a society, all men would enjoy a peaceable tranquillity of mind, without the dread, that by means of political arts, a traitor should impose himself upon them for a friend; that hypocrisy should usurp an unjust veneration; that applause should be tainted with the venom of flattery; that advice should be insincere, and calculated to promote the interest of him who gave it; or that correction should be the child of anger, and not the offspring of zeal. But unhappy for us, how distant are we from enjoying the blessings of such happy citizens! for we scarce are allowed an instant of relaxation, from the fears, inquietudes, and suspicions, that continually afflict us, and which are produced, by the experience we have, of the little sincerity there is to be met with in the world. Consider now, whether the frequency of lying, does not rob us of a great blessing, or to speak more properly, of many inestimable blessings.

SECT. IV.

X. The second reply I have to make to the before-named observation, is, that it very frequently happens, that those lies which are only looked upon as officious and jocose, are attended with pernicious consequences. What does it signify, that he who tells a lie did not do it with an intention to injure any one, if in reality the mischief follows? The emperor Theodosius the second, presented the empress Eudoxia with an apple of uncommon magnitude; and she afterwards gave it to Paulinus a learned and discreet man, whose conversation she was very fond of, and with whom, her correspondence was perfectly innocent. Paulinus, ignorant of the hand by which the apple was brought to the Empress, shewed it to the Emperor, and begged him to accept of it; the Emperor, recollecting that it was the same apple he had given the Empress, took an occasion to ask Eudoxia by surprize, what she had done with the apple? The question coming upon her unawares, and she, apprehensive the Emperor might be displeased with her for parting with the apple, answered she had eaten it. This, in the intention of Eudoxia, was a lie purely officious; but was attended with a most pernicious consequence, as it was the occasion of Paulinus being put to death; for Theodosius, suspecting the commerce between him and the Empress not to be very chaste, ordered him to be dispatched.

XI. Caligula having recalled from banishment, one who had been sentenced to that punishment by his predecessor, asked him how he employed his time while he was banished; and he, to recommend himself to the good graces of the Emperor, answered, that he employed the greatest part of it in praying to the gods for the death of Tiberius; because that would make way for his ascending the throne. What lie to all appearance could be more innocent than this? Yet in its consequences, it was very pernicious, for Caligula, taking it into his head, that those he had banished would occupy themselves in the same way, ordered them all to be put to death.

XII. I could give more examples of the same sort; but am aware, that it may be said in answer to them, that these are unforeseen accidents; but they notwithstanding, are the evil accidental consequences of lies, which although the person who tells them cannot foresee, are not unworthy the attention of the legislature; and of their taking measures to prevent the mischiefs arising from them, by assigning some species of punishment to all kinds of lies whatever. At least, the motive of preventing these accidental mischiefs, should operate jointly with the reasons we have already given, to induce the legislature, to fall upon some mode of punishment to curb the vice of lying.

SECT. V.

XIII. But the principal mischiefs that are produced by lies, which are called jocose and officious, do not only happen by accident, but such lies have in their own nature, a tendency to bring on those mischiefs. Of this sort are all flattering lies. Of the many apophthegms we meet with, that have been severe upon liars, there is no one seems to me to be better pointed, than that of Bion one of the seven wise men of Greece. He being one day asked, what animal he esteemed the most pernicious? answered, that to the world at large it was a tyrant, and in private life, a flatterer. For so it is, that flattery always, or nearly always, is pernicious to the person to whom it is addressed. The same man, who if the incense of unmerited applause was not offered to him, would be gentle, prudent, and modest, would by the application of it, be corrupted to such a degree, as to become proud, fierce, intolerable, and ridiculous. It is not one man only, that a flattering lie may be the undoing of, but it is also capable of ruining a whole kingdom; and this is a fatality that has often happened. Many princes, who have had a portion of the taint of ambition in their compositions, if there had not been those about them, who fomented this evil tendency of their minds, would have led happy and peaceable lives, but upon being persuaded by a flatterer, that their greatest glory consisted in adding new dominions to their crown, have become bloody scourges, both to their own subjects, and those of their neighbours.

XIV. The great Louis the Fourteenth, was without doubt, endued with excellent qualities; and was blessed with a sufficient understanding, to distinguish in what the most solid glory of a king consisted, and to be convinced, that it consisted in making his subjects happy. Notwithstanding which, through the whole of his dominions, the bulk of his people were oppressed, and groaned under the intolerable weight of the taxes, he found it necessary to load on them, in order to support the vast expences of the many wars he engaged in; to which grievance, might be added the lamentation and grief that was produced, by the loss of the infinite quantity of French blood that had deluged the fields in his quarrels. From whence did all this mischief proceed? Why from the venomous influence of poisonous flatterers, who persuaded him, that his greatest glory consisted in extending his dominions by his arms, and in making himself dreaded by all the neighbouring powers. They not only persuaded him to this, but even intimated to him, that these were the most effectual means, to render his own kingdom happy and flourishing. A flattering poet carried his servile complaisance so far, as to sing in his ear, that by pursuing this conduct, he would not only make his own people happy, but would make those so likewise, whom he conquered; and that they would hug the chains, with which he bound the little liberty they ever possessed; and what was beyond all the rest, this fulsome poet, went so far as to assert, that his desire of making them happy, was his only motive for bringing them under his yoke.

_Il regne par amour dans les Villes conquises,_
_Et ne fait des sujets que pour les rendre heureux._

In the idea of this poet, desolating his own country by excessive contributions, carrying fire and sword into the territories of his neighbours, and sacrificing men by tens of thousands on the altars of Mars, is the most effectual way to make people happy; and that it is the great glory of a monarch, to be the pest of his own dominions, and those of all his neighbours. To these extravagant lengths has flattery been carried, and such are the unhappy effects it has produced.

XV. A flattering lie in private life, is not capable of doing so much mischief, if we consider it as standing by itself; but the mischief is infinitely extensive, that results from many of those lies put together; as the use of them is so general, that their numbers are nearly infinite. A learned modern French author, says, that the practice of the world, is made up of people’s occupying themselves continually in circulating false complaisance. Mankind depend reciprocally upon each other; and the poor man not only flatters the rich one, but the rich one flatters the poor one in his turn. The poor man courts the rich one, because he has need of his contributions; and the rich one endeavours to conciliate himself with the poor man, because he cannot subsist without the aid of his labour. The money they all go to market with, to gain and purchase the hearts of each other, is coined from the bullion of flattery; which is the falsest money that can be circulated, because in consequence of trafficking with it in this vile commerce, all sides are cheated.

SECT. VI.

XVI. But besides flattering lies, there are many others which are hurtful in various ways, notwithstanding we find them classed among the jocose and officious ones. A coward brags of his prowess, and martial deeds; a stander-by who hears him, and believes what he says, endeavours to make a friend of him, in hopes that he will bear him out in any fray or quarrel in which he should happen to be engaged; and in consequence of the confidence he puts in this support, he precipitates himself into some dispute, where his bravo deserts him, and he loses his life. An ignorant fellow, palms himself upon simple people for a learned man, and they, by believing all he says to be right and true, get their heads filled with extravagances, which they afterwards by venting in other companies, expose their folly, and so by a very easy and short method, acquire the reputation of blockheads.

A neglected or disappointed man, brags of the interest he has with a great person; and some who hear and believe what he says, fancy he will be a good channel through which they may convey an application to that great person, and induce him to assist them in a matter they have much at heart, and in which they are deeply interested, and in hopes of the great benefits they may derive from his friendship and aid, pay great court to him, and waste the greatest part of their substance in presents and bribes to him. A spiritual puffer, brags of the miracles he has seen and experienced of such and such a saint; which one way or other, is generally attended with prejudicial consequences to the cause of religion. The physician brags of a skill or knowledge he does not possess; a valetudinary person who hears him, believing him to be an Esculapius, surrenders himself without further enquiry to his management, and becomes a voluntary victim. A young mariner, brags of his great abilities and skill in navigating and conducting a ship, which afterwards being trusted to him, is shipwrecked and dashed to pieces, on some rock or shoal. The same dangers, in a greater or a less degree, and in proportion to the matters that are confided to their management, are we exposed to, by trusting vaunters in all arts and professions, who although they are unskilful, presume to boast of their great knowledge. I should never have done, was I to set about enumerating all the species of lies, which go under the name of jocose and officious, and which are attended with pernicious consequences.

SECT. VII.

XVII. But I cannot avoid making particular mention, of a certain species of lies, which find ample protection with, and pass current through the world, as if they were perfectly innocent; when in reality, they are extremely injurious to the public. I mean judicial lies; such, as when in stating a fact which gave rise to, or is the subject matter of a litigation, the parties interested, and those employed in the suit, disguise and disfigure it, to make it appear more favourable to their own side. This species of deceit, or as I may say lie, is so frequent, that we scarce see a cause in which it is not practised, and in which, both parties agree in the state of the facts, on which the matter in issue rests; and from hence arise the length of the pleadings, and the principal delay, and great expence of law-suits. Who can entertain a doubt, but that this is very injurious to the public? Yet there is nobody will attempt finding out a remedy for the evil. It might perhaps be asked, what remedy can be applied to it; but to this I should answer, the remedy that is made use of in Japan. Among those islanders, whose political government there is no doubt excells ours in many particulars, they punish a judicial lie, or one advanced in a legal process, with great severity; and the Algerines do the same. Whoever lies, or when he is brought before the Bey, or any of his judicial magistrates, to answer to a civil process, shall deny, if the prosecution is for a debt, that he owes the person suing for it the money in question, or if the prosecutor shall be found guilty of making a false or unjust demand, in either of these cases, he who shall be found to falsify, is adjudged to a rigorous bastinadoing. Thus these causes are speedily and safely determined, nor is there the least necessity for any writing in them, for the fear of that severe punishment, deters any man from demanding what is not due to him, and terrifies any one from denying a just debt. If something like this method was to be adopted among us, law-suits of this sort in Spain, would be as short as they are in those places. What delays law-suits, is not so much the difficulty of finding out what the law is with respect to the matter in question; but such delays arise for the most part, from fallacious suggestions, and evasive statings of facts. If the suitors, and all the parties concerned or employed in a cause, knew, that for every fallacy they advanced, they were to pay a large fine, they would be careful not to suggest or advance any thing, that was not simply and exactly true. By this means, the parties would soon be agreed as to the fact, and a determination would quickly be made in favour of the person who had the right of his side, and there would be nothing left to do, but for process to issue agreeable to the ordinary forms of law, in order to enforce and compleat the judgment. The doing of this, is seldom attended with much expence or delay; and by adopting the before-mentioned method of proceeding, there would soon be a stop put to all law-suits, that are founded on false or sinister suggestions; and people would not be near so exposed to have vexatious and roguish prosecutions commenced against them, as they are at present. The state or public at large, would be great gainers by such a regulation taking place, as the loss occasioned by the attendance, that many artificers, and people employed in useful branches of trade are obliged to give on courts of law would be avoided. So that the whole loss that would be incurred by adopting this method, would fall on the advocates, solicitors, and other men of the law; but this would be amply compensated for to the state, by the increase it would occasion of professors in useful arts.

XVIII. It is true, that our laws in Spain have not been so deficient in this respect, as not to have assigned certain punishments in various cases to judicial lies. One of those which is to be found among the laws which we term the laws _de Partida_ seems to me admirably calculated to suppress this evil. It runs thus: _He of whom any thing is demanded judicially by another person, as his property, who shall deny the person making the demand was ever possessed of it, shall, if it is afterwards proved that the person who makes the demand was possessed of it, be obliged to surrender it to him who demands it, although the demander should not be able to prove the thing ever was his property._ But I could wish in the first place, that both this law, and all others of the same sort, should be extended to more cases than they take in, or to speak more properly, to all cases whatever; so that every judicial lie should be liable to a punishment, proportioned to the mischief it might be attended with. I would wish secondly, that some lawyers in expounding those laws, had given a larger extent to them, and not have limited the operation of them but to few cases; for we have reason to apprehend, that it is in consequence of these expositions, that we very rarely or never, have seen any one punished for this offence, at least I do not remember to have ever known, or to have ever heard of any one that was punished for it. The greatest part of the Judges, although there may appear but little reason for their acting with lenity, are apt to lean to the compassionate side; but it seems to me, that it would be for the good of the public, if upon these occasions, they would exercise a proper degree of severity.

SECT. VIII.

XIX. Finally, by contemplating a lie in all its extent, I find it so inconvenient to the life of man, that I am disposed to think the whole rigour of the laws should be levelled against it, and that it should be treated as a most pestiferous enemy to human society. Zoroaster the famous legislator of the Persians, or Zerduscht, which according to the learned Thomas Hyde was his name, in which sentiment Thomas Stanley differs but little from him, he writing it Zaraduissit; from all which we may conclude, that the changing his name to Zoroaster, was an alteration made by the Greeks to make it correspond the better with their own language; but to have done with criticising upon his name, he in the statutes he formed for the government of that nation, estimated a lie, as one of the most serious crimes a man could commit. I must confess; that he erred in this as a Theologian; but that he was quite right, and acted wisely as a politician; because no better means can be fallen upon, to make men live happy in society, than that of introducing among them, an utter abhorrence of a lie; and on the other hand, if the great propensity in man to lying is not curbed, although the rest of the laws should be ever so pious and just, they will not be able to prevent innumerable mischiefs and disorders.

SECT. IX.

XX. It is only in one particular instance, that I look upon lying to be sufferable; and that is, when there is no fence to resist the impertinent and officious enquiries of people into secrets, that are trusted to a man in confidence. I state the case thus: a friend of mine, for the sake of asking my advice, informs me in confidence of a crime that he has committed. A person in power suspects him to be the man who committed the crime, and by making an improper use of his authority, demands of me, whether I do not know that such a person committed such a crime. I will suppose for argument’s sake, that he is a person of such penetration, that I could not deceive him by evasions, and giving answers, that amounted to my neither owning nor denying that I knew any thing of it; and that my not giving a positive answer, would only tend to confirm him in the opinion that my friend had actually committed the crime he suspected him of; so that I am drove to the necessity of answering positively, yes, or no. It is certain in such a case, that I am bound by the laws of friendship, fidelity, charity and justice, not to reveal the secret confided to me. How then am I to act in such a pressing exigency?

XXI. After stating a variety of different opinions of Theologians, and other eminent men upon cases of this sort, which I shall omit to insert, as I apprehend they would rather seem tedious, than afford either entertainment or instruction to the reader; Father Feyjoo proceeds thus: But I do not chuse to take any part in this question, as it would require more time to discuss, than I at present have leisure to bestow upon it; and therefore shall waive entering into it, and returning to the subject of my discourse, shall say, that admitting a man, upon being unfairly pressed, cannot avoid disclosing a secret which has been confided to him, without telling a lie, those lies ought to be tolerated by human society, and the punishment of them should be left to God alone, for that a republic or state is exposed to no inconvenience from them; and that on the contrary, daily mischiefs might result to it, by not preventing the evil effects, of the malicious, and vicious curiosity of men, who are impertinently fond of prying into other people’s secrets. And he who makes these enquiries, should blame himself for any imposition or deceit that happens in consequence of them, and not the person who told the lie, for the inquisitor is the aggressor in this case, as he may be termed an invader of other people’s secrets, which he had improperly, and without any right so to do, taken upon him officiously to pry into.

ON
THE LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY,
AND
National Prejudice or Prepossession.

SECT. I.