Chapter VI: Part III: BIOLOGY.—Organosophy, Phytogeny, (5)

M. Littré, recognizing the necessity for some modification of the hierarchy of the Sciences, as enunciated by M. Comte, still regards it as substantially true; and for proof of its validity, he appeals mainly to the essential _constitutions_ of the Sciences. It is unnecessary for me here to meet, in detail, the arguments by which he supports the proposition, that the essential constitutions of the Sciences, justify the order in which M. Comte places them. It will suffice to refer to the foregoing pages, and to the pages which are to follow, as containing the definitions of those fundamental characteristics which demand the grouping of the Sciences in the way I have pointed out. As already shown, and as will be shown still more clearly by and bye, the radical differences of constitution among the Sciences, necessitate the colligation of them into the three classes—Abstract, Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete. How irreconcilable is M. Comte’s classification with these groups, will be at once apparent on inspection. It stands thus:―

Mathematics (including rational Mechanics), partly Abstract, partly Abstract-Concrete. Astronomy Concrete. Physics Abstract-Concrete. Chemistry Abstract-Concrete. Biology Concrete. Sociology Concrete.

[4] This definition includes the laws of relations called necessary, but not those of relations called contingent. These last, in which the probability of an inferred connexion varies with the number of times such connexion has occurred in experience, are rightly dealt with mathematically.

[5] Here, by way of explanation of the term negatively-quantitative, it will suffice to instance the proposition that certain three lines will meet in a point, as a negatively-quantitative proposition; since it asserts the absence of any quantity of space between their intersections. Similarly, the assertion that certain three points will always fall in a straight line, is negatively-quantitative; since the conception of a straight line implies the negation of any lateral quantity, or deviation.

[6] Lest the meaning of this division should not be understood, it may be well to name, in illustration, the estimates of the statistician. Calculations respecting population, crime, disease, etc., have results which are correct only numerically, and not in respect of the totalities of being or action represented by the numbers.

[7] Perhaps it will be asked—how can there be a Geometry of Motion into which the conception of Force does not enter? The reply is, that the time-relations and space-relations of Motion may be considered apart from those of Force, in the same way that the space-relations of Matter may be considered apart from Matter.

[8] I am indebted to Prof. Frankland for reminding me of an objection that may be made to this statement. The production of new compounds by synthesis, has of late become an important branch of chemistry. According to certain known laws of composition, complex substances, which never before existed, are formed, and fulfil anticipations both as to their general properties and as to the proportions of their constituents—as proved by analysis. Here it may be said with truth, that analysis is used to verify synthesis. Nevertheless, the exception to the above statement is apparent only,—not real. In so far as the production of new compounds is carried on merely for the obtainment of such new compounds, it is not Science but Art—the application of pre-established knowledge to the achievement of ends. The proceeding is a part of Science, only in so far as it is a means to the better interpretation of the order of Nature. And how does it aid the interpretation? It does it only by verifying the pre-established conclusions respecting the laws of molecular combination; or by serving further to explain them. That is to say, these syntheses, considered on their scientific side, have simply the purpose of _forwarding the analysis of the laws of chemical combination_.

[9] This must not be supposed to mean chemically-produced forces. The molecular motion here referred to as dissipated in radiations, is the equivalent of that sensible motion lost during the integration of the mass of molecules, consequent on their mutual gravitation.

[10] Embracing the interpretation of such phenomena as the solar spots, the faculæ and the coronal flames.

[11] Want of space prevents anything beyond the briefest indication of these subdivisions.

[12] Perhaps some will say that such incidental phenomena as those of the heat and light evolved during chemical changes, are to be included among chemical phenomena. I think, however, the physicist will hold that all phenomena of re-distributed molecular motion, no matter how arising, come within the range of Physics. But whatever difficulty there may be in drawing the line between Physics and Chemistry (and, as I have incidentally pointed out in _The Principles of Psychology_, § 55, the two are closely linked by the phenomena of allotropy and isomerism), applies equally to the Comtean classification, or to any other. And I may further point out that no obstacle hence arises to the classification I am defending. Physics and Chemistry being both grouped by me as Abstract-Concrete Sciences, no difficulty in satisfactorily dividing them in the least affects the satisfactoriness of the division of the great group to which they both belong, from the other two great groups.

[13] It may be said that the mingling of problems and theorems in Euclid is not quite consistent with this statement; and it is true that we have, in this mingling, a trace of the earlier form of the science. But it is to be remarked that these problems are all purely abstract, and, further, that each of them admits of being expressed as a theorem.

{118}

REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE.

[_Originally published in April 1864 as an appendix to the foregoing essay._]

While the preceding pages were passing through the press, there appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ for February 15th, 1864, an article on a late work of mine—_First Principles_. To M. Auguste Laugel, the writer of the article, I am much indebted for the careful exposition he has made of some of the leading views set forth in that work; and for the catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt with them. In one respect, however, M. Laugel conveys to his readers an erroneous impression—an impression doubtless derived from what appears to him adequate evidence, and doubtless expressed in perfect sincerity. M. Laugel describes me as being, in part, a follower of M. Comte. After describing the influence of M. Comte as traceable in the works of some other English writers, naming especially Mr. Mill and Mr. Buckle, he goes on to say that this influence, though not avowed, is easily recognizable in the work he is about to make known; and in several places throughout his review, there are remarks having the same implication. I greatly regret having to take exception to anything said by a critic so candid and so able. But the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ {119} circulates widely in England, as well as elsewhere; and finding that there exists in some minds, both here and in America, an impression similar to that entertained by M. Laugel—an impression likely to be confirmed by his statement—it appears to me needful to meet it.

Two causes of quite different kinds, have conspired to diffuse the erroneous belief that M. Comte is an accepted exponent of scientific opinion. His bitterest foes and his closest friends, have unconsciously joined in propagating it. On the one hand, M. Comte having designated by the term “Positive Philosophy” all that definitely-established knowledge which men of science have been gradually organizing into a coherent body of doctrine; and having habitually placed this in opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by theologians; it has become the habit of the theological party to think of the antagonist scientific party, under the title of “positivists.” And thus, from the habit of calling them “positivists,” there has grown up the assumption that they call themselves “positivists,” and that they are disciples of M. Comte. On the other hand, those who have accepted M. Comte’s system, and believe it to be the philosophy of the future, have naturally been prone to see everywhere the signs of its progress; and wherever they have found opinions in harmony with it, have ascribed these opinions to the influence of its originator. It is always the tendency of discipleship to magnify the effects of the master’s teachings; and to credit the master with all the doctrines he teaches. In the minds of his followers, M. Comte’s name is associated with scientific thinking, which, in many cases, they first understood from his exposition of it. Influenced as they inevitably are by this association of ideas, they are reminded of M. Comte wherever they meet with thinking which corresponds, in some marked way, to M. Comte’s description of scientific thinking; and hence are apt to imagine him as introducing into other minds, the {120} conceptions which he introduced into their minds. Such impressions are, however, in most cases quite unwarranted. That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine and method elaborated by Science, is true. But it is not true that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature and limits, are appreciably different from what they were before. If they are “positivists,” it is in the sense that all men of science have been more or less consistently “positivists;” and the applicability of M. Comte’s title to them, no more makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, make these his disciples. M. Comte himself by no means claims that which some of his adherents are apt, by implication, to claim for him. He says:—“Il y a, sans doute, beaucoup d’analogie entre ma _philosophie positive_ et ce que les savans anglais entendent, depuis Newton surtout, par _philosophie naturelle_;” (see _Avertissement_) and further on he indicates the “grand mouvement imprimé à l’esprit humain, il y a deux siècles, par l’action combinée des préceptes de Bacon, des conceptions de Descartes, et des découvertes de Galilée, comme le moment où l’esprit de la philosophie positive a commencé à se prononcer dans le monde.” That is to say, the general mode of thought and way of interpreting phenomena, which M. Comte calls “Positive Philosophy,” he recognizes as having been growing for two centuries; as having reached, when he wrote, a marked development; and as being the heritage of all men of science.

That which M. Comte proposed to do, was to give scientific thought and method a more definite embodiment and organization; and to apply it to the interpretation of classes of phenomena not previously dealt with in a scientific manner. The conception was a great one; and the endeavour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and {121} applause. Some such conception was entertained by Bacon. He, too, aimed at the organization of the sciences; he, too, held that “Physics is the mother of all the sciences;” he, too, held that the sciences can be advanced only by combining them, and saw the nature of the required combination; he, too, held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when separated from their roots in natural philosophy; and thus he, too, had some idea of a social science growing out of physical science. But the state of knowledge in his day prevented any advance beyond the general conception: indeed, it was marvellous that he should have advanced so far. Instead of a vague, undefined conception, M. Comte has presented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated conception. In working out this conception he has shown remarkable breadth of view, great originality, immense fertility of thought, unusual powers of generalization. Considered apart from the question of its truth, his system of Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. But after according to M. Comte high admiration for his conception, for his effort to realize it, and for the faculty he has shown in the effort to realize it, there remains the inquiry—Has he succeeded? A thinker who re-organizes the scientific method and knowledge of his age, and whose re-organization is accepted by his successors, may rightly be said to have such successors for his disciples. But successors who accept this method and knowledge of his age, _minus_ his re-organization, are certainly not his disciples. How then stands the case with M. Comte? There are some few who receive his doctrines with but little reservation; and these are his disciples truly so called. There are others who regard with approval certain of his leading doctrines, but not the rest: these we may distinguish as partial adherents. There are others who reject all his distinctive doctrines; and these must be classed as his antagonists. The members of this class stand substantially in the same position as they would {122} have done had he not written. Declining his re-organization of scientific doctrine, they possess this scientific doctrine in its pre-existing state, as the common heritage bequeathed by the past to the present; and their adhesion to this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates them with M. Comte. In this class stand the great body of men of science. And in this class I stand myself.

* * * * *

Coming thus to the personal part of the question, let me first specify those great general principles on which M. Comte is at one with preceding thinkers; and on which I am at one with M. Comte.

All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte; and this I also hold—hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. Comte; since, not only do I believe that all the ideas acquired by individuals, and consequently all the ideas transmitted by past generations, are thus derived; but I also contend that the very faculties by which they are acquired, are the products of accumulated and organized experiences received by ancestral races of beings (see _Principles of Psychology_). But the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, is not originated by M. Comte; nor is it claimed by him. He himself says—“Tous les bons esprits répètent, depuis Bacon, qu’il n’y a de connaissances réelles que celles qui reposent sur des faits observés.” And the elaboration and definite establishment of this doctrine, has been the special characteristic of the English school of Psychology. Nor am I aware that M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done anything to make it more certain, or give it greater definiteness. Indeed it was impossible for him to do so; since he repudiates that part of mental science by which alone this doctrine can be proved.

It is a further belief of M. Comte, that all knowledge is phenomenal or relative; and in this belief I entirely agree. But no one alleges that the relativity of all knowledge was first enunciated by M. Comte. Among others who have {123} more or less consistently held this truth, Sir William Hamilton enumerates, Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin, Boethius, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebræus, Melancthon, Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Campanella, Bacon, Spinoza, Newton, Kant. And Sir William Hamilton, in his “Philosophy of the Unconditioned,” first published in 1829, has given a scientific demonstration of this belief. Receiving it in common with other thinkers, from preceding thinkers, M. Comte has not, to my knowledge, advanced this belief. Nor indeed could he advance it, for the reason already given—he denies the possibility of that analysis of thought which discloses the relativity of all cognition.

M. Comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes of phenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their causes; and I coincide in the opinion that the assumption of such separate entities, though convenient, if not indeed necessary, for purposes of thought, is, scientifically considered, illegitimate. This opinion is, in fact, a corollary from the last; and must stand or fall with it. But like the last it has been held with more or less consistency for generations. M. Comte himself quotes Newton’s favorite saying—“O! Physics, beware of Metaphysics!” Neither to this doctrine, any more than to the preceding doctrines, has M. Comte given a firmer basis. He has simply reasserted it; and it was out of the question for him to do more. In this case, as in the others, his denial of subjective psychology debarred him from proving that these metaphysical entities are mere symbolic conceptions which do not admit of verification.

Lastly, M. Comte believes in invariable natural laws—absolute uniformities of relation among phenomena. But very many before him have believed in them too. Long familiar even beyond the bounds of the scientific world, the proposition that there is an unchanging order in things, has, within the scientific world, held, for generations, the {124} position of an established postulate: by some men of science recognized only as holding of inorganic phenomena; but recognized by other men of science, as universal. And M. Comte, accepting this doctrine from the past, has left it substantially as it was. Though he has asserted new uniformities, I do not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated them, as to make the induction more certain; nor has he deductively established the doctrine, by showing that uniformity of relation is a necessary corollary from the persistence of force, as may readily be shown.

These, then, are the pre-established general truths with which M. Comte sets out—truths which cannot be regarded as distinctive of his philosophy. “But why,” it will perhaps be asked, “is it needful to point out this; seeing that no instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to M. Comte?” I reply that though no disciple of M. Comte would deliberately claim them for him; and though no theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philosophy, supposes M. Comte to be the first propounder of them; yet there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them, that false impressions are produced, even in spite of better knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation, definite proof is at hand. In the No. of the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ named at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, the words—“Toute religion, comme toute philosophie, a la prétention de donner une explication de l’univers. La philosophie qui s’appelle _positive_ se distingue de toutes les philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu’elle a renoncé à cette ambition de l’esprit humain;” and the remainder of the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins—“Tout imbu de ces idées, que nous exposons sans les discuter pour le moment, M. Spencer divise, etc.” Now this is one of those collocations of ideas {125} which tends to create, or to strengthen, the erroneous impression I would dissipate. I do not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended to say that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the “Positive Philosophy,” are peculiarly the ideas of M. Comte. But little as he probably intended it, his expressions suggest this conception. In the minds of both disciples and antagonists, “the Positive Philosophy” means the philosophy of M. Comte; and to be imbued with the ideas of “the Positive Philosophy” means to be imbued with the ideas of M. Comte—to have received these ideas from M. Comte. After what has been said above, I need scarcely repeat that the conception thus inadvertently suggested, is a wrong one. M. Comte’s brief enunciations of these general truths, gave me no clearer apprehensions of them than I had before. Such clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions, as I can trace to any particular teacher, I owe to Sir William Hamilton.

* * * * *

From the principles which M. Comte held in common with many preceding and contemporary thinkers, let us pass now to the principles that are distinctive of his system. Just as entirely as I agree with M. Comte on those cardinal doctrines which we jointly inherit; so entirely do I disagree with him on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds, and which determine the organization of his philosophy. The best way of showing this will be to compare, side by side, the―

_Propositions held by M. Comte._ _Propositions which I hold._

“. . . chacune de nos conceptions The progress of our conceptions,
principales, chaque branche and of each branch of knowledge,
de nos connaissances, passe is from beginning to end
successivement par trois états intrinsically alike. There are not
théoriques différens: l’état three methods of philosophizing
théologique, ou fictif; l’état radically opposed; but one method
métaphysique, ou abstrait; of philosophizing which remains,
l’état scientifique, ou positif. in essence, the same. At first,
En d’autres termes, l’esprit and to the last, the conceived
humain, par sa nature, emploie causal agencies of phenomena,
successivement dans chacune de have a degree of generality
ses recherches trois méthodes de corresponding {126} to the width
philosopher, dont le caractère of the generalizations which
est essentiellement différent et experiences have determined; and
même radicalement opposé: d’abord they change just as gradually
la méthode théologique, ensuite as experiences accumulate. The
la méthode métaphysique, et enfin integration of causal agencies,
la méthode positive.” _Cours de_ originally thought of as
_Philosophie Positive_, 1830, Vol. multitudinous and local, but
i. p. 3. finally believed to be one and
universal, is a process which
involves the passing through all
intermediate steps between these
extremes; and any appearance of
stages can be but superficial.
Supposed concrete and individual
causal agencies, coalesce in
the mind as fast as groups of
phenomena are assimilated, or seen
to be similarly caused. Along
with their coalescence, comes
a greater extension of their
individualities, and a concomitant
loss of distinctness in their
individualities. Gradually, by
continuance of such coalescences,
causal agencies become, in
thought, diffused and indefinite.
And eventually, without any change
in the nature of the process,
there is reached the consciousness
of a universal causal agency,
which cannot be conceived.[14]

“Le système théologique est As the progress of thought is parvenu à la plus haute perfection one, so is the end one. There dont il soit susceptible, are not three possible terminal quand il a substitué l’action conceptions; but only a single providentielle d’un être unique au terminal conception. When jeu varié des nombreuses divinités the theological idea of the indépendantes qui avaient été providential action of one being, imaginées primitivement. De même, is developed to its ultimate le dernier terme du système form, by the absorption of all metaphysique consiste à concevoir, independent secondary agencies, au lieu des différentes entités it becomes the conception of a particulières, une seule grande being immanent in all phenomena; entité générale, la _nature_, and the reduction of it to envisagée comme la source this {127} state, implies the unique de tous les phénomènes. fading-away, in thought, of all Pareillement, la perfection du those anthropomorphic attributes système positif, vers laquelle by which the aboriginal idea il tend sans cesse, quoiqu’il was distinguished. The alleged soit très-probable qu’il ne doive last term of the metaphysical jamais l’atteindre, serait de system—the conception of a pouvoir se représenter tous les single great general entity, divers phénomènes observables _nature_, as the source of all comme des cas particuliers d’un phenomena—is a conception seul fait général, tel que celui identical with the previous one: de la gravitation, par exemple.” the consciousness of a single p. 5. source which, in coming to be regarded as universal, ceases to be regarded as conceivable, differs in nothing but name from the consciousness of one being, manifested in all phenomena. And similarly, that which is described as the ideal state of science—the power to represent all observable phenomena as particular cases of a single general fact, implies the postulating of some ultimate existence of which this single fact is alleged; and the postulating of this ultimate existence, involves a state of consciousness indistinguishable from the other two.

“. . . la perfection du système Though along with the extension positif, vers laquelle il tend of generalizations, and sans cesse, quoiqu’il soit concomitant integration of très-probable, qu’il ne doive conceived causal agencies, the jamais l’atteindre, serait de conceptions of causal agencies pouvoir se représenter tous les grow more indefinite; and though divers phénomènes observables as they gradually coalesce into comme des cas particuliers d’un a universal causal agency, seul fait general, p. 5. . . . . . they cease to be representable considérant comme absolument in thought, and are no longer inaccessible, et vide de sens supposed to be comprehensible; pour nous la recherche de ce yet the consciousness of _cause_ qu’on appelle les _causes_, soit remains as dominant to the last premières, soit finales.” p. 14. as it was at first; and can never be got rid of. The consciousness of cause can be abolished only by abolishing consciousness itself.[15] (_First Principles_, § 26.) {128}

“Ce n’est pas aux lecteurs de cet Ideas do not govern and
ouvrage que je croirai jamais overthrow the world: the world
devoir prouver que les idées is governed or overthrown by
gouvernent et bouleversent le feelings, to which ideas serve
monde, ou, en d’autres termes, que only as guides. The social
tout le mécanisme social repose mechanism does not rest finally
finalement sur des opinions. Ils on opinions; but almost wholly
savent surtout que la grande on character. Not intellectual
crise politique et morale des anarchy, but moral antagonism, is
sociétés actuelles tient, en the cause of political crises.
dernière analyse, à l’anarchie All social phenomena are produced
intellectuelle.” p. 48.[16] by the totality of human emotions
and beliefs; of which the emotions
are mainly pre-determined,
while the beliefs are mainly
post-determined. Men’s desires
are chiefly inherited; but their
beliefs are chiefly acquired,
and depend on surrounding
conditions; and the most important
surrounding conditions depend
on the social state which the
prevalent desires have produced.
The social state at any time
existing, is the resultant of all
the ambitions, self-interests,
fears, reverences, indignations,
sympathies, etc., of ancestral
citizens and existing citizens.
The ideas current in this social
state, must, on the average, be
congruous with the feelings of
citizens; and therefore, on the
average, with the social state
these feelings have produced.
Ideas wholly foreign to this
social state {129} cannot be
evolved, and if introduced from
without, cannot get accepted—or,
if accepted, die out when the
temporary phase of feeling which
caused their acceptance, ends.
Hence, though advanced ideas when
once established, act on society
and aid its further advance;
yet the establishment of such
ideas depends on the fitness of
the society for receiving them.
Practically, the popular character
and the social state, determine
what ideas shall be current;
instead of the current ideas
determining the social state and
the character. The modification
of men’s moral natures, caused
by the continuous discipline of
social life, which adapts them
more and more to social relations,
is therefore the chief proximate
cause of social progress. (_Social_
_Statics_, chap. xxx.)

“. . . je ne dois pas négliger The order in which the d’indiquer d’avance, comme une generalizations of science are propriété essentielle de l’échelle established, is determined by encyclopédique que je vais the frequency and impressiveness proposer, sa conformité générale with which different classes avec l’ensemble de l’histoire of relations are repeated in scientifique; en ce sens, que, conscious experience; and this malgré la simultanéité réelle et depends, partly on _the directness_ continue du développement des _with which personal welfare_ différentes sciences, celles qui _is affected_; partly on _the_ seront classées comme antérieures _conspicuousness of one or both the_ seront, en effet, plus anciennes _phenomena between which a relation_ et constamment plus avancées _is to be perceived_; partly on que celles présentées comme _the absolute frequency with which_ postérieures.” p. 84. . . _the relations occur_; partly on . . . . . . “Cet ordre est their _relative frequency of_ déterminé par le degré de _occurrence_; partly on their simplicité, ou, ce qui revient au _degree of simplicity_; and partly même, par le degré de généralité on their _degree of abstractness_. des phénomènes.” p. 87. (_First Principles_, 1st ed., § 36; or otherwise see “_Essay on_ _Laws in General and the Order of_ _their Discovery_.”)

“En résultat définitif, la The sciences as arranged in this mathématique, l’astronomie, succession specified by M. Comte, la physique, la chimie, la _do not_ logically conform to the physiologie, et la physique natural and invariable hierarchy sociale; telle est la formule of phenomena; and {130} there encyclopédique qui, parmi is no serial order whatever in le très-grand nombre de which they can be placed, which classifications que comportent les represents either their logical six sciences fondamentales, est dependence or the dependence seule logiquement conforme à la of phenomena. (See _Genesis of hiérarchie naturelle et invariable Science_, and foregoing Essay.) des phénomènes.”[17] p. 115.

“On conçoit, en effet, que l’étude The historical development of rationelle de chaque science the sciences _has not_ taken fondamentale exigeant la culture place in this serial order; nor préalable de toutes celles qui la in any other serial order. There précèdent dans notre hiérarchie is no “true _filiation_ of the encyclopédique, n’a pu faire de sciences.” From the beginning, progrès réels et prendre son the abstract sciences, the véritable caractère, qu’ après un abstract-concrete sciences, and grand développement des sciences the concrete sciences, have antérieures relatives à des progressed together: the first phénomènes plus généraux, plus solving problems which the second abstraits, moins compliqués, et and third presented, and growing indépendans des autres. C’est done only by the solution of the dans cet ordre que la progression, problems; and the second similarly quoique simultanée, a dû avoir growing by joining the first lieu.” p. 100. in solving the problems of the third. All along there has been a continuous action and reaction between the three great classes of sciences—an advance from concrete facts to abstract facts, and then an application of such abstract facts to the analysis of new orders of concrete facts. (See _Genesis of Science_.)

Such then are the organizing principles of M. Comte’s philosophy and my reasons for rejecting them. Leaving out of his “_Exposition_” those pre-established general {131} doctrines which are the common property of modern thinkers; these are the general doctrines which remain—these are the doctrines which fundamentally distinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. To each proposition I oppose either a widely-different proposition, or a direct negation; and I not only do it now, but have done it from the time when I became acquainted with his writings. The rejection of his cardinal principles should, I think, alone suffice; but there are sundry other views of his, some of them largely characterizing his system, which I equally reject. Let us glance at them.

How organic beings have This inquiry, I believe, admits
originated, is an inquiry which of answer, and will be answered.
M. Comte deprecates as a useless That division of Biology which
speculation: asserting, as he concerns itself with the origin of
does, that species are immutable. species, I hold to be the supreme
division, to which all others are
subsidiary. For on the verdict
of Biology on this matter, must
wholly depend our conception of
human nature, past, present, and
future; our theory of the mind;
and our theory of society.

M. Comte contends that of what is I have very emphatically expressed commonly known as mental science, my belief in a subjective science all that most important part of the mind, by writing a which consists of the subjective _Principles of Psychology_, one analysis of our ideas, is an half of which is subjective. impossibility.

M. Comte’s ideal of society That form of society towards which
is one in which _government_ we is are progressing, I hold
developed to the greatest to be one in which _government_
extent—in which class-functions will be reduced to the smallest
are far more under conscious amount possible, and _freedom_
public regulation than now—in increased to the greatest amount
which hierarchical organization possible—one in which human
with unquestioned authority nature will have become so moulded
shall guide everything—in which by social discipline into fitness
the individual life shall be for the social state, that it will
subordinated in the greatest need little external restraint,
degree to the social life. but will be self-restrained—one
in which the citizen will tolerate
no interference with his freedom,
save that which maintains the
equal freedom of others—one in
which the spontaneous {132}
co-operation which has developed
our industrial system, and is now
developing it with increasing
rapidity, will produce agencies
for the discharge of nearly all
social functions, and will leave
to the primary governmental agency
nothing beyond the function of
maintaining those conditions
to free action, which make
such spontaneous co-operation
possible—one in which individual
life will thus be pushed to the
greatest extent consistent with
social life; and in which social
life will have no other end than
to maintain the completest sphere
for individual life.

M. Comte, not including in his I conceive, on the other hand,
philosophy the consciousness of that the object of religious
a cause manifested to us in all sentiment will ever continue
phenomena, and yet holding that to be, that which it has ever
there must be a religion, which been—the unknown source of
must have an object, takes for his things. While the _forms_ under
object—Humanity. “This Collective which men are conscious of the
Life (of Society) is in Comte’s unknown source of things, may
system the _Être Suprême_; the fade away, the _substance_ of
only one we can _know_ therefore the consciousness is permanent.
the only one we can worship.” Beginning with causal agents
conceived as imperfectly known;
progressing to causal agents
conceived as less known and less
knowable; and coming at last to
a universal causal agent posited
as not to be known at all; the
religious sentiment must ever
continue to occupy itself with
this universal causal agent.
Having in the course of evolution
come to have for its object
of contemplation the Infinite
Unknowable, the religious
sentiment can never again (unless
by retrogression) take a Finite
Knowable, like Humanity, for its
object of contemplation.

Here, then, are sundry other points, all of them important, and the last two supremely important, on which I am diametrically opposed to M. Comte; and did space permit, I could add many others. Radically differing from him as I thus do, in everything distinctive of his philosophy; and having invariably expressed my dissent, {133} publicly and privately, from the time I became acquainted with his writings; it may be imagined that I have been not a little startled to find myself classed as one of the same school. That any who are acquainted with my writings, should suppose I have any general sympathy with M. Comte, save that implied by preferring proved facts to superstitions, astonishes me.

It is true that, disagreeing with M. Comte, though I do, in all those fundamental views that are peculiar to him, I agree with him in sundry minor views. The doctrine that the education of the individual should accord in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind, considered historically, I have cited from him; and have endeavoured to enforce it. I entirely concur in his opinion that there requires a new order of scientific men, whose function shall be that of co-ordinating the results arrived at by the rest. To him, I believe, I am indebted for the conception of a social _consensus_; and when the time comes for dealing with this conception, I shall state my indebtedness. And I also adopt his word, Sociology. There are, I believe, in the part of his writings which I have read, various incidental thoughts of great depth and value; and I doubt not that were I to read more of his writings, I should find others.[18] It is very probable, too, that I have said (as I am told I have) some things which M. Comte had already said. It would be difficult, I believe, to find two men who had no opinions in common. And it would be extremely strange if two men, starting from the same general doctrines established by modern science, should traverse some of the same fields of inquiry, without their lines of thought having any points of intersection. But {134} none of these minor agreements can be of much weight in comparison with the fundamental disagreements above specified. Leaving out of view that general community which we both have with the scientific thought of the age, the differences between us are essential, while the correspondences are non-essential. And I venture to think that kinship must be determined by essentials, and not by non-essentials.[19]

* * * * *

Joined with the ambiguous use of the phrase “Positive Philosophy,” which has led to a classing with M. Comte of many men who either ignore or reject his distinctive principles, there has been one special circumstance that has tended to originate and maintain this classing in my own case. The assumption of some relationship between M. Comte and myself, was unavoidably raised by the title of my first book—_Social Statics_. When that book was published, I was unaware that this title had been before used: had I known the fact, I should certainly have adopted an alternative title which I had in view.[20] If, however, instead of {135} the title, the work itself be considered, its irrelation to the philosophy of M. Comte becomes abundantly manifest. There is decisive testimony on this point. In the _North British Review_ for August, 1851, a reviewer of _Social Statics_ says―

“The title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. According to all analogy, the phrase “Social Statics” should be used only in some such sense as that in which, as we have already explained, it is used by Comte, namely as designating a branch of inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium or order, as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress. Of this Mr. Spencer does not seem to have had the slightest notion, but to have chosen the name for his work only as a means of indicating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a scientific manner.”—p. 321.

Respecting M. Comte’s application of the words _statics_ and _dynamics_ to social phenomena, now that I know what it is, I will only say that while I perfectly understand how, by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings, the one may be used to indicate social _functions in balance_, and the other social _functions out of balance_, I am quite at a loss to understand how the phenomena of _structure_ can be included in the one any more than in the other. But the two things which here concern me, are, first, to point out that I had not “the slightest notion” of giving Social Statics the meaning which M. Comte gave it; and, second, to explain the meaning which I did give it. The units of any aggregate of matter, are in equilibrium when they severally act and re-act on one another on all sides with equal forces. A state of change among them implies that there are forces exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like forces exercised by others; and a state of rest implies the absence of such uncounterbalanced {136} forces—implies, if the units are homogeneous, equal distances among them—implies a maintenance of their respective spheres of molecular motion. Similarly among the units of a society, the fundamental condition to equilibrium, is, that the restraining forces which the units exercise on each other, shall be balanced. If the spheres of action of some units are diminished by extension of the spheres of action of others, there necessarily results an unbalanced force which tends to produce political change in the relations of individuals; and the tendency to change can cease, only when individuals cease to aggress on each other’s spheres of action—only when there is maintained that law of equal freedom, which it was the purpose of _Social Statics_ to enforce in all its consequences. Besides this totally-unlike conception of what constitutes Social Statics, the work to which I applied that title, is fundamentally at variance with M. Comte’s teachings in almost everything. So far from alleging, as M. Comte does, that society is to be re-organized by philosophy; it alleges that society is to be re-organized only by the accumulated effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase of authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of it. A more pronounced individualism, instead of a more pronounced nationalism, is its ideal. So profoundly is my political creed at variance with the creed of M. Comte, that, unless I am misinformed, it has been instanced by a leading English disciple of M. Comte as the creed to which he has the greatest aversion. One point of coincidence, however, is recognizable. The analogy between an individual organism and a social organism, which was held by Plato and by Hobbes, is asserted in _Social Statics,_ as it is in the _Sociology_ of M. Comte. Very rightly, M. Comte has made this analogy the cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy. In _Social Statics_, the aim of which is essentially ethical, this analogy is pointed out incidentally, to enforce certain ethical considerations; and is there obviously suggested partly by the definition of life which {137} Coleridge derived from Schelling, and partly by the generalizations of physiologists there referred to (chap. xxx. §§. 12, 13, 16). Excepting this incidental agreement, however, the contents of _Social Statics_ are so entirely antagonistic to the philosophy of M. Comte, that, but for the title, the work would never, I think, have raised the remembrance of him—unless, indeed, by the association of opposites.[21]

And now let me point out that which really _has_ exercised a profound influence over my course of thought. The truth which Harvey’s embryological inquiries first dimly indicated, which was afterwards more clearly perceived by Wolff, and which was put into a definite shape by Von Baer—the truth that all organic development is a change from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity—this it is from which very many of the conclusions which I now hold, have indirectly resulted. In _Social Statics_, there is everywhere manifested a dominant belief in the evolution of man and of society. There is also manifested the belief that this evolution is in both cases determined by the incidence of conditions—the actions of circumstances. And there is further, in the sections already referred to, a recognition of the fact that organic and social evolutions, conform to the same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various orders, everywhere determined by natural causes (beliefs {138} again displayed in the _Theory of Population_ and in the _Principles of Psychology_); the formula of Von Baer set up a process of organization. The extension of it to other kinds of phenomena than those of individual and social bodies, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen in the last paragraph of an essay on “The Philosophy of Style,” published in October, 1852; again in an essay on “Manners and Fashion,” published in April, 1854; and then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an essay on “Progress: its Law and Cause,” published in April, 1857. Afterwards, there came the recognition of the need for modifying Von Baer’s formula by including the trait of increasing definiteness; next the inquiry into those general laws of force from which this universal transformation necessarily results; next the deduction of these from the ultimate law of the persistence of force; next the perception that there is everywhere a process of Dissolution complementary to that of Evolution; and, finally, the determination of the conditions (specified in the foregoing essay) under which Evolution and Dissolution respectively occur. The filiation of these results is, I think, tolerably manifest. The process has been one of continuous development, set up by the addition of Von Baer’s law to a number of ideas that were in harmony with it. And I am not conscious of any other influences by which the process has been affected.

It is possible, however, that there may have been influences of which I am not conscious; and my opposition to M. Comte’s system may have been one of them. The presentation of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definiteness and development of one’s own thoughts. It is probable that the doctrines set forth in the essay on “The Genesis of Science,” might never have been reached, had not my dissent from M. Comte’s conception, led me to work them out; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay. Possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of {139} repugnance to M. Comte’s views, may have aided in elaborating my own views; though I cannot call to mind any other cases.

Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that I do not regard M. Comte’s speculations as of value. True or untrue, his system as a whole, has doubtless produced important and salutary revolutions of thought in many minds; and will doubtless do so in many more. Doubtless, too, not a few of those who dissent from his general views, have been healthfully stimulated by consideration of them. The presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a whole, whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers. And he has done especial service by familiarizing men with the idea of a social science, based on the other sciences. Beyond which benefits resulting from the general character and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are scattered through his pages many large ideas that are valuable not only as stimuli, but for their actual truth.

It has been by no means an agreeable task to make these personal explanations; but it has seemed to me a task not to be avoided. Differing so profoundly as I do from M. Comte on all fundamental doctrines, save those which we inherit in common from the past; it has become needful to dissipate the impression that I agree with him—needful to show that a large part of what is currently known as “positive philosophy,” is not “positive philosophy” in the sense of being peculiarly M. Comte’s philosophy; and to show that beyond that portion of the so-called “positive philosophy” which is not peculiar to him, I dissent from it.

And now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my great regret that these explanations should have been called forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liberally. Nothing will, I fear, prevent the foregoing pages from appearing like a very ungracious response to M. Laugel’s sympathetically-written review. I can only hope that the gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it {140} concerns myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient apology.

NOTE.

_The preceding pages originally formed the second portion of a_ _pamphlet entitled_ The Classification of the Sciences: to which are added Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte, _which was first published in 1864. For some time past this pamphlet has been included in the third volume of my_ Essays, &c., _and has been no longer accessible in a separate form. There has recently been diffused afresh, the misconception which originally led me to exhibit my entire rejection of those views of M. Comte, which essentially distinguish his system from other systems; and the motives which then prompted me to publish the reasons for this rejection, now prompt me to put them within the reach of all who care to inquire about the matter. The Appendix, presenting an outline of the leading propositions of the Synthetic Philosophy, will further aid the reader in forming a correct judgment_.

_Oct. 7, 1884._