Chapter VIII
ALLEN'S LETTERS TO THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, TO THE NEW YORK PROVINCIAL CONGRESS, AND TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONGRESS.
The Continental Congress, affected by sinister influences, favored the removal of the stores and cannon of Ticonderoga to the south end of Lake George. Allen wrote to Congress a vigorous remonstrance. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut protested, and the project was abandoned. On May 29th, 1775, from Crown Point, Allen addressed the Continental Congress as follows:
An abstract of the action of Congress has just come to hand: and
though it approves of the taking the fortress on Lake Champlain
and the artillery, etc., I am, nevertheless, much surprised that
your Honors should recommend it to us to remove the artillery
to the south end of Lake George, and there to make a stand; the
consequences of which must ruin the frontier settlements, which
are extended at least one hundred miles to the northward from
that place. Probably your Honors were not informed of those
settlements, which consist of several thousand families who are
seated on that tract of country called the New Hampshire Grants.
Those inhabitants, by making those valuable acquisitions for the
Colonies, have incensed Governor Carleton and all the ministerial
party in Canada against them; and provided they should, after
all their good service in behalf of their country, be neglected
and left exposed, they will be of all men the most consummately
miserable....
If the King's troops be again in possession of Ticonderoga and
Crown Point and command the Lake, the Indians and Canadians will
be much more inclined to join with them and make incursions into
the heart of our country. But the Colonies are now in possession
and actual command of the Lake, having taken the armed sloop from
George the Third, which was cruising in the Lake, also seized a
schooner belonging to Major Skene at South Bay, and have armed
and manned them both.... The Canadians (all except the noblesse)
and also the Indians appear at present to be very friendly to us;
and it is my humble opinion that the more vigorous the Colonies
push the war against the King's troops in Canada, the more
friends we shall find in that country. Provided I had but 500 men
with me at St. John's (18th May) when we took the King's sloop, I
would have advanced to Montreal. Nothing strengthens our friends
in Canada equal to our prosperity in taking the sovereignty of
Lake Champlain, and should the Colonies forthwith send an army
of two or three thousand men and attack Montreal, we should have
little to fear from the Canadians or Indians, and should easily
make a conquest of that place, and set up the standard of liberty
in the extensive province of Quebec, whose limit was enlarged
purely to subvert the liberties of America. Striking such a
blow would intimidate the Tory party in Canada, the same as the
commencement of the war at Boston intimidated the Tories in the
Colonies. They are a set of gentlemen that will not be converted
by reason, but are easily wrought upon by fear.
By a council of war held on board the sloop the 27th instant,
it was agreed to advance to the Point Aufere with the sloop and
schooner, and a number of armed boats well manned, and there make
a stand, act on the defensive, and by all means command the Lake
and defend the frontiers. Point Aufere is about six miles this
side of forty-five degrees north latitude, but if the wisdom of
the Continental Congress should view the proposed invasion of the
King's troops in Canada as premature or impolitic, nevertheless,
I humbly conceive, when your Honors come to the knowledge
of the before-mentioned facts, you will at least establish
some advantageous situation toward the northerly part of Lake
Champlain, as a frontier, instead of the south promontory of
Lake George. Commanding the northerly part of the Lake, puts it
in our power to work our policy with the Canadians and Indians.
We have made considerable proficiency this way already. Sundry
tribes have been to visit us, and have returned to their tribes
to use their influence in our favor. We have just sent Capt.
Abraham Ninham, a Stockbridge Indian, as our embassador of peace
to the several tribes of Indians in Canada. He was accompanied
by Mr. Winthrop Hoit, who has been a prisoner with the Indians
and understands their tongue. I do not imagine, provided we
command Lake Champlain, there will be any need of a war with the
Canadians or Indians.
On June 2, 1775, Allen addressed the New York Provincial Congress:
The pork forwarded to subsist the army, by your Honors'
direction, evinces your approbation of the procedure; and as it
was a private expedition, and common fame reports that there are
a number of overgrown Tories in the province, your Honors will
the readier excuse me in not first taking your advice in the
matter, but the enterprises might have been prevented by their
treachery. It is here reported that some of them have been lately
savingly converted, and that others have lost their influence. If
in those achievements there be anything honorary, the subjects
of your government, viz., the New Hampshire settlers, are justly
entitled to a large share, as they had a great majority of
numbers of the soldiery as well as the command in making those
acquisitions, and as your Honors justify and approve the same.
I desire and expect your Honors have, or soon will lay before
the Grand Continental Congress, the great disadvantage it must
inevitably be to the Colonies to evacuate Lake Champlain,
and give up to the enemies of our country those invaluable
acquisitions, the key of either Canada or our country, according
as which party holds the same in possession and makes a proper
improvement of it. The key is ours as yet, and provided the
Colonies would suddenly push an army of two or three thousand men
into Canada, they might make a conquest of all that would oppose
them in the extensive province of Quebec, except a reinforcement
from England should prevent it. Such a diversion would weaken
General Gage or insure us of Canada.
I wish to God America would at this critical juncture exert
herself agreeable to the indignity offered her by a tyrannical
ministry. She might rise on eagle's wings, and mount up to glory,
freedom, and immortal honor if she did but know and exert her
strength. Fame is now hovering over her head. A vast continent
must now sink to slavery, poverty, horror, and bondage, or rise
to unconquerable freedom, immense wealth, inexpressible felicity,
and immortal fame.
I will lay my life on it, with fifteen hundred men and a proper
train of artillery I will take Montreal. Provided I could be thus
furnished and if an army could command the field, it would be
no insuperable difficulty to take Quebec. This object should be
pursued, though it should take ten thousand men to accomplish
the end proposed; for England cannot spare but a certain number
of her troops, anyway, she has but a small number that are
disciplined [this was months before the Hessians and other
mercenaries were hired], and it is as long as it is broad the
more that are sent to Quebec, the less they can send to Boston,
or any other part of the continent.
Our friends in Canada can never help us until we first help them,
except in a passive or inactive manner. There are now about
seven hundred regular troops in Canada. I have lately had sundry
conferences with the Indians; they are very friendly. Capt.
Abraham Ninham, a Stockbridge Indian, and Mr. Winthrop Hoit, who
has sundry years lived with the Caughnawgoes in the capacity of a
prisoner and was made an adopted son to a motherly squaw of that
tribe, have both been gone ten days to treat with the Indians
as our embassadors of peace and friendship. I expect in a few
weeks to hear from them. By them I sent a friendly letter to the
Indians which Mr. Hoit can explain to them in Indian. The thing
that so unites the Indians to us is our taking the sovereignty
of Lake Champlain. They have wit enough to make a good bargain,
and stand by the strongest side. Much the same may be said of the
Canadians.
It may be thought that to push an army into Canada would be too
premature and imprudent. If so, I propose to make a stand at the
Isle-aux-Noix which the French fortified by intrenchment the last
war, and greatly fatigued our large army to take it. It is about
fifteen miles this side St. John's. Our only having it in our
power thus to make incursions into Canada, might probably be the
very reason why it would be unnecessary to do so, even if the
Canadians should prove more refractory than I think for.
Lastly, with submission I would propose to your Honors to raise
a small regiment of Rangers, which I could easily do, and that
mostly in the counties of Albany and Charlotte, provided your
Honors should think it expedient to grant commissions and thus
regulate and put the same under pay. Probably your Honors may
think this an impertinent proposal: it is truly the first favor
I ever asked of the Government, and if it be granted, I shall be
zealously ambitious to conduct for the best good of my country
and the honor of the Government.
On June 9th Allen addressed the Massachusetts Congress:
These armed vessels are at present abundantly sufficient to
command the Lake. The making these acquisitions has greatly
attached the Canadians, and more especially the Indians, to
our interest. They have no personal prejudice or controversy
with the United Colonies, but act upon political principles,
and consequently are inclined to fall in with the strongest
side. At present ours has the appearance of it; as there are at
present but seven hundred regular troops in all the different
parts of Canada. Add to this the consideration of the imperious
and haughty conduct of the troops, which has much alienated
the affections of both the Canadians and Indians from them.
Probably there may soon be more troops from England sent there,
but at present you may rely on it that Canada is in a weak and
helpless condition. Two or three thousand men, conducted by
intrepid commanders, would at this juncture make a conquest of
the ministerial party in Canada with such additional numbers
as may be supposed to vie with the reinforcements that may be
sent from England. Such a plan would make a diversion in favor
of the Massachusetts Bay, who have been too much burdened with
the calamity that should be more general, as all partake of the
salutary effects of their valor and merit in the defence of
the liberties of America. I hope, gentlemen, you will use your
influence in forwarding men, provisions, and every article for
the army that may be thought necessary. Blankets, provisions, and
powder are scarce.
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Ethan Allen, the Robin Hood of VermontChapter VIII
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