Chapter IX: The Reformation and the CIVIL Wars in France (2)

Catherine had hitherto followed two lines of conduct. At one time she had tried to act as a mediator between the two religious parties; at another to support the weaker, and thus maintain a balance. But both had failed. The crown was not powerful enough for the first, and, instead of succeeding in the second, she had been obliged to join the stronger party. A third alternative remained. Might it not be possible to revive the national hostility to Spain; sink religious differences in a foreign war; form a great Protestant league against the Pope and Spain; divide the Netherlands with England and William of Orange; and at home secure the authority of the crown? Such were the views of Coligny, which were now to be adopted by the King and Catherine. Charles IX., feeble though he was, was not without some traces of better things; he had always been averse to civil war, and saw that Spain had been the chief gainer from the discords of France, since, as Marshal Vielleville had said long ago, ‘as many gallant gentlemen had fallen in one battle as would have sufficed to drive the Spaniards out of Flanders.’ The Spanish victory of Lepanto over the Turks in October, 1571, only served to intensify Charles’ dread of Philip. Moreover, as we have seen, he was jealous of the fame his brother, the Duke of Anjou (the favourite of his mother), had gained in the late campaign, and hoped that he might eclipse it by leading a national war against the Spaniard. But the support of the King would have been of little value had not Catherine also favoured the designs of Coligny. Philip had refused to further her dynastic interests at the Conference of Bayonne, in June 1565 (cf. p. 407). His third wife, Elizabeth of France, had died in 1568. He now declined either to marry Margaret of Valois, Catherine’s second daughter, or to urge the claims of that lady upon the young King of Portugal. Accordingly Catherine wished to marry her to the young King of Navarre, the first prince of the blood, whose possessions[82] stretched from the Pyrenees to the other side of the Garonne, and whose friendship, whether he was converted or not, might be of great assistance to her. His mother, however, Jeanne d’Albret, dreaded the influence of the depraved court of France on her son, and rightly suspected the character of the young princess; and Catherine, eager to gain the assistance of the Admiral, who alone was likely to overcome the scruples of the Queen of Navarre, listened to his suggestions, and negotiations were opened with William of Orange and with England. The Prince eagerly welcomed these overtures. He had long realised that the revolt of the Netherlands against Spain would not be successful if fought solely on religious lines. The Protestants were too scattered, and too much divided among themselves, for that; and the only chance lay in waging a political war against Spanish tyranny, in alliance with foreign powers. Accordingly Louis of Nassau was sent to negotiate, and there was talk of an alliance of France, England, and the Empire, and of a division of the Netherlands between them. In pursuance of this scheme, Elizabeth of England was approached; but though at this time quarrelling with Philip over the exploits of the ‘Sea-dogs’ on the Spanish Main, and angry at the support he had given to the Ridolfi plot in 1571, she had insuperable objections to see Antwerp and the Scheldt in French hands. It was therefore proposed that she should marry the Duke of Anjou, and that he should be declared sovereign of the Netherlands (cf. p. 338). To this proposal Elizabeth appeared more favourably inclined, and Walsingham, her agent in France, was closely questioned as to the personal appearance of the Duke. The negotiations broke down, indeed, in January, 1572, owing to the preference of Anjou, who had been influenced by the Guises, for the hand of the Queen of Scots, ‘the rightful Queen of England,’ but even then Alençon, Anjou’s younger brother, was suggested; and a correspondence on the subject, which, on the part of Elizabeth at least, was only entered into to gain time, continued until arrested by the massacre of St. Bartholomew.

| La Marck seizes Brille. April 1, 1572.

While Elizabeth trimmed, events moved rapidly. On the 1st of April, 1572, the Comte de la Marck, a Flemish refugee, being expelled from Dover with his ships by the order of the English Queen, who was not yet prepared for an open breach with Philip, seized Brille and Flushing, and Holland and Zealand rose. In May, Louis of Nassau, having by the connivance of Charles raised a force, chiefly of Huguenots, in France, took Mons, the capital of Hainault, while Elizabeth, not to be outdone, allowed English volunteers to cross to Flushing. The dream of Coligny seemed likely to be fulfilled, and Charles appeared to be on the point of declaring war on Spain.

| Catherine becomes alarmed at the growing influence of
| Coligny.

| Genlis defeated and taken prisoner. July 19, 1572.

| Attempted assassination of Coligny. Aug. 22, 1572.

| The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Aug. 24, 1572.

Unfortunately, the apprehensions of Catherine had been in the meantime aroused. She had consented to the Treaty of St. Germain because she feared the Guises; she was now threatened by the more distasteful ascendency of Coligny, who, if we may believe Tavannes, advised Charles that he would never be truly King until he had emancipated himself from his mother’s control. She therefore returned to the idea, often entertained, and often pressed upon her, of getting rid of the leaders of the Huguenots, more especially of Coligny. At what date she finally decided on this course it is impossible to say with certainty, but there is evidence to show that the scheme had assumed practical shape as early as February, 1572. Even then had the movement in the Netherlands met with complete success, King Charles might have made up his mind to declare war against Spain; Elizabeth might have cast away her doubts, and some of the Protestant princes of Germany would have joined the alliance. The position of Coligny would then have been too strong for Catherine, who, as she had often done before, might have submitted to the inevitable, and the hopes of Burleigh and Walsingham of beating back Catholicism behind the Alps and the Pyrenees might have been realised. Unfortunately, de la Noue was driven from Valenciennes, a French detachment under the Count of Genlis was cut to pieces by the son of Alva in an attempt to relieve Mons (July 19), and Genlis himself was taken prisoner. The hands of Catherine were now free, and she planned the assassination of Coligny with the Duke of Anjou and Henry of Guise. The attempt was made in the midst of the festivities which followed the marriage of Henry of Navarre and Margaret. Whether, if it had succeeded, Catherine would have been satisfied, or whether she hoped that the murder would cause the Protestants to rise, and thus give the Catholics an excuse for proceeding further, it is impossible to say. In any case, the assassin missed his aim; Coligny escaped with a serious wound, and it was necessary to proceed to further extremities. Accompanied by the Duke of Anjou, by Birago a Milanese, the successor of L’Hôpital in the chancellorship, and by others, the Queen-mother visited the King, and, with threats and imputations that he was too timid to act, at last persuaded him. ‘By God’s death,’ said he, ‘since you insist that the admiral must be killed, I consent; but with him every Huguenot in France must perish, that not one may remain to reproach me with his death, and what you do, see that it be done quickly.’ The King’s consent obtained, the plan was rapidly concerted between Catherine, Anjou, Henry of Guise, and Charron, the ‘Prévôt des Marchands’ of Paris. Whether, even then, it was intended to dispose of more than some of the leaders is doubtful, but, when once the order had gone out, the fanatical mob of Paris could not be restrained. On Sunday morning, August 24, the massacre began, and was subsequently taken up in the provinces.

| No change in foreign policy contemplated.

Such appears to be the truth with regard to the causes of this pitiful tragedy, which some think had been premeditated as early as the Treaty of St. Germain itself. All direct evidence, however, has been destroyed, and the facts have been so distorted by partisanship, that certainty is no longer possible. The number of victims has been variously stated; but at the lowest computation they were not less than 1000 in Paris, and 10,000 elsewhere. Among the victims, besides Coligny, were Teligny, his son-in-law, and La Rochefoucauld, an important noble of Poitou. Navarre and the young Condé were spared, but were forced to abjure Protestantism, and were practically prisoners in the hands of Catherine and the Guises. As to any future policy, the Court had not made up its mind. Catherine, it is said, had hoped that, if the responsibility could be thrown upon the Guises, the Huguenots would rush to arms and attack them, and that an obstinate struggle would then ensue, which would weaken the two factions, and justify the King in interfering to restore order; thus both parties might be destroyed, and she and her favourite son Anjou might be left without dangerous rivals. Accordingly the King at first announced that the affair had been the result of the long-standing quarrel between the Guises and the Châtillons, which the Government had done its best to suppress. But as the Guises would not accept the responsibility, the King changed his tone, justified the crime by declaring that the Huguenots had been plotting against the crown, and, with singular baseness, urged Alva to put to death all the Huguenot prisoners he had taken before Mons. At the same time, Catherine was eager not to alienate the Protestants abroad. She looked upon the massacre as a domestic incident, and was not unwilling to continue the policy of Coligny now that he was gone. This she was the more anxious to do, because she now entertained the idea of securing the crown of Poland, just vacant by the death of the last of its hereditary Kings, the Jagellons, for her favourite son Anjou. It was therefore announced that the Edict of Amboise would be kept, and negotiations were continued with the Protestant powers. This policy met with some success.

| Attitude of European Powers.

| Anjou elected King of Poland. May 9, 1573.

The rulers of Europe expressed delight or disapprobation according to their sentiments, but guided their policy as their interest demanded. Philip was at first beside himself with joy; it meant, he thought, the end of the French alliance with the Netherlands; Alva, however, warned him that the overthrow of the Huguenots would strengthen France too much. Elizabeth declared her disgust, but could not afford to quarrel with France; while William the Silent, especially after the fall of Mons on September 19, was not in a position to abandon all hopes of French assistance. The Protestant Princes of Germany at first showed great indignation, but did nothing to interfere with the candidature of the Duke of Anjou, who was elected King of Poland (May 9, 1573).

| Effect of Massacre on France.

| 4th Civil War. August, 1572-June, 1573.

| Treaty of La Rochelle. June 24, 1573.

| Rise of the Politiques.

At home, Catherine was not so successful, and ‘France,’ says Sully, ‘atoned for the massacre by twenty-six years of disaster, carnage, and horror.’ On the news of the massacre, the survivors took up arms, but they were not strong enough to meet their enemies in the field, and the resistance was confined to a few cities, of which Nîmes and Montauban in the south, Sancerre and La Rochelle in the west, were the most important. The Government in vain attempted their reduction. The siege of La Rochelle cost the lives of some 20,000 men, and of more than 300 officers of some distinction. Sancerre was reduced to such straits that cats, rats, mice, and even dogs, were eaten; the last, says Jean de Lery, whose narrative has not been inaptly called a cookery book for the besieged, were found to be rather sweet and insipid. At last, on June 24, 1573, the Government despairing of success, and unwilling that the Polish ambassadors should find their new King, the Duke of Anjou, who was in command of the army, besieging a Protestant town, concluded the Treaty of La Rochelle. By this treaty the Huguenots were promised liberty of conscience throughout France, and the right of holding services in La Rochelle, Nîmes, and Montauban. These towns were also to be free from royal garrisons. In August, by the mediation of the Polish ambassador, Sancerre was admitted to the same terms. But the treaty could not last. It was doubtful whether the Government were sincere, and it was not likely that the Huguenots would consent to forego their rights of worship. Besides all this, their cause was being strengthened by the rise of the ‘Politiques,’ or ‘Peaceable Catholics’ as they called themselves. This party, born of the horror and weariness which the Civil War had caused, was anxious to establish peace on the basis of mutual toleration. Its leaders were the two sons of the old Constable, Francis, Marshal of France and Governor of Paris, and Henry Damville, Governor of Languedoc. Their jealousy of the Guises they had inherited from their father, yet their ideas as to toleration would have been most distasteful to him, and, still more so, the opinions of his two youngest sons, William (Thoré), and Charles (Méru), who adopted the Huguenot faith. The Politiques were strongest in the south, where the adherents of the two creeds had been more equally balanced, and where the struggle had been most severe. As a whole they were not actuated by high principle. If they adopted the views of L’Hôpital it was from cynical indifference to religion, rather than from conviction as to the merits of toleration, and the leaders at least were largely influenced by ambition or personal motives. Indeed, the massacre of St. Bartholomew was followed by a general lowering of tone and of morality throughout France.

| Change in the character and views of the Huguenot
| Party.

Closely connected with the Politiques stood Navarre and Henry of Condé, who had been forced to abjure their faith and were practically prisoners in royal hands, and the King’s brother, the Duc d’Alençon, who selfishly sided with Huguenots in the hope of securing the crown on the death of Charles IX. At this time, too, the results of the massacre were seen in a complete transformation of the views of the Huguenots. Hitherto, the party had been dominated by the nobility, great and small, who, in spite of the feudal colour which they gave to the movement, had asserted that they were not fighting against the crown, but for the removal of foreign and unpopular ministers, while the third estate had limited its demands to an extension of the powers of the States-General. But now many of the greater nobility had fallen, and many had abjured their faith. The importance of the _bourgeoisie_ and of the ministers had consequently increased, and under their influence republican ideas had become more prominent; while the feudal element, which was still represented by the smaller local nobility, went to strengthen separatist tendencies. The change was accompanied by the appearance of numerous political pamphlets, of which the most striking were the _Franco-Gallia_ of Hotman, and the _Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos_ from the pen of Languet, or possibly of Duplessis-Mornay, the faithful adviser of Henry of Navarre.

| The Franco-Gallia, and Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos.

The _Franco-Gallia_, adopting the historical method, asserts that the Teutonic nations saved France from the tyranny of Rome, revived the free institutions of the Gauls, and established an elective monarchy, which governed through the people and for the people, in whom eventually the sovereignty resides. The decadence of this free constitution began with the Capetian Kings, who in time overthrew the privileges of the Estates, and introduced the despotic rule of King and ‘Parlement.’ The writer goes on to illustrate from the history of France the evil results of the rule of women, and holds that this is the reason for their exclusion from the throne, rather than any fundamental law, like the Salic Law, which conflicts with the primeval right of free election.

The author of the second treatise, the _Vindiciæ_, adopts the opposite method, and seeks to prove his point by a deductive argument. Both King and people have made a contract with God: the King to rule his country well, the people to depose him when he fails to do so. Hence resistance to a tyrant is a duty. Nevertheless, the right of resistance does not belong to individuals, except, indeed, against an invader, an usurper, or a woman, if such, in defiance of law, seek to rule a country; for they are outside the law. In other cases, not the individuals, but their representative, the magistracy, should be the judge of breach of contract. Thus, although the doctrine of resistance is clearly enunciated, the resistance must come from the properly constituted authorities, and the writer objects to anything which savours of anabaptism or other extreme views.

| Political organisation of the Huguenots.

| Fifth Civil War. Feb. 1574-May 1576.

| Death of Charles IX. March 30, 1574.

The Huguenots did not limit themselves to theory. On the 24th of August, 1573, the anniversary of St. Bartholomew, the Protestants of Languedoc and Upper Guienne formed two federative republics, each divided into dioceses with small deliberative assemblies, which were to send deputies to the central assemblies at Nîmes and Montauban. These, with an elective governor, were to have the power of levying troops and of imposing taxes on Protestant and Catholic alike. This republican form of government, in which we see the Presbyterian ideas of church-government applied to secular politics, was to be extended to all parts of France which the Protestants might subsequently win. After thus settling the government of the south, the Huguenots sent a petition to the King demanding complete liberty of conscience and of worship throughout the kingdom, and the cession of two fortresses in each province as a security. The Politiques at the same time published a manifesto demanding toleration. ‘If Condé had been alive and in possession of Paris he would not have asked so much,’ said Catherine. And on February, 1574, the fifth war broke out. An unsuccessful attempt on the part of Navarre and Alençon to fly from St. Germain, led to the imprisonment of the Marshal Montmorenci, and Marshal de Cossé, another Politique. Henry of Condé effected his escape, and negotiated with the German princes for help. Before, however, any event of importance occurred, the unfortunate King, Charles IX., passed away (March 30, 1574), tortured to the last by remorse, and terrified by visions of the massacre to which, in an evil hour, he had consented.

§ 5. _The reign of Henry III., March 1574-July 1589._

| Henry III. leaves Poland and reaches France. Sept.
| 1574.

The death of Charles IX. gave Henry a pretext for hastily leaving Poland, where he had already become unpopular. He did not, however, appear to be in any hurry to reach his new kingdom. Warned by his mother to avoid North Germany, since ‘the German princes had too many causes of quarrel with France,’ he passed through Austria and Italy. At Venice, he wasted two months in luxury and debauch, and is said to have been corrupted by the licence of that town. On his arrival in France (September, 1574), he seemed for a moment inclined to adopt a conciliatory policy. But his mother, now that her favourite son was King, hoped that if he were victorious over the Huguenots her influence would be paramount, and expected everything from the hero of Jarnac and Moncontour. The King therefore announced that he would recognise liberty of conscience, but would not tolerate religious practices which deviated from Catholicism, and that he would speak of peace when his castles and his cities had been restored.

| Peace of Monsieur. May, 1576.

Thus the war dragged on, though without any decisive events, and soon Henry III. began to crave for peace that he might indulge in his pleasures. The definite alliance of the Politiques with the Huguenots of the south, which took place in December, enabled the rebels to hold their own. In September, 1575, Alençon, and in the following February, Navarre, effected their escape. Meanwhile Duke Casimir, son of the Elector Palatine, who dreamt of heading an aggressive Calvinistic party in Europe, had invaded France, ravaged Burgundy and the Bourbonnois, and, in March, joined Alençon at Sozé. Finally, by the exertions of Francis of Montmorenci, the Marshal, who had been released by the King, the Peace of Monsieur (May, 1576) gave to the Huguenots better terms than they had hitherto obtained. They were allowed to worship where they liked, except within two leagues of Paris, and within the domains of any lord who might withhold his sanction. Cases in which Protestants were concerned were to be tried by ‘Chambres mi-parties’ in each ‘Parlement,’--that is, by courts composed of an equal number of judges of the two religions. The Estates were to be convened at Blois; and eight cities were to be held by the Huguenots in pledge of the fulfilment of the treaty. The Duke of Alençon, or Anjou, as he had now become in consequence of the accession of Henry of Anjou to the throne, was to receive the duchies of Berry, Touraine, and Anjou, with reservation of the rights of suzerainty to the crown. To Henry of Navarre was given the governorship of Guienne, and to Henry of Condé that of Picardy, with Péronne as his residence. The last concession was an important one, for Picardy hitherto had been very Catholic in its sympathies, and had divided the Huguenots from their Protestant allies in the Netherlands. The Peace of Monsieur was received with violent indignation by the Catholics of France, and led to an agitation which was directed almost as much against the crown as against the Huguenots.

| The Catholic Leagues.

| The Guises adopt democratic views.

The idea of forming associations of ‘Better Catholics’ was no new one. Shortly after the Edict of Amboise, in 1563, we find mention of several, such as the Fraternity of the Holy Ghost in Burgundy, and the Christian and Royal League of Champagne. With the massacre of St. Bartholomew these associations had fallen into neglect; they were now to be revived on a much more important scale. The first of these new leagues was that of Péronne, organised by Humières, the old governor who refused to surrender the fortress to Condé (1576). The example was speedily followed elsewhere, and formed the counterpart to Huguenot federation in the south (cf. p. 419). The organisation of these leagues was a military one. Their objects were declared to be: the defence of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church; the preservation of Henry III. in the obedience of his subjects, and after him ‘of all the posterity of the House of Valois’; the execution of the resolutions which should be presented by the Estates which were about to meet; and the restoration of the ancient liberties as they existed in the time of Clovis, the first Christian King. In this declaration we are reminded of a new departure in the policy of the Guises. Hitherto they had attempted to secure their power as the first ministers of the crown, and supported the principles of despotic rule. But Henry III. threatened to shake himself free from their influence, and was already leaning upon his favourites ‘the Mignons.’ Accordingly, Henry of Guise, who, by the death of his uncle, the cardinal, in 1574, was the undoubted leader of his house, assumed a position of antagonism to the crown, and even began to dream of some day winning the throne itself. The unpopularity which Henry III. incurred by the Peace of Monsieur and by his foppish follies, caused the Duke to lean on popular support, while many of the Catholic nobles had joined the Politiques. Thus the party of the Guises, without completely breaking with the upper classes, began to seek its fulcrum in a lower stratum.

| Henry III. tries to make use of the States-General.

The change is represented not only in the articles of these Catholic Leagues but also in the Catholic pamphlets of the day, which began to borrow the popular doctrines of the _Franco-Gallia_ and other Huguenot writings. Denying the application of the Salic Law to France, they asserted that the title of the House of Lorraine was superior to that of the Bourbon, and even to that of the House of Valois itself, since it could trace its descent through the female line from Charles the Great himself. In the face of these new developments, Henry III. followed for some time an oscillating policy. At first he forbade all Associations. Subsequently he abandoned that idea, and tried to utilise them for the purpose of influencing the elections to the States-General which were to meet at Blois according to the Treaty, in the hope, by the aid of the Catholic majority thus obtained, of putting down both the Guises and the Huguenots. In this he was only partially successful. The Huguenots, indeed, despairing of success owing to the terrorism and intrigues of the League, declined even to send deputies from those districts and towns which were in their power, and the Catholics finding themselves in a majority, demanded that there should be only one religion in France. Yet so great was the dislike to a continuance of the war that they refused the necessary supplies, and brought forward constitutional demands which made Henry III. only too glad to be quit of them (March 1577).

| Sixth Civil War, 1577.

| Treaty of Bergerac. Sept. 17, 1577.

In the war which had broken out in the meantime, the King was somewhat more successful. The Duke of Anjou (Alençon), who had now deserted the Huguenots, took command of the royal army; the aristocratic prejudices and the religious indifference of the Politiques could ill agree with the earnestness of the republican and Calvinistic burghers; and Damville, who by the death of his brother had now become Duke of Montmorenci and Marshal of France, soon abandoned the alliance and made his peace with the court (May, 1577). Under these circumstances the Huguenots lost ground. In May fell La Charité on the Loire; in August, Brouage, a place next in importance to La Rochelle; and it was only the want of union among the Catholics themselves, and the utter weariness of the country, which enabled the Huguenots to gain such favourable terms as they did by the Treaty of Bergerac (September 17, 1577). Their right of worship was indeed restricted to the domains of nobles, to all cities where worship was held at the date of the peace, and elsewhere to one city or its suburbs in each sénéchaussée--Paris itself being specially excluded. The ‘Chambres mi-parties’ were also confined to the four southern ‘Parlements’ where the Huguenots were strongest. But they still had eight cities intrusted to them in pledge for six years, and Condé received St. Jean d’Angély instead of Péronne. The King was probably sincere in desiring to maintain the Peace of Bergerac, for he was anxious if possible to escape from the thraldom of the Guises, and the violations of the treaty which occurred were due to the insubordination of the governors of provinces, to the popular fanaticism, and to the stubborn ill-will of the Law Courts.

| Seventh Civil War, April 1580, to Peace of Fleix,
| Nov. 1580.

In 1580, indeed, ‘The Lovers’ War’ broke out. This was caused, however, rather by quarrels between the King and Henry of Navarre concerning the dower of Margaret, and it is noticeable that the great Protestant leader, de la Noue, disapproved of it, and that neither La Rochelle nor the southern towns took part in it. It was ended by the Peace of Fleix, in Perigord (26th November, 1580), which confirmed the Treaty of Bergerac, and closed the Seventh Civil War.

| Disorganisation of France.

The Peace of Fleix was followed by five years of feverish peace, which served only to illustrate the utter disorganisation of the country and the demoralisation of all classes. Although there were not wanting earnest, if fanatical, adherents of the two creeds, these formed an ever lessening minority; and for the most part, as a competent observer tells us, ‘Men were combating not for the faith, nor for Christ, but for command.’ Of the greater nobles, the Guises were attempting to overawe the crown, if not to seize it for themselves; the rest, like Henry de Montmorenci the Marshal, and the Duke of Mercœur, strove to make themselves independent in the provinces of which they were governors. The smaller nobility played the same game on a less magnificent scale, and in some cases had degenerated into brigands; while many, both great and small, spent their leisure in duels and assassinations, often caused by some shameful intrigue. Even the women resorted to the dagger to free themselves from an inconvenient lover, or to avenge some act of infidelity. While the upper classes were thus disturbing the country with their ambitions and their vices, the lower classes were bemoaning their social grievances, and threatening social war. At the head of this seething mass of iniquity, and of political, social, and moral anarchy, stood a vacillating, effeminate King, and an intriguing Queen-mother.

Henry III. had in earlier life shown some character. He was far more able than his brothers, the unfortunate Charles IX., or the Duke of Anjou (Alençon); and had distinguished himself in the battles of Jarnac and Moncontour. His natural gifts, however, had been choked in a life of licence and of luxury, and ever since his accession he had gone from bad to worse. He dressed himself more like a woman than a man; he surrounded himself with favourites, and with lap-dogs; he relieved the monotony of his debaucheries by ridiculous acts of penance and superstition which deceived no one. No doubt, the idea of raising new men to power to balance the ambitions of the older nobility was not altogether a foolish one, and some of the favourites, like Épernon, Joyeuse, and the Marshal de Biron, were men of capacity. But others, like Villequier and D’O, would have disgraced any court; while all were influenced by sordid and unworthy motives. By the King’s side stood the Queen-mother, still intriguing for power though life was fast ebbing, and descending to the arts of a procuress to win her opponents. Clearly there was no hope for France until the last of this degenerate race of the Valois had disappeared. The only chance for a continuance of internal peace, such as it was, lay in a vigorous foreign policy, which might have monopolised the attention of the turbulent spirits, and put the King at the head of a united people.

| Sovereignty of Netherlands accepted by Anjou. Sept.
| 1580-Feb. 1582.

| Expedition to the Azores. June 1582.

| The French Fury. Jan. 16, 1583. Anjou leaves
| Netherlands, June 1583, and dies. Assassination of
| William of Orange. July 10, 1584.

For this, the offer of the sovereignty of the Netherlands to the Duke of Anjou, in September, 1580, furnished an opportunity which Catherine, angry at the recent occupation of Portugal by Philip (cf. p. 298), eagerly embraced. Even the King himself approved; while Elizabeth received with favour the advances of Anjou for her hand in marriage. The sovereignty was finally conferred on the Duke in February, 1582. In the June of that year, Catherine sent an expedition to the Azores in support of Antonio, the Pretender of Portugal. William of Orange might well hope that France was about to return to the policy of Coligny, and, in alliance with the Protestant Queen of England, and the Netherlands, finally to join issue with the representative of the Catholic reaction. His hope was not, however, to be realised. Henry III. was not prepared for so bold a course, and was half-jealous of his brother. Elizabeth had been only scheming to prevent the Netherlands from being incorporated into France, and, if possible, to embroil France with Philip, and, for all her love-making, had no intention of really marrying Anjou. The expedition to the Azores, as well as another which was despatched in June, 1583, was destroyed by a Spanish fleet under the Marquis de Santa Cruz. Anjou, ill satisfied with the restricted authority granted to him, rashly attempted to establish himself in a more independent position by seizing Bruges and Antwerp (January 16). The attempt failed, and in June, 1583, Anjou retired from the Netherlands to die in the following June. One month after (July, 1584), William the Silent fell a victim to the pistol of Balthazar Gérard.

| Sovereignty of Netherlands offered to Henry III. Oct.
| 1584.

| The Catholic League.

The deaths of Anjou and of William the Silent both led to most momentous consequences. The first made the Protestant, Henry of Navarre, the heir-presumptive, and rendered a renewal of civil war almost inevitable; the second was followed by the offer of the sovereignty of the Netherlands to Henry III. It seemed by no means impossible that Henry III. would reconcile himself with his heretic heir, and accept the offer made him. At once the apprehensions of the French Catholics, of the Guises, and of Philip were aroused, and the outcome was the Catholic League. Following the model of the Catholic Associations of 1576, the League was formed in Paris. The city was divided into five districts: the president of each of these, assisted by an elective Council of Eleven, formed the famous _Sixteen._ This Council deliberated on the measures to be adopted, and its decisions were communicated to the faithful through the agency of professional and trade associations. The example of Paris was rapidly followed in the provincial towns; and France was threatened with the tyranny of a central club with its affiliated societies, whose authority was maintained partly by terrorism, partly by the fanaticism excited through the preaching of friars and Jesuits.

| Treaty of Joinville. Jan. 1585.

Although Henry of Guise did not altogether approve of the democratic principles adopted by the Catholic League, his interests demanded that he should put himself at the head of it. But this was not the only important change in the policy of the Guises. The reputation of the family had been originally made in defending France against Spain, and Francis, Duke of Guise, had always been anti-Spanish in his views; while Philip, on his side, was most unwilling to see Mary, Queen of Scots, their kinswoman, triumphant in England, and had even sent secret help to the Scottish rebels. Of late, however, the more imperative necessity of preventing the French from assisting the Dutch, or from incorporating any part of the Netherlands into France, had caused Philip to alter his views. Negotiations had accordingly been entered into with Henry of Guise as early as the end of the year 1581, and Philip pretended to favour the family designs in favour of Mary Stuart, now a captive in the hands of Elizabeth. The death of Anjou, and the danger of reconciliation between Henry III. and the heretic Henry of Navarre, still further aroused the apprehensions of Philip. He therefore approved of the organisation of the League, and in January, 1585, concluded the Treaty of Joinville with Guise. The allies bound themselves to eradicate heresy, and to proclaim the Cardinal of Bourbon, the Catholic uncle of Henry of Navarre, King in the event of the decease of Henry III.; the viscounty of Béarn and French Navarre was to be ceded to Philip, as a price of his assistance. In March, 1585, the Leaguers issued a manifesto, in which they declared their intention to restore the dignity and unity of the crown, to secure the nobility in their ancient privileges, to drive unworthy favourites from the court, to relieve the country from new taxes, and to prevent future troubles by settling the succession on a Catholic king, and by providing for regular sessions of the States-General.

Meanwhile, to enforce their views they had seized the three bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, most of the towns of Picardy, all Champagne, and the larger part of Burgundy, Normandy, and Brittany; while in June they presented an ultimatum to the King insisting on the withdrawal of the late Edict of Toleration. The formidable movement which was thus inaugurated was the outcome of the union of three forces:--

1. The determination of the Catholic party to oppose the claims of a heretic heir.

2. The jealousy of the Guises for the King’s ‘Mignons.’

3. The European policy of Philip II., who not only dreaded the French alliance with the Netherlands, but also feared that it might lead to a definite alliance with the Protestant Queen of England, and thus shatter his hopes of re-establishing his authority and that of the Catholic Church.

| Henry III. submits to the League. July 5, 1585.
| Sixtus excommunicates Henry of Navarre. Sept. 9,
| 1585.

It remained to be seen what line of conduct Henry III. would adopt in the face of this formidable conspiracy. Sixtus V., who had just succeeded Pope Gregory XIII. (August 26, 1585), did not altogether approve of the League. ‘I fear me,’ he said, ‘that matters will be pressed so far that the King, Catholic though he be, will be constrained to appeal to the heretics for aid to rid himself of the tyranny of the Catholics,’ and this for a moment did not appear impossible. Henry III. went so far as to acknowledge Henry of Navarre as his lawful successor, and laughed at the claims of the Cardinal as those ‘of an old fool.’ He forbade all Leagues and Associations, and even made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Duke of Guise at Metz. But a continuation of such a bold policy was scarcely to be looked for from such a King. Elizabeth, although she could scold Henry for submitting to rebels within his kingdom, would not depart from her position of dubious neutrality; Henry of Navarre, although professing his willingness ‘to be instructed,’ refused to declare himself a Catholic; while Catherine, who was hoping to secure the succession for her daughter Claude and her husband the Duke of Lorraine, warned the King of the danger of opposing so powerful a coalition. Henry, to his ruin, listened to his mother’s advice, and allowed her to yield, in his name, to the demands of the Leaguers at the Conference of Nemours (July 5, 1585). The Edicts of Toleration were revoked, and they of the Huguenot faith who would not conform were to leave the country. Sixtus, now partly relieved from his apprehensions, issued a Bull of Excommunication against Henry of Navarre.

| Altered position of the Huguenots and Catholics.

The capitulation of Henry III. to the League brought Henry of Navarre prominently to the front. He had already shown his military abilities during the Lovers’ War, and, in 1581, he had been appointed ‘Protector of the Churches.’ He now became the representative of all those whose bigotry or whose interest did not destroy their patriotism. It is interesting to note how completely the position of the two parties was reversed. The charges of opposing the legitimate successor, of holding republican doctrines, and of alliance with the foreigner, once brought against the Huguenots, could now be laid at the door of the Catholics; while the Huguenots could claim to be fighting for the principle of legitimacy and of national independence. Navarre was, accordingly, supported by the Politiques and by the Constable Henry of Montmorenci, who was, however, chiefly influenced by personal jealousy of the Guises. Even the ‘Parlement’ of Paris remonstrated against the intolerance of the Edict, and against the Papal Bull. Although opposed as before to the concession of the right of worship to the Protestants, its members were in favour of liberty of conscience, and resented, as they had always done, the papal claim to interfere in the internal affairs of France. Thus the party of the Huguenots was by no means a contemptible one. The centre of their position lay in the territories belonging to Henry of Navarre, or under his control. These, spreading from the Spanish frontier to the Dordogne, and from the Bay of Biscay to Languedoc, comprised Lower Navarre and Béarn, which Henry held in his own right, and seven fiefs which he held of the King of France. He was also Governor of Guienne, and he was not without adherents in Normandy and Brittany, while Languedoc was held by the Constable. And yet the position of the Huguenots was discouraging enough. If their party was not confined to those of their religious profession, this only added to the divisions which had always weakened them. The Catholics held by far the greater part of France; in the Netherlands, Alexander of Parma had secured Antwerp (August, 1585), and threatened to carry all before him, and were his task in the Netherlands finished, how should they resist the united forces of the League and of Philip II.? What wonder if many apostatised or fled, and that the beard of Henry of Navarre turned white with anxiety. Already Philip dreamed of overthrowing Elizabeth of England, of placing Mary Queen of Scots on the English throne, and of subjugating France under his lieutenant, the Duke of Guise. Fortunately, however, the King of Spain as usual procrastinated, and preferred to work his end by diplomacy and by bribes, rather than by arms. The Guises were not in complete accord with him, and Henry III. himself daily grew more impatient of the yoke. To these causes, and to the personal ability of the King of Navarre, the salvation of France must be attributed.

| Eighth Civil War. War of the three Henries.----1585-April
| 30, 1589.

| Battle of Courtras. Oct. 20, 1587.

| The Barricades. Aug. 12, 1588.

| Assassination of Henry of Guise. Dec. 23, 1588.

| Ten years Truce. April 30, 1589.

| Death of Catherine, Jan. 5; Assassination of Henry III.
| July 31, 1589.

Henry III. hoped, in the war which now broke out, to humble the Huguenots, and yet curb the ambition of the Guises. He accordingly gave to the Duke of Joyeuse, his favourite, the command of the army which was to advance against the Huguenots, while he himself opposed the German ‘reiters’ whom Casimir, brother of the Elector Palatine, had sent to the assistance of the Protestants. Unfortunately for the King, Joyeuse was defeated and slain by Henry of Navarre at Courtras on the Isle (October 20, 1587), and although the ‘reiters’ were forced to retire, the Guises succeeded in gaining the credit of their retreat. ‘Saul,’ cried the fanatics of Paris, ‘has slain his thousands, but David his ten thousands.’ Philip was anxious at this moment to prevent any interference with his schemes for the Armada. His envoy, Mendoza, therefore urged the Duke of Guise to make further demands on the King; and on his hesitating to comply with these, the Duke entered Paris in defiance of the royal command (May 12). The attempt of the King to reassert his authority by ordering the Municipal Guard and the Swiss to secure the important points of the city was answered by the ‘barricades’; and Henry III., finding himself no longer master of his capital, retired to Chartres, never again to enter Paris. Forced for the moment to submit to the League, the feeble monarch next tried to outbid the Guises with the deputies of the States-General, which assembled at Blois on September 16, 1588. But so extreme were the views adopted by the League at this moment that this proved impossible. Accordingly, the King turned to the last expedient of the coward, and ordered the assassination of Henry of Guise in his royal palace of Blois (December 23, 1588). The Cardinal of Guise the brother of the Duke, was executed the next day, and the Cardinal of Bourbon was held a prisoner. ‘Now at last I am King,’ said Henry. The illusion was soon to be dispelled, for the assassination of the Duke led to the open revolt of the League. Supported by the decision of the Sorbonne, it declared that the crown was elective; and when the ‘Parlement’ resisted, its more obstinate members were imprisoned. The Duke of Mayenne, the eldest surviving brother of the murdered Duke, was made Lieutenant-General of the realm, and ruled Paris with a Council of forty, formed of deputies from the affiliated societies of the League. The example of Paris was followed elsewhere, and the League secured most of the important towns of the centre and south of France. Meantime, the failure of the royal army in Guienne destroyed the last chance of maintaining an independent attitude, and the King at last did what he should have done four years before, and threw himself into the arms of Henry of Navarre. A truce for a year was made between the two Henries (April 30, 1589). The King promised to leave the Huguenots undisturbed, and Navarre engaged to oppose the Duke of Mayenne. The armies of the two Kings shortly after advanced on Paris, which seemed doomed, when the dagger of the Dominican, Jacques Clement, an emissary of the League, avenged the assassination of the Duke of Guise (July 31). The death of the last Valois King had been preceded only a few months by that of Catherine de’ Medici, his mother. She died (January 5, 1589), with the reproaches of the Cardinal of Bourbon ringing in her ears: ‘If you had not deceived us and brought us here (to Blois) with fine words, the two brothers (the Guises) would not be dead, and I should be a free man.’

§ 6. _Henry IV. and the League, July 1589--May 1598._

By the assassination of Henry III., Henry of Navarre became the legitimate King of France. The question was, whether he would make good his claim. Had he now been willing to declare himself a Roman Catholic, he would have at once won over the more conservative of the people, for the League was daily becoming more anarchical; the Cardinal of Bourbon, who was by it acknowledged as King Charles X., was but a puppet of Spain; and the Spanish alliance was ever growing more unpopular. But conversion would have probably lost him the support of the Huguenots, while it would not have gained the more fanatical members of the League. Accordingly, Henry refused. He offered to recognise Catholicism; to grant to the Huguenots no privileges beyond those they had hitherto gained; and to submit ‘to the instruction’ of a National or General Council. In thus acting he was guided by policy, not by conviction; and the interpretation he would put on his favourite phrase ‘receiving instruction’ would depend on his success in the field.

| 9th and last Civil War. 1589-1595.

| Battle of Arques, 5 Sept. 1589; and of Ivry, March
| 1590.

| Siege of Paris.

| Death of Alexander of Parma. Dec. 1592.

Not feeling strong enough to attack Paris itself, Henry determined to hold Picardy, Champagne, and Normandy, whence the capital drew her supplies. The Duke of Longueville was therefore sent to Picardy, the Marshal d’Aumont to Champagne, while Henry himself dropped back on Normandy, and occupied Dieppe, the most important of the Norman ports, and valuable on account of its proximity to England. The attempt of the Duke of Mayenne to dislodge him was foiled at the battle of Arques (September 21). In the following March, 1590, the still more brilliant victory of Ivry, near Dreux, conclusively proved the superiority of Henry over his antagonist. Henry perhaps ‘committed the bravest folly’ that ever was in staking the fate of a kingdom on a single battle, in which he had far inferior forces; but at least his intrepidity won for him the admiration of his countrymen. Possibly if he had pressed on at once, Paris might have been taken; but Henry had not the faculty of making the best of a victory, and preferred to continue his more cautious policy of starving the city into submission. He occupied Corbeil, Lagny, and Creil, which commanded the upper Seine, the Marne, and the Oise, and by the end of August, Paris was reduced to fearful straits. ‘Nothing was cheap except sermons.’ As at Sancerre, dogs, cats, rats, and mice were eagerly devoured; some, it is said, even ate the flesh of children; and the people were loudly clamouring for peace or bread, when the approach of Alexander of Parma, from the Netherlands, baulked Henry of his prey, and forced him to retire (September 10). In the year 1592, Parma again entered France, and saved Rouen from Henry’s clutches. In December, however, the death of the great commander freed the King from immediate apprehension, and left the League without any leader who could match him in the field. Nevertheless, the war seemed likely to be indefinitely protracted. The party of the League indeed threatened to break up. Mayenne was impatient of Spanish influence, and was becoming daily more disgusted with the extravagance of the League in Paris. In the preceding November, the Sixteen had even dared to execute Brisson, the president of the ‘Parlement,’ and two other judges who opposed them, and had established a reign of terror. Accordingly, Mayenne had marched into the city, seized and condemned four of the Sixteen to death, and reasserted his authority. Hated, however, as he was by the fanatics, he was in no position to carry on the war with vigour unless with Spanish help, which he wished to do without.

| Position of Henry of Navarre.

| Declaration of Mantes. July, 1591.

Henry, too, was gaining popularity. Although his sensuality, his lack of real conviction, his cynical indifference, prevent our making altogether a hero of the King of Navarre, his superabundant energy, his splendid courage, his frankness, affability, and genuine humanity, coupled with his caustic wit, had already endeared him to his countrymen. And yet he was not powerful enough to win his country by the sword; the Catholics would not consent to see a heretic on the throne of France; his attempt to settle the religious difficulty by the Declaration of Mantes (July, 1591), which acknowledged the Catholic religion as that of the State, while he himself remained a Protestant, pleased neither party. Too many, like the Marshal Biron and D’O, who had control of the finances, were interested in perpetuating the war, lest a return of peace might deprive them of employment, or of the hope of carving out a fortune for themselves.

| The States-General. Jan. 26, 1593.

| Henry IV. ‘receives instruction.’ July 23, 1593.

Meanwhile, France was going to ruin. Trade was at a standstill. Even the more patriotic of the nobles--whether Catholic or Protestant--despairing of peace, were aiming at their own independence, and the enemies of France were taking advantage of her weakness; Philip II. hoped to place his nominee on the throne, and to secure Brittany; the Duke of Savoy was attempting to encroach on her south-east frontier; and even Elizabeth of England was demanding Calais, or some other return for help, niggardly and intermittent though it was. The earnest desire, therefore, of all the moderate Catholics in France who were not sold to Philip, that Henry would ‘go to Mass,’ cannot excite surprise. In the spring of 1593, the meeting of the States-General, summoned to settle the question of the succession, brought matters to a crisis. The Cardinal of Bourbon had died in 1590; and, according to the Catholic view, the throne had been vacant for three years. Philip II., therefore, instructed his representative the Duke of Feria, to propose that the crown should be conferred on the Infanta (who through her mother represented the House of Valois in the female line). If, however, the Salic Law could not be violated, he was to suggest that the Archduke Ernest, the Governor of the Netherlands, and brother of the Emperor Rudolf, should be chosen King, or, failing him, the young Duke of Guise, who should take the Infanta as his Queen. In all probability, had the Duke of Feria at once proposed the Duke of Guise as King, he would have been accepted; but fortunately for Henry IV. he first suggested the Infanta, and thereby aroused the indignation of the ‘Parlement’ and of all those who cared for the fundamental laws of the country, and were not wholly sold to Spain. Convinced that delay was perilous, Henry now accepted the offers of a deputation of the Estates-General sent to hold conference with him at Suresnes, and promised to ‘receive instruction’ within two months, while at the same time he strengthened his position by occupying Dreux. On July 23, Henry IV. recognised the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church as the true one, and promised obedience. On the following February 27, he was anointed in the Cathedral of Chartres, since Rheims, where this ceremony should have been performed, was still in the hands of the League.