Chapter XXX: The Next Moves in the International Game

Out of the Peace Conference and the welter of policies that followed it students of international affairs have learned one thing, if nothing else: to distrust the efficacy of formulas to improve relations among nations. Despite the sacrifices and the heroic deeds of countless millions of civilized human beings, despite the educational propaganda of the war years, despite the high ideals for the triumph of which we believed that we were fighting, there was a scramble for spoils immediately the war was ended. The Paris Peace Conference conclusively proved that there had been no conversion of statesmen from their faith in traditional foreign policies to the widely heralded and much vaunted principles of “self-determination,” “rights of small nations,” “making the world safe for democracy,” “a durable world peace,” and “the league of nations.” No effort was made to repudiate the Prussian idea that “might goes before right,” and it was soon evident that the war fought to liberate subject peoples had resulted in the destruction and ruin of some of them and in bringing out in the rest of them the bad traits we condemned the Germans for showing.

The story of Europe since 1918 gives us furiously to think; for we have seen our statesmen and leaders unable to abandon the traditional rules of the diplomatic game in their efforts to solve post-bellum problems and the great mass of intelligent men and women unwilling to inform themselves about and think constructively upon questions affecting world peace. It was natural that there should have been indulgence in prejudices and passions during the war. Whether in a righteous cause or not, fighting implies the abandonment of the inhibitions of civilized society and a return of the law of the jungle. Violence and the reasoning faculty cannot be used coördinately in the settlement of disputes. The excuse for putting our trust in force was that our opponents would listen to no other argument, and that when we had won we intended to restore the rule of reason. Our methods and our aims were totally different from those of our enemies, so we said, and we were saving civilization while they were trying to destroy it.

In fairness to our statesmen it must be recognized that public opinion in all the victorious countries called out for a victors’ peace and that if the world now exhibits symptoms of social disintegration and is for the time being on the down grade, it is because the passions engendered by the war did not die out and because hysterical peoples forgot or disclaimed in the hour of victory the goal that had made them capable of stupendous sacrifices and effort during the war years.

The Entente Powers and the United States are beginning to recognize that their failure to agree upon a common policy in Europe and the Near East is condemning them to forego the advantages of their victory in the World War. Protagonists and critics of the Paris peace settlement are still poles apart. On one point, however, all must agree. The Treaty of Versailles, and the other treaties modeled after it and dependent upon it, have failed to bring peace to Europe and the world. It is fruitless to talk about the bad faith of Germany, the abstention of the United States, the disconcertingly long lease of life of Soviet Russia, the imperialism of Great Britain, the militarism of France, and the unreasonableness of small states and subject nationalities; for each of these factors, taken by itself, is a result rather than a cause of the failure of the treaties. If we content ourselves with calling each other bad names and seeking to find in some one unruly national current or attitude the source of our ills, the universal chaos will only increase. It would not be hard to build up a convincing brief against the foreign policy followed by every nation, friend and enemy, since the armistice of November 11, 1918. But we get nowhere unless we are able to show that the present state of affairs is due, not to the errors of statesmen dealing with specific problems, but to fundamentally unsound and irrealizable concepts in the general bases of the treaties.

Among the errors of the Paris settlement we can point out: (1) creating a League of Nations whose charter provides for the permanent hegemony of five nations, with widely divergent interests; (2) reserving the advantages of the treaties to a few nations but making all members of the League responsible for their execution; (3) treating the vanquished enemies as criminals without right to counsel or appeal to an impartial tribunal, but at the same time not providing jailers to keep them in prison during the period of punishment; (4) denying the principle of reciprocity in contractual obligations; (5) declaring that the treaties are based upon the policy of freeing peoples from alien rule, but limiting the application of the policy to a few especially favored peoples, and violating it in other cases; (6) failing to apply one weight and one measure in passing upon the claims to reparations of peoples who had suffered in the World War through aggression, invasion, and the violation of international law; and (7) maintaining the old balance of power theory.

When we analyze the treaty, and study the course of the negotiations, we see that the first six errors are the children, that is, the outgrowth, of the seventh. It is possible to explain all the treaties by keeping in mind that the dominating idea of the Peace Conference was the recognition of the transcendent rights of the powers that had big armies and navies. The battle had been to the strong; so likewise should be the spoils. A new balance of power had to be created by virtue of which the strong could remain permanently strong by compounding their rivalries and by allowing one another strategic frontiers and the privilege of forming new international combinations for the purpose of keeping weak the peoples that had been conquered. The methods of waging war and of gauging strength, however, had radically changed during the nineteenth century. No longer were man-power and geographical position decisive elements. Coal, iron, oil, and access to food-stuffs and raw materials had become vital factors in the power of nations.

Far from being discouraged by the alarming condition of international relations five years after the war, we should feel relieved that we have been afforded a salutary demonstration of the futility of the Paris peace settlement at so little cost. If our eyes are now opened to the dangers of the international game, as it has been played since 1918, there is yet a chance to mend our ways before irreparable damage is done. Most of those who are writing on European politics are neither cynics nor pessimists, and they do not record the failure of these years with ghoulish delight. In discussing the possible dangers ahead they do not relish the rôle of Cassandra. The purpose of writing is to show how policies, approved in the beginning by public opinion, are likely to work out. Is the game worth the candle? That is for the reader to decide.

The twofold mandate from voters to those who represent them in matters of foreign policy is: make us secure, and make us prosper. That is why the struggle for the possession of coal, iron, oil, and world markets, and not international coöperation as embodied in the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, underlies the history of Europe since 1918, and furnishes an appallingly sordid explanation of the policies followed by European statesmen in the Saar, the Ruhr, Upper Silesia, Eastern Galicia, the Banat of Temesvár, the Donetz region of Ukrainia, the Caucasus, northern Persia, and the Mosul region of Turkey. If Germany and Russia could be permanently deprived of the resources essential to war that abound in these disputed territories, their man-power would count for little. They would be reduced to a state of vassalage, and the strength of the nations possessing or controlling these regions would be correspondingly increased.

Under the spell of this idea France is trying to reconstruct Europe, and she has been able to find support for her policy among those to whom German and Russian coal, iron, and oil have been allotted, and to whom German and Russian sea-ports and provinces have been given. In the Near East France was willing to let Great Britain have a free hand in the Caucasus and Persia and to sacrifice the right to Mosul recognized in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. To Rumania were handed over Bessarabia and the iron and coal in Temesvár. Germany’s coal supplies passed under Franco-Polish control, and the French hope that Poland has become by the possession of Upper Silesia and Eastern Galicia a state strong enough to be a permanent barrier between Germany and Russia. As an additional safeguard against the regrouping of the Teutonic element in central Europe and its contact with Hungary and Russia, the Little Entente was formed.

For France the next move in the international game is to settle the reparations question with Germany and to make peace with Russia in such a way that Germany will lose control of her essential resources for war making and will be cut off permanently from the temptation of forming with Russia an alliance to shake off the stranglehold of the victors in the World War upon these two powers. France believes that Great Britain’s interests in Asia and her anxiety to prevent Germany from making another effort to compete with her for world markets and the carrying trade will eventually induce the British to acquiesce in the French scheme for a new European balance of power directed against both Germany and Russia.

The flaw in the French program is the failure to realize that France’s control of the Rhineland and the Ruhr and the dependence of Poland upon her give rise to the suspicion that her aim is the military and economic domination of Europe. The protestation or the fact of innocence of any such plan makes no difference to those who fear it. France has a great reservoir of African troops. With control of German coal and with Poland as a vassal she will be in a more advantageous position to impose her will upon Europe than Germany was in 1914, with Austria-Hungary as a vassal. The control of the Ruhr mines and factories will inevitably cause other European states to combine with Great Britain against France as they combined in the decade preceding the World War against Germany.

Great Britain is in an unhappy frame of mind over the political and economic situation of Europe. To get France out of the Ruhr and to release the hold of France on Germany, British public opinion is prepared to forgive the French debt--and the other interallied debts, for that matter. It is more important for Great Britain to-day than ever that no power dominate Continental Europe. The British are eager for the return of normal economic conditions and the restoration of their European markets. Outside Europe they have made many sacrifices, as in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and India, to get rid of military burdens and financial outlay by adopting an attitude of compromise toward demands of native populations for self-government. The imperialism of British foreign policy after the World War was, as we have seen, very quickly checked. British public opinion is alive to the danger of disregarding the aspirations of Asiatic and African peoples, and is prepared to go to almost any length to keep together the empire that has been centuries in the building. The greatest difficulty ahead for Great Britain comes from the insistent demand of Continental European countries that the world’s raw materials be pooled and that equality of access to them be granted by the great colonial power.

Italy’s next move in the international game is undoubtedly along the line of unhampered access to raw materials in Asia, and Africa, and Australia, and unrestricted emigration to the United States and the British Dominions. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that Italy stands in the same relation to the outside world in which Germany and Japan stand. The three great powers have become industrial nations with a rapidly growing population, and to exist and prosper they must import raw materials and food-stuffs and export manufactured goods. They need also an outlet for surplus population and opportunities for capital investment in countries where such investment helps their trade. There would have been no World War had not Germany felt herself deprived of “her place in the sun.” Other nations were ahead of her in preëmpting colonizing areas and the regions upon which Europe could draw for raw materials and rely for markets. The war did not solve Germany’s problem. It was her own fault, we can assert, and leave it at that. But how about Italy and Japan, our comrades in arms? Their need of world-wide equality for trade and emigration are as great as Germany’s, and they have not forfeited consideration of their claims, as Germany has done. On the contrary, they have a greater claim to the consideration of the more fortunate powers than they had a few years ago.

In attempting to put into one volume the eventful story of Europe since 1918 we have given very little space to the League of Nations and the United States; for during these years neither one nor the other has had a vital part in European affairs. What the future will bring forth none knows. But it is safe to venture the prophecy that Europe will successfully solve her own problems as she had done in the past, and that the rôle played by the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice will be negligible compared with the individual rôles of France and Great Britain. These two colonial powers hold in their hands the raw materials upon which all Europe except Russia and the Balkans depends for its well-being. What will be the colonial policy of Great Britain and France toward other European nations, especially toward Italy and Germany? What will be their policy toward Japan? Does not the peace of the world depend upon how the colonial powers will solve the problem of giving to Italy, Germany, and Japan a fair share in the privilege of developing and trading with Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world over which fly the British and French flags?

If Russia were still an ally of France and Great Britain, in sympathy with the doctrine that to those who have should be given and from those who have not should be taken even that which they have, the danger of a war over raw materials and trade and emigration outlets would not be imminent. As matters now stand earnest men should not be devoting all their attention and effort to creating and maintaining machinery to prevent war when no serious attention is being paid to the great cause of war, which is, in our generation, inequality in trade, colonization, and investment opportunities among powers of equal size, strength, standard of living, and productive capacity.

INDEX

Aaland Islands, 208

Abbazia conference, 285, 293

Abdul Hamid, 479–81

Abernon, Lord d’, 391, 539, 543

Adalia, 151

Adana, 480

Adrianople, 425, 496

Afghanistan, 185–6, 475–7

Albania, 134–5, 145–6, 166, 282, 285, 295, 349, 520, 523

Albert, King of Belgians, 374, 545

Alexander, King of Greece, 425, 428

Alexander, King of Serbia, 278–9, 287–9

Allenstein plebiscite, 55, 85

Alsace-Lorraine, 20–1, 79–81, 121, 244, 308, 381, 551

Ambassadors, Conference of, 243–4, 431, 522

Angora, 430–1, 447, 454, 456, 495, 500, 503

Annunzio, G. d’, 206–7, 245, 278, 347, 349, 357

Antwerp, 370, 372, 374, 376, 381

Archangel, 182

Armenia, 35, 151, 155–6, 158, 163, 182, 451–2

Armenian massacres, 8, 189, 439, 449, 480

Armistice commission at Spa, 22

Armistice with Germany, terms of, 14–17, 21–3

Asquith, H. H., 31, 480, 571

Austria-Hungary, armistice with, 3, 7, 12, 23–4, 33, 122, 330–3

Austria, republic of, 261, 266–8, 330–45, 390

Baker, Ray Stannard, 38, 86, 114–16

Balfour Declaration, 153

Balfour, Secretary, 538

Balfour note on interallied debts, 589

Balkan states 474, 491, 494

Baltic republics, 205–30, 295

Barnes, George, 31, 38

Barthou, M., 195–6

Baruch, B. N., 114, 117

Bauer, Chancellor, 55, 394

Bela Kun, 319, 322

Belgium, participation in Peace Conference, 24–5, 42–3, 371–3
subservient to French policy, 43, 377–80, 537
dissatisfied with Versailles treaty, 98
problems internal after World War, 368–85
exaggerated claims of, 369, 375
invited to Washington Conference, 510
joins France in Ruhr occupation, 378, 561–84
money depreciated, 587

Benes, Dr. Edouard, 203, 259, 266–8, 270–2

Berlin, Congress of 1878, 298, 305–7

Bessarabia, 181, 199, 203, 212, 299–302, 309–310, 520, 605

Bissolati, Senator, 347

Bliss, General T. H., 9, 13, 114, 508, 580

Bolivia, 25

Bonar Law, Premier, 539–43, 546, 562–3, 575–6

Bonomi, Premier, 341, 354

Borah, Senator, 509

Bosphorus, _see_ Straits

Boulogne, Conference, 525–6

Boyden, R. W., 565–6

Bradbury, Sir John, 539, 543, 565

Bratiano, Premier, 38, 64–8, 98, 302, 314

Bratislava, 266

Brazil, 24, 25, 42

Briand, Premier, 356, 533, 549, 557

Britain, _see_ Great Britain

British Dominions, participation in Peace Conference, 24, 25, 96;
in world affairs, 593, 608

British Labor party, against peace of revenge, 31–2
opposes Ruhr occupation, 571

Brest-Litovsk, treaty of (1918), 8, 16

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count von, 50, 55, 389

Brusa, 425, 462

Brusiloff, General, 167

Brussels Conferences, 525–7, 532–3, 537

Bucharest, Treaty of (1913) 135–6

Bucharest, Treaty of (1918), 8, 16

Bulgaria, armistice with, 3, 4, 7, 331
accepts Treaty of Neuilly, 69
loses outlet to Ægean, 135–6
Macedonia still bone of contention, 136–7, 292–4
Prosperity not seriously affected by World War, 139–40
Stambulisky régime in and its overthrow, 141–4, 504
Revolt against treaty, 144, 294
Rumania’s relations with, 295 ff.

Butler, Dr. N. M., 392

Caillaux, Joseph, 551

Canada, 38, 42, 83

Cannes Conference, 533

Caporetto, 434

Caucasus republics, 35, 182, 200, 443–4, 449, 452, 473–4,
476–7, 604–5

Cecil, Lord Robert, 84, 512

Chamberlain, Austen, 551

Chanak, 459

Charles, Hapsburg Emperor, 269, 287

Chester, Admiral, 503

Child, Ambassador, 500–1

China, participation in Peace Conference, 24–5
Japan’s intentions concerning, 34, 101
championed, then deserted by Wilson, 48
refuses to sign Versailles Treaty, 57, 94–5, 180
renewal of dispute with Russia over Mongolia, 183–4
invited to Washington Conference, 510
victim of European imperialism, 499, 515

“Christian Science Monitor,” 244–5

Cilicia, 150, 152, 156, 159, 163, 443–4, 452–3

Clemenceau, Georges, 28–31, 40, 42–3, 50–1, 57, 64–5, 97, 116, 119,
365, 421–2, 565

Coanda, General, 307

Colby, Secretary, 243

Colby note to Russia, 217–24

Communism, does not attract outside Russia, 173
failure of in Russia, 172–6;
in Italy, 349–55;
in Germany, 388, 394–5;
in Hungary, 321–2;
in Serbia, 287–9;
in Bulgaria, 142

Constantine, King, 415, 419–20, 428–9, 432, 435

Constantinople, _see_ Straits

Continuation conferences, 69, 160, 180, 519–43

_Cordon sanitaire_ policy, 251

Crete, 491

Crimean War, 474

Cuba, 24–5

Cuno, Chancellor, 410–12, 574–5, 580

Curzon, Lord, 184, 364, 457–9, 483, 494, 500–1, 539, 573, 575

Cyprus, 35, 153, 426, 491

Czechoslovakia, creation of, 24, 123–5, 257–72, 295, 333
participation of in Peace Conference, 24–5, 42
relations with Soviet Russia, 202–3
disputes with Poland over Teschen, 238–9
helps Austria, 341
fears _Anschluss_, 343
money depreciated, 587

Czernin, Count, 259

Damascus, 206, 475

Danzig corridor, 80, 86, 237, 270, 284

Dardanelles, _see_ Straits

Degoutte, General, 568

Denikin, General, 182, 192, 194, 212–3, 239, 302

Denmark, 57, 81–2

Dmowski, Roman, 43, 233

Dodecanese, 151, 163, 347, 421, 426, 491

Dorpat, Peace of, 214

Ebert, President, 345, 387, 389, 403, 567

Ecuador, 25

Egypt, 35, 87, 100, 153, 231, 365, 469, 475–6, 491, 607

England, _see_ Great Britain

Entente, Little _see_ Little Entente

Entente Powers, unpreparedness for peace, 4–6
organized Peace Conference, 24–6
secret understandings among, 34–5, 48, 151
difficulties in agreeing on other treaties after Versailles,
61–3, 69, 205–7
gain through treaty compromises, 94, 129–30
sell out Serbia to Italy, 122
Balkan diplomacy of, 140–41
attempt to partition Albania, 146
differ on Near Eastern policy, 150, 469–504
recognize independence of Hedjaz, 152
use mandate scheme to distribute German colonies and divide
Ottoman Empire, 156–9
prestige affected by delay of peace with Turkey, 162
secret oil agreement at San Remo, 163, 524
attitude toward Soviet Russia, 169–71, 193–7, 527
intrigues in Baltic States, 201
attempt to modify Rumanian territorial claims, 302–6
help Belgium after war, 374
generally divergent foreign policies of, 521–43

Epirus, Northern, 163, 421

Eski Sheïr, 425, 430, 443

Esthonia, 35, 200–01, 209–10, 212–14, 216–17

Eupen, 84–5, 373–4

Facta, Premier, 352, 363

Fascismo, 327, 352–5, 357–64

Feisal, Emir, 152, 159

Ferrero, Signor, 105–6

Finland, 35, 100, 199–200, 208–9, 219, 230, 295, 590, 587

Fiume, 33, 48, 80, 86, 100, 122, 206, 278, 281, 283–4, 293, 347,
349, 363, 365, 422, 523

Foch, Marshal, 15, 25, 50, 116, 529, 532, 544

Forster, Henry A., 598

Foster, Sir George, 117

France, unprepared for peace, 4–5
participation in Peace Conference, 24, 27–31
demands against Germany outlined during war, 27
infeudates Belgium, 42–3, 377–80
infeudates Poland, 42–3, 79–80, 122, 231–2, 242, 244–7, 250–1,
265, 269, 487, 605–6
satisfaction with Versailles Treaty, 97–8
length of Rhineland occupation dependent upon will of, 116–17
blocks renewal of German expansion to east, 130–1
aims to become dominant Mediterranean power, 153–4, 364
hostile to Soviet Russia, 168, 192–4, 197, 269–70
policy toward Austria, 343
intrigues against Greece, 421–2
treaty with Turkish Nationalists, 452–5
abandons Cilicia, 159, 188, 452–4
opposes Great Britain in Near East, 469–90
attitude toward Germany explained, 544–60
occupies Ruhr, 561–89
financial weakness of, 587, 591, 595–6
foreign policy of, 605–7, 609–10

Franchet d’Espérey, General, 156

Franklin Bouillon, Senator, 452–4, 460, 483

Frankfort, Treaty of (1871), 121

Gade, Commander, 220–23

Galicia, Eastern, 237–8, 241–4, 295, 328, 520, 604

Galicia, Western, 237

Geddes, Sir Eric, 559

Genoa Conference, 193–7, 270–2, 534–7

George, King of Greece, 429, 435

Germany, armistice with, 3–17, 21–3
did not surrender unconditionally, 19–21, 51
war responsibility, 8, 23, 33, 50, 54, 73, 77
blockade continued after armistice, 16, 23, 50
war prisoners held, 16, 23
excluded from Peace Conference, 26
colonies divided among enemies, 34, 374
required to evacuate Posen on renewing armistice, 46
internal conditions since the war, 55–6, 386–414
her _Drang nach Osten_ blocked by Paris treaties, 130, 297
makes treaty with Russia at Genoa, 194–6
resists reparation payments, 389–414, 519–543
passive resistance in Ruhr, 561–84
France’s fear of, 544–560

Gibraltar, 154, 484, 487, 489

Giolitti, 348–51, 352–3, 363

Gonatas, Colonel, 435, 437

Gouraud, General, 161, 206

Great Britain, participation in Peace Conference, 24, 31–33
against freedom of the seas, 13–14
insists upon modification of Polish frontiers, 47, 55, 250–1
Versailles Treaty advantageous to Great Britain, 95–6, 346, 456
determined to break Germany’s hold on Danubian countries, 130
policies in Near East, 151–6, 159–63, 469–90
evacuates Caucasus, 183, 185
forces treaty on Persia, 185
makes trade agreement with Soviet Russia, 186
sends ultimatum to Russia, 199
policy in Baltic republics, 212–24
supremacy in Mediterranean contested by Italy, 364, 484
attitude toward Belgium, 372–3, 379
refuses to give back to Turkey Mosul, 497–8
at Washington Conference, 510–16
attitude toward German reparations, 524–43, 561–3, 565–6
funds debt to United States, 588–590
financial obligations of European Allies toward, 591–3
present foreign policy of, 606–8
holds raw materials and colonizing areas, 609–10

Great Powers, former relations to Balkans and Turkey, 148–9

Greece, participation in Peace Conference, 24–5, 68, 98
Hellenistic ambitions of, 45, 416–9, 421, 488
expansion and debacle of, 415–41
used by Entente in Asia Minor, 155, 161, 422–7, 432
at Lausanne Conference, 436, 438, 440, 491–504
depreciated money of, 587

Grouitch, Dr. Slavko, 279

Guatemala, 24–25

Haiti, 24, 25

Haller, 253–4

Hamburg, 406, 567

Hamilton, General Sir Ian. 105

Hapsburg Empire, succession of, 119–32

Harding, President, 191, 506–8, 516

Hedjaz, kingdom of, 24, 25, 151–3, 159, 164–5, 465–6, 475–6, 475,
491, 497, 502

Hellenism, 416–9, 421;
_see also_ Greece

Herriot, Senator, 197

Hindenburg, Marshal von, 330 388

Holland, 100, 222, 369–73, 381, 386–7, 510, 559, 572

Honduras, 24, 25

Hoover, Herbert, 508, 597

Horthy, Admiral, 326, 332

House, Colonel, E. M., 9, 111, 113

Hughes, Secretary, 458, 508–9, 514

Hussein, King, 152

Hungary the new state of, 126, 259, 266–9, 311, 315

Hymans, 42, 43, 228–9

Hythe Conference, 525–6

India, 24, 25, 96, 192, 405–7, 475, 607

Interallied debts, 518, 520–1, 534, 537–8, 550, 585–98

Irak, 466

Ireland, 231, 469

Ismet Pasha, 493–5, 499–501

Italy, participates in Peace Conference, 24, 33–4
against Serbian expansion, 33, 47, 62–3, 122–4, 279–80, 282–85,
292–3, 349, 523
retires from Peace Conference, 48, 422
opposition in to Versailles Treaty, 100–1
driven out of Albania, 146–7, 349, 523
progressively withdraws from Asia Minor, 161, 453, 459
Russian policy of, 198, 215, 350
foreign policy of, 343, 363–6, 424, 487, 539
intrigues against Greece, 161–2, 421–2, 432–3, 471–2
at Washington Conference, 510–12
indebtedness to United States, 537, 590, 592
demands unhampered access to raw materials and unrestricted
immigration, 608–9

Japan, 24, 34, 42, 101–2, 179–80, 182, 364, 510–18, 579, 608–9

Jewry, international, 476

Jews, persecuted in Poland, 253–5
situation of in Rumania, 305–7

Jugoslavia, _see_ Serbia

Kaiser Wilhelm II, flees to Holland, 386–7
proposed trial of, 32, 77, 371

Karagach, 496, 504

Kattowitz, 246–8, 400–1

Kemal Pasha, _see_ Mustafa Kemal

Kerensky, A., 167, 170

Keynes, J. M., 117

Kiev, 239–40, 302

Klagenfurt plebiscite, 282

Knox, Senator, 73–4, 114

Kolchak, Admiral, 167, 182, 185, 192, 194, 212–3, 239, 302

Konia, 152, 161

Korfanty, 400

Kramar, M., 66, 264

Krupp von Bohlen, 570

Lansing, Secretary, 15, 38, 113–5

Latin America, British investments in, 593

Lausanne, Conference of, 188, 198–9, 364–6, 415. 436, 438, 440, 448,
451, 461–2, 466, 491–504, 517, 537, 539

Latin American republics, attitude toward Versailles Treaty, 102–4

Latvia, 35, 200–1, 209–11, 216–17, 240

Law, Bonar, 31, 32, 83, 539–43, 546, 562–3, 575–6

League of Nations, proposed by Wilson, 41
draft modified, 45
Wilson defends, 59–60
exclusion of Germany from, 75–6
gives British Empire six votes, 96
France shows no faith in, 97
imperfectly safeguards Monroe Doctrine, 103
United States refuses to enter, 106–8 506–7, 522
Lansing against, 114
intervenes to settle Serbo-Albanian frontier, 147
ignores Near Eastern questions, 149–50, 489
fails to enforce mandatory government in Near East, 157–9,
206, 520
important to settle Vilna question, 225–8
helps Austria to get credits, 340
suggests Brussels Conference, 532
ignores German protests, 403
offers membership to Turkey, 431
champions special rights, 489–90

Lemburg, 247

Lenin, 171, 177, 184, 186, 202, 212, 214, 227, 360, 462

Libau, 209, 215

Liberia, 24, 25

Liebknecht, Karl, 388

Lithuania, 35, 100, 200–1, 207, 209–11, 216–17, 219–29, 233–5,
245–6, 295

Little Entente, 251, 266–9, 287, 291–2, 326, 460, 605

Lloyd George, 31, 32–3, 38, 40, 46–47, 116–7, 120, 154–5, 161,
195–6, 279, 356, 365, 395, 421–4, 427, 457–9, 473, 480,
483, 524, 527, 550–3, 538–40, 546, 548–9, 562, 571

London, continuation conferences in, 523, 530–2, 538–9, 542

London, Pact of, 24

London, Treaty of (1839), 370

London, Treaty of (1913), 449

London, secret treaty of (1915), 24, 33, 34, 48, 122, 137, 151–2,
346, 364, 487, 523

Luxemburg, Grand Duchy, 370, 372–3, 380

Luxemburg, Rosa, 388

Lvoff, Prince, 167, 170

Lympne conference, 527–8

Macedonia, 134, 136–8, 234, 280, 292–4, 476, 479–80, 491

Maestricht, 371–2

Malmédy, 84–5, 373–4

Malta, 487

Manchuria, 183

Mandates, _see_ League of Nations

Marienwerder plebiscite, 55, 85

Maritza River, 135, 504

Masaryk, President, 259

Mecca, _see_ Hedjaz

Memel, 86, 207, 209, 228–9, 246, 284, 520

Mesopotamia, British occupation of, 35, 152, 159, 163, 431, 443,
467, 469, 475–6, 491, 607

Mexico, 593

Millerand, President, 161, 356

Minsk, 240

Mongolia, 183–4

Monroe Doctrine, 102–4

Montenegro, incorporated in Serbia, 147, 275–6, 278, 282, 285, 520

Morocco, 87, 365

Mosul, 152, 443, 497–9, 604–5

Mudania armistice, 435, 460–2, 472, 492

Mussolini, 198, 352–66, 450, 462, 524, 540, 542, 576, 591

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 161, 326, 444, 450–1, 454–62, 465, 488, 501,
504

Narutowicz, President, 253–4

Near East Relief, 440

Neuilly, Treaty of, 69, 134–40, 142–4, 282, 292, 294, 307, 426

Nicaragua, 24, 25

Niedamowski, 253–5

Nitti, Premier, 38, 100, 117, 161, 163, 165, 178, 203, 347–8, 357,
391, 395, 524

Open door, real significance of, 101–2, 596, 603–5, 607–10

Orlando, Premier, 63, 100, 348, 363, 365, 421

Ottoman Empire, _see_ Turkey

Paderewski, Premier, 66, 236, 238

Painlevé, Paul, 557

Palestine, 35, 152–3, 158–9, 163, 165, 469, 476, 491

Panama, 24, 25

Panama Canal, 489

Paris, atmosphere of during Peace Conference, 27

Paris, Conference of (1856), 298

Paris, continuation conferences in, 402, 523, 528–9, 532, 541–3, 563

Paris Peace Conference, 18–70, 111–18, 205–6, 281–2, 298, 307,
325–6, 334, 338, 420–4, 446, 519–20, 548, 599

Pashitch, Premier, 265, 277, 280–1, 285, 290

Pellé, General, 503

Pershing, General, 508

Persia, 35, 96, 151, 180, 184–6, 443–4, 474–7, 604–5, 607

Peru, 25

Pilsudski, Marshal, 236–7, 251–2

Plastiras, Colonel, 435, 438

Poincaré, Raymond, 40, 184, 364, 460, 483, 525, 533–4, 538–43, 546,
549, 563, 573

Poland, resurrection of, 24, 79, 123, 125, 231–56, 295–6
participation in Peace Conference, 24, 25, 42, 43
real interests not considered at Peace Conference 79–80
wins victory over Soviet Russia, 200–1
frontiers of, 48, 55, 233–5, 250–1, 520
Vilna seizure, 206–7, 225–8
protests Lithuanian seizure of Memel, 229
financial weakness of, 249–50, 587
and Upper Silesia, 400–2
dependence on France, 42–3, 79–80, 122, 231–2 242, 244–7, 250–1,
265, 269, 487, 605–6

Porta Rosa Conference, 342

Portugal, 24, 25, 510

Pressburg (Bratislava), 266

Przemysl, 243

Racial equality, Japanese ask for at Peace Conference, 101–2

Rapallo, Treaty of, 283–5, 349

Rapallo, Treaty of (Russia and Germany), 194, 193–7, 536

Rathenau, Walter, 195

Reciprocity, denial of principle in Versailles treaty, 76–81

Reparations from Germany, 32–3, 52–4, 91–2, 375–6, 399, 402–13, 469,
518, 520, 525–43, 561–4, 588, 591, 596

Reparations Commission, 405, 520, 525, 539, 541, 565, 576, 591

Reval, 210, 215

Rhineland, occupation of, 18, 21–2, 79, 97, 116–7, 373, 404, 414,
483, 549, 557–9, 563, 569, 606

Ruhr, France threatens to occupy, 398, 404, 411, 529, 532, 534,
541–3, 546, 561
occupation of, 208, 228, 500, 561–84, 606–7
Spartacist, insurrection in, 394–5

Rhodes, _see_ Dodecanese

Riga, 209, 215

Riga, Treaty of, 201–2, 215–227, 240–2

Root, Elihu, 114

Rumania, aggrandizenment of, 24, 123, 125, 275, 295–316
participation in Peace Conference, 24, 25, 64, 298–302
intervention bought by secret treaty, 34, 122, 137, 265
protests against Treaty of St.-Germain, 64–8
annexes Bessarabia, 203, 212, 300–2
common frontier with Poland, 241
occupies Budapest, 299
signs treaties, 307
finances of, 587

Russia, Soviet, Entente Powers in war with, 35
excluded from Paris Peace Conference, 57, 180
stands behind Turkey, 162–5
internal evolution and foreign policy of, 167–204
makes treaty with Afghanistan, 185,
with Turkey, 187–9, 453,
with Great Britain, 186,
with Germany, 194–7,
with Poland, 201–2,
with Czechoslovakia, 270
at Lausanne Conference, 188, 198–9
at Genoa Conference, 193–7
Great Britain sends ultimatum to, 199
relations with Baltic states, 205–30
anti-Bolshevist movement, 211
excluded from Washington conference, 510–12
German economic activity in, 406
no peace for in League of Nations, 180
Russia, Transcaucasian, 96

Saar Commission, 83

Saar Valley, 82–4, 100, 604

St.-Germain, Treaty of, 62–9, 99, 119–32, 221, 258, 265, 267, 274,
282, 288, 305–6, 335–40, 344, 426

San Remo, Conference of, 160–3, 187, 395, 424, 431, 471–2, 523–4

San Stefano, Treaty of, 474

Scheidemann, 389, 394

Schleswig, 57, 81–2

Self-determination, violations of principle of in Versailles
Treaty, 81–7
in St.-Germain and Trianon Treaties, 123 ff., 205–6, 284, 304,
317–19
in Treaty of Neuilly, 137–9
in Treaty of Sèvres, 205–6
in Treaty of Riga, 201–2
proclaimed by Soviet Russia, 179
Wilson’s dilemma concerning, 218–19

Serbia, aggrandizement of, 24, 123, 125–6, 273–294, 295–6
participation in Peace Conference, 25, 42
conflict between Pan-Serbs and Jugoslavs, 265, 276–8, 281, 286–91

Sèvres, Treaty of, 162–6, 326, 424–7, 429–34, 443, 446, 459, 462,
471–2, 477–8, 484

Shantung question, 48, 50, 87, 94–5, 101, 365, 515–16

Siam, 24, 25

Siberia, 179, 182, 200, 203, 510–11

Sikorski, General, 255

Simons, Secretary, 402, 530–1

Smuts, General, 38, 58–9, 72, 116, 157

Smyrna, Greece asked by Big Four to occupy, 160, 365, 415, 422–5,
434–5, 443, 453, 455, 501

Spa Conference, 396–7, 525–8 592

Stambulisky, late Premier, 141–4, 504

Stefanik, General, 259

Straits, question of, 162, 166, 188, 198, 315, 425, 448–9,
460, 469–90, 517

Suez Canal, 475–6, 484, 487, 489

Supreme Council, 6–13, 25–6, 40, 295, 299–302, 305–6, 431,
444, 458, 522

Sweden, 100, 559, 572

Switzerland, 100, 559, 572

Sykes-Picot agreement, 35, 152, 605

Syria, French occupation of, 35, 158–9, 161, 432, 443, 491

Tardieu, André, 38, 116

Tchitcherin, 188, 195, 198–9

Temesvár, Banat of, 44, 126, 138, 280, 282, 298–305, 310,
324, 327, 604

Ter Meulen plan, 532–3

Teschen dispute, 44, 238, 265

Thrace, Eastern, 134–6, 162, 425, 427, 433, 435–6, 439, 443, 453,
460, 462, 479, 483, 492, 498

Thrace, Western, 135–7, 441, 447, 496–7, 504

Transiberian railway, 179, 183

Trianon, Treaty of, 69, 119–32, 258, 265, 274, 282, 288, 305, 307,
312, 317–23, 326, 344, 426

Triest, 80, 86, 283

Tripoli, 480, 491

Trotzky, 171

Trumbich, M., 66

Turkey, armistice with, 3, 7, 150, 331, 442–3, 459
Hedjaz detached from, 24
secret understanding among Entente Powers concerning, 35, 135
proposed division of 148–66
future not settled by Paris Conference, 159–60
money depreciated, 587

Turkish Nationalists, 161–2, 165–6, 187, 189, 423, 431, 440,
442–68, 491–504

Ukrainia, 35, 182, 200, 212, 237–8, 240, 244, 295, 302, 604

United States, participates in Peace Conference, 24, 29, 44
involved in Entente war against Soviet Russia, 35
Yankee imperialism, 102
Monroe Doctrine, 102–4
no moral leadership of, had treaty been ratified, 104–5
refuses to ratify treaty, 106–9
protests against partition of Albania, 146, 523
not offered mandate over Armenia, 155–6
protests San Remo oil agreement, 165
Persia asks for financial mission, 186
Russian policy, 217–24, 510–11
difficulties encountered in taking sides in European
questions, 224
Finland funds debt to, 230, 588
refuses to refer German protests to Allied Governments, 403
refuses to recognize return of Constantine, 429
and Panama Canal, 489
at Lausanne Conference, 500–3
at Washington Conference, 505–18
opposition to League of Nations, 506–7, 522
at Brussels Conference, 537
declines invitation to Genoa Conference, 534
European indebtedness to, 537–8, 550, 585–98
suggested fixed indemnity at Peace Conference, 548
duty of to help France constructively, 554, 557–60
Great Britain funds debt to, 587–8
observer on Reparations Commission declares Versailles Treaty
impracticable, 566
has had no vital part in European affairs since 1918, 609

Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), 474

Upper Silesia, 55, 85–6, 207, 237, 246–7, 344, 399–402, 404,
520, 537, 604–5

Uruguay, 25

Vaïda, Premier, 312–14

Vandervelde, 38

Venizelos, E., 68, 98, 154, 160–1, 163, 265, 415, 418–24, 427–9,
436, 438, 441, 493–4, 504

Versailles, Treaty of, 49–61, 71–118, 160, 167, 178, 221, 228–9,
237, 328, 334, 337, 347, 373–5, 398, 414, 519, 523–7, 543–5,
558, 566–7, 573–4, 601–4

Versailles, Treaty of, principal features, 74–5, 446, 461, 506

Vienna, Conference of (1815), 26, 95, 208, 219, 415

Vilna made Lithuanian capital, 210–11

Vilna, question of, 201, 207, 225–8, 245–6, 344

Viviani, Premier, 356

Vladivostok, 183

Warsaw, 204, 236, 253–6, 261

Washington Conference, 180, 183, 485–6, 505–18, 550

Wei-hai-wei, 515

Weimar assembly, 389, 396

Wilson, President, war speeches of, 4, 7–8, 13–14, 27, 35, 43, 47,
48, 104, 218
arrival in Paris, 36
distinguished between Germans and their government, 7–8, 119
refers Germany’s armistice request to Supreme Council, 8
curious attitude of on Polish frontiers, 48
Fourteen Points of, 9, 10, 13–14, 21, 30, 47, 52, 283
at Peace Conference, 21, 28, 40–1, 44–9, 95, 122
Manchester speech, 30
proposes Prinkipo conference, 40
seems to break physically at Paris, 48
ignorant of secret treaties, 48, 158
deceived on mandates question, 157–9, 374
tries to keep Versailles terms secret, 52
lauds treaty in statement to press, 59–60
betrayed into defending Old World diplomacy, 66–8
denies accuracy of Peace Conference records, 67
urges ratification of Versailles Treaty, 72, 106–7, 506
note to Austria-Hungary, 217–18
opposes Italy on Fiume question, 48, 86, 101, 346, 365, 422
joins in asking Venizelos to occupy Smyrna, 160, 421–3

Wirth, Chancellor, 401, 404

Wojciechowski, President, 255

Wrangel, Baron, 154, 167, 182, 192, 194, 204, 527

Yudenitch, General, 182, 192, 212–13

Zara, 283

Zeligowski and Vilna, 207, 225–9, 245

FOOTNOTES

[1] Since writing this chapter, my attention has been called to a remarkably clear and frank article contributed by General Tasker H. Bliss, American military member of the Supreme Council, in the September, 1922, “Journal of International Law.” General Bliss quotes copiously from his own notes and correspondence to show that the Allied Premiers had begun to discuss the armistice on October 8, and that the French, British, and Italian military advisers were subject to higher political authority in fixing the terms of the armistice. General Bliss protested on purely military grounds. He believed that whether the Germans consented or not, no armistice should be proposed that did not render the enemy immediately impotent. The Entente Powers, according to General Bliss, allowed the military and naval terms of peace, which could have been communicated to the Germans within a few weeks after the armistice, to be withheld until the final treaty was ready seven months later. The unmilitary character of the armistice and peace negotiations was due to the fact that the Entente Powers were “out for loot,” as the General puts it, and were constantly suspicious of one another. From the beginning there were programs--but no common program!

[2] In his last great speech, on September 27, 1918, speaking of the work of the conference ahead, Mr. Wilson had said: “There must be a full acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. That is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace.”

[3] Many observers, like myself, marveled at the change that came over Mr. Wilson between January and May. His vindictiveness, as brought out in the discussions over Polish frontiers, puzzled the British as well as the Americans. He had traveled far from the spirit of his message to Congress of December 4, 1917, in which he had said: “No nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong.... The wrongs ... committed in this war ... cannot and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies.”

[4] Shortly before the election of 1920, Mr. Wilson, in a public statement, denied having made any such statement. The words had been attributed to Mr. Wilson by Senator Spencer of Missouri, who was running for reëlection on the Republican ticket. The denial was given at St. Louis, thus showing that it was meant to influence the campaign. Because Senator Spencer had quoted from one of my articles in “The Century Magazine,” I was called upon to substantiate the citation. This I was able to do from the minutes of the eighth plenary session, a complete copy of which is in my possession. A curious refutation was attempted in the form of a newspaper despatch from Chicago purporting to give the exact transcription of the notes of Mr. Wilson’s confidential stenographer. But the official minutes did not misquote Mr. Wilson. They had been established very carefully, and had not been filed in French in M. Dutasta’s office at the secretariat of the conference until they had been submitted to the American delegation and approved by it. The words quoted here are what Mr. Wilson wanted to have put on official record as expressing his sentiment at the time. The whole context of Mr. Wilson’s speech, moreover, bears witness to the accuracy of the sentiment expressed in this extract.

[5] The comparatively trifling value of the Saar coal, when one thinks of the violence done to the sentiments of over half a million people, was first brought to my attention by a group of Alsatians, all of them thoroughly loyal to France, but who were opposed to the Saar clauses of the treaty. They told me in December, 1918, that the propaganda for separating the Saar from Germany was ill advised, both from the political and economic points of view. Politically, they were afraid of the reunited provinces being swamped with more Germans, who could easily cross the frontier from the Saar valley. Economically, they declared that the coal was of little value and that the clamor for the Saar mines was simply a prelude to the annexation of the Rhine provinces by France, to which all Alsatians were opposed. What they told me is borne out by an article in “The New York Times,” March 25, 1923, in which a consulting engineer, Mr. Walter Graham, says: “The Saar coal basin is almost useless; for the coal makes a very inferior coke and the mines are deep and gaseous, the veins thin, and the coal impure.”

[6] One hundred years of trial have made Americans feel that the Monroe Doctrine is not to be unthinkably and lightly surrendered. The Senators who questioned the Covenant of the League of Nations were on unassailable ground when they insisted upon a reservation to make clear Article XXI. How poorly this article was drafted is shown by a comparison of the English and French texts, which have quite a different meaning. One cannot be called a translation of the other. The French text reads: “Les engagements internationaux, tels que les traités d’arbitrage, et les ententes régionales, comme le doctrine de Monröe, qui assurent le maintien de la paix, ne sont considérés comme incompatibles avec aucune des dispositions du présente pacte.” The English text says: “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to effect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.” Which text is right? The defenders of the League are necessarily silent on this point. Of one thing we are sure, that from the American viewpoint, the Monroe Doctrine is neither an “entente régionale” or a “regional understanding.” It is simply a unilateral declaration of purpose, valid only because of our determination and ability to enforce it.

[7] The assertion, so often made, that the United States was offered a share in the exploitation of the Ottoman Empire, and that the opportunity to aid effectively in the solution of the Near Eastern problem was rejected by our refusal to accept President Wilson’s mandate scheme, is without foundation. No such offer was ever made by the Entente Powers. It was not their intention to grant us any mandate like their own in Asiatic Turkey. Within narrow limits that excluded the plains, the mines, the timber, and the oil-fields, the British, French, and Italian premiers would have been glad to see created an Armenian state, financed and protected by the Americans, to which they might deport the Armenians remaining in Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and which would serve as a buffer between their sphere of influence and Soviet Russia. This purpose is revealed in a memorandum of General Franchet d’Espérey to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he summed up the resources of the regions inhabited by the Armenians. Citing the figures of agricultural and mining engineers, military observers, and railway experts, the general advocated the retention by France of Cilicia and the upper valley of the Euphrates, on the ground that this part of Armenia was a rich country that could be profitably exploited and easily defended, while it was geographically accessible from the Gulf of Alexandretta on the Mediterranean. The bare mountains of Armenia he declared to be without economic value and costly from the points of view of defense or the establishment of communications. He recommended that these regions should therefore be given to the United States!

[8] This statement is sure to be challenged by those who believe that Communism would have its fairest test in a small thickly populated industrial country like Belgium or larger industrial nations such as Germany and England. But we must remember that Communism does not appeal as strongly to Occidental peoples as to Slavs and peoples of Central Asiatic origin. In an Occidental industrial country the Bolshevist theory would have taken the form of State Socialism demanding to be immediately applied, and the suddenness and insistence of the challenge would have led to crushing failure within a few months, followed by a counter-revolution.

[9] The most bitter of Russian reactionaries were jealous of the unity of Russia. General Yudenitch, for instance, could never be induced to recognize the independence of Esthonia, even though he needed its military aid when he was using Esthonian territory as a base for operations against Petrograd. General Denikin sacrificed a chance to overthrow the Moscow Soviet in order to fight separatism in the Caucasus and the Ukraine. Admiral Kolchak could not be persuaded to use the bait of Siberian independence to help along his cause. In 1919 the Entente Powers and the United States felt they could not risk dampening the ardor of the Russian reactionaries by revealing their eventual policy. This is the explanation for the delay in answering Rumania’s pleas concerning Bessarabia.

[10] De facto recognition was eventually given to the Baltic republics, and their unofficial missions at Washington were changed to legations. But only Finland is as yet regarded by our State Department as on a footing with sovereign states.

[11] In fairness to the Polish Government it must be stated that the Diet, in anticipation of the Ambassadors’ action, passed a law in September, 1922, granting autonomy to Eastern Galicia. According to Count Skrzynski, the Polish Foreign Minister, interviewed in London on April 13, 1923, by a correspondent of the “Christian Science Monitor,” there are to be three local parliaments in Eastern Galicia, with two chambers, one of which must be composed of members of the Ukrainian community. Permanent officials will be appointed by the governor in a way corresponding “with the actual requirements of the two nationalities.” Governmental and judicial affairs are to be conducted in the Polish language, but the county parliaments may determine their own official language. These measures seem to me (I am familiar with local conditions) calculated to prevent the Ukrainians from voicing their national aspirations, and for this reason to be the granting of autonomy in name only. The law contains two good provisions, however, the promise of the establishment and maintenance of a Ukrainian university out of state funds, and the prohibition of colonization in Eastern Galicia.

[12] “Perhaps the severest blow to the prospects of peace in Europe and its economic recovery,” is how a number of British economists characterized the Upper Silesian decision in an open letter to the press. They pointed out that the loss of Königshütte, Kattowitz, Rybnik, and Pless made inevitable the day of German default in reparation payments.

[13] The assassin was disclaimed by his party, the National Democrats, as an irresponsible neurotic, and was executed on January 31. But ever since his death the Nationalists have regarded him as a martyr. Contributions to “place a wreath on the grave of Niewiadomski” were solicited in the press; and all over Poland mass was said, in the presence of distinguished congregations, “for the pure soul of Eligius Niewiadomski, who by the sacrifice of his own life has awakened the spirit of the nation.” According to the Warsaw correspondent of “The Manchester Guardian” (April 6, 1923), in many places shops were forced to close when these services were held; and the movement gained such volume in the churches that the Roman Catholic episcopate of Poland saw itself forced to intervene and declare that “although it is laudable to pray for the souls of the dead, the Holy Mass should not be made to serve purposes of political propaganda and demonstration.”

[14] The United States, however, owing to the skilful diplomacy of Dr. Slavko Grouitch, aided powerfully by his American wife, had recognized the union of the Jugoslavic portions of the defunct Hapsburg Empire with Serbia in January, 1919, and received Dr. Grouitch at Washington as “minister of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.” Throughout the Peace Conference Jugoslavia had American support, and President Wilson did not hesitate to risk wrecking the Conference to protect the Jugoslavs against the territorial greed of Italy.

[15] My Rumanian friends have sent me lengthy criticisms of the new constitution. Their objections seem to me not well taken; for their complaints are rather against the methods used in framing and securing the adoption of the constitution rather than on the contents of the document. The truth of the matter is that in Rumania as in Jugoslavia the new provinces are unwilling to lose their identity by being incorporated, without safeguards of local autonomy, in Greater Rumania and Greater Serbia. This same tendency I found last year among the Greeks of Asia Minor and Constantinople, and the Athens Government would have had troubles similar to those that are confronting the Belgrade and Bucharest Governments, had their military efforts against Turks ended in the liberation of Ottoman Greeks.

[16] The most striking example of Mussolini’s unhesitating determination to use the iron fist rather than tolerate lack of discipline in the ranks of Fascismo occurred on May 23, 1923, when he ordered the expulsion from the Fascist party of Captain Padovani, Commander of the Neapolitan district. Padovani was not only a dear friend of Mussolini, but also the acknowledged leader of the movement in southern Italy. In the expulsion decree the names of a dozen other leading followers of Mussolini in Naples appeared along with that of Padovani.

[17] Mussolini felt very sure of the loyalty of the younger members of the Catholic Party. Father Don Sturzo, leader of the Catholics, found that he could not count upon the willingness of the bulk of his followers to put Catholic interests above Fascist principles. Fascismo has so strong a hold upon even the most devout, who are in sympathy with the objects for which Don Sturzo has been fighting in a country that is still politically anti-Clerical, that there is a movement on foot to form a Fascist Catholic Party, which will give whole-hearted support to Mussolini.

[18] The members of the Raed van Vlaenderen, who were charged with making the independence of Flanders the real object of their demand for equality of language and higher education, and certain Activists, convicted of assisting the enemy by their work for this movement during the war, were sentenced to death for high treason. But they had already escaped to Holland, where they were well received by both the Government and the public. Dutch newspapers declared that these men had in what they considered a patriotic duty to their own country not aided Germany, wittingly or unwittingly, but were engaged of composite race.

[19] French policy is endeavoring to find a means of preventing Germany from developing her aërial activities, even after the five-year period provided for in the Treaty of Versailles has expired. An aviation convention, between France and Czechoslovakia, signed at the beginning of April, 1923, stipulates that the two nations bar Germans from landing in, or flying across, their respective countries. Germany retaliated by refusing permission of French and Czechoslovak airmen to land in and fly across her territory. That she was in earnest in affirming her right to reciprocity was indicated on May 19, when a French aviator, having to come down on German territory, was promptly thrown in jail and his airplane confiscated. When the French protested the Germans replied that they were doing as they were being done by. The only way such theses can be maintained is by the virtual continuance of European nations at war with one another.

[20] According to the “Annual Register” for 1921 (London), p. 180, Poland obtained almost exactly half of the two million inhabitants, although she had less than 40 per cent of the votes, and her share of the industrial region was far out of proportion to her voting strength. Poland got 49½ out of 61 coal-mines; all the iron-mines; 22 out of 37 furnaces; 400,000 out of 570,000 tons of pig-iron per annum; 12 out of 16 zinc- and lead-mines; and the three important cities of Königshütte, Kattowitz, and Tarnowitz, which had voted by large majorities to Germany.

[21] So far as productive capacity is concerned German shipyards have more than returned to their pre-war position. The new _Deutschland_, just completed, was the largest vessel launched in the world in 1922. In 1922 Germany was an easy second to Great Britain in building, her shipyards turned out 187 vessels of 526,000 tons. Not excepting Great Britain, every country except Germany turned out a smaller tonnage in 1922 than in 1921. In 1928, if the record of 1922 is kept up, Germany will have completely recovered from the effects of the war on her shipping. Similar reports from credible sources have come to me concerning airplane building. Germany is again leading the world in production of light motors, and has invented a new Diesel engine. The activity of Germany in Russia is emphasized by the concessions agreement signed at Moscow on May 18, 1923, by which the German Eastern Relations Society received 2,000,000,000 acres of forest land and the exploitation of the Moscow-Rybinsk Railway. German firms lead the field in export and import privileges in Russia.

[22] These figures, and more, are given in the London “Saturday Review” (March 3, 1923) to show that German industrialists have been taxed so heavily since the war that they “have gone to the limit in payment of what private enterprise can bear without breaking down altogether.”

[23] Italy welcomed the evidences of internal weakness and suicidal political strife indicated by the return of Constantine. The vote against Venizelos in November and the plebiscite in favor of the King in December helped the Italian Government to find the excuse that had been sought ever since San Remo to refuse to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres and to recognize the agreements made between Venizelos and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For fear that the Greeks might recover their senses, Italy promptly recognized Constantine.

[24] In the interior of Asia Minor in the spring of 1922 I found many influential Turks who were bitterly opposed to the Nationalist movement, and the opposition was still more marked in Constantinople. The summary action of the Angora Assembly against the Sultan was used by intelligent anti-Kemalists to excite the peasants, with the result that a Central Revolutionary Committee was formed in January, 1923, to overthrow Kemalism. With the coming of summer bands formed in many parts of Asia Minor and the guerilla warfare became formidable.

[25] The treaties recommended by the Washington Conference were:

(1) A five-power treaty involving the scrapping of sixty-eight capital ships, the restriction of the tonnage of navies and of fortification in the Far East, and a ten-year naval holiday.

(2) A five-power treaty outlawing the use of submarines as an agency of attack on merchant ships and prohibiting the use of poison-gas.

(3) A nine-power treaty stabilizing the conditions in the Far East and reiterating the open-door principle in regard to China.

(4) A nine-power treaty making a beginning of the division of Chinese customs, abolishing foreign post-offices, and releasing the Chinese Government from the obligation to keep funds lying idle in foreign banks.

(5) A four-power treaty binding the principal Pacific powers to respect one another’s territory in the Pacific and to confer when the peace of the Pacific is threatened. (This treaty abrogated the existing Anglo-Japanese treaty.)

(6) An agreement between Japan and China for the restoration of the German lease in Shantung, coupled with declaration of the willingness of Great Britain to renounce the lease of Wei-hai-wei and of France to renounce the lease of Kwang-chau-Wan.

[26] For a fuller discussion of Russia’s rôle at Genoa and the reasons actuating the attitude of the Entente Powers, see Chapter X, “The Internal Evolution and Foreign Policy of Russia under the Soviets.”

[27] “Everywhere there are ruins, but as for men, they are not in ruins, and, in the same fashion as the French have astonished the world in war, they will astonish it again in peace.”

[28] Just how far French and German nationals have parted with their American investments is an open question; and many well informed Americans dissent vigorously from the conventional statement of New York banking circles, which, for lack of specific data to the contrary, I have been inclined to accept at its face-value.

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.

The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.

The illustration on the Title Page is the publisher’s logo.

Page 247: “Lemberg” is spelled “Lemburg” in the Index.

Page 327: “wakeners” and “awakeners” both appear in the same paragraph, but nowhere else; both retained.

Page 380: "asked to chose between" was printed that way.

End of Project Gutenberg's Europe Since 1918, by Herbert Adams Gibbons