Chapter XXII: That Interview with the Kaiser

After the appearance, in August, 1917, in the _Philadelphia Public Ledger_ and other newspapers in America and the _Telegraph_ in England of the message of the Kaiser to President Wilson, the official _North German Gazette_, evidently unaware of the fact that the original message of the Kaiser in his own hand was in my possession, published the following:

"The _London Daily Telegraph_ publishes from the
memoirs of former Ambassador Gerard a telegram
that His Majesty the Kaiser is alleged to have
sent to President Wilson on August 10, 1914, and
in which the events before the participation of
England in the present war are set forth.

"We are, in these circumstances, in the position
TO GIVE THE ASSURANCE THAT A TELEGRAM OF THE
KAISER OF THIS NATURE DOES NOT EXIST.

"It is correct that an audience was granted to
Ambassador Gerard on August 10, 1914, in order to
give the opportunity to spread before His Majesty
the peace mediation offer of President Wilson.

"The personal message of President Wilson to the
Kaiser runs as follows: 'As official head of one
of the Powers which signed the Hague Convention, I
feel according to Article III of this Convention
it is my right and my duty to declare to you in
the spirit of the truest friendship that I would
welcome every opportunity to act in the interest
of the peace of Europe whether now or at another
more fitting time....'

"This proposition came at a time when the opposing
armies had already crossed the frontiers and when
it seemed out of the question to halt the march of
events.

"His Majesty could, therefore, only transmit to
the President his thanks for the mediation offered
and to add thereto that it was too early for the
mediation of a neutral Power, but that later the
friendly proposition of President Wilson could be
taken up again.

"His Majesty, the Emperor, then talked for some
time with the American Ambassador and set forth to
him separately the events which led to the
outbreak of the war. Particularly did the Kaiser
call attention to the equivocal and unloyal
position of England which had destroyed the hope
of a peaceful issue.

"The setting forth by Ambassador Gerard in his
memoirs seems to be a contradiction of this
conversation.

"If the press of enemy countries sees revelations
in this that only shows that they are not
acquainted with the German White Book which sets
forth these events.

"Possibly, during the interviews, the Emperor
wrote down notes for the Ambassador, in order that
the latter should not send anything incorrect to
Washington. In this case we have to do only with
certain notes to aid the memory of the Ambassador,
not with a communication of the Emperor to
President Wilson."

The _Tageblatt_ reprinted this lame and silly explanation in its issue of August 13, 1917, and complained that, although its correspondent at the Hague sent, on August 7, 1917, this part of my first book in a telegram, only on August 11, did the Government permit the delivery to the _Tageblatt_ of this story from the correspondent. Then the newspaper despatch had to be submitted to the Censorship officials who only released it for publication at midnight. The _Tageblatt_ says, "The form of the explanation which has now appeared in the _North German Gazette_ can hardly be called very happy. What does this mean--'possibly during the interview the Kaiser wrote down notes for the Ambassador in order that the latter should not send anything incorrect to Washington'? Now, after a week the occurrence must have been fathomed and it was not necessary to make use of a 'possibly.' Could Mr. Gerard consider these 'notes' in the handwriting of the Emperor as a draft for a telegram? And do these notes read, as a telegram of the Emperor to Wilson--as Mr. Gerard repeats them?"

Does not the _Tageblatt_ article give a glimpse not only of how the newspapers of Germany are hampered and censored, but of the positively glorious incompetency of the Government officials who denied the existence of an original document in the Kaiser's own hand which the most elementary inquiries in their own circle would have disclosed not only was in existence but in my possession?

The redoubtable Reventlow writing in the Conservative _Tages Zeitung_ commented as follows:

"Kaiser William had possibly for his answer
written down notes and given them to Gerard, but
these were only helps for Gerard's memory and it
was not a question of a direct communication of
the German Kaiser to the President. In accordance
with the Gerard reports it now seems that
nevertheless the Ambassador telegraphed the
Imperial notes immediately and literally to
Washington. Mr. Gerard has, therefore, again in
this respect lied, which is not surprising."

Reventlow, of course, had not then seen the facsimile of the Kaiser's telegram which is headed in his own hand "To the President, personally."

Later the other German newspapers took the Foreign Office to task for making such a weak denial of an incontrovertible fact. And note the charming parliamentary language of dear old Reventlow!

The article, which appeared in the _Tages Zeitung_ of August 14th last, is interesting because Reventlow is without doubt the oracle and mouthpiece of the Prussian Conservatives. He continues to attack me in this article but much of the attack is in reality praise, and, as we say in expressive slang, "every knock is a boost." The article continues:

"It is very desirable to know if the former
Chancellor was present at the audience; it is
regrettably not inconceivable, but is a new proof
of the incompetence of the Chancellor, that he did
not, according to his duty, inform his Imperial
Lord of the political personality and character of
a man like Gerard.

"In the U-boat crisis Mr. Gerard had been able to
play a quite decisive part. He was like Mr. von
Bethmann-Hollweg entirely of the view that the
German Empire must give in to the demands of the
United States and constantly showed himself
wonderfully informed about what step each inner
circle would for the moment take.

"The influence of Mr. Gerard is all the more a
shameful and heavy reproach for the official
leadership of Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, since this
American Ambassador, while an intriguer, was not a
personality.

"But when Gerard said anything, wished anything or
threatened anything, that imported always a
fear-exciting event, and he was finally sly enough
to seize and use this halo to the limit. That a
man like Gerard has been able through all these
years to win and keep such a position and such an
influence over German affairs is without example."

But I must really put aside the halo which Reventlow so graciously hands me. While I was informed of what was going on, I certainly did my best to persuade Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow and Zimmermann as well as the Emperor and numberless others from defying America. If von Bethmann-Hollweg and any of the others were against ruthless submarine war, seeing that to adopt any other policy would bring America into this war, then they took this position because it seemed to them best for their country and history will prove them right.

Reventlow says further:

"In the winter of 1916-17 one dreamed already of
loans and imports from the United States during
the peace negotiations. Mr. Gerard came back from
America with alms for the wounded and the result
of his sublime patience and of the sublime
patience of Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg was
pictured by the Gerard celebration in Berlin.

"Then came the decision for ruthless submarine
war. The first time in his ambassadorial service
was Mr. Gerard surprised and the men who
entertained him were also surprised for they
dreamed of and wished for quite other things. It
is incorrect, if it has been stated, that at the
time of the Gerard celebration ruthless submarine
war had already been agreed on. That came later."

_Sitting, left to right_--Von Wermuth, Mayor of Berlin; Ambassador Gerard; Zimmermann; Von Sydow, Minister of Commerce.

_Standing, left to right_--Unknown; Consul General Lay; Commander Gherardi, U. S. N.; First Secretary Grew; Unknown; Count Montgelas; Solf, Colonial Minister; General Friedrich, in charge of prisoners of war; Isaac Wolf, President of American Association of Commerce and Trade; John B. Jackson, former Minister to Cuba.]

But I did know that ruthless submarine war was coming, knew of the orders given, and this is proved not only by my reports which are still secret, but by what I told not only many people in America but several editors who with my full approval published articles showing this belief.

I am obliged to Reventlow for what he says of me. I admire him as a powerful writer for whose ability I have a deep respect and perhaps if I were a Prussian Junker I would follow him as blindly and confidently as do the army and navy officers, the nobles, great and small, and the land-holding squires of Prussia, to whom his writings are as seductive as the pipings of the Pied Piper to the townsfolk of Hamlin.

Reventlow's charge of lying was made in the line of his duty as a Prussian Junker, according to the best traditions of Prussian government and diplomacy but it is so thoroughly disproved and the authenticity of the Kaiser's telegram so universally admitted in Germany, even in official circles there, that I feel only sorrow for a Prussian nobleman and Junker and editor compelled by the exigencies of his position to make so ridiculous a statement.

I think that the Germans just now are beginning to realise that I always told them the truth and treated them fairly, a procedure, I admit, far more disconcerting and disturbing to them than the most subtle wiles and moves of the old diplomacy.

Von Bethmann denied that the peace terms as set forth in my book were his (he did not deny that they are the terms of the Junkers) and criticised me for "unethically" publishing an account of my experiences in Germany. This is what he said:

"In his published report of this particular
conversation Mr. Gerard attributed utterances to
me which may have been made in other quarters in
Germany and to which he frequently referred in the
progress of our conversation but which were not my
own. This applies especially to those references
to Germany's alleged intentions to seize Liége and
Namur, and of Germany's plans to take possession
of the Belgian ports, the railways and to
establish military and commercial dominion over
that country.

"I never unfolded such German war aims to Mr.
Gerard. In the course of my several conversations
with him as also in our discussion last January I
invariably referred to my Reichstag speeches in
which I stated that Germany would exact positive
guarantees that Belgian territory and politics
would not in the future be exploited as a menacing
factor against us. I did not make any statement as
to the nature of these guarantees.

"In the progress of our conversation Mr. Gerard
suggested that the realisation of far-reaching
aspirations in Belgium would give King Albert
merely a sham authority and asked whether it
would not be better for Germany to forego such
plans and instead of them endeavour to acquire
Liége which Mr. Gerard thought possible of
achievement.

"Perhaps this suggestion was a bait intended to
provoke a reply from me. If so, the attempt
failed. In all my discussions with the Ambassador
on this subject I referred to my public utterances
in which I emphasised that I was endeavouring to
procure a peace that would permit us to live in
cordial and neighbourly relations with Belgium.

"Mr. Gerard's memory would seem also to have
served him faultily when he wrote down what was
said about Russia. He dealt but superficially with
Germany's eastern war aims, observing that the
United States' interest in this direction was very
limited and that Germany undoubtedly would have a
free hand there. For Roumania and Serbia he also
revealed very slender sympathy. Mr. Gerard did not
obtain out of my mouth any of the statements
concerning these countries which he attributes to
me.

"When diplomats undertake to exploit their
official career for journalistic purposes they are
very apt to be misled into putting into mouths of
foreign statesmen utterances which either are the
creation of an ample imagination or are based on
faulty memory. Discussion of political opinions is
bound to be transitory and fleeting.

"You Americans are impetuous people. You do not
seem to permit even your retiring diplomats to
observe the traditional silences nor have you the
patience to abide the post mortem publication of
their memoirs. Sir Edward Goschen (former British
Ambassador to Germany and Austria) or Jules Cambon
(former French Ambassador to Germany, the United
States and Spain) probably could excel Mr. Gerard
in revelations of entertaining diplomatic history
and gossip. Count von Bernstorff, former
Ambassador to the United States, too, I imagine
might startle us with a diary of his Washington
experiences.

"In Europe, however, it was seen that publication
of such matters was best postponed by common
consent to a later period when judgments are both
calm and more mature. Mr. Gerard, however, may
hold the special license conferred by shirtsleeve
diplomacy, as you call it, and I shall not dispute
his prerogatives. But he must not give his
imagination the free rein."

And this was my answer: published in the _New York Times_ for September 2, 1917:

"Dr. Hollweg apparently did not have the exact
copy of my articles for if he had read them he
would have seen clearly that I said the peace
terms described were the German peace terms and
not the opinions of the Chancellor. Dr. Hollweg
said he himself was subject to the rule of the
military party of Germany and could not follow his
own desires.

"In the second place, Dr. Hollweg admits that the
German government intended to exact guarantees
from Belgium and makes the admission himself after
the interview in which he so sharply criticises
me.

"Thirdly, I ask if those terms as cited are not
the German peace terms, then what are the German
peace terms?

"Dr. Hollweg gives nothing different from these
and so it might be assumed they are the German
terms after all. I consider it a matter of great
regret that the German government put Dr. Hollweg
out of office and I feel that personally he is
bitterly opposed to the ruthless submarine warfare
of the German government and that he only
refrained from resigning his office out of
deference to the wishes of Emperor Wilhelm.

"I presume he was put out because his ideals were
too liberal for the German authorities to endure.
This liberality is shown in the interview. I am
sorry to take issue with Dr. Hollweg on this
subject because I have a great admiration for him
and I think he is a fine old fellow.

"The old-time diplomacy, which Dr. Hollweg
advocated, has succeeded in plunging almost the
whole world into the bloodiest war of history.
When the people of a nation know what is going on
in the seats of government such wars cannot
happen.

"I do not believe in backstairs diplomacy any more
than Dr. Hollweg. I believe the people of a nation
are entitled to know what is going on. This German
diplomacy may be all right in a monarchy of the
most limited type but it will not go at all in a
modern democracy.

"As to the ethics of publishing my memoirs now, I
pass over the obvious repartee that to hear a
German speak of ethics borders on the ludicrous
and especially the man who openly in the Reichstag
announced that necessity knows no law and that the
German troops were at that moment deliberately
violating the neutrality of Belgium.

"But I believe that the old style diplomacy in the
dark caused this war. Of course, it is hard for a
German ex-official to conceive that the people
have a right to be enlightened about this awful
calamity. But I hope one of the results of this
war will be the end of backstairs diplomacy. When
the Germans with the Chancellor's approval
violated the usage of all nations and times and
kept me as a hostage after I had demanded my
passports, I think to talk of ethics comes with a
bad grace from the German side."

Understand that Bethmann-Hollweg is not a bad man, but for one who openly announced that necessity knows no law and defended the invasion of Belgium, failed to stop the cruelties of the prison camps and gave official, if not private, consent to the murder of women and babies not only on the high seas but in undefended towns, to talk of ethics because I dared to tell the world what was happening in Germany is more than ridiculous. It verges on the ludicrous--but why attack poor Bethmann? Opportunity knocked at his door, but the want of a backbone prevented his becoming a great figure.

History will laud him for opposing ruthless submarine war so long, but will blame him for weakly yielding in the end. As for the "ethics," I have been careful to give only official conversations with the Emperor, interesting as the others are, and never shall disclose my private conversations with Bethmann, von Jagow, Zimmermann and others, including my talks with Bethmann and Zimmermann on the day I left Germany, because it was understood that these conversations should never be disclosed whatever happened.

And as time goes on more and more do I believe that history will vindicate von Jagow and teach the Emperor and the people of Germany that a faithful and skilful servant should never be sacrificed to the intrigues of a few gossiping politicians. It is part of the strength of President Wilson that he backs up his officials and refuses to listen even to widespread popular clamour for their heads. It was the business of von Jagow to conduct the Foreign policy of Germany, but the intriguers demanded his removal because he was too occupied to waste time talking to amateur politicians, and because his voice did not charm the Reichstag.