Chapter IX: Part VI: The Third Dutch War to the Revolution (2)

[5] The _Admiralty MS._ makes of the three paragraphs of this instruction three separate instructions, numbered 7, 9, and 10, and inserts after the first paragraph a new instruction numbered 8, with an _Observation_ appended. It is as follows: _Additional Instruction, No. VIII.:_ 'When any of his majesty's ships that have gained the wind of the enemy, and that the general or admiral would have them bear down and come to a close fight, he will put abroad the same signal as for their tacking, and hoist and lower the same till it be discerned; at which, they that are to windward shall answer by bearing down upon the enemy. _Observation_.--The same in the battle of Solebay, Sir Joseph Jordan got the wind and kept it for want of a signal or fireships.' This _Observation_ appears to be intended as a continuation of the previous one, the new instruction supplies the missing signal there referred to.

[6] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'The 28th May, '73, the battle fought in the Schooneveld, the rear-admiral of their fleet commanded by Bankart (? Adriaen Banckers) upon a signal from De Ruyter gave way for some time, and being immediately followed by Spragge and his division, it proved only a design to draw us to leeward, and that De Ruyter might have the advantage of weathering us. So that for any small number giving way it is not safe for the like number to go after them, but to press the others which still maintain the fight according to the article following.

[7] No.11 in the _Admiralty MS_. with the following _Observation_: 'In bearing down upon an enemy when you have the wind, or standing towards them and they towards you, if it is in your power to fall upon any part of their ships, those to windward will be the most exposed; therefore you must use your utmost endeavour to ruin that part. The battle fought in _1666_, the headmost or winderly ships were beaten in three hours and put to run before half the rest of the fleet were engaged. We suffered the like on the 4th of June, for Tromp and De Ruyter never bore down to engage the body of our fleet, but pressed the leading ships where Spragge and his squadron had like to have been ruined.'

[8] _Admiralty MS._ No. 12.

[9] For 'headmost of the enemy's ships' the _Admiralty MS_. has 'windmost ships of the enemy's fleet, and endeavour all that can be to force them to leeward.' Also this _Observation_: 'It may happen that the headmost of their fleet may be the most leewardly, then in such case you are to follow this instruction, whereas before it was said to stand with the headmost ships of the enemy.'

[10] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 13 and 14. It has the _Observation_: 'This ought to be for each squadron apart.'

[11] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 15 and l6. To the first paragraph, or No. 15, it has the _Observation_: 'It may happen that by the winds shifting there may be neither van nor rear; then in that case a signal for each squadron would be better understood, so that you are to follow the 14th and 15th of the "Sailing Instructions." For in the battle of August '73 the wind shifted and put the whole line out of order.'

[12] The _Admiralty MS_. here inserts a new article, No. 17: 'If the general would have those ships to windward of the enemy to bear down through their line to join the body of the fleet, he will put abroad a white flag with a cross from corner to corner where it can best be discovered.'

[13] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 18 to 23.

[14] _Admiralty MS_. Nos, 18 to 23.

[15] _Admiralty MS_. adds: 'having regard to press the weathermost ships and relieve such as are in distress.' It is worth noting that this important relaxation of strict line tactics practically embodies the idea of Rupert's Additional Instruction of 1666. _Supra_, p. 129.

[16] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 24 to 26.

[17] _Admiralty MS_. No. 27. It adds this _Observation_: 'When the fleet is to leeward of the enemy you to take care to put yourself in such a station as that you may (when any signal is given) without loss of time tack and stand in to the line. And when any part of the fleet or ships wherein you are concerned are ordered to tack and gain the wind of the enemy, you are to make all the sail you can and keep up with the headmost ships that first tack.'

[18] _Admiralty MS. 'Observation_: The reward of saving a friend to be equal to that of destroying an enemy.'

[19] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 28 and 29.

[20] _Admiralty MS._ No. 30.

[21] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation:_ 'in changing ships be as careful as you can not to give the enemy any advantage or knowledge thereof by striking the flag. In case of the death of any flag officer, the flag to be continued aloft till the fight be over, notice to be given to the next commander-in-chief, and not to bear out of the line unless in very great danger. It hath been observed what very great encouragement the bare shooting of an admiral's flag gives the enemy, but this may be prevented by taking in all the flags before going to engage. It was the ruin of Spragge in the battle of August '73 by taking his flag in his boat, which gave the enemy an opportunity to discover his motion, when at the same [time] we saw three flags flying on board the main topmast-head of three ships which Tromp had quitted.'

[22] _Admiralty MS._ No. 31.

[23] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 32 and 33.

[24] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation_: 'By reason that guns are not so well to be distinguished at the latter end of a battle from chose of the enemy, sky-rockets would be proper signals.' This appears to be the earliest recorded suggestion for the use of rockets for naval signalling.

II

MEDITERRANEAN ORDERS, 1678

INTRODUCTORY

In 1677 Narbrough had been sent for the second time as commander-in-chief to the Mediterranean, to deal with the Barbary corsairs. To enable him to operate more effectively against Tripoli, arrangements were on foot to establish a base for him at Malta, and meanwhile he had been using the Venetian port of Zante. It was at this time that Charles II, in a last effort to throw off the yoke of Louis XIV, had married his eldest niece, the Princess Mary, to the French king's arch-enemy William of Orange, and relations between France and England were at the highest tension. Preparations were set on foot in the British dockyards for equipping a 'grand fleet' of eighty sail; on February 15 was issued a new and enlarged commission to Narbrough making him 'admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Straits'; Sicily, which the French had occupied, was hurriedly evacuated; Duquesne, who commanded the Toulon squadron, was expecting to be attacked at any moment, and Colbert gave him strict orders to keep out of the British admiral's way.[1]

It will be seen that it was in virtue of his new commission, and in expectation of encountering a superior French force, that Narbrough issued his orders, and they may be profitably compared with those of Lord Sandwich on the eve of the Second Dutch War as the typical Fighting Instructions for a small British fleet. No collision however occurred; for Louis could not face the threatened coalition between Spain, Holland, and England, and was forced to assent to a general peace, which was signed at Nymwegen in the following September.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] Corbett, _England in the Mediterranean_, ii. 97-104. The official correspondence will be found in Mr. Tanner's _Calendar of the Pepys MSS._, vol. i., and in the _Lettres de Colbert_, vol. iii.

_SIR JOHN NARBROUGH_, 1678.

[+Egerton MSS. 2543, f. 839+.]

_Sir John Narbrough, Knight, admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean seas for this expedition.

Instructions for all commanders to place their ships for their better fighting and securing the whole fleet if a powerful enemy sets upon us_.

When I hoist my union flag at the mizen peak, I would have every commander in this fleet place himself in order of sailing and battle as prescribed, observing his starboard and larboard ship and leader, either sailing before or by the wind, and so continue sailing in order so long as the signal is abroad.

In case a powerful squadron of ships falls with our fleet, and will fight us, and we see it most convenient to fight before the wind, and the enemy follow us, I would have every commander place his ships in this order of sailing prescribed as followeth, and so continue sailing and fighting, doing his utmost to annoy the enemy, so long as shall be required for defence of himself and whole fleet.

_Larboard side_. Portsmouth frigate.
Newcastle frigate.
Samuel and Henry 30
Advice 20
Diamond.
Friendship 12
Lion 20
Bonaventure. 11
John and Joseph 10
Pearl frigate.
Return 10
Benjamin and Elizabeth 14
Concord 26
Fountain 8
Leopard 20
Boneto sloop, Baltam^r.[1]
Plymouth, Admiral.
Spragge frigate, Batchelor.[1]
St. Lucar Merchant 20
Prosperous 30
Sapphire frigate
Mary and Martha 30
Delight 9
Olive Branch 10
Italian Merchant 30
Tiger 30
James galley
Dragon 18
Samuel and Mary 24
Mediterranean 16
James Merchant 20
King-fisher frigate.
_Starboard side_. Portland frigate.

In case the enemy be to leeward of us, and force us to fight by the wind, then I would have each ship in this fleet to follow each other in a line as afore prescribed, either wing leading the van as the occasion shall require.

In case I would have the van to tack first (in time of service) I will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and if I would have the rear of the fleet to tack first I will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, each commander being [ready] to take notice of the said signals, and to act accordingly, following each other as prescribed, and be careful to assist and relieve any that is in necessity.

In case of separation by foul weather, or by any inevitable accident, and the wind blows hard westerly, then Zante Road is the place appointed for rendezvous.

Given under my hand and on board his majesty's ship Plymouth, at an anchor in Zante Road.

This 4th of May, 1678.

JOHN NARBROUGH.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] Neither Baltimore nor Batchelor nor any similar names of commissioned officers occur in Pepys's Navy List, 1660-88. Tanner, _op. cit._

III

THE LAST STUART ORDERS

INTRODUCTORY

The next set of orders we have are those drawn up by George Legge, first Lord Dartmouth, for the fleet with which he was entrusted by James II, to prevent the landing of William of Orange in 1688. The only known copy of them is in the _Sloane MSS._ 3650. It is unfortunately not complete, the last few articles with the date and signature being missing, so that there is no direct evidence that it related to this fleet. There can however be no doubt about the matter. For it is followed by the battle order of a fleet in which both ships and captains correspond exactly with that which Dartmouth commanded in 1688. The only other fleet which he commanded was that which in 1683 proceeded to the Straits to carry out the evacuation of Tangier, and it was not large enough to require such a set of instructions.

We know moreover that in this year he did actually draw up some Fighting Instructions, shortly after September 24, the day his commission was signed, and that he submitted them to King James for approval. On October 14 Pepys, in the course of a long official letter to him from the admiralty, writes: 'His majesty, upon a very deliberate perusal of your two papers, one of the divisions of your fleet and the other touching your line of battle, does extremely approve the same, commanding me to tell you so.[1]

Lord Dartmouth's articles follow those which James had last drawn up in 1673 almost word for word, and the only alterations of any importance all refer to the handling of the line in action. There can be practically no doubt therefore that we here have the instructions which Pepys refers to, and that the new matter relating to the line of battle originated with Dartmouth, as the result of a considerable experience of naval warfare. After leaving Cambridge he joined, at the age of 17, the ship of his cousin, Sir Edward Spragge, and served with him as a volunteer and lieutenant throughout the Second Dutch War. In 1667, before he was 20, he commanded the Pembroke, and in 1671 the Fairfax, in Sir Robert Holmes's action with the Dutch Smyrna fleet, and in the battle of Solebay. In 1673 he commanded the Royal Catherine (84), and served throughout Rupert's campaign with distinction. Since then, as has been said, he had successfully conducted the evacuation of Tangier. If on this occasion he needed advice he had at hand some of the best, in the person of his flag officers, Sir Roger Strickland and Sir John Berry, two of the most seasoned old 'tarpaulins' in the service, and both in high estimation as naval experts with James.

The amendments introduced into these instructions, although not extensive, point to a continued development. We note first that James's Articles 3 and 4 are combined in Dartmouth's Article 3, so as to ensure the close-hauled line being formed before any attempt is made to divide the enemy's fleet. No such provision existed in the previous instructions. Another noteworthy change under the new article is that, whether by intention or not, any commander of a ship is given the initiative in weathering a part of the enemy's fleet if he sees an opportunity. If this was seriously intended it seems to point to a reaction to the school of Monck and Rupert, perhaps under Spragge's influence. Dartmouth's next new article, No. 5, for reforming line of battle as convenient, regardless of the prescribed order of battle, points in the same direction.

The only other change of importance is the note inserted in the sixth article, in which Dartmouth lays his finger on one of the weak points in James's method of attack from windward by bearing down all together, and suggests a means by which the danger of being raked as the ships come down may be minimised.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] _Dartmouth MSS. (Historical MSS. Commission_, XI. v. 160.)

_LORD DARTMOUTH, Oct._ 1688.

[+Sloane MSS. 3650, ff. 7-11+.]

_George, Lord Dartmouth, admiral of his majesty's fleet for the present expedition_.

_Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in fighting_.

1 and 2. _[Same as in Duke of York's_, 1673.]

3. If the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and come to fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall endeavour to put themselves into one line as close upon a wind as they can lie, according to the order of battle given, until such time as they shall see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet, &c. _[rest as in Article 3 of_ 1673].

4. [_Same as_ 5 _of_ 1673.] [1]

5. If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, when other ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is to bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. In this case, whether the line hath been broke or disordered by the shifting of the wind, or otherwise, each ship or division are not unreasonably to strive for their proper places in the first line of battle given, but they are to form a line, the best that may be with the admiral, and with all the expedition that can be, not regarding what place or division they fall into or between.

If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, &c. [_rest as in 6 of 1673_].

6. In case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands towards them and they towards the enemy, then the van of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind, and when they are come at a convenient distance from the enemy's rear they shall stay until their own whole line is come up within the same distance from the enemy's van; and then the whole line is to tack, every ship in his own place, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can without endangering the loss of the wind--[Note that they are not to bear down all at once, but to observe the working of the admiral and to bring to as often as he thinks fit, the better to bring his fleet to fight in good order; and at last only to lask away[2] when they come near within shot towards the enemy as much as may be, and not bringing their heads to bear against the enemy's broadsides]--and to stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van. And in case the enemy tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's fleet is to tack first with as many ships or divisions as are those of the enemy's, and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth.

7 to 9. [_Same as 8 to 10 of 1673_.]

10. [_Same as 11 of 1673, but with yellow flag instead of red_.]

11. When the admiral would have the other divisions to make more sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the ensign staff for the vice-admiral, a blue for the rear, and for both a striped.

12. As soon as the fleet shall see the admiral engage or make a signal by putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, each division shall take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy, according to such order of battle as shall be given them, and no ship or division whatsoever is upon any pretence to lie by to fight or engage the enemy whereby to endanger parting the main body of the fleet till such time as the whole line be brought to fight by this signal.

13 to 18. [_Same as 14 to 19 of 1673_.]

18. The several commanders in the fleet are to take special care, upon pain of severe punishment, that they fire not over any of their own ships.

19. [_Same as 20 of 1673_.]

20. The fireships in their several divisions are to endeavour to keep the wind, and they with the small frigates to be as near the great ships as they can, attending the signal and acting accordingly.

21. [_Same as 22 of 1673_.][3]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Article 4 of 1673 is omitted, being included in Article 3 above.

[2] To sail with a quartering wind. Morogues urged this precaution a century later (_Tactique Navale_, p. 209).

[3] The MS. ends abruptly in the middle of this article.