Chapter LXXXI: Appendix: IX

(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 6.)

_Letter from A. C. LYALL, ESQ., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Kabul, dated Simla, April, 1880._

I have the honour to inform you that the Governor-General has
received and considered in council your telegrams of the 22nd and
23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by
you from Sirdar Abdur Rahman on the 21st instant, together with
a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that
letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to
Lieutenaut-General Sir Frederick Roberts and yourself.

In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this
important communication, the Government of India considers it
expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has hitherto
been acting in northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the
point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of
affairs in that country. The single object to which, as you are
well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times
been directed and limited, is the security of the North-West
frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less
invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of
this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign
influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude
or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently
subsidized and otherwise assisted the Amirs of Kabul. It has also,
more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never
interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their
kingdom. Regulating on this principle and limiting to this object
the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our
long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their
strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own
frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the
attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is
still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security
of our frontier as much as possible independent of such
conditions.

This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when
forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal
of a Russian alliance, proposed by Russia in contemplation of a
rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire
for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan
Power, and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our
alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him, on
conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the
generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of
Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally
convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to
its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion
to a policy dependent for its fruition on the gratitude, the good
faith, the assumed self-interest, or the personal character of any
Afghan Prince.

When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in
September last, it was with two well-defined and plainly-avowed
objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of
the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the
safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing
for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less
precarious character.

These two objects have been maintained: the first by the capture
of Kabul and the punishment of the crime committed there, the
second by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.

Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no
longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements
with the Rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of
friendly assurances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on
the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of
various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them,
which was, nevertheless, a thoroughly friendly one, and no less
conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to
those of the British Power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which
secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally
ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have
fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence
and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formally applied. Our
advance frontier positions at Kandahar and Kuram have materially
diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India,
and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its
Ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to
the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to
maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.

Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our
forces from northern Afghanistan have hitherto been--_first_, the
excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul,
with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed
gatherings near Ghazni; and, _secondly_, the inability of the
Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a
Ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the
country.

The first-named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a
minute dated the 30th ultimo the Viceroy and Governor-General
stated that 'the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as
possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those
to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In
order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a Ruler for
Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps,' continued
His Excellency, 'are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile, it
is essential that we should make such a display of strength in
Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation,
and will overawe disaffection.'... 'All that is necessary, from a
political point of view, is for General Stewart to march to
Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there or in the
neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir
Frederick Roberts at Kabul.' The military operations thus defined
have been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action
before Ghazni.

With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of
our troops in northern Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdur
Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claims the
Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be
approved, and likely to be supported, by at least a majority of
the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our
wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of
order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.

The Governor-General in Council has consequently decided that the
evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next,
and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter
and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdur Rahman have been
carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.

What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is
the desire that it expresses for the permanent establishment of
Afghanistan with our assistance and sympathy under the joint
protection of the British and Russian Empires. This suggestion,
which is more fully developed in the Sirdar's unwritten message,
cannot be entertained or discussed.

As already stated, the primary object and declared determination
of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign
influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal
condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times
and in all circumstances, been deemed essential for the permanent
security of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. As such, it has hitherto
been firmly maintained by successive Governors-General of India
under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Nor
has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian
Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and
under every recent change of circumstances in Afghanistan, renewed
the assurances solemnly given to the British Government that
'Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her
influence.'

It is true that negotiations at one time passed between the two
Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain
territories as constituting a neutral zone between their
respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at
one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as
a neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved
fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally
determined by mutual agreement, and in 1876 the Russian Government
formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that, 'while
maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the
limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of
Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the
discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no
practical result.'

The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these
engagements was again distinctly affirmed on behalf of the Queen's
Government by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government
of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction
of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her
Majesty's Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you
should take occasion to inform Abdur Rahman that the relations of
Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires are matters which
the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with
the Sirdar. The Afghan states and tribes are too contiguous
with India, whose North-Western frontier they surround, for the
Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with
any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized
influence over those tribes and States.

The Governor-General in Council is, nevertheless, most anxious
that the Sirdar should not misunderstand the light in which his
personal sentiments and obligations towards Russia are regarded
by the Government of India. So long as the Rulers of Kabul were
amenable to its advice, this Government has never ceased to
impress on them the international duty of scrupulously respecting
all the recognized rights and interests of their Russian
neighbour, refraining from every act calculated to afford the
Russian authorities in Central Asia any just cause of umbrage or
complaint. The intelligence and good sense which are conspicuous
in the Sirdar's letter and messages to you will enable him to
appreciate the difference between conduct regulated on these
principles and that which cost Sher Ali the loss of his throne.
This Government does not desire, nor has it ever desired, to
impose on any Ruler of Kabul conditions incompatible with that
behaviour which Russia, as a powerful and neighbouring Empire, is
entitled to expect from him; least of all can we desire to impose
such conditions on a Prince who has received hospitality and
protection in Russian territory. I am therefore to observe that,
in the natural repugnance expressed by Abdur Rahman to conditions
which 'might make him appear ungrateful' to those 'whose salt he
has eaten,' the Governor-General in Council recognizes a sentiment
altogether honourable to the Sirdar, and perfectly consistent with
the sincerity of his professed goodwill towards ourselves.

These observations will furnish you with a sufficient answer to
the question asked by Abdur Rahman as to the 'nature of our
friendship' and 'its conditions.'

The frankness with which he has explained his position entitles
him to receive from us a no less unreserved statement of our own.
The Government of India cordially shares the wish expressed by
Abdur Rahman that, between the British and Russian Empires, his
'tribes and countrymen may live quietly in ease and peace.' We do
not desire to place them in a position of unfriendliness towards a
Power which is pledged to us to regard their country as 'entirely
beyond the sphere of its action.' The injury to Afghan commerce
caused by the present condition of Afghanistan, to which the
Sirdar has alluded, is fully appreciated by the Government of
India, and on the restoration of peace between the two countries
the revival and development of trade intercourse need present no
difficulty. As regards our own friendship, it will, if sincerely
sought, be freely given, and fully continued so long as it is
loyally reciprocated. But we attach to it no other condition. We
have no concessions to ask or make, and the Sirdar will therefore
perceive that there is really no matter for negotiation or bargain
between him and us.

On this point your reply to Abdur Rahman cannot be too explicit.
Previous to the Sirdar's arrival in Turkestan, the hostility and
treachery of those whose misconduct he admits and deplores had
compelled the Government of India to make territorial arrangements
of a material and permanent character for the better protection of
our frontier. The maintenance of these arrangements is in no wise
dependent on the assent or dissent, on the good will or ill-will,
of any Chief at Kabul. The character of them has been so fully
explained by you to all the other Kabul Sirdars that it is
probably well known to Abdur Rahman. But in order that our present
intercourse and future relations with the Sirdar may be perfectly
clear of doubt on a point affecting the position he aspires
to fill, the Governor-General in Council authorizes you, if
necessary, to make him plainly understand that neither the
district assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any part
of the province of Kandahar, will ever be restored to the Kabul
Power.

As regards this last-mentioned province, the Government of India
has been authorized by that of Her Majesty to give to Sher Ali
Khan, the present Wali of Kandahar, a distinct assurance that
he will be not only recognized, but maintained, by the British
Government as the Ruler of that province. Sher Ali Khan is one of
the Native nobles of Kandahar. He is administering the province
with ability, good sense, and complete loyalty to the British
Government, which has promised him the support of a British
garrison so long as he requires such support. The Governor-General
in Council cannot doubt that Sirdar Abdur Rahman will readily
recognize the obligation incumbent on the honour of the British
Government to keep faith with all who, whether at Kandahar or
elsewhere, have proved themselves true and loyal adherents.
Yakub Khan forfeited our alliance, and with it his throne, by
mistrusting the assurances we gave him, and falsifying those
which he had given to us. If, misled by his example, Yakub Khan's
successor attempts to injure or oppress the friends of the British
Government, its power will again be put forth to protect or avenge
them. Similarly, if the next Kabul Ruler reintroduces into his
Court or country foreign influences adverse to our own, the
Government of India will again take such steps as it may deem
expedient to deal with such a case. These contingencies, however,
cannot occur if the sentiments of Abdur Rahman are such as
he represents them to be. Meanwhile, the territorial and
administrative arrangements already completed by us for the
permanent protection of our own interests are not susceptible of
negotiation or discussion with Abdur Rahman or any other claimant
to the throne of Kabul.

To the settlement of Herat, which is not included in these
completed arrangements, the Governor-General in Council cannot
authorize you to make or invite any reference in your reply to
Abdur Rahman. The settlement of the future administration of
Herat has been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government; with those
present views in regard to this important question, the Government
of India is not yet acquainted.

Nor can our evacuation of Kabul constitute any subject for
proposals in your correspondence with the Sirdar. This measure
was determined on by the Government of India long before the
appearance of Abdur Rahman as a candidate for the government of
the country we are about to evacuate. It has not been caused by
the hostility, and is not, therefore, conditional on the goodwill,
of any Afghan Power.

The Government of India is, however, very willing to carry out the
evacuation of Kabul in the manner most conducive to the personal
advantage of Abdur Rahman, whose interests we believe to be, more
than those of any other Sirdar, in accordance with the general
interests of the Afghan people. For this reason it is desirable
that you should inform Abdur Rahman of our intention to evacuate
Kabul, and our desire to take that opportunity of unconditionally
transferring to his authority the whole of the country from which
our troops will be withdrawn. You are authorized to add that our
military and political officers at Kabul will be empowered to
facilitate any practical arrangement suggested by the Sirdar for
promptly and peaceably effecting, in co-operation with him, the
transfer thus contemplated on his behalf. Such arrangement must,
however, be consistent with our obligations towards those who have
served and aided the British Government during our occupation of
those territories.

For this purpose, it appears to the Governor-General in Council
desirable that the Sirdar should lose no time in proceeding to
Kabul, and there settling, in conference with General Stewart and
yourself, such preliminary arrangements as may best promote the
undisturbed establishment of his future government.

The Governor-General in Council has, however, no desire to press
this suggestion, should it appear to the Sirdar that his presence
at Kabul, previous to the withdrawal of our troops for the purpose
of personal conference with the British authorities, might have
the effect of weakening his popularity, or compromising his
position in the eyes of his future subjects.

The point is one which must be left entirely to the Sirdar's own
judgment and inclination.

But Abdur Rahman is doubtless aware that there are at present,
in and around Kabul, personages not destitute of influence, who
themselves aspire to the sovereignty he seeks, and that the family
of Yakub has still numerous personal adherents, who may possibly
take advantage of the withdrawal of our troops to oppose the
Sirdar's authority if he is not personally present to assert it.

It should on both sides he remembered and understood that it is
not the policy of this Government to impose upon the Afghan people
an unpopular Ruler or to interfere uninvited in the administration
of a friendly one. If Abdur Rahman proves able and disposed to
conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeiting
the good understanding which he seeks with us, he will assuredly
find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact.
Our reason for unconditionally transferring to him the government
of the country, from which our forces will in any case be
withdrawn a few months hence, is that, on the whole, he appears to
be the Chief best able to restore order in that country, and also
best entitled to undertake such a task. In his performance of it
he will receive, if he requires it, our assistance. But we neither
need nor wish to hamper, by preliminary stipulations or provisoes,
his independent exercise of a sovereignty which he declares
himself anxious to maintain on a footing of peace and friendship
with the British Government.

The present statement of the views and intentions of His
Excellency the Governor-General in Council respecting Abdur Rahman
will enable you to represent them with adequate accuracy in your
reply to the Sirdar's friendly overtures, and it will now be your
duty to convey to Abdur Rahman, without any avoidable delay,
the answer of the Government of India to the letter and message
received from him. His Excellency feels assured that you will give
full expression to the spirit of candour and goodwill in which
these communications have been received and are reciprocated.

But I am to impress on your attention the importance of avoiding
any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for
negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions
of the Sirdar and the Government of India.

In conclusion, I am to request that on receipt of this letter you
will be so good as to lose no time in submitting its contents to
General Sir Donald Stewart, should he then have reached Kabul.
In any case, you will, of course, communicate them to General
Roberts, and act upon them in consultation with the chief military
authority on the spot.

* * * * *