Chapter XI: Part 11

In more than one example it was not so much an existing state of the self which we felt to be determined directly by the properties of a given fact before us, but a _change_ of the self as growing out of something particular, just appearing in the field. Sudden fright at an unexpected event of a certain sort is an instance of this sort of dynamical determination. Again, when in climbing a mountain we reach a dangerous place, fear may quickly grow out of the observation of the lie of the land where we must take the next three steps. After these steps have been successfully accomplished, a feeling of relief will develop out of the situation, no less directly.

Nevertheless there will sometimes be more of a _development_ in such a dynamical state of the total field. When I described my feeling in a restaurant, full of smoke and full of talk, “nervousness,” or uneasiness, was not the only thing I had to report about myself. I had to add that I felt very eager _to go_. This means that, beside my experiencing uneasiness as the natural effect directly determined by the environment, I felt a tendency in my self _to move away from it_. Again, this tendency was not experienced as something arising, _as such_, without reference to definite other parts of the total field; on the contrary it was felt to grow directly out of certain properties of the situation and my uneasiness. As a layman I would say that I wanted to go _because of_ my uneasiness in this particular situation, and as a psychologist I shall admit that the layman’s expression is absolutely correct, because it corresponds once more to the fact that there is insight into the direct determination of that tendency toward a definite sort of activity.

Our life is full of trivial instances of this kind and, occasionally, the most important and decisive impulses toward definite forms of conduct arise directly out of given conditions in the same way. And generally we experience the _how_ and the _why_ of such experience.

I am sitting in full sunlight quite contentedly. After a while I feel too hot; at the same time a tendency to move away from where I am sitting, arises. A shadowy place near by seems pleasant; the impulse away from the sunlight becomes at once a tendency toward the shadow, and as at first the properties of one place made me inclined to move away from it, the properties of another now arouse an impulse of approach. In both cases there is insight, since we feel _how_ in the first case one tendency grows directly out of the nature of one situation, and in the second _how_ some other part of the field, due to its properties, quite as naturally determines another impulse. From an earlier remark the reader will remember that it does not at all matter for our present problem whether the relevant properties of the seen shadow are known to us by previous learning or some other way.[82]

The same description may usually be given of fright. When a sudden event is felt as producing fright in me, I shall have to add at once, in a correct description, that with the fright there arose a vehement impulse to move away from the locus of that event. Again, this tendency immediately to increase the distance between that place and myself is experienced as being the direct outcome of the startling occurrence quite as much as the fright itself is felt as its direct result. We noticed before how, in Watson’s description of a child’s behavior, the overt behavior of withdrawing from the uncanny object may be regarded in the sensory experience of the onlooker, as a visible picture of the child’s own total field. Does any one believe that the child feels a fear of the object, on the one hand, and an impulse to move away, on the other, as independent experiences? Or that the child might just as well feel a tendency toward embracing or swallowing the object, during his fear? As Watson has shown in this case, the object has become “dangerous” through previous learning. This does not prove, however, that between the danger itself, the fear and the withdrawal, there is not more than indirect connections.

As an impulse of withdrawal arises directly out of certain given situations, so the opposite tendency belongs as naturally to other situations. I have mentioned above the case of a shadow attracting, as it were, a person who has had more than enough of the sun. We all know that similar instances are more frequent in our life than trees in a wood. The child, observed objectively as reaching for an animal’s head in Watson’s experiment, feels attracted towards that interesting object, if we are willing to grant him any experience at all. From our own total field we are well acquainted with the fact that such a tendency appears to us as being a natural characteristic of exactly such a situation and of a great many similar ones. In Spain, after a particularly brilliant achievement of the toreador, the admiration of the crowd often drives them so intensely in their hero’s direction, that, unable to enter the arena themselves, they hang over the balustrades, reaching toward him as far as possible; the stress will sometimes be so great that hats, handkerchiefs, and so on, are thrown down in the direction of the dominating impulse. Did these people learn gradually by some process of conditioning to connect an approach-tendency with admiration, as though a tendency toward frowning or shaking the left leg might have been, if conditioned, equally well “connected” with admiration? I cannot help thinking sometimes that whether we are introspectionists, behaviorists or whatever else, the chief dividing line among contemporary psychologists would separate those who acknowledge obvious, direct determination as it appears in common experience from those who can only admit indirect “connections.”

As a last example I choose a simple, practical event: for some purpose I wish to break a wooden board. I press against it and, feeling my effort directed against the felt resistance of the board, I see and feel the board yielding in the same direction. Is it true that, as Hume would have us say, this yielding of the board in my experience does not develop more naturally out of the direction of my effort than would, for instance, a change of the board’s color or a darkening of the sun, under the same circumstances? Personally, I feel the board yielding just in the direction of my effort and not otherwise, almost as naturally as I feel myself yielding in a definite direction, if a friend of mine and I measure our strength by pressing hard against each other’s shoulders, and I lose the battle. However that may be, if once the board begins to yield to my effort, I immediately feel a tendency toward going on or, rather, increasing the pressure as a direct outcome of that change in the board’s resistance. And, indeed, I really do increase my effort.

What is the common content of these examples? That there is more than mere succession in the development of our attitudes as they refer to actual objects in our field! Things _might_ occur in human experience in this way: First, I feel uneasy near a hot radiator, for instance; then, as something apart and as an altogether separate bit of experience, I feel an impulse away from the radiator, and, eventually, as a third independent feeling, I find myself moving in some direction which, _geometrically_, would increase the distance between that object and me. It is almost impossible to talk about these three experiences in a manner which would exclude any natural context between them as radically as, in terms of the viewpoint I wish here to exhibit, it ought to be excluded. As we read the words, the context of insight is built up at once, spontaneously. What is meant will become more apparent if again I say that, from such a viewpoint, any event whatsoever might follow the first instead of the second, and similarly with the relation between the second and the third. In experience the real development is supposed to have no better “connection,” originally, than any other sequence would have. The first experience does not _require_ the second, nor the second the third!

Again we return to machine theory. Normally, one might say, the development will consist of just those three events, indeed. Feeling hot, feeling a tendency toward moving and moving in a direction which, geometrically, coincides with the direction of that tendency. Why do just that second and that third event follow the first? One possibility: because there is something like an original reflex, a well-established path in the nervous system conducting from the place of the first process to the place of the second, and a number of similar paths leading from this second place to the centers controlling the particular movement of our feet in the certain direction. In such a theory of the sequence, the result would be practical enough from the viewpoint of an observer, and even the subject himself might feel satisfied at the _end_ of the series, but that would be all. If, in the same situation (heat), pinching his left thumb between the fingers of the right hand occurred, followed by his moving in a certain direction and, then, by his feeling well, the subject would understand the sequence quite as much as or, better, quite as little as, when he sees a natural context in the _real_ development. Mere connections between parts of the nervous system enforce the sequence, the _properties_ of A _as such_ do not take part in the determination of B, and those of B are altogether innocent of C’s succession. Such a production of the sequence cannot produce in experience more than a series of feelings indifferent to each other. There cannot be insight.

Suppose that no reflexes are provided in this case; what theoretical explanation can we give, then, of the right succession? The second possibility is learning or habit. Many different things originally happened in my experience when I felt very hot. Among them, occasionally, there were impulses toward moving. Again, among these now and then there was one accidental impulse, the direction of which was away from the radiator, _geometrically_. (Not for the subject, however, who might just as well define this direction as northwest, for instance!) After these few occasions another series of events followed in a haphazard fashion, all of them equally indifferent to the foregoing. But sometimes real _motion_ in the stated direction, and the experience of it, would be the next events and, finally, an experience of feeling satisfied. However it came to pass in the first instance, this one sequence, after it has fortunately happened to occur frequently enough, becomes a well-established chain of events, in short, a habit. Thereafter it operates as soon as our subject feels hot enough. But its operation is no more immediate or natural than all those other possible combinations _as such_ would have been. The subject feels satisfied at the end of the sequence. But if, after the feeling of heat, counting from one to twenty-six had brought about this same feeling of relief, and if this sequence had been well associated, he would not experience a less natural or satisfying development than he really does in the case of the habit of withdrawal. No one development is more natural than any other; without exception all sequences are _merely_ sequences, and nothing else. It is only by some fortunate mechanism that those sequences are “stamped in” as a habit, the end of which is _practical success_. The subject cannot feel in experience more than an indifferent series of events since, in the associated series, the properties of heat do not have any influence upon the “right” tendency as the next event, and the experience of the “right” movement will be the third event, independently of the nature of that tendency. Synapses have become less resistant between the localities of those processes; the connecting fibers have become more readily conductive. But the connections in the nervous system have had nothing to do with the properties of the heat or with the direction of that tendency away from the radiator or with the direction of the movement itself. The neural factors were merely frequency of repetition, recency, and success in a purely external sense of the word, or any other principle independent of the concrete properties of heat, tendency and movement in their mutual relations with one another.

And instinct? I know only two ways to give this term a somewhat concrete meaning as an explanation of real development in experience and in behavior. Often the concept means the same thing as “a chain of reflexes,” with or without some adornments in the guise of habit formation. In this case what has already been said about machine theory, about habit or conditioning as the building up of a secondary machine, applies immediately to instinct. Two machine theories of development, knit together in one application, can lead only to a more complicated theory of essentially the same type. Instinct is sometimes regarded as a supranatural process, accomplishing those practically adequate sequences of behavior which we are not able to explain otherwise in a sensible manner. In this form the concept is so little suited to my scientific taste that I should like to be excused from further discussion of it.

And then? Surprisingly enough, apart from these explanations of behavior, we do not seem to recognize other than merely “random” sequences in psychology. Where neither an inherited nor an acquired machine determines the sequence of events, our theoretical formulations, not accustomed to dynamical considerations, will regard chance as ruling whatever may happen to occur. So much we have already seen in Chapter IV. But a third possibility of orderly determination was found there, which we shall now discuss in its application to the total field.

After what has been said about the states of the self as depending upon the properties of its environment, felt uneasiness (felt as resulting from too much heat on one side of the body) will have a corresponding process in the underlying brain-field, which will be determined directly by that other process underlying the experience of an excess of heat on one side. But the tendency to move away from the heat is felt as developing in this situation, just as directly as the uneasiness is. Consequently we must again draw the same physiological conclusion: if some process underlying a certain sensory experience directly causes another process underlying dislike and uneasiness in the self, a tendency toward increasing the distance between the place of the first and the place of the self must develop just as directly at the same time. As the tendency is felt to grow out of the nature of that sensory experience, and of the experience of uneasiness, the tendency must be physiologically determined by the concrete properties of the corresponding processes. In dynamics such a tendency toward increasing the distance between two things or events is called a field of force. We may say, then, that there is in the brain-field a field of force tending to increase the distance between the place of the radiator and the place of the self. If, now, the subject overtly moves in that direction, what happens in the brain-field? As the distance is enlarged objectively, exactly the same occurs in the brain-field,--the process corresponding to the self moving away from the processes of the radiator and of the heat. The subject will feel himself moving in precisely the same direction which was felt one moment before as the direction of a tendency to movement; and, physiologically, the increase of distance in the brain-field will correspond exactly to the stress which, as a field of force, was tending in that same direction. Therefore, physiologically, as well as in experience, what happens will be no more than the natural consequence, the real development, or the evolution of something which, in germ, was already implicitly contained in the tendency.

So we are led to a more complete application of the theory of direct dynamical determination. There is no mere sequence of indifferent events, connected indirectly. Each phase of what happens grows out of its predecessors, depending upon their concrete nature. And the subject, whose experiences are an expression of this one developing context in the brain-field, will experience the development, along with its “referring to,” “depending upon,” “away from” and so forth--that is, with _insight_.

One remark is needed here with regard to the overt movement of the organism in its relation to a field of force, existing between the self and some part of its environment, in the brain-field. We know that during the first months a child is not able to move his hands, in accordance with the interest which an object has aroused in his sensory field. This fact may be interpreted in two different ways: (1) Either there is no natural determination of overt movement by definite fields of force in the brain. In this case all “connections” between the two would have to be learned. (2) Or the hand does not yet move in the direction of actual interest for some other reason, whereas when that unknown obstacle is removed a little later by organic development, the general direction of the clumsy movements depends directly upon actual fields of force in the brain. The astonishingly early coördination of eye-movements would make me inclined to consider the second hypothesis no less seriously than the first. However, the theory of direct determination does not depend upon this choice. Even if learning should be the only way in which movements of the hand or of any other parts of the body become connected with the distribution of forces in the brain-field, the _right_ movement will still be marked out by more than the final success it achieves. As soon as, partially or entirely, the direction of an overt movement coincides with the actually existing nervous field of force, there will be a relaxation of tension or stress. Therefore, any beginning in the right direction will be felt as being in the right line. Later on, when coördination of movement is complete, familiar overt movements will always go in the right direction; and they will be felt as fitting into the dynamics of the situation, because, in the brain-field, they produce the release of previously existing tension.

* * * * *

In order to show how the fundamental motors of behavior can bring about more complicated conduct through direct determination, I shall conclude with the analysis of an observation made on an ape several years ago.

Outside the animal’s cage a banana is placed on the ground, beyond the reach of his arm. In a similar situation some days before the ape had used a stick as an instrument for the first time. He finds a stick to-day, too, but it is a rough thing. A branch projects from the side of the stick, near the ape’s hand. At first this branch does not operate as an obstacle because, when he reaches for the fruit, the ape holds his instrument accidentally in such a position that the branch is parallel to the bars of the cage and does not touch them. Presently however, in order to change his place with regard to the fruit, the ape pulls the stick back into the cage. When he reaches for the fruit again, the branch hits a bar and the stick does not move in the direction of the fruit. The animal tries to overcome the difficulty by pushing hard and crudely a few times. Suddenly, however, and just after pressing forward with all his force, he pulls the stick back in the cage and bites the branch with the ferocity of anger. It does not matter for our purposes whether or not this new conduct was successful. But how did it come about at all? An explanation may be given in terms of brain-physiology or from the viewpoint of experience. Though I do not think that the experience of animals is a matter of great intrinsic interest for us, I shall treat the case in terms of experience, since it would be more difficult to understand the meaning concretely if I made the neurological analysis. When the ape is first directed completely toward the fruit, his reaching for it is determined directly in the manner we have described. To begin with, the obstacle in his way directly produces an increased effort in the same direction. But the ape can scarcely push against the bar of his cage without localizing the place of the obstacle after a while by touch and, perhaps, by vision. He does not feel the obstacle in the direction of his main effort; he feels it in the locality of the branch. When an obstacle is experienced in our way we become angry by immediate determination, and our anger is an attitude directed toward or against the obstacle. Consequently, after the main object, the banana, has determined the primary direction, the felt obstacle will make the ape’s direction bend toward the branch, and since the tendency directly determined by anger is attack or destruction, the ape will begin to destroy the obstacle.

I do not know whether this is a completely satisfactory description of the whole process. When he attacks the branch, the ape, though actually angry, is probably still determined by his _main_ tendency at the same time. And this would be required. Otherwise the whole development would become a sequence of events, each occurring in direct determination, i.e., with insight, but not to be regarded as members of one single development occurring in one given situation. Here, however, we reach the field of intelligence proper, which I have excluded from the program of these chapters.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

W. Benary: Psychol. Forsch. 2. 1922.

K. Duncker: The Pedag. Sem. 23. 1926.

Erismann: _Die Eigenart des Geistigen_. 1923.

K. Jaspers: _Psychopathologie_. 1921.

K. Koffka: _The Growth of the Mind_. 1924.

K. Koffka: Psychol. Forsch. 9. 1927.

W. Köhler: _Mentality of Apes_. 1925.

W. Köhler: _Die Methoden der Psychologischen Forschung an Affen_.
1922 (cf. Chap. II).

W. Köhler: Arch. f. Entw. Mech. 1927.

K. Lewin: _Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis. 1927_.

M. Wertheimer: _Schlussprozesse im produktiven Denken_. 1920.

A. N. Whitehead: _Science and the Modern World_. 1925.

INDEX

Ability, 47

Abstraction, 351

_Accelerando_, 248 f.

Actions, 250

Activity, 39 f., 222, 259, 370 (James), 380

Admiration, 352, 383

Adrenin, 41

After image, as case of direct experience, 27;
form, 77, 82;
on figure and ground, 220;
of movement, 362;
size of, 76, 82

All-or-none law, 58, 62, 132

Ameba, 45

Anatomical apparatus, 204 n.;
basis, 118;
structure, 130

Anger, 41, 261, 355, 357, 363 f., 393

Animal psychology, 50, 69, 161, 295, 299

Animals, delayed reaction, 277, 306;
insight, 371;
perception of, 162;
transposition of training, 216, 302

Anisotropy, of visual field, 215

Anthropomorphism, 137

Apes, 52, 105, 216 f., 235, 392, 394

Approach-tendency, 383

Area, and form, 202

Area striata, 14, 131 f.

Aristotle, 114, 150

Aristotelians, 136 f.

Aristotelian astronomy, 108

Arrangements, anatomical, preëstablished and acquired, 108, 118, 126,
130, 133, 134, 140, 146

Arrhenius, S., 53

“Articulation,” 250

Assimilation, 239, 241

Association, chapter on, 267-300;
in empiristic theory, 237, 241, 265, 337, 339, 342, 344;
laws of, 333;
as organization, 311, 313, 315, 319, 329, 335, versus task, 341

Associations, and nerve conduction, 116 f.;
as machine theory, 121, 377

Astronomical movements, and machine theory, 137

Atom, as example of dynamical system, 112, 138, 280;
as sub whole, 157

Atomism, sensory, 148, 351, 369

Attention, 169, 324

Attitude, analytical, 106;
conflict of, 335 f.;
dynamical, 263;
influence on sensory experience, 123 f., 124 n., 126, 323;
emotional, 324, 363;
introspective, 106;
and organization of the field, 324 ff., 351 ff.;
towards past, 333 ff.;
psychological aspect of, 184, 374;
and reproduction, 333 ff., 341 f.;
of observer, 79, 92, 96;
as “special vector,” 211

Automatic associations, 332

Autonomic, part of nervous system, 19

Autochthonous reactions, 52

Aversion, 360

“Background” (_see_ Ground), 219

Bacteriology, 364

Balance, of force, 139

Banana, 392 f.

Beats, 189

Becher, E., 346

Behavior, chapter on, 224-268;
behaviorist’s definition, 17;
emotional, 40, 44, 45;
intelligent, 48, 53;
language as form of, 68;
“motors” of, 392;
qualitative types of, 39 f.;
orderly, 107;
physiological foundations of, 66, 102, 106, 115, 373;
and physics, 37 f.;
as reaction to stimuli, 180, 350;
and reflexes, 57;
restricted, 51

Behaviorism, chapter on, 3-34, 37, 38, 41, 51, 53, 55 ff., 67 ff., 87,
97, 98, 101, 104, 114, 178, 260, 267 f., 296 f.

Behaviorist, 373, 378, 383

“Belonging Together,” 149, 177, 181 ff., 225

Benary, W., 394

Bentley, M., 102, 300

Benussi, V., 130 n., 190

“Between,” 64 f.

Beyrl, 105 n.

Binet and Simon, 16, 47

Biological theory, changes in, 110

Birds, 158 ff., 162, 306

Blindness, mental, 169

Blood, circulation of, 109, 131

Body, my, 23, 228 ff., 236, 239, 320;
ambiguity of concept, 229

Bodily events, 236 f., 240, 260

Boring and Teak, 47 n.

Brain field, 226, 375, 379, 389 f.

Brain physiology, 115, 118, 132, 250, 319, 373, 393

Brightness, constancy of, 78, 80 ff., 91 f., 104 f., 122, 127;
versus color, 144;
as quality of several senses, 241;
absolute versus relative, 304

Brown, J. F., 84

Bühler, K., 204 f., 317 n.

Buytendijk und Plessner, 268

Camouflage, 172, 211

Cartesius, _see_ Descartes

Cassiopeia, 154, 164

Cats, 304, 306 ff.

Cavendish, 42

Cells, 132

Central fields, 132

Central terminal nuclei, 344

Cerebral area, 345 f.

Character, knowledge of, 234

Chemical properties, of the blood, 131

Chemistry, 138, 280

Chemical reaction, 189 f.

Chick, 69, 105, 216, 302, 303, 304

Child, behavior of, 323, 382, 391

Children, constancy of size for, 105

Chimpanzee, 238

Circle, constancy of form, 76, 80

Clang, analysis, 124

Climatological condition, 364

Clouds, relative motion of moon, 320;
“ominous,” 363

Coefficient of correlation, 353

Coherence, 149, 173, 219

Color, constancy of, 220;
localization, 103;
and reproduction, 213

Colors, in distribution, 190, 202;
and underlying processes, 62 f., 143, 189, 215

Communication, genesis of, 258

Comparison, 10, 68

Complication, 307

Concept, behavioristic, 56;
mechanical in biology, 114;
of physical things, 28, 230

Concepts, formation of, 304

“Confusion,” 27, 242

“Connections,” in machine theory, 383, 385, 391

“Consciousness,” 32, 40, 162, 240, 262, 269;
its relation to direct experience, 8 n.

Constant conditions, of events, 111

Conditions, total set of, 126

Conditioned reflex, 55, 57, 69, 99, 298 f., 365, 373, 383

Conduct, 393

Conducting paths, 116, 345 f.

Conduction, of electrolytes, 53 f.;
nervous, 115 f., 122, 132, 387

Conductivity, and learning, 290

Conductors, isolated, 98, 122, 377

Constancy, _see_ Color, form, size

Constant properties, 112

Constellation, of stimuli in a larger area, 126, 161, 202;
geometrical versus functional reality, 197, 200

Constellations, of sky, 171

Contiguity, laws of, 280

Contours, 114, 144, 170, 202

Contrast, 106, 125, 127

Coolness, 241

Cornelius, H., 193 f.

Cortical termini, 115

_Crescendo_, 246, 248 f., 256, 262, 264

Cross, ambiguous figure, 198, 219

Crystal, spheres, 109

Current, potential and densities of, 148;
of nervous energy, 290 f.

Curves, 40 f.

Descartes, 110, 239

Delayed reaction, _see_ Animals and Reaction

Depression, 253, 356

Descriptive Observation, _see_ Observation

Determination, dynamical versus topographical, 113, 134;
point to point in stimulation, 125

Development, real, 385 ff.

_Diminuendo_, 248

Dipper, 154

Direct dynamical determination, 364 ff., 370 f., 374, 378, 380, 383,
390 ff.

Direction, of change in physical system, 139;
in experience, 250, 264, 271 f., 323

Discrimination, sensory, 297

Distribution, of forces or processes, 108, 113, 121 f., 127, 135-144,
148, 182, 187, 190, 193 f., 204, 217 f., 226, 280;
of processes, 117

Dog, 323

Dominating impulse, 383

Dreaming, 275

Drives, 325

Drop, of water, 134 ff.

Dualists, 59, 261

Duncker, K., 394

“Dust cloud,” 70, 133

Dynamical, _see_ also Interaction

Dynamics, and order, 109 f., 111 ff., 117 ff., 127 ff., 133, 138 ff.,
140 ff., 152, 182 f., 192, 216, 220 ff., 226 ff., 271, 327

Dynamical explanation, of reproduction, 347

Dynamical interrelation, in total psychophysical field, 319 ff., 336,
349 ff., 361, 364, 370, 375, 380

Dynamical structure, in inner and overt behavior, 222, 248, 250

Dynamical unit, in experience and underlying physiological processes,
66

Dynamo-geometrical relations, of sensory processes, 226, 228 f., 233

Ebbinghaus, H., 283 f.

Effort, 358, 384

Effector organ, 98, 120, 179

von Ehrenfels, 187 ff., 214, 220, 255, 259, 264

Election, 111

Electric charge, 112 f., 280

Electric current, 27, 41, 120, 138, 140, 148

Electrolysis, 53 f., 185, 218

Electromagnetic, entities, 7

Electromotive phenomena, 218

Electrostatic forces, 111, 280

Elevation, feeling of, 253

Ellipse, 76, 80, 160

Embarrassment, 263, 265

Emotion, 193, 264

Empiricism, 118, 123, 153, 220, 232, 299, 313

Endocrinology, 19, 57

Energy, distribution of, 132

Enjoyment, 354, 360, 375 f.

Entropy, 28

Environment, 54, 57, 95, 134, 152, 173, 209, 219, 315 f., 320, 323,
327, 356, 377, 389

Envy, 238

Epistemology, 31 ff.

Equilibrium, 135, 140 n., 218

Erismann, 394

Euphoria, 253

Exact sciences, 13, 18

Experience, 24, 62 ff., 74, 85, 104, 164, 166, 177, 225, 251, 270,
272, 299, 351, 355;
blind, 364;
common, 375, 383;
depending upon, 359, 361, 370, 373;
direct, 8-39, 55, 58 ff., 67 ff., 84, 106 f., 129, 190, 203, 217,
235 f., 240, 269, 363, 373;
external, 321 ff.;
inner, 249, 253, 258, 260 ff., 265, 322;
and instinct, 388, 385;
kinesthetic, 167 ff., 212;
localization of non-visual, 233;
localization of, 103;
and insight, 372, 377, 385;
and meaning, 72, 81, 360;
naïve, 6, 86;
objective, 15, 21 ff., 60, 66 f., 71, 74, 83 ff., 105, 224, 243,
255, 259 ff., 319, 322, 326, 329;
actual and physiological processes, 67, 102, 115, 373 f.;
previous, 151, 153 f., 156, 205 f., 208 ff., 213 f., 220, 237, 285,
337, 354, 356, 365, 386;
punctiform, 191;
sensory, 73 ff., 85, 90 ff., 118 ff., 145 ff., 167, 176, 178, 215,
222 ff., 241 ff., 255, 266 f., 275, 288, 294, 327 ff., 351,
360, 382, 389;
subjective, 35, 40, 66 f., 235, 238, 241 ff., 264;
error, 176, 181, 195

Experiences, acoustic, 242, 246, 248;
accurate of physicist, 41;
genuine, 87, 95;
“irregular,” 91;
unusual versus naïve, 86 f.;
visual, 169, 205, 226 ff., 241, 246, 248, 252

Experiential, object, 36

Expression, _see_ facial

Extended areas, 147, 170, 188 f., 193, 297

Extension, 215

Eye movements, 75, 96

Eyes, 254 f.

Facial expression, 238

Fatigue, 319

Fear, fright, 21, 109, 249, 263, 266, 355 f., 379, 381 f.

Fechner, G. T., 16, 46

Feeling, of relief, 253, 356, 379, 387

Field of force, 390 f.

Figure, and ground, 219 f., 274;
gamma movement, 128

Figures, and memory, 310;
and reproduction, 314

Fixation point, 76, 324, 363

Fogelsonger, 316

Force, lines of, 324

Forces, 111 f., 121, 133 ff., 143 ff., 158

Form, constancy of, 80 ff., 123;
and experience, 207 f., 211 f., 275;
and meaning, 209;
property of whole, 219;
“real” as explanation of constancy of form, 81;
reality of, 195 ff., 205, 213 f., 273 f.;
as secondary quality, 6;
in time, 204, 214 f.;
-qualities, of circle, triangle, etc., 191

Forms, localization, 103

Frank, H., 221

von Frey, 128

Frings, 317 f.

Function, nervous and machine theory, 130 f.;
order of, 114, 118, 121

Functions, one way, 113, 116

Functionally homogeneous, 145

Functional, incompleteness in experience, 270;
interrelation, 171, 183, 204;
reality, of segregated wholes, 195, 197;
relations, of direct experience, 8 f.;
relationship, between experiential and physical object, 36;
scheme, of traditional nerve psychology, 344;
wholes, _see_ Wholes

Fundierte Inhalte, 191

Galileo, 32, 43, 109

Galvanometer, 29 ff.

Ganglionic fields, 143;
tissue, dynamical intercourse in, 132

Gatti, A., 320

Gelb and Goldstein, 169

Gelb and Granit, 220

Gestalt, meaning of, 191 f.;
analysis, 183;
primitive behavior, 216;
problem, 187;
psychology, 66, 97 n., 102, 130, 135, 148, 150 f., 168, 174, 182
ff., 219, 223, 258, 273, 287, 304, 311, 324, 350;
-qualitäten, 191, 192, 216;
theory, 140 n., 192, 202, 216, 223, 296, 297, 322

Gestalten, perception of, 174

Goethe, 192

Gottschaldt, 206 f.

Graz, school of, 190, 216

“Ground,” 202, 219 ff., 274

Group and grouping, 155, 158, 177, 183, 251, 259, 274 f., 277, 285,
289, 292, 294, 303 ff., 317, 321, 323, 327, 329, 351

Habit, 117, 273, 278 f., 301, 303, 315, 338, 342, 349, 366, 386 f.;
formation of, 16, 116, 296 f., 298, 388

Hand, as visual object, 227

Handwritings, 365

Harvey, discovery, 109

Hearing, distance in, 128

von Helmholtz, H., 77, 125, 241

Hemispheres, 141

Hering, E., 61, 63

Hertz, M., 158, 216, 306

von Hornbostel, E., 242 n.

Hume, 359, 367 ff., 377, 383

Hunger, inner experience, 7, 325 f.

Hunter, W. S., 159, 277

Huyghens, 32

“I,” 228, 230, 234

Idea, and action, 250, 366;
free, 237

Illusion, and memory, 72, 81

Illusions, optical, 78 f., 94 ff., 125

Image, 260, 270 f., 275

Images, _see also_ Retinal

Impulse, of withdrawal, 382

Indifferent network, of relations, 369 f.

Inertia, 134, 139

Inference, by analogy, 238, 241

Inhibition, in reproduction, 316 ff., 335, 341

Innervation, 18, 19, 258

Insight, 371 f., 376 ff., 391, 394

Instinct, 325, 388, 391

Intelligence, 16, 46 f., 49 f., 371, 394

Intensity, 165, 215

Interaction, dynamical, 135, 137, 140, 143 f., 281

Interest, 324

Interval, dead, 204

Introspection, 9 ff., 18 f., 25, 31, 55, 60, 69, 70-102 (chapter on),
103 ff., 114, 123, 133, 183, 350, 383

Ions, 54, 218

I Q, 47

Irradiation, of excitations, 98, 121 f.

Isolation, in sensory field, 95

Isolating conductors, as explanation of order, 131 f., 145

Jaspers, K., 394

James, W., 70, 101, 270, 369 f.

James-Lange, theory of Emotions, 245

Janet, P., 253

Joy, 12

Katz, D., 102

Kester, P., 128

Kinesthesis, 166 f., 233

Klages, L., 243

Koffka, K., 129, 300, 310, 394

Köhler, W., 69, 102, 147, 186, 194 n., 223, 394

Knowledge of other man’s mind, 257;
previous, 152, 155

von Kries, J., 343

Krueger, F., 193 n.

Kühn, 285 n.

Language, as special type of behavior, 18, 67 ff.;
primitive, 242

Lashley, K. S., 216

Laughing, 265

Layman, 349 f., 367 f., 372, 377, 380

Leading-tone, 222

Learning, in empiristic theory, 80 f., 104, 117 f., 366, 373, 386;
and meaning, 151, 365, 381 f., 391;
theory of 116, 193, 282-303, 316 ff., 329, 340

Lesion, of the brain, 169

Level, 272

Lewin, K., 330, 332 f., 338 ff., 348

Lewin and Karsten, 360 n.

Liebmann, S., 144

Light-waves, not organized, 174 f., 181, 257

Local arrangements, 132, 140;
processes, 115, 119, 121 f., 127, 129, 140, 146, 149, 182, 231;
sensory elements, 82, 96, 99, 118 f., 122, 125, 126, 147 f., 187,
189, 190, 193, 255;
stimulation, 95 ff., 99, 106, 118 f., 122, 124, 126, 176, 178, 187
f., 203, 276

Localization, external, 228;
geometrical in brain and nervous system, 225, 346;
in group, 306;
of hidden object, 309;
in space, 84, 93, 104, 215

Mach, E., 140, 187, 214

Machine-arrangements, and the organism, 117, 122, 131

Machine, explained, 108 ff., 133 f.;
theory, or conception, 110 f., 122, 126 ff., 141, 145 f., 149, 190,
194, 298 f., 344, 347, 377 ff., 385, 388

Magnet, deflection of, 41

Magnetism, 48

Map, as ambiguous figure, 196

McCarthy, 343 n.

Meaning of objects, 151 f., 173, 208, 265, 300

Meaning, as opposed to pure sensations, 72 f., 81 ff., 90 ff., 95
ff., 105, 129;
theory, 90 ff., 97, 103 ff., 123, 125, 149 f., 153 ff., 205, 213,
237, 299, 351

Meaningful material versus nonsense, 284, 286 ff.

Measurement, in psychology, 40, 49

Memory, and association, 278 f., 295;
in empiristic theory, 153 f.;
and organization, 315, 329, 332;
physiological theories, 273;
image, 7

von Meinong, A., 190

Melody, 204 f., 215, 275, 290, 360

Mental life, 9 f., 58, 214, 238, 240 f., 246, 336, 349, 378

Method, of behaviorism, 17;
in psychology, 38 ff., 43 f., 52;
of natural science, 20

Michotte, A., 320

Mind, and body, 231, 261;
relation to direct experience, 10

Molecules, 53, 112, 119, 138, 156, 158, 189, 272

Molecular forces, 143

Monkey, 308 f.

Moon, 320 f.

Morgenstern, C., 242

Morphogenesis, 130

Mosaic theory, 204, 280 f.

Motor melodies, 275;
phenomena, 96

Movement, seen, 84, 129, 192, 204, 249;
as secondary quality, 6;
of water, 134 f.;
co-ordination of, 392;
tendency to, 167, 390;
of extension, 128;
eye, 167 f., 179, 212

Movements, stroboscopic, 79, 128, 130;
overt bodily, 115, 166 f., 261, 392;
celestial, 114

Müller, G. E., 61 n. ff., 285

Müller-Lyer figure, 94, 96

Musical form, as temporal form, 204, 215

Music, understanding of, 257

Muscles, 245

Nagel, 283, 315

Nativism, 118, 123, 232

Natural sciences, 42, 279, 350, 378

Neighborhood, factor of, 281, 289 f.

Nervous activity, and all-or-none law, 58, 62;
mechanistic theory of, 98, 100, 102, 114, 116, 121, 126, 130, 257,
349, 377 f.;
new theory of, 123, 292;
field of force, 392;
processes, and experienced field, 374

“Nervousness,” 356, 380

Nervous system, 26, 49, 56 f., 97, 99, 116, 120, 125, 132, 141 f.,
174 f., 184, 257, 266, 269, 278, 280, 312, 315, 322, 344, 346
f., 350, 385 ff.

Network, nervous, 142 ff.;
of wires, 140

Newton, 32

Nietzsche, 234

Noise, comparison of intensity, 271

Nonsense syllables, 281 ff., 295, 315 ff., 332, 334, 338 ff.

Object-characters, 20, 25, 27, 71 f.

Object, of naïve experience, 6

Objects, physical, their influence on each other, 7

Observation, in laboratory and analytical, 40 f., 86, 94

Obstacles, 370, 393

Occipital lobes, 141

Oetjen, F., 215 n.

Oersted, 41

Ogden, R. M., 300

One-way street, 118, 378

Ontogenesis, gestalt in, 130, 194, 216

Optical center, lesions in, 169

Optic sector, 116, 346 f.

Order, dynamical, 131, 137, 140, 145, 149, 194;
enforced, 98, 122, 130, 133, 145, 337;
experienced, and physiological processes, 64 ff., 163, 203, 230,
248, 258, 326, 373 f., 376, 389;
in psychophysical relations, 115, 170 ff., 256;
logical, as opposed to experienced, 63;
spatial, 65, 225;
temporal, 65, 163

Organism, action of, 391;
not an isolated system, 140;
mechanistic theory of, 110, 119;
as quasi-machine, 381 n.;
as part of total saturation, 325 f.;
as dynamic system, 180

Organisms, and physical systems, 44 f., 56

Organization, 54, 122, 126 f., 149, 152, 158 n., 163 ff., 174 ff.,
191, 202 f., 208 ff., 217, 250, 256 ff., 267, 273 ff., 278, 283
ff., 289 ff., 300, 307 ff., 313 ff., 323, 326 ff., 340, 367,
370;
Bipolar, 323 ff.

Organized trace, 293, 314, 329

Parts, and wholes, 183, 209, 366

Path, of optimal conduction, 377

Perception, 9, 72, 195

Peripheral vision, 12, 27, 242

Peripheral conditions, of vision, 141

Persistency, 337

Physics, and order by dynamical interaction, 137 f., 324;
and direct experience, 29 ff., 35 ff., 178, 267;
and psychology, 29 ff., 41, 44, 48, 57, 146, 280, 376

Physical system, brain as, 227 f., 319;
classification of, 56, 112, 133 f.;
reality, 24 ff., 230, 239 f.

Physiological locus, confusion with sensory localization, 104

Physiological principles, common to Introspectionism and Behaviorism,
114

Physiological processes, as correlate of spatial order, 225, 227

Physiological processes, inferred from direct experience, 60 ff.

Physiological process, and stimulus distribution, 197

Physiological stress, as correlate of attitude, 184, 326 f.

Physiological trace, 272 f., 291, 347

Phylogenesis, 130 ff.

Pianist, example, 237, 257 f.

Pleasure, 260, 376

Poppelreuter, W., 348

Position, 215, 217

Potential, 325

Practice, 94

Pressure, 134, 330

Primary qualities, 7

Principle of congruence, in the systematic properties of direct
experience and its concomitant physiological processes, 61

Process, distribution of, 114, 127, 132, 134, 139, 182, 190, 225 f.,
273, 292, 311 f.;
underlying experience, 62, 269, 291, 321, 325;
properties of, 142;
of observing and material observed, 31

Processes, “Higher,” 216;
total, 107, 141 ff.;
sensory, 86, 119, 133, 162, 278, 280 f., 298 f., 350, 374

Properties, of more extended fields, 188;
surface--of physical objects, 172;
of situation determining behavior, 350, 370

“Psycho-physical axioms,” 61

Psycho-physical field, 215, 232, 266

Purpose, 370

Puzzle-picture, 171, 201

Qualitative, observation, 36, 41 ff., 44, 50, 52 f.

Qualitative, types of behavior, 39 f.

Quality, 215

Quantitative measurement, 36, 38 f., 42 f., 46, 48, 50 f., 53

Quantum theory, 132

Rays, 175

Reaction, delayed, 159, 276, 304 f., 306, 308, 309;
to results of organization, 180

Relative reactions, 304

Recall, 301, 331 ff.

Receptor organs, 98, 345

Recognition, 267, 274, 301

Reflex action, 55 ff., 98, 298, 377, 381, 385 ff.

_Reforzando_, 249

Regularity, change towards, 310

Regular, as a form quality, 191

Relations, logical between local stimuli, 203, 358, 369;
spatial, 227, 320, 321

Relative distance, 157, 165

Relations, constancy of, and constancy hypothesis, 97 n.

Relation, in successive comparison, 271

Relative properties, determining organization, 121, 127, 138, 147,
182, 202, 257, 280 f., 294, 311

Relief, 387

Repetition, 334

Reproduction, 81 f., 116 f., 121, 193, 212 ff., 273 ff., 282 f., 291
ff., 300, 301-348 (chapter on), 349, 366

Repulsion, 120

“Restless,” 264

Retention, 301

Retinal pattern, and phenomenal pattern, 142 ff.

Retinal points, central projection of, 141

Retina, chemical reactions on Retina as conditions of organized
vision, 141

Retinal, position and localization, 84;
image, perspective of, 76;
geometry of R. stimulation, 115, 124 f., 133, 166, 177, 194 ff.,
200 f., 257

Richter, C. P., 39, 43

_Ritardando_, 248, 256

Rhythm, 204 f., 319

Röntgen, 42

_Sachlicher Zusammenhang_, 354

Sander, W., 223

Scientific criticism, 5

Scientific effort, least, 130

Scientific method, 12, 30, 53, 267

Scholz, W., 128

Schumann, F., 79 n.

Searching, 357

“Secondary Qualities,” 6

Segregation, 149 ff., 151, 154, 156, 158, 163 f., 167 f., 172 ff.,
182, 187, 191 ff., 202 f., 212, 220, 225, 231, 239, 251, 263,
267, 274, 327, 369, 371, 374

Self, 319 ff., 336, 351 f., 361, 374, 377, 379, 389 f.

Selz, O., 300

Sensory discrimination, 296

Sensory dynamics, 170 f.;
field, 119, 135, 140 n., 151 f., 158, 167, 173, 177, 184, 187, 191,
193 f., 212 ff., 281, 327, 350 f., 391

Sense organs, 177, 347

Sensory organization, 163, 165 f., 170 ff., 185, 187, 215 f.

Sensation, 71 ff., 82, 84 f., 86, 88, 91, 93, 98, 103, 129, 153, 158,
163, 187, 190 f., 214, 351

Sexual behavior, 325 f.

Shadow, 80, 91

Shepard, J. F., 316

Size, constancy of, 74, 81 ff., 86, 93, 105 f., 133

Soap bubble, 56, 119

Social forces, as causes of grouping, 328

Social contagion, 266

Social psychology, 234, 328

Solar system, 138

Sorrow, 12

Soul, 10, 110

Sound, localization of, 103, 224, 232;
waves, not dynamically organized, 256 ff.

Space, physical, 115;
sensory, 232, 262 ff.

Speed, seen and retinal, 93

Spheres, crystal, 109

Spider, 354, 375

Stability of distribution, 139, 148

Standardization, 52

Stars, constellations of, 154

“States beyond,” physiological, 271

Stern, W., 215 n.

Stimuli, as indifferent mosaic, 257;
constellation of, 106, 125, 180, 203, 215, 258 f., 264, 275, 311 f.

Stimulus, and response, 120, 166, 179, 217;
error, 176

Stimulation, under the Constancy Hypothesis, 93, 127, 133, 298

Straight line, machine theory for perception of, 204 n.

Stress, 140, 326, 338, 357, 370, 375

Striving, 193

Structure, of two grays, 217;
supralocal, 203, 218

Sub-wholes, 157, 183, 201, 205, 282 f., 313, 318 f.

Subjective phenomena, 21 f., 24 f., 265

Subjectivity, genetic, 24 f.

Successive comparison, 271, 273, 304

Surface tension, 48, 158

Synopses, 387

Task, 330 ff., 339

Tendency, 330, 370, 380 f., 384, 389, 390

Temporal organization, 164, 258

Tension, 250 f., 364

Ternus, J., 130 n.

Thing, one, 129, 155

“Things,” 21 ff., 84, 219 f., 224, 230

Thinking, 19, 83, 193, 244

Time, experience, similar to space experience, 163, 289;
physiological correlate of experienced time, 65

Tinklepaugh, O. L., 277 n., 308

Togetherness, 361

Tonal fusion, 124, 127

Topographical, conditions and arrangements, 112 ff., 133 f., 138,
140, 146, 347

Total field, 320, 324, 327, 329, 332, 336, 343, 350, 352 f., 358,
361, 367, 371 f., 376, 378 ff., 389

Touch, 128, 162, 220, 231, 242, 354

Traces, 278, 291 ff., 302, 304, 307, 309 ff., 315

Training, 207, 303

Transposition, 214, 216 ff., 303

Trial and error, 177

Understanding, of others, 238, 240, 245, 259 ff.

Unknown something, 152 f.

“Units,” retinal, 177;
_see_ segregation

Unrest, 110

Usnadze, 242 n.

Van der Veldt, 275

Verbal report, 69

Vector, 134, 211

Visual space, 225 f., 232

Visual, form, 197 ff., 202, 208, 212 f., 328

Visual depth, 174, 194

Vision, form in V. and touch, 162;
in birds and humans, 159;
localization in, 103, 128;
order in, 114 f.

Visual processes, connection with other sensory processes, 116

Visual units, corresponding to physical objects, 172, 177

Visual organization, _see_ organization

Visual segregation, _see_ segregation

Visceral organs, 19, 245

Visual field, 84, 104, 115, 129, 140, 142, 144, 146, 149, 167, 196,
201, 203, 212, 220, 244, 274, 320, 324

Vitalism, 114, 118, 146

Watson, J. B., 52, 252, 267, 323, 382

Weber’s law, 16

Weiss, A. T., 34

Werner, H., 310 n.

Wertheimer, M., 129, 130 n., 147, 150 n., 157, 163, 186, 215 n., 223,
394

Whitehead, A. W., 394

Witasek, S., 190

Whole, functional, 106 f., 119, 141, 148, 157, 182, 263, 269, 270,
292, 295, 311, 336, 343;
and form, 200 f., 205, 208 f., 209;
and memory, 300, 303;
organized, 288, 294, 300, 311, 337

Wholes, empiristic explanation of, 158 n.;
extended, 126, 156, 169;
motor, 170;
specific properties of, 221 f., 242, 253, 256, 259;
segregated, _see_ Segregation;
preferred, 158, 209;
primitive, 161 f., 216 f.;
_see also_ Sub-wholes

Warmth, as general quality, 241

Words, applying to subjective and objective experiences equally, 243

World, of direct experience, 5, 7, 23, 25, 86;
physical, 6, 8, 10, 20, 22 f., 25 f., 33, 35, 36, 41, 60, 115, 132
f.

Wolf, F., 310

Wundt, W., 79 n.

Yarbrough, J. N., 304, 307, 309

Yerkes, R. M., 278

Zeigarnik, B., 330, 332

FOOTNOTES

[1] It seems more cautious to talk about direct experience than about “consciousness.” For some people consciousness is rather a function by or in which we become aware of “immediate experience.” In my terminology, if some one has a “feeling of becoming aware,” this is only _one special case_ of direct experience.

[2] The opposition between introspectionism and behaviorism discussed in this chapter is the opposition between those who use and those who reject the observation of direct experience. In Chapter III introspectionism as a special interpretation of the use of direct experience will be discussed.

[3] By the way, the same warning applies to the relation between my organism as a physical system and “my body” as I have it in direct experience. Obviously “my body” is the outcome of certain special processes in my physical organism--started in the eyes, muscles, skin, etc.--exactly as the chair before me is the final product of other special processes in the same physical organism. And if the chair is seen “before me,” the “me” of this phrase means my experienced body, of course, not my organism as an object of the physical world. Even accredited psychologists do not always seem to be clear about this point. Later on we shall come back to it.

[4] Cf. C. P. Richter, _Animal Behavior and Internal Drives. The Quarterly Review of Biology_, II, p. 307, 1927.

[5] If it can be demonstrated more generally that the tests measure “speed” primarily--as Boring and Teak have found in their subjects--the value of the method would be more restricted than I have here supposed.

[6] Cf. G. E. Müller, _Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 14_, p. 189.

[7] _Loc. cit._

[8] Cf. Chapter VI.

[9] The German word for “eagle.”

[10] This argument has been used by Wundt and Schumann.

[11] _Archiv f. d. ges. Psychol., 36_, 1917.

[12] Cf. J. F. Brown, _Psycholog. Forschung, 10_, 1927.

[13] Cf. v. Kries, _Allg. Sinnesphysiologie_.

[14] This is the famous constancy hypothesis. Some introspectionists have said that _gestalt_ psychology, as any science must, has also to acknowledge certain constant relations between given conditions and subsequent effects. Quite! We do not argue against constant relations existing between conditions and results in general, but only against a constant relation between _local_ stimulation and _local_ experience. For brevity’s sake we call that “the” constancy hypothesis.

[15] _Optische Untersuchungen am Schimpansen und am Haushuhn. Abhandl. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss._, 1915.

[16] _Op. cit._ and Frank, _Psychol. Forsch., 7_, 1926; _10_, 1927. Beyrl, _Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 100_, 1926.

[17] Among the first we may count those anatomical arrangements which, though not ready in embryonic life and at the time of birth, will develop to their final form by maturation.

[18] If I say that “attitude” will sometimes have an influence upon sensory experience, this statement does not mean, that “mental power” can change the sensory field arbitrarily. First of all, strictly speaking, it is not the attitude, as an experience, which changes the sensory facts; the physiological process underlying it changes the sensory process. Also, such a change is not produced arbitrarily; it necessarily follows definite antecedents. Furthermore, natural objective experience does not yield to all slight changes of attitude. Apart from introspection our attitude will not tend radically to alter sensory experience. Some very important exceptions will be considered later on.

[19] _Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 61_, 1912.

[20] Benussi has contributed to our knowledge of these problems by excellent experimental work. His investigation of similar facts in the field of touch has been mentioned above. Recently certain extremely important properties of stroboscopic movement have been investigated by Wertheimer and Ternus (_Psycholog. Forschung, 7_, 1926).

[21] I am neglecting here the influence of inert velocities which may be neglected indeed in all discussion of the nervous system.

[22] The reader is asked not to judge the physical side of _gestalt_ theory on the basis only of this short report. The concept of equilibrium is less fundamental in biology than is that of dynamics. But the _direction_ of dynamics cannot be defined without it. Furthermore, we are not allowed to treat the sensory field (or even the organism) as though it were an isolated system. Therefore the laws of dynamics do not apply here in their simplest form.

[23] _Psycholog. Forschung, 9_, 1927.

[24] It is well known in photometry that without differences of brightness figures lose their definite form by diffusion into the ground.

[25] If the surrounding field is not homogeneous the symmetry of the circle will be distorted as in the well-known illusion in which two lateral vertical lines make the circle oblate without, of course, changing the retinal image. A number of other illusions illustrate the same principle.

[26] _Psycholog. Forschung, 4_, 1923.

[27] One form of empiristic explanation would say that we have learnt to regard as wholes whatever always moves together. Wertheimer has pointed out that, here, we have rather to do with one more principle of sensory segregation and organization: when some parts of the field begin to move at the same time and in a somewhat uniform way, they will become one moving whole at once and _ipso facto_.

[28] _Zeitschrift für vergleichende Physiologie, 7_, 1928.

[29] _Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 41_, 1918.

[30] One chapter of _Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand_ has the title: “Denn was innen, das ist aussen.” Should these words of Goethe have produced the misapprehension? Who reads the chapter will see at once that that title refers to the similarity between sensory experience and the physiological processes accompanying it, not to the relationship between organic processes and the environment (cf. § 181).

[31] Not all subjects are equally suitable for this experiment.

[32] There is some suspicion that the color process, mainly as a chemical affair, may even _follow_ other more physical sides of the whole dynamical event on some occasions. In an electrolyte some chemical reaction at the electrodes may begin after the distribution of current is established throughout. Similarly, we need not see colors or differences of color in order to experience definite results of dynamical self-distribution.

[33] In the theory of F. Krueger, rather the opposite view was held originally under the influence of von Ehrenfels and Cornelius. Recently, however, the concept of _gestalt_ in our meaning of the word is given more attention by Krueger.

[34] Köhler, _Gestaltprobleme und Anfänge einer Gestalttheorie_. Jahresberichte über die gesamte Physiologie, herausgeg. von Rona, Berlin, 1924.

[35] Of course, even this expression is not justified. There is no “line” unified and segregated _as such_ in the mosaic of retinal stimuli. There is not more than a definite series of spots, which qualitatively are stimulated in a manner different from their neighbors.

[36] Under certain abnormal conditions both forms may be seen at the same time.

[37] _Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren_, Kopenhagen, Berlin, London, 1921.