Chapter XX: Conclusion

Government in China has in the Republican era undergone one of the most significant transformations to be found anywhere in the world's political experience. The oldest society on earth found itself forced to redefine its position and to reconstruct its ways of thought and internal means of organization. Pressure from without compelled China to adopt the modern state. Chinese society was required to incorporate this state and all implied institutions in its routine living. The earlier period of the Republic marks an epoch in which modern forms had been established in harmony with the accepted standards of the Western state system. Chinese society fell into chaos beneath the up-to-date superstructure. The later period witnessed the correlation of state and society by coordination of ideological, military, and governmental power. From the collapse of the Manchu rule in 1911 to the operative zest of the National Government at Nanking in 1937 there was a revolution in the processes of government which for completeness can compare with any century of Western transformation.

_The Collapse of the Imperial Society_

Western ideology has failed to enter China as a constructive whole, but it has smashed whatever reality there was to the old world view. Western-educated Chinese leadership has undertaken the task of governing a people which has learned only indirectly of the West. In carrying out a program of adaptation, contemporary Chinese leadership has relied on Sun Yat-sen's phrase, "modernization without Westernization." But a dilemma remains. How can the standards of the modern world be divorced from their Western origins? How can Western technology be used without the attitude of mind which has created it and brought it to operative efficiency? How can a world which never knew Rome or the Normanic _Curia Regis_ know jurisprudence? How can modern government be made Chinese, when government itself has meant something far different in China from what it has meant in the West?

Further, the nature of Chinese leadership has not only been transformed from being literary and ethical in its orientation to being technical and legal; it has also been transformed socially in the replacement of scholars by soldiers. The ideal ruler of old was a humane classicist with a taste for historical studies; the contemporary Chinese ruler must be military, if not militaristic, and must have the inevitable background of engineering and management which modern war connotes. The soldier must collaborate with the modern administrator, while both recapture the high ideals of devotion typical of the old scholastic rule, even if they cannot use its substance. These imperatives are indispensable if China is to live.

Finally, the language system which did so much to create and then perpetuate the scholastic elite through thousands of years of Chinese culture has now submitted to changes deeper and more far-reaching than any in the past. The development of the _pai-hua_ school of literature and the progress of mass education indicate that even with ideographs the Chinese can reach conditions of uniform literacy approximating those which prevail in the advanced Western nations. If the alphabetization of the Chinese language, which is now in the form of tentative experiment, should become a fact, even more striking developments could take place. Reading and writing, and on this basis the transmission of authoritative tenets, does not presuppose profound economic adjustments. The modern Chinese will know his classics increasingly through paraphrases no more difficult than a newspaper column. When it is realized that the simplification of intellectual activity is offered to a people schooled in the idolatry of books, the potentialities of educational and intellectual renaissance--already partially realized--become apparent.

With the disappearance of the imperial world society of the Confucians as a consequence of its encirclement by Westernized states, with the passing of the scholars and the rise of Western-trained soldiers, lawyers, and technicians, and with the alteration of the linguistic and intellectual foundation upon which the old society rested, what is there left of old China?

_The Nature of the Transformation_

In the first place, the ideological change is not complete. No Western idea can enter China unimpaired. Sun Yat-sen was influenced by the almost entirely contradictory notions of Western nationalism, democracy, and socialism. In the _San Min Chu I_ their Western identity was destroyed, and the new doctrines had much in common with the past. Western ideas served largely as a mold; when the mold was removed, the form was Western but the content was still Chinese. Mazzini and Confucius might both approve of Sun's political doctrines.

Secondly, the extrapolitical agencies of Chinese life remain. Chinese society may be shattered in dogma, but it persists in fact. The family, though subject to legal redefinition caused by Western cultural and economic influences, nevertheless plays a role far greater than in the West. The village is still the fundamental grouping among the rural masses. The guild system is impaired by the Western impact, but the party organizations--Nationalist and Communist--have absorbed much of the strength which once lay in the _hui_. Under foreign domination, these institutions may play a determining role in the struggle against the intruder.

Thirdly, for modern government the Chinese have resources of their own experience on which to rely. But they also have Western devices and prescriptions. The National Government, while falling short of Western levels of government efficiency, nevertheless trained large numbers of Chinese to think in terms of the modern state. But no new pattern has as yet crystallized. Chinese political and military development may well present a flexibility beyond Western grasp.

Fourth, the Chinese have still ahead of them the choice of criteria of authority to prevail in society. Learning, office, property played a decisive part in the old society. Hitherto, the Republic has grown with three modes of power: ideological, military, governmental. The relation between them is not yet determined.

_The Problems of Government in China_

Among the governmental problems confronting China the acquisition of national territorial sovereignty stands out. Ever since the establishment of the Republic the Chinese have grown acutely conscious of the fact that some of their most important economic centers have been lifted out of the national territory. Sun Yat-sen realized in the frustration of his first efforts toward republicanization and social policy that the problems of internal government could not be settled unless the people as a whole were free. Without general freedom there could be no question of democracy, no question of a coordinated plan for the realization of the _min shêng_ principle.[1] Observing the intimate relation between the _tuchüns_ and the foreign interests, which often favored them, Sun and his followers began to stress their nationalist role. With the Japanese invasion of the Northeast in 1931, of Shanghai in 1932, of Inner Mongolia and North China in the following years, and of China as a whole in 1937, the issue of territorial sovereignty has become the most important one of all. Until it is settled, all other questions must necessarily be considered in their relation to it.

Second, the question of economic sustenance and development is becoming pressing. Without an adequate economic base, the Chinese population lives under the constant threat of simply starving to death. Military difficulties emphasize this problem; in fact, military effectiveness and strategy will have to depend upon the physical existence of the people in and behind the lines. The Chinese masses have lived close to the edge of starvation for a long time. As a consequence, the Chinese cannot wage war but in close proximity to the point of economic paralysis--plain exhaustion of the physical necessities of life. The economic problem cannot wait for spontaneous self-cure.

Third, the Chinese will have to recognize the need for politicalization of public opinion. They must evolve the faculty of transforming group opinion into governmental or organizational action. They must acquire techniques for group collaboration which will allow them to break down traditional groups into more diversified units--a government commission, a factory workshop, an army unit--without reference to family bonds or village and _hui_ connections. This is less a problem of doctrine or education than one of habit and practice.

Fourth, the restoration of national prestige is necessary to the security of the Chinese nation in the international sphere, and to the wholesome development of the Chinese people within their national boundaries as well. They cannot effectively borrow from the West if they do so reluctantly, overcome by the thought of inferiority or by shame. Unless they conquer their present handicap, the Chinese will continue to lack self-confidence.

Fifth, the army problem must be solved. In the last analysis, the excess of men under arms damages the Chinese military, as the number of well-equipped effectives remains disproportionately small. The hordes of half-armed soldiers constitute a heavy burden upon the society, reduce the general economic level, and--by affording one particular group a disproportionate opportunity for making its preferences felt--brutalize the operation of public opinion and discourage peaceable group pursuit.

Sixth, the Chinese state--if China is to solve political questions through governmental procedures--must be constituted as a clear and legal entity. The old imperial society of China was able to dispense with law through reliance upon social forces expressing themselves in a large number of small but stable units. If these disappear the question arises: How can the individual conceive clearly his relationships within Chinese society? Systematized modern organization requires a legal framework.

_The Question of Chinese Political Survival_

That the Chinese will survive, biologically, as a race--this no one doubts. That the Chinese will survive culturally is more open to question. The Chinese absorbed all their conquerors of the past because the country was large, because the people were extraordinarily homogeneous in ideology and habit, because the Chinese were wealthier than their conquerors and more cultured. Absorption or cultural extinction is not a matter of race; it is a question of ideology, of thought and the habits which arise from ways of thought. What ways of thought are there today that will absorb the conquerors? What ways of thought are there that the conquerors might tear apart from the long past, to change China into a mere geographical expression?

In the past, China has been conquered by invaders who accepted the Chinese estimate of China, and who reciprocated the Chinese self-esteem with a deep admiration for Chinese culture. China's modern invaders bring with them a veritable cult of national self-aggrandizement. Their fondness for the Chinese past is mixed with contempt for modern China. Will the Chinese preserve their national equanimity and sanity in the face of such an attitude? Much depends upon their military and political fortune and its effect upon their confidence.

Government in the Republican era demonstrates the fertility and inventiveness of the Chinese mind in building political and administrative institutions and in finding means of uniting and controlling the Chinese as a people. When the chaos from which they have been emerging is considered, their recent accomplishments are an attestation of political ability. The National Government and the Chinese Soviet Republic were worthy adversaries; each met disastrous odds, not the least of which was the other. Their governmental forms may be destroyed and yet reappear so long as the Chinese remain Chinese in the sense of their long past. Sun Yat-sen expressed his countrymen's elementary social and national consciousness, so different from the feverish nationalism of the West, in very clear language:

Suppose that we, Chinese, were naturalized English or Americans and
helped England or America to conquer China on the principle that we
accept cosmopolitanism, would our consciences, I ask you, be at rest
or not? If our consciences troubled us, that would be a sign that we
have nationalism; nationalism would trouble our consciences.[2]

Such nationalism may prove indestructible. With democracy and _min shêng_ as nationalism's corollaries, China promises to contribute a gift of peace and political intelligence to the world, and may yet return to her ancient role as the pacific preceptress of nations.

NOTES

[1] See above, pp. 41 ff.

[2] Paschal M. d'Elia, S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, p. 132, Wuchang, 1931.

CHRONOLOGY OF DYNASTIES

This is the accepted time scheme in China. The dates are the Western equivalents of the most widely current Chinese computation, which is known to be incorrect or haphazard from the eighth century B.C. back. The periods given for the dynasties are chronological formulas rather than the exact expression of political realities. For a discussion of the materials of Chinese historiography, see Charles S. Gardner, _Chinese Traditional Historiography_, Cambridge, 1938. For an excellent short summary of Chinese history, see the "Historical Sketch" by Lei Hai-tsung in _The Chinese Year Book_, 1936-1937, Shanghai. Chronologies are to be found in the major Chinese-English dictionaries, and--among many others--in Leon Wieger, S. J., _La Chine à travers les âges_, Hsien-hsien, 1920, where they are accompanied by a great deal of the old-style, uncritical, but nevertheless informative, Chinese scholarship.

HSIA ended 1765 (?)B.C. } prehistoric
SHANG 1765(?)-1123 (?)B.C. } or
CHOU 1122(?)-256 B.C. } semihistoric
_Ch'un Ch'in_ (Spring and
Autumn Epoch) 770-473 B.C.
_Chan Kuo_ (Warring States
Epoch) 473-221 B.C.
CH'IN 221-203 B.C.
EARLY HAN (including Wang Mang) 202 B.C.-A.D. 25
LATER HAN A.D. 25-220
SAN KUO (Three Kingdoms) A.D. 221-264 }
CHIN A.D. 265-419 } China's
NAN PEI CH'AO (Northern } "dark ages"
and Southern Dynasties) A.D. 420-588 }
SUI A.D. 589-619
T'ANG A.D. 620-906
WU TAI (Five Dynasties) A.D. 907-960
SUNG A.D. 960-1279
YÜAN (the Mongols) A.D. 1280-1367
MING A.D. 1368-1643
CH'ING (the Manchus) A.D. 1644-1911
MIN KUO (The Republic) 1912-

INDEX

A

Administration (_see_ Hsien; Scholastic bureaucracy; and _Yüan_
system)

Agrarian problems, 115ff.

Aircraft, military, 108ff.

Anfu party, after 1916, 47, 157

Armies, under the Han, 83ff.;
Manchu period, 86ff.;
Nationalist, 105ff.;
national, 110ff.;
_tuchünal_, 104ff.

B

Barga Mongol Soviet Republic, 185

Borodin, Michael, 53, 162

Boxer uprising, 95, 117

Buddhism, 24, 131

C

Canton governments (established by Sun in opposition to the Peking
Republic), 156ff., 160ff.

Canton-Moscow entente (_see_ Nationalist-Communist coalition)

Capitalism, 46, 69

Chan Kuo epoch, 473-221 B.C., 15ff., 82

Chang Chung-chang, the Dog-Meat General, 103

Chang Hsüeh-liang, 1898- (ex-_tuchün_ of Manchuria, son of
Chang Tso-lin), 108

Chang Hsün (monarchist _tuchün_), 156

Chang Tso-lin, 1876-1928 (_tuchün_ of Manchuria), 103ff., 158, 168

Charioteers (Chou period), 80ff.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 1879- (excommunicated Communist leader), 65

Chiang K'ai-shek [Chiang Chieh-shih], 1888- (military heir
to Sun Yat-sen; educated in Japan, further trained by Russians,
advised by Germans; leading general in China after 1927, and
outstanding figure in the National Government), 52, 105ff., 122,
164, 182

Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, 259-210 B.C. (king of Ch'in, legalist, despot,
unifier, conquered all China by 221 B.C.), 80ff., 128ff.

Chinese Soviet Republic (established in Kiangsi, 1931; merged with
National Government, 1937), 66, 182ff.

Ch'ing dynasty (_see_ Manchu dynasty)

Chinputang (Progressive Party), 151

Chou, Duke of (died 1105 B.C.[?]; semi-historic state founder), 127

Chou dynasty, 1122(?)-256 B.C., 14ff., 80ff., 127ff.

Christianity, 48ff.

Chu Hsi, 1130-1200 (Sung philosopher; interpreter of Confucianism), 16

Ch'un Ch'iu epoch, 770-473 B.C., 15, 81, 128

Communism, 51ff., 63ff., 72ff., 182ff.

Communist Party, 54ff., 68, 182ff.

Concessions, foreign, 140

Confucius [K'ung Ch'iu], 551-479 B.C. (China's most important
philosopher, spent his life teaching, with intervals of practical
administration), 15ff., 128

Constitutions: Constitution of 1923, 158;
Constitutional Compact, 1914, 153;
Draft Constitution, 1937, 181;
Nanking Organic Law, 1928, 172;
Nanking Provisional Constitution, 1931, 172;
Provisional Constitution of 1912, 148ff.

Council of State (_see_ Yüan system)

Customs, Maritime, 159

D

Democracy (_see_ San Min Chu I)

Double Ten Day, 145

E

Emperor, in old China, 18ff., 130ff.

Empress Dowager Tzu[)u] Hsi [Yeho-nola], 1835-1908 (actual ruler of
China in the latter days of the Ch'ing), 141

Extraterritoriality, 140

F

Family system, 3, 136ff.

Federal Revolutionary Government, 1932-1933 (Foochow), 184ff.

Fêng Yü-hsiang, 1880- (the Christian general,
later pro-Soviet, joined the Nationalists, revolted in 1930, took
part in anti-Japanese agitation), 103ff.

Feudalism, 80ff.

Foreign Office, 139, 159

G

Genyosha (ultra-patriotic Japanese group), 71

George, Henry, 118

Goodnow, Professor Frank, 154

Gordon, Charles George, 1833-1885 (British commander of the
Ever-Victorious Army), 93

H

Han dynasty, 202 B.C.-A.D. 220, 82ff., 116, 129

Han Lin (Imperial Academy), 130, 177

Hsia dynasty, 2205(?)-1765(?) B.C., 13

_Hsien_ (district) system, 178ff.

Hsüan T'ung (last Manchu emperor of China; abdicated in his boyhood;
now Kang Têh, Emperor of Manchoukuo), 156, 186

Hu Han-min, 1886-1937 (leader, Right Kuomintang), 59

Hu Shih, 1891- (philosopher, literary critic, language reformer), 76

Huang Hsing (early military leader of Republicans), 96

_Hui_ (guild, league) system, 3, 136ff.

Hundred Days, the (see Reform Movement)

I

Ideology (see San Min Chu I)

Imperialism, 119ff.

Islam, 24ff., 94

Islamistan, 184

J

Japanese-Chinese conflict, 34, 69ff., 74, 122ff., 154, 188ff.

"Japanese Monroe Doctrine," 70

Joffe, Adolf (Soviet agent in China), 51ff., 161ff.

K

K'ang Yu-wei, 1856-1928 (monarchical reformer), 140

Kuang Hsü, Emperor, 1871-1908 (modernist and reformer), 95, 140ff.

Kublai Khan, 1214-1294 (emperor, Yüan dynasty), 88

K'ung, H. H. [K'ung Hsiang-hsi], 1881- (industrial and financial
administrator; Kuomintang leader), 60

Kuomintang, 31ff., 38ff., 50ff., 57ff., 72ff., 161ff., 167ff.

L

Lao Tz[)u], traditionally 6th century B.C. (founder of Taoism,
mystical philosophy antistate in effect), 24, 128

Li Hung-chang, 1822-1901 (Ch'ing viceroy), 92, 142

Li Yüan-hung (military opportunist; once President), 146, 155

Linebarger, Judge Paul (adviser to Sun Yat-sen), 161

Local government (_see_ Hsien)

M

Manchoukuo, 28, 72, 185ff.

Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, 1644-1911, 32, 86ff., 135ff.

Mandarins (_see_ Scholastic bureaucracy)

Marxism (_see_ Communism)

Mêngkokuo, 185

Militarism (_see_ Armies; _Tuchünism_)

_Min shêng_ (_see_ San Min Chu I)

Ming dynasty, A.D. 1368-1643, 17, 85

Missionaries (_see_ Christianity)

Mohammedanism (_see_ Islam)

Municipal government, 181

N

Nanking government (_see_ National Government of China; "Reformed
Government")

National Government of China (Nanking, 1927-1937; inland thereafter),
114, 164, 167ff.

Nationalism (_see_ San Min Chu I)

Nationalist-Communist coalition 1923-1927, 54ff., 161ff.

Nationalist Government at Nanking (_see_ National Government of
China)

"Nationalist Government" of Peking, 1930-1931 (rebellious coalition of
Northern tuchüns and Left Kuomintang; suppressed), 59, 107

Nationalist Government, soviet in form (Canton, 1925-1926; Wu-han,
1926-1927), 162ff.

Nationalists (_see_ Kuomintang)

New Life movement, 61

O

Opportunist movements, 44ff.

Outer Mongol People's Republic, 185ff.

Overseas Chinese, 35ff.

P

Pan-Asianism, 47, 70ff.

Pan-Mongolism, 47

Parliamentary Republic at Peking, 1912-1928, 114ff., 149ff., 157ff.

Party Congress, Kuomintang, 170ff.

Political doctrines, Sun Yat-sen's, 41ff.

Pro-Japanese movements, 47

Propaganda, 23ff.

Provincial government, 134, 177ff.

"Provisional Government" at Peking, 1937- , 186

Provisional Government of the United Provinces of China, Nanking,
1911-1912, 146

R

Red Army, Chinese, 107, 182ff.

Reform Movement, Manchu, 140ff.

"Reformed Government" at Nanking, 1938- , 186

Republicans (_see_ Kuomintang)

Revolution, doctrine of, 59, 162;
of 1911-1912 [the Republican Revolution], 38, 97ff., 145ff.;
of 1926-1927 [the Great Revolution], 55, 105ff., 168

Revolutionists (_see_ Kuomintang)

S

Salt Revenue Administration, 159ff.

San Min Chu I (the philosophy of Sun Yat-sen, since 1927 the official
state dogma of China), 36, 41ff., 59ff., 72ff., 120, 167ff.

Scholastic bureaucracy, 5, 86, 129ff., 188

Settlements, foreign, 140

Shang dynasty, 1765(?)-1123(?) B.C., 14, 80, 126

Shih Huang Ti (_see_ Ch'in Shih Huang Ti)

Siam, 69

Sian, kidnaping of Chiang K'ai-shek at, 62, 66ff.

Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, 34

Soong, T. V. [Sung Tz[)u]-wen], 1894- (brother-in-law of Sun
Yat-sen; Kuomintang leader; finance administrator), 59ff., 121

Soviet Republic, Chinese (_see_ Chinese Soviet Republic)

Soviet Russia (_see_ Nationalist-Communist coalition)

Sun K'ê [Sun Fo], 1891- (son of Sun Yat-sen; Kuomintang
leader; railway administrator), 59ff.

Sun Yat-sen [Sun I-hsien; Sun Wên], 1867(?)-1925 (agitated for a
republic; first President, 1912; author of the San Min Chu I; elected
Leader, Tsung-li, of the Kuomintang; known after death as Chung Shan),
31ff.

Sun Yat-sen, Mme., 59

Sung Chiao-jen, Nationalist, 152

Sung dynasty, A.D. 960-1279, 1, 16

T

Taikwa reforms, 645 A.D., 132

T'ai-p'ing rebellion, 1849-1865 (Christian agrarian jacquerie), 32ff.,
117

T'ang dynasty, A.D. 620-906, 1, 85, 132ff.

Tannu-Tuva People's Republic, 185

Taoism (_see_ Lao Tz[)u])

Toa-shugi [Far-Easternism], 71

Treaties, with Western states, 48, 139ff.

Treaty ports, 140

Tsao Kun (Northern tuchün), 103

Tsêng Kuo-fan, 1811-1872 (Ch'ing viceroy), 82

Tuan Chi-jui (Northern _tuchün_; once President), 103

_Tuchünism_, 45ff., 76ff., 107ff., 114ff., 157

Tungpei troops (Chinese soldiers exiled from Manchuria), 67

U

United Front policy, 1937- , 60, 67ff., 72ff., 184

V

Village system, 3, 136ff.

W

Wang Ch'ing-wei, 1885- (leader, Left Kuomintang), 59

Wang Mang, 33 B.C.-A.D. 23 (Utopian who usurped the throne, dividing
early and later Han), 17

War, in Chinese thought, 79

War lord (_see Tuchünism_)

Ward, Frederick Townsend, 1831-1862 (American adventurer in Manchu
service), 93

Whampoa Military Academy, 105

Wu Chih-hui, 1864- (Kuomintang leader with anarchist leanings), 59

Wu P'ei-fu (_tuchün_ of the Yangtze valley), 28, 103ff.

Wu-han regime (_see_ Nationalist Government, soviet in form)

Y

Yellow Turbans, 3rd century A.D. (farmer rebels), 63

Yen Hsi-shan, 1881- (the "Model Governor"; Northern _tuchün_ who
joined the Nationalists, revolted in 1930, subsequently retired), 103

Yen, Dr. James [Yen Yang-chu], 1894- (mass-education leader), 76

Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (administrator, soldier, politician; served
the Manchus, leading in army modernization; became President,
attempted usurpation, failed, and died), 38, 44, 94ff., 146ff.

_Yüan_ system (five-fold division of powers), 172ff.

Transcriber's Notes: Obvious errors in spelling have been silently corrected. Also 'u' with breve is represented as [)u] in this text.