Chapter II (6)

Antisthenes’ principles are simple, because the content of his teaching remains general; it is hence superfluous to say anything further about it. He gives general rules, which consist of such excellent maxims as that “virtue is self-sufficing, and requires nothing more than a Socratic strength of character. The good is excellent, the bad discreditable. Virtue consists of works, and does not require many reasons or theories. The end of man is a virtuous life. The wise man is contented with himself, for he possesses everything that others seem to possess. His own virtue satisfies him; he is at home all over the world. If he lacks fame, this is not to be regarded as an evil, but as a good,” &c.[168] We here, once more, have the tedious talk about the wise man, which by the Stoics, as also by the Epicureans, was even more spun out and made more tedious. In this ideal, where the determination of the subject is in question, its satisfaction is placed in simplifying its needs. But when Antisthenes says that virtue does not require reasons and theories, he forgets that he himself acquired, through the cultivation of mind, its independence and the power of renouncing all that men desire. We see directly that virtue has now obtained another signification; it no longer is unconscious virtue, like the simple virtue of a citizen of a free people, who fulfils his duties to fatherland, place, and family, as these relationships immediately require. The consciousness which has gone beyond itself must, in order to become Mind, now lay hold of and comprehend all reality, i.e. be conscious of it as its own. But conditions such as are called by names like innocence or beauty of soul, are childish conditions, which are certainly to be praised in their own place, but from which man, because he is rational, must come forth, in order to re-create himself from the sublated immediacy. The freedom and independence of the Cynics, however, which consists only in lessening to the utmost the burden imposed by wants, is abstract, because it, as negative in character, has really to be a mere renunciation. Concrete freedom consists in maintaining an indifferent attitude towards necessities, not avoiding them, but in their satisfaction remaining free, and abiding in morality and in participation in the moral life of man. Abstract freedom, on the contrary, surrenders its morality, because the individual withdraws into his subjectivity, and is consequently an element of immorality.

Yet Antisthenes bears a high place in this Cynical philosophy. But the attitude he adopted comes very near to that of rudeness, vulgarity of conduct and shamelessness; and later on Cynicism passed into such. Hence comes the continual mockery of, and the constant jokes against the Cynics; and it is only their individual manners and individual strength of character which makes them interesting. It is even told of Antisthenes that he began to attribute value to external poverty of life. Cynicism adopted a simple wardrobe—a thick stick of wild olive, a ragged double mantle without any under garment, which served as bed by night, a beggar’s sack for the food that was required, and a cup with which to draw water.[169] This was the costume with which these Cynics used to distinguish themselves. That on which they placed highest value was the simplification of their needs; it seems very plausible to say that this produces freedom. For needs are certainly dependence upon nature, and this is antagonistic to freedom of spirit; the reduction of that dependence to a minimum is thus an idea which commends itself. But at the same time this minimum is itself undetermined, and if such stress is laid on thus merely following nature, it follows that too great a value is set on the needs of nature and on the renunciation of others. This is what is also evident in the monastic principle. The negative likewise contains an affirmative bias towards what is renounced; and the renunciation and the importance of what is renounced is thus made too marked. Socrates hence declares the clothing of the Cynics to be vanity. For “when Antisthenes turned outside a hole in his cloak, Socrates said to him, I see thy vanity through the hole in thy cloak.”[170] Clothing is not a thing of rational import, but is regulated through needs that arise of themselves. In the North the clothing must be different from that in Central Africa; and in winter we do not wear cotton garments. Anything further is meaningless, and is left to chance and to opinion; in modern times, for instance, old-fashioned clothing had a meaning in relation to patriotism. The cut of my coat is decided by fashion, and the tailor sees to this; it is not my business to invent it, for mercifully others have done so for me. This dependence on custom and opinion is certainly better than were it to be on nature. But it is not essential that men should direct their understanding to this; indifference is the point of view which must reign, since the thing itself is undoubtedly perfectly indifferent. Men are proud that they can distinguish themselves in this, and try to make a fuss about it, but it is folly to set oneself against the fashion. In this matter I must hence not decide myself, nor may I draw it within the radius of my interests, but simply do what is expected of me.

_b._ DIOGENES.

Diogenes of Sinope, the best known Cynic, distinguished himself even more than Antisthenes by the life he led, as also by his biting and often clever hits, and bitter and sarcastic retorts; but he likewise received replies which were often aimed as well. He is called the Dog, just as Aristippus was called by him the royal Dog, for Diogenes bore the same relation to idle boys as Aristippus did to kings. Diogenes is only famed for his manner of life; with him, as with the moderns, Cynicism came to signify more a mode of living than a philosophy. He confined himself to the barest necessities, and tried to make fun of others who did not think as he, and who laughed at his ways. That he threw away his cup when he saw a boy drinking out of his hands is well known. To have no wants, said Diogenes, is divine; to have as few as possible is to come nearest to the divine. He lived in all sorts of places, in the streets of Athens, in the market in tubs; and he usually resided and slept in Jupiter’s Stoa in Athens; he hence remarked that the Athenians had built him a splendid place of residence.[171] Thus the Cynics thought not only of dress, but also of other wants. But a mode of life such as that followed by the Cynics, which professed to be a result of culture, is really conditioned by the culture of the mind. The Cynics were not anchorites; their consciousness was still essentially related to other consciousness. Antisthenes and Diogenes lived in Athens, and could only exist there. But in culture the mind is also directed to the most manifold needs, and to the methods of satisfying these. In more recent times the needs have much increased, and hence a division of the general wants into many particular wants and modes of satisfaction has arisen; this is the function of the activity of the understanding, and in its application luxury has a place. We may declaim against the morality of this, but in a State all talents, natural inclinations and customs must have free scope and be brought into exercise, and every individual may take what part he will, only he must in the main make for the universal. Thus the chief point is to place no greater value on such matters than what is demanded, or generally, to place no importance either on possessing or dispensing with them.

Of Diogenes we have only anecdotes to relate. In a voyage to Ægina he fell into the hands of sea-robbers, and was to be sold as a slave in Crete. Being asked what he understood, he replied, “To command men,” and told the herald to call out, “Who will buy a ruler?” A certain Xeniades of Corinth bought him, and he instructed his sons.

There are very many stories told of his residence in Athens. There he presented a contrast in his rudeness and disdainfulness to Aristippus’ fawning philosophy. Aristippus set no value on his enjoyments any more than on his wants, but Diogenes did so on his poverty. Diogenes was once washing his greens when Aristippus passed by, and he called out, “If you knew how to wash your greens yourself, you would not run after kings.” Aristippus replied very aptly, “If you knew how to associate with men, you would not wash greens.” In Plato’s house he once walked on the beautiful carpets with muddy feet, saying, “I tread on the pride of Plato.” “Yes, but with another pride,” replied Plato, as pointedly. When Diogenes stood wet through with rain, and the bystanders pitied him, Plato said, “If you wish to compassionate him, just go away. His vanity is in showing himself off and exciting surprise; it is what made him act in this way, and the reason would not exist if he were left alone.” Once when he got a thrashing, as anecdotes often tell, he laid a large plaster on his wounds, and wrote on it the names of those who had struck him in order that they might be blamed of all. When youths standing by him said, “We are afraid that you will bite us,” he replied, “Don’t mind, a dog never eats turnips.” At a feast a guest threw bones to him like a dog, and he went up to him and behaved to him like a dog. He gave a good answer to a tyrant who asked him from what metal statues should be cast: “From the metal from which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were cast.” He tried to eat raw meat, which did not, however, agree with him; he could not digest it, and died at a very great age, as he lived—in the streets.[172]

_c._ LATER CYNICS.

Antisthenes and Diogenes, as already mentioned, were men of great culture. The succeeding Cynics are not any the less conspicuous by their exceeding shamelessness, but they were, generally speaking, nothing more than swinish beggars, who found their satisfaction in the insolence which they showed to others. They are worthy of no further consideration in Philosophy, and they deserve in its full the name of dogs, which was early given to them; for the dog is a shameless animal. Crates, of Thebes, and Hipparchia, a Cynic, celebrated their nuptials in the public market.[173] This independence of which the Cynics boasted, is really subjection, for while every other sphere of active life contains the affirmative element of free intelligence, this means the denying oneself the sphere in which the element of freedom can be enjoyed.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Zur Philosophie und Geschichte. Pt. V. pp. 184—186. (Edition of 1828, in 12 vols.)

[2] S. Marheineke: “Lehrbuch des Christlichen Glaubens und Lebens.” Berlin, 1823. § 133, 134.

[3] “_Meinung ist mein._”

[4] Cf. Hegels Werke, vol. VI. § 13, pp. 21, 22.

[5] Flatt: De Theismo Thaleti Milesio abjudicando. Tub. 1785. 4.

[6] Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, pp. 211, 212; cf. Anweisung zum Seligen Leben, pp. 178, 348.

[7] Sanchuniathonis Fragm. ed. Rich. Cumberland, Lond. 1720, 8; German by J. P. Kassel, Magdeburg, 1755, 8, pp. 1-4.

[8] That is to say in the Lectures preceding these, delivered in the Winter Session 1825—1826.

[9] Confucius, Sinarum philosophus, s. scientia Sinensis, latine exposita studio et opera Prosperi Juonetta, Herdtrich, Rougemont, Couplet, PP. S. J., Paris, 1687, fol.

[10] Mémoires concernant les Chinois (Paris, 1776, sqq.), Vol. II., pp. 1-361. Antiquité des Chinois, par le Père Amiot, pp. 20, 54, &c.

[11] Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte, Vol. I., p. 157.

[12] Cf. Windischmann, ibid., p. 125.

[13] Mémoire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu, par Abel Rémusat (Paris, 1823), p. 18 sqq.; Extrait d’une lettre de Mr. Amiot, 16 Octobre, 1787, de Peking (Mémoires concernant les Chinois, T. xv.), p. 208, sqq.

[14] Dr. Legge states in “The Religions of China” that Tâo was not the name of a person, but of a concept or idea. Of the English terms most suitable for it, he suggests the Way in the sense of Method.—[Translator’s note.]

[15] Abel Rémusat, l.c. p. 31, seq.; Lettre sur les caractères des Chinois (Mémoires concernant les Chinois, Tome 1) p. 299, seq.

[16] Rémusat thought that he discovered in these three syllables the word Jehovah.—[Translator’s note.]

[17] Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. I., Part I. London, 1824, pp. 19-43. (II., on the Philosophy of the Hindus, Part I., by Henry Thomas Colebrooke, read June 21, 1823).

[18] Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. i., Part I., pp. 92—118. (VII. Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus, Part II., by Henry Thomas Colebrooke.)

[19] Brucker, Hist. Phil. T. I. p. 460; Plutarch, De plac. phil. I. 3.

[20] Herod. II. 20; Senec. Quæst. natur. IV. 2; Diog. Laert. I. 37.

[21] Diog. Laert. 1. § 34, et Menag. ad. h. 1.

[22] Cf. Ritter: Geschichte der Ionischen Philosophie, p. 15.

[23] Plutarch, De plac. phil. I. 3; Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I. 10. Aristot. Phys. III. 4.

[24] Cf. Aristot. Phys. I. 4.

[25] Simplicius ad Arist. Phys. (I. 2), p. 5, 6.

[26] Stobæi Eclog. Physic. c. 11., p. 294, ed. Heeren.

[27] Simplicius ad Phys. Arist. p. 6, b.

[28] Cf. Plutarch Quæst. convival. VIII. 8.

[29] Diog. Laert. I. 119; Menagius ad h. 1.

[30] In irrisione gentilium, c. 12 (citante Fabricio ad Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. III. 4, § 30).

[31] Cf. Porphyr. De vita Pythag., §§ 14, 15; et Ritterhus, ad. h. I.

[32] Cf. Porphyr. De vita Pyth. 6, Iamblich. De vita Pyth. XXIX. 158.

[33] Diog. Laert. I. 12; VIII. 8; Iamblich. VIII. 44; XII. 58.

[34] Porphyr. De vita Pyth. 25, 21, 22; Iamblich. De vita Pyth. 36; VII. 33, 34; XXXII. 220-222.

[35] Diog. Laert. VIII. 11, Porphyr., 18-20; Iamblich. II. 9, 10, XXIV. 108, 109; Menag. et Casaub. ad Diog. Laert. VIII. 19.

[36] Porphyr. 37; Iamblich. XVII. 71-74; XVIII. 80-82; XXVIII. 150; XX. 94, 95; Diog. Laert. VIII. 10.

[37] Iamblich. XXI. 100; XXIX. 165; Diog. Laert. VIII. 22; Porphyr. 40.

[38] Porphyr. 32-34; Iamblich. XXIX. 163, 164; XX. 96; XXI. 97; XXIV. 107; Diog. Laert. VIII. 19, 21, 39.

[39] Diog. Laert., VIII. 39, 40; Iamblich. XXXV. 248-264; Porphyrius, 54-59; Anonym. De vita Pyth. (apud Photium), 2.

[40] Cf. Platon. Timæum, p. 20, Steph. (p. 8, ed. Bekk.).

[41] Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 18, § 152; adv. Math. X. § 250, 251.

[42] Mathem. c. 5, p. 30, ed. Bullialdi: cf. Aristoxen. ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. 2, p. 16.

[43] Gnomicorum poetarum opera: Vol. I. Pythagoreorum aureum carmen, ed. Glandorf Fragm. I. v. 45-48; Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IV. § 2, et Fabric. ad h. 1.

[44] Burney points out the fallacy of this statement in his History of Music. [Translator’s note.]

[45] Sext. Empiricus Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 18, § 155; adv. Math. IV. §§ 6, 7; VII. §§ 95-97; X. § 283.

[46] Diog. Laert. VIII. §§ 4, 5, 14; Porphyrius, §§ 26, 27; Iamblichus, c. XIV. § 63. (Homer’s Iliad XVI. v. 806-808; XVII. v. 45, seq.).

[47] Gnomicorum poëtarum opera, Vol. I. Pyth. aureum carmen, ed. Glandorf. Fragm. I. v. 1-4.

[48] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 33, § 225; Simpl. ad Phys. Arist. pp. 5, 6; Plut. de plac. philos. II. 4.

[49] That Xenophanes is here meant is shown from the titles of the collected Becker manuscripts, as also from comparing this passage with the verses remaining to us, which are by Xenophanes, though they were earlier ascribed to Zeno; this was done by Hegel when he did not, as in many lectures, take the Eleatic passages together. The editor found a justification in this for placing the passage in its proper place. [Note by editor.]

[50] Adv. Math. VII. 47-52; 110, 111; VIII. 326; Pyrrh. Hyp. II. 4, § 18.

[51] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. X. 313, 314; Simplic. in Phys. Arist., p. 41.

[52] Platon. Theaet. p. 183. Steph. (p. 263, ed. Bekk.); Sophist, p. 217 (p. 127).

[53] Diog. Laert. IX. 23; et Casaubonus ad. h. 1.

[54] Plutarch, De plac. phil. II. 7; Euseb. XV. 38; Stob. Ecl. Phys. c. 23, p. 482-484; Simplicius in Arist. Phys. p. 9 a, 7 b; Arist. Met. I. 4; Brandis Comment. Eleat. p. 162.

[55] De Sensu, p. 1, ed. Steph. 1557 (citante Fülleborn, p. 92).

[56] This obscure clause has been differently interpreted. Dr. Hutchison Stirling, in his annotations on Schwegler’s “History of Philosophy,” says: “Zeller accepts (and Hegel, by quoting and translating the whole passage, already countenanced him in advance) the equivalent of Theophrastus for _τὸ πλέον, τὸ ὑπέρβαλλον_ namely, and interprets the clause itself thus:—‘The preponderating element of the two is thought occasions and determines the ideas;’ that is as is the preponderating element (the warm or the cold) so is the state of mind. In short, _the more is the thought_ is the linguistic equivalent of the time for _according to the more is the thought_.” [Translator’s note.]

[57] As a matter of fact, since a comparison of this reasoning with the fragments of Melissus which Simplicius (in Arist. Physica and De Cœlo) has retained, places this conjecture beyond doubt, the editor is constrained to place it here, although Hegel, when he dealt with the Eleatics separately, put it under the heading of Xenophanes. [Note by Editor.]

[58] Cf. Plat. Parmenid. pp. 126, 127, Steph. (pp. 3—5 Bekk.).

[59] Diog. Laert. IX. 26, 27, et Menag. ad h. 1. Valer. Max. III. 3 ext. 2, 3.

[60] Diog. Laert. VI. 39, Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 8, § 66.

[61] Plat. Cratyl. p. 402, Steph. (p. 42, Bekk.); Aristot. Met. I. 6, XIII. 4.

[62] Johannes Philoponus ad Aristot. de Anima (I. 2) fol. 4 a.

[63] Clemens Alex.: Stromata V. 14, p. 712, ed. Pott. (cit. Steph. Poës. phil. p. 131).

[64] Cf. Stobaei Ecl. Phys. 22, p. 454.

[65] Diog. Laërt. IX. 7; Simplic. ad Arist. Phys. p. 6; Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 3, p. 58-60.

[66] Plutarch. de plac. phil. I. 28.

[67] Heraclides; Allegoriæ Homericæ, pp. 442, 443, ed. Gale.

[68] In writing of them Hegel very seldom separates these two philosophers, though he does so in the Jena edition.

[69] See Hegel’s “Werke,” Vol. III. p 181, et seq.

[70] Ib. p. 112.

[71] Plutarch, de plac. phil. I., 26; Stobæi Ecl. Phys. 20, p. 394. (Tennemann, Vol. I. p. 278.)

[72] Empedocles Agrigentinus. De vita et philosophia ejus exposuit, carminum reliquias ex antiquis scriptoribus collegit, recensuit, illustravit, præfationem et indices adjecit Magister Frid. Guil. Sturz, Lipsiæ, 1805.

[73] Empedoclis et Parmenidis fragmenta, &c., restituta et illustrata ab Amadeo Peyron.

[74] Cf. Plat. Parmenid. p. 127 (p. 4).

[75] Metaph. I. 3 and 8; De gener. et corrupt. I. 1.

[76] Adv. Math. VII. 120; IX. 10; X. 317.

[77] Arist. De anim. I. 2; Fabricius ad Sext. adv. Math. VII. 92, p. 389, not. T; Sextus adv. Math. I. 303; VII. 121.

[78] Hegel certainly used in his lectures, to follow the usual order, and treat Empedocles before the Atomists. But since, in the course of his treatment of them, he always connected the Atomists with the Eleatics and Heraclitus, and took Empedocles, in so far as he anticipated design, as the forerunner of Anaxagoras, the present transposition is sufficiently justified. If we further consider that Empedocles swayed to and fro between the One of Heraclitus and the Many of Leucippus, without, like them, adhering to either of these one-sided determinations, it is clear that both moments are assumptions through whose variations he opened a way for the Anaxagorean conception of end, which, by comprehending them, is the essential unity from which proceeds the manifold of phenomena, as from their immanent source.—[Note by Editor.]

[79] Anaxagoræ Clazomenii fragmenta, quæ supersunt omnia, edita ab E. Schaubach, Lipsiæ, 1827.

[80] Plin. Hist. Nat. VII. 53; Brucker, T. I. pp. 493, 494, not.

[81] Diog. Laert. II. 16; Plutarch in Lysandro, 12.

[82] Diog. Laert. II., 12-14; Plutarch, in Pericle, c. 32.

[83] Cf. Aristot. Phys. VIII. 5; Met. XII. 10.

[84] Cf. Sext. Empiric. Hypotyp Pyrrh. III. 4, § 33.

[85] Diog. Laert. II. 6; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. IX. 6; Arist. Phys. VIII. 1.

[86] Platonis Protagoras, pp. 310-314, Steph. (pp. 151-159, Bekk.).

[87] Plat. Protag., pp. 314-317 (pp. 159-164).

[88] Plat. Protag. pp. 318-320 (pp. 166-170).

[89] Plat. Protag. pp. 320-323 (pp. 170-176).

[90] Ibid. pp. 323, 324 (pp. 176-178).

[91] Plat. Protag. pp. 324-328 (pp. 178-184.)

[92] Plat. Meno., p. 91 (p. 371).

[93] Plat. Gorg. pp. 452 et 457 (pp. 15 et 24).

[94] Plat. Euthydem. pp. 283, 284 (pp. 416-418).

[95] Ibid. p. 298 (p. 446).

[96] Xenoph. Memorab. II. c. 1, § 21 _seq._

[97] Diog. Laert. IX. 50.

[98] Ibid. 54.

[99] Plat. Protag. p. 338 fin. (p. 204).

[100] Plutarch in Pericle, c. 36.

[101] Diog. Laërt. IX. 51, 52; 55, 56 (Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IX. 56).

[102] Plat. Theætet. p. 152 (p. 195); Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I, c. 32, § 216.

[103] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 388, 60; Plat. Theætet. p. 152. (p. 195-197).

[104] Plat. Theætet. p. 154 (p. 201).

[105] Plat. Theæt. pp. 153, 154 (pp. 199, 200); pp. 156, 157 (pp. 204-206); pp. 158-160 (pp. 208-213).

[106] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 32, §§ 217-219.

[107] Diodorus Siculus: XII. p. 106 (ed. Wesseling).

[108] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 66.

[109] Ibid. 67.

[110] Aristotel. de Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, c. 5.

[111] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 68-70.

[112] Ibid. 71.

[113] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 73, 74.

[114] Ibid. 75, 76.

[115] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 77-80.

[116] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 83, 84.

[117] The distinction between these two words is a very important one. Schwegler, in explaining Hegel’s position in his “History of Philosophy,” states that Hegel asserts that Socrates set _Moralität_, the subjective morality of individual conscience, in the place of _Sittlichkeit_, “the spontaneous, natural, half-unconscious (almost instinctive) virtue that rests in obedience to established custom (use and wont, natural objective law, that is at bottom, according to Hegel, rational, though not yet subjectively cleared, perhaps, into its rational principles).” As Dr. Stirling says in his Annotations to the same work (p. 394), “There is a period in the history of the State when people live in tradition; that is a period of unreflected _Sittlichkeit_, or natural observance. Then there comes a time when the observances are questioned, and when the right or truth they involve is reflected into the subject. This is a period of Aufklärung, and for _Sittlichkeit_ there is substituted _Moralität_, subjective morality: the subject will approve nought but what he finds inwardly true to himself, to his conscience.”—[TRANSLATOR’S NOTE.]

[118] Diog. Laert. II, 44 (cf. Menag. ad h. 1); 18-20, 22.

[119] Diog. Laert. II. 22, 23; Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 28 (p. 113).

[120] Diog. Laert. II. 24; Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, § 18; Plat. Apol. Socrat. p. 32 (pp. 120-122); Epist. VII. pp. 324, 325 (p. 429).

[121] Plat. Convivium, pp. 212, 176, 213, 214, 223 (pp. 447, 376-378, 449, 450, 468, 469).

[122] Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, § 10.

[123] Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, § 11-16; Aristot. Metaph. I. 6.

[124] Aristot. Metaph. XIII. 4

[125] From the Lectures of the winter 1825-1826.—(NOTE BY EDITOR.)

[126] Platonis Theætetus, p. 210 (p. 322).

[127] Plat. Protag. p. 349 (pp. 224, 225); pp. 360, 361 (pp. 245-247).

[128] Xenoph. Memorab. IV. c. 2, §§ 11-17.

[129] Xenoph. Memorab. IV. c. 1, § 1; c. 2, § 40.

[130] Cf. Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 2, §§ 12-16, sqq.

[131] Herodot. IX. 33, seq.

[132] Xenoph. Apologia Socrat. § 10; Memorab. I. c. 1, § 1 Plat. Apologia Socrat. p. 24 (p. 104).

[133] Apologia Socrat. §§ 11—13; Memorab. I. c. 1, §§ 2—6; 19.

[134] Plat. Apol. Socrat. p. 26 (108, 109).

[135] Apologia Socrat. § 14 (cf. Memorab. I. c. 1, § 17).

[136] Plato. Apol. Socrat. p. 21 (p. 97).

[137] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. § 14.

[138] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. §§ 16—19; Memorab. I. c. 2, §§ 1—8.

[139] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. § 20; cf. Memorab. I. c. 2, § 49 seq.

[140] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. §§ 20, 21; Memorab. I. c. 2, §§ 51—55; Plat. Apol. Socrat. pp. 24—26 (pp. 103—107).

[141] Meier und Schömann: Der Attische Process, pp. 173-177.

[142] Diog. Laërt. II. 106.

[143] Diog. Laërt. VI. 24.

[144] Cicer. Acad. Quæst. II. 42.

[145] Menag. ad Diog. Laërt. II. 106; Aul. Gellius: Noct. Atticæ, VI. 10.

[146] Plutarch. de fraterno amore, p. 489, D. (ed. Xyl.); Stobæi Sermones: LXXXIV. 15 (T. III. p. 160, ed. Gaisford); Brucker. Hist. Crit. Philos. T. I. p. 611.

[147] Diog. Laërt. II. 106.

[148] Diog. Laërt. II. 108.

[149] Diog. Laërt. II. 109.

[150] Diog. Laërt. II. 111, 112.

[151] Diog. Laërt. II. 108; Cicero, Acad. Quæst. IV. 29; De divinat. II. 4.

[152] Diog. Laërt. VII. 196.

[153] Athenæus IX. p. 401 (ed. Casaubon, 1597); Suidas, s. v. Φιλητᾶς, T. III. p. 600; Menag. ad Diog. Laërt. II. 108.

[154] Diog. Laërt. II. 135.

[155] Diog. Laërt. II. 108; Bruckeri Hist. Crit. Phil. T. I. p. 613.

[156] Diog. Laërt. II. 108; Cicer. Acad. Quæst. IV. 29; Bruck. Hist. Crit. Philos. T. I. p. 614, not. s.

[157] Aristoteles: De Soph. Elench. c. 14; Buhle ad h. 1. argumentum, p. 512.

[158] Diog. Laërt. II. 113, 115, 119.

[159] Plutarch, advers. Coloten. c. 22, 23, pp. 1119, 1120, ed. Xyl. pp. 174-176, Vol. XIV. ed. Hutten.

[160] Diog. Laërt. II. 65; Tennemann, Vol. II. p. 103: Bruck. Hist. Crit. Philos. T. I. p. 584, seq.

[161] Diog. Laërt. II. 66, 67, 72, 77 (Horat. Serm. II. 3, v. 101), 79-81.

[162] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 191, 199, 200.

[163] Diog. Laërt. II. 97, 98 (101, 102).

[164] Diog. Laërt. II. 93-95.

[165] Cic. Tusc. Quest. I. 34; Val. Max. VIII. 9.

[166] Diog. Laërt. II. 96, 97.

[167] Diog. Laërt. VI. 13, 1, 2, 15-18.

[168] Diog. Laërt. VI. 11, 12 (104).

[169] Diog. Laërt. VI. 13, 6, 22, 37; Tennemann, Vol. II. p. 89.

[170] Diog. Laërt. VI. 8; II. 36.

[171] Diog. Laërt. VI. 74, 61, 37, 105, 22.

[172] Diog. Laërt. VI. 29, 30 (74); II. 68; VI. 26, 41, 33, 45, 46, 50, 76, 77 (34).

[173] Diog. Laërt. VI. 85, 96, 97.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE:

—Obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected.