Chapter XV: Part 15

From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word, he is already assisted by the Holy Spirit." (_C. R._ 21, 659.) Again: "I therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and immovable will of God that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you hear the Son of God, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of God, presented to the human race! You will answer: 'I cannot.' But in a manner you can (_immo aliquo modo potes_), and when you sustain yourself with the voice of the Gospel, then pray that God would assist you, and know that the Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this manner God intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (_liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam_); _i.e._, he hears the promise, endeavors to assent, and abandons sins against conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered. For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory wills in God, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference why Saul is rejected and David is received; _i.e._, there must of necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. _Cum promissio sit universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his duobus._ Properly understood, this is true, and the use [_usus_] in the exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in the Son of God, shown in the promise) will illustrate this copulation of causes: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (_C. R._ 21, 659f.)

At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is reported to have said that the passage in his _Loci_ of 1548 defining free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the regenerated will (_voluntas renata_), as, he said, appeared from the context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact, however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the passage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying that God would assist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply itself to grace, endeavor to assent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new edition of his _Loci._ For all, including the last one to appear during his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The passage added by the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther's death is repeated in all subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (_C. R._ 21, 570.)

The sections which were added to the _Loci_ after 1548 also breathe the same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to govern his motions, _i.e._, he can enjoin upon his external members such actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of God. But he cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. _Cum autem trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare._" (21, 1078; 13, 162.)

Other publications contain the same doctrine. While in his _Loci_ of 1543 he had spoken only of three causes of a good action (_bonae actionis_), Melanchthon, in his _Enarratio Symboli Nicaeni_ of 1550, substituted "conversion" for "good action." We read: In conversion these causes concur: the Holy Spirit, the voice of the Gospel, "and the will of man, which does not resist the divine voice, but somehow, with trepidation, assents. _Concurrunt in conversione hae causae: Spiritus Sanctus ... vox Evangelii ... et voluntas hominis, quae non repugnat voci divinae, sed inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur_." Again: "And concerning this copulation of causes it is said: The Spirit comes to the assistance of our infirmity. And Chrysostom truly says: God draws, but he draws him who is willing." Again: God's promise is universal, and there are no contradictory wills in God; hence, though Paul is drawn in a different manner than Zacchaeus, "nevertheless there is some assent of the will (_tamen aliqua est voluntatis assensio_)." "God therefore begins and draws by the voice of the Gospel but He draws him who is willing, and assists him who assents." "Nor is anything detracted from the glory of God, but it is truly affirmed that the assistance of God always concurs in the beginning and afterwards (_auxilium Dei semper initio et deinceps concurrere_)." (23, 280 ff.) Accordingly, God merely concurs as one of three causes, among which the will of man is the third. In his _Examen Ordinandorum_ of 1554, Melanchthon again replaced the term "good action" by "conversion." He says: "In conversion these causes concur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and Son send to kindle our hearts, and our will, assenting and not resisting the Word of God (_et nostra voluntas assentiens et non repugnans Verbo Dei_). And lest we yield to diffidence, we must consider that both preachings are universal, the preaching of repentance as well as the promise of grace.... Let us therefore not resist but assent to the promise, and constantly repeat this prayer: I believe, O Lord, but come to the help of my weakness." (23, 15.) Finally in his _Opinion on the Weimar Book of Confutation,_ March 9, 1559, Melanchthon remarks: "Again, if the will is able to turn from the consolation, it must be inferred that it works something and follows the Holy Spirit when it accepts the consolation. _Item, so sich der Wille vom Trost abwenden mag, so ist dagegen zu verstehen, dass er etwas wirket und folget dem Heiligen Geist, so er den Trost annimmt._" (9, 768.)

W. Preger is right when he says: "According to Melanchthon's view, natural man is able to do the following [when the Word of God is preached to him]: he is able not to resist; he is able to take pains with respect to obedience; he is able to comfort himself with the Word.... This [according to Melanchthon] is a germ of the positive good will still found in natural man which prevenient grace arouses." (_Flacius Illyricus_ 2, 189 f.) Schmauk writes: Melanchthon found "the cause for the actual variation in the working of God's grace in man, its object. This subtle synergistic spirit attacks the very foundation of Lutheranism, flows out into almost every doctrine, and weakens the Church at every point. And it was particularly this weakness which the great multitude of Melanchthon's scholars, who became the leaders of the generation of which we are speaking, absorbed, and which rendered it difficult to return, finally, after years of struggle, to the solid ground, once more recovered in the _Formula of Concord._" (_Conf. Principle,_ 601.)

R. Seeberg characterizes Melanchthon's doctrine as follows: "A synergistic trait therefore appears in his doctrine. In the last analysis, God merely grants the outer and inner possibility of obtaining salvation. Without man's cooperation this possibility would not become reality; and he is able to refuse this cooperation. It is, therefore, in conversion equally a cause with the others. _Sie [die Mitwirkung des Menschen] ist also freilich eine den andern Ursachen gleichberechtigte Ursache in der Bekehrung._" God makes conversion possible, but only the decision of man's free will makes it actual,--such, according to Seeberg, was the "synergism" of Melanchthon. (Seeberg, _Dogg.,_ 4, 444. 446.)

Frank says of Melanchthon's way of solving the question why some are converted and saved while others are lost: "The road chosen by Melanchthon has indeed led to the goal. The contradictions are solved. But let us look where we have landed. We are standing--in the Roman camp!" After quoting a passage from the _Tridentinum,_ which speaks of conversion in terms similar to those employed by Melanchthon, Frank continues: "The foundation stone of Luther's original Reformation doctrine of salvation by grace alone; _viz._, that nothing in us, not even our will moved and assisted by God, is the _causa meritoria_ of salvation, is subverted by these propositions; and it is immaterial to the contrite heart whether much or little is demanded from free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace." Frank adds: "What the Philippists, synchronously [with Melanchthon] and later, propounded regarding this matter [of free will] are but variations of the theme struck by Melanchthon. Everywhere the sequence of thought is the same, with but this difference, that here the faults of the Melanchthonian theory together with its consequences come out more clearly." (1, 134f.) The same is true of modern synergistic theories. Without exception they are but variations of notes struck by Melanchthon,--the father of all the synergists that have raised their heads within the Lutheran Church.

156. Pfeffinger Champions Synergistic Doctrine.

Prior to 1556 references to the unsound position of the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians are met with but occasionally. (Planck 4, 568.) The unmistakably synergistic doctrine embodied in the _Loci_ of 1548, as well as in the Leipzig Interim, did not cause alarm and attract attention immediately. But when, in 1555, John Pfeffinger [born 1493; 1539 superintendent, and 1543 professor in Leipzig; assisted 1548 in framing the Leipzig Interim; died January 1, 1573] published his "Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will--_De Libertate Voluntatis Humanae Quaestiones Quinque._ D. Johannes Pfeffinger Lipsiae Editae in Officina Georgii Hantschi 1555," the controversy flared up instantly. It was a little booklet containing besides a brief introduction, only 41 paragraphs, or theses. In these Pfeffinger discussed and defended the synergistic doctrine of Melanchthon, maintaining that in conversion man, too, must contribute his share though it be ever so little.

Early in the next year Pfeffinger was already opposed by the theologians of Thuringia, the stanch opponents of the Philippists, John Stolz, court-preacher at Weimar composing 110 theses for this purpose. In 1558 Amsdorf published his _Public Confession of the True Doctrine of the Gospel and Confutation of the Fanatics of the Present Time,_ in which he, quoting from memory, charged Pfeffinger with teaching that man is able to prepare himself for grace by the natural powers of his free will, just as the godless sophists, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and their disciples, had held. (Planck 4, 573. 568.) About the same time Stolz published the 110 theses just referred to with a preface by Aurifaber (_Refutatio Propositionum Pfeffingeri de Libero Arbitrio_). Flacius, then professor in Jena, added his _Refutation of Pfeffinger's Propositions on Free Will_ and _Jena Disputation on Free Will._ In the same year, 1558, Pfeffinger, in turn published his _Answer to the Public Confession of Amsdorf,_ charging the latter with falsification, and denouncing Flacius as the "originator and father of all the lies which have troubled the Lutheran Church during the last ten years." But at the same time Pfeffinger showed unmistakably that the charges of his opponents were but too well founded. Says Planck: "Whatever may have moved Pfeffinger to do so, he could not (even if Flacius himself had said it for him) have confessed synergism more clearly and more definitely than he did spontaneously and unasked in this treatise." (4, 574.) Frank: "Pfeffinger goes beyond Melanchthon and Strigel; for the action here demanded of, and ascribed to, the natural will is, according to him, not even in need of liberation by prevenient grace.... His doctrine may without more ado be designated as Semi-Pelagianism." (1, 137.)

At Wittenberg, Pfeffinger was supported by George Major, Paul Eber, and Paul Crell and before long his cause was espoused also by Victorin Strigel in Jena. Disputations by the Wittenberg and Leipzig synergists (whom Schluesselburg, 5, 16, calls "cooperators" and "die freiwilligen Herren") and by their opponents in Jena increased the animosity. Both parties cast moderation to the winds. In a public letter of 1558 the Wittenberg professors, for example, maligned Flacius in every possible way, and branded him as "der verloffene undeutsche Flacius Illyricus" and as the sole author of all the dissensions in the churches of Germany. (Planck 4, 583.)

157. Statements of Pfeffinger.

Following are some of the synergistic deliverances made by Pfeffinger in his _Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will._ Par. 11 reads: "Thirdly, when we inquire concerning the spiritual actions, it is correct to answer that the human will has not such a liberty as to be able to effect the spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit (_humanam voluntatem non habere eiusmodi libertatem, ut motus spirituales sine auxilio Spiritus Sancti efficere possit_)." Par. 14: "Therefore some assent or apprehension on our part must concur (_oportet igitur nostram aliquam assensionem seu apprehensionem concurrere_) when the Holy Spirit has aroused (_accenderit_) the mind, the will and the heart. Hence Basil says: Only will, and God anticipates; and Chrysostom: He who draws, draws him who is willing; and Augustine: He assists those who have received the gift of the call with becoming piety, and preserve the gifts of God as far as man is able. Again: When grace precedes, the will follows--_praeeunte gratia, comitante voluntate._" In Par. 16 we read: "The will, therefore, is not idle, but assents faintly. _Voluntas igitur non est otiosa sed languide assentitur._"

Paragraph 17 runs: "If the will were idle or purely passive, there would be no difference between the pious and the wicked, or between the elect and the damned, as, between Saul and David, between Judas and Peter. God would also become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in the wicked and damned; and to God would be ascribed contradictory wills, --which conflicts with the entire Scripture. Hence it follows that there is in us a cause why some assent while others do not. _Sequitur ergo in nobis esse aliquam causam, cur alii assentiantur, alii non assentiantur_." Par. 24: "Him [the Holy Spirit], therefore, we must not resist; but on the part of our will, which is certainly not like a stone or block, some assent must be added--_sed aliquam etiam assensionem accedere nostrae voluntatis, quam non sicut saxum aut incudem se habere certum est._" Par. 30: "But apprehension on our part must concur. For, since the promise of grace is universal, and since we must obey this promise, some difference between the elect and the rejected must be inferred from our will (_sequitur, aliquod discrimen inter electos et reiectos a voluntate nostra sumendum esse_), _viz._, that those who resist the promise are rejected, while those who embrace the promise are received.... All this clearly shows that our will is not idle in conversion or like a stone or block in its conduct. _Ex quibus omnibus manifestissimum apparet, voluntatem nostram non esse otiosam in conversione, aut se ut saxum aut incudem habere._"

Par. 34 reads: "Some persons, however, shout that the assistance of the Holy Spirit is extenuated and diminished if even the least particle be attributed to the human will. Though this argument may appear specious and plausible, yet pious minds understand that by our doctrine-- according to which we ascribe some cooperation to our will; _viz._, some assent and apprehension (_qua tribuimus aliquam SYNERGIAM voluntati nostrae, videlicet qualemcumque assensionem et apprehensionem_)-- absolutely nothing is taken away from the assistance rendered by the Holy Spirit. For we affirm that the first acts (_primas partes_) must be assigned and attributed to Him who first and primarily, through the Word or the voice of the Gospel, moves our hearts to believe, to which thereupon we, too, ought to assent as much as we are able (_cui deinde et NOS, QUANTUM IN NOBIS EST, ASSENTIRI oportet_), and not resist the Holy Spirit, but submit to the Word, ponder, learn, and hear it, as Christ says: 'Whosoever hath heard of the Father and learned, cometh to Me.'" Par. 36: "And although original sin has brought upon our nature a ruin so sad and horrible that we can hardly imagine it, yet we must not think that absolutely all the knowledge (_notitiae_) which was found in the minds of our first parents before the Fall has on that account been destroyed and extinguished after the Fall, or that the human will does not in any way differ from a stone or a block; for we are, as St. Paul has said most seriously, coworkers with God, which coworking, indeed, is assisted and strengthened by the Holy Spirit--_sumus synergi Dei, quae quidem synergia adiuvatur a Spiritu Sancto et confirmatur._" Evidently no comment is necessary to show that the passages cited from Pfeffinger are conceived, born, and bred in Semi-Pelagianism and rationalism.

Planck furthermore quotes from Pfeffinger's _Answer to Amsdorf,_ 1558: "And there is no other reason why some are saved and some are damned than this one alone, that some, when incited by the Holy Spirit, do not resist, but obey Him and accept the grace and salvation offered, while others will not accept it, but resist the Holy Spirit, and despise the grace." (4, 578.) Again: "Although the will cannot awaken or incite itself to spiritually good works, but must be awakened and incited thereto by the Holy Ghost, yet man is not altogether excluded from such works of the Holy Ghost, as if he were not engaged in it and were not to contribute his share to it--_dass er nicht auch dabei sein und das Seine nicht auch dabei tun muesse._" (576.) Again: In the hands of the Holy Spirit man is not like a block or stone in the hands of a sculptor, which do not and cannot "know, understand, or feel what is done with them, nor in the least further or hinder what the artist endeavors to make of them." (576.) "But when the heart of man is touched, awakened, and moved by the Holy Ghost, man must not be like a dead stone or block, ... but must obey and follow Him. And although he perceives his great weakness, and, on the other hand, how powerfully sin in his flesh opposes, he must nevertheless not desist, but ask and pray God for grace and assistance against sin and flesh." (577.) Planck remarks: According to Pfeffinger, the powers for all this are still found in natural man, and the only thing required is, not to recreate them, but merely to incite them to action. (579.)

In 1558, in an appendix to his disputation of 1555, Pfeffinger explained and illustrated his position, in substance, as follows: I was to prove nothing else than that some use of the will [in spiritual matters] was left, and that our nature is not annihilated or extinguished, but corrupted and marvelously depraved after the Fall. Now, to be sure, free will cannot by its own natural powers regain its integrity nor rise after being ruined, yet as the doctrine [the Gospel] can be understood by paying attention to it, so it can also in a manner (_aliquo modo_) be obeyed by assenting to it. But it is necessary for all who would dwell in the splendor of the eternal light and in the sight of God to look up to and not turn away from, the light. Schluesselburg adds: "_Haec certe est synergia_--This is certainly synergism." (_Catalogus_ 5, 161.)

Tschackert summarizes Pfeffinger's doctrine as follows: "When the Holy Spirit, through the Word of God, influences a man, then the assenting will becomes operative as a factor of conversion. The reason why some assent while others do not must be in themselves.... Evidently Pfeffinger's opinion was that not only the regenerate, but even the natural will of man possesses the ability either to obey the divine Spirit or to resist Him." (521.) According to W. Preger, Pfeffinger taught "that the Holy Spirit must awaken and incite our nature that it may understand, think, will and do what is right and pleasing to God," but that natural free will is able "to obey and follow" the motions of the Spirit. (2, 192. 195.)

No doubt, Pfeffinger advocated, and was a candid exponent and champion of, nothing but the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon, according to which God never fails to do His share in conversion, while we must beware (_sed nos viderimus, C. R._ 21, 658) lest we fail to do our share. Pfeffinger himself made it a special point to cite Melanchthon as his authority in this matter. The last (41st) paragraph in his _Five Questions_ begins as follows: "We have briefly set forth the doctrine concerning the liberty of the human will, agreeing with the testimonies of the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures, a fuller explanation of which students may find in the writings of our preceptor, Mr. Philip (_prolisciorem explicationem requirant studiosi in scriptis D. Philippi, praeceptoris nostri_)." And when, in the subsequent controversy Pfeffinger was publicly assailed by Amsdorf, Flacius, and others, everybody knew that their real target was none other than-- Master Philip. Melanchthon, too, was well aware of this fact. In his _Opinion on the Weimar Confutation,_ of March 9, 1559, in which the synergism of the Philippists is extensively treated, he said: "As to free will, it is apparent that they attack me, Philip, in particular." (_C. R._ 9, 763.)

158. Strigel and Huegel Entering Controversy.

The synergistic controversy received new zest and a new impetus when, in 1559, Victorin Strigel and Huegel (Hugelius), respectively professor and pastor at Jena, the stronghold of the opponents of the Wittenberg Philippists, opposed Flacius, espoused the cause of Pfeffinger, championed the doctrine of Melanchthon, and refused to endorse the so called _Book of Confutation_ which Flacius had caused to be drafted particularly against the Wittenberg Philippists and Synergists, and to be introduced. The situation thus created was all the more sensational because, in the preceding controversies, Strigel had, at least apparently, always sided with the opponents of the Philippists.

The "_Konfutationsbuch_--Book of Confutation and Condemnations of the Chief Corruptions, Sects, and Errors Breaking in and Spreading at this Time" was published in 1559 by Duke John Frederick II as a doctrinal norm of his duchy. In nine chapters this Book, a sort of forerunner of the _Formula of Concord,_ dealt with the errors 1. of Servetus, 2. of Schwenckfeld, 3. of the Antinomians, 4. of the Anabaptists, 5. of the Zwinglians, 6. of the Synergists, 7. of Osiander and Stancarus, 8. of the Majorists, 9. of the Adiaphorists. Its chief object, as expressly stated in the Preface, was to warn against the errors introduced by the Philippists, whose doctrines, as also Planck admits, were not in any way misrepresented in this document. (4, 597. 595.) The sixth part, directed against synergism bore the title: "_Confutatio Corruptelarum in Articulo de Libero Arbitrio sive de Viribus Humanis_--Confutation of the Corruptions in the Article Concerning Free Will or Concerning the Human Powers." The _Confutation_ was framed by the Jena theologians, Strigel and Huegel also participating in its composition. However, some of the references to the corruptions of the Philippists must have been rather vague and ambiguous in the first draft of the book; for when it was revised at the convention in Weimar, Flacius secured the adoption of additions and changes dealing particularly with the synergism of the Wittenbergers, which were energetically opposed by Strigel.

Even before the adoption of the _Book of Confutation,_ Strigel had been polemicizing against Flacius. But now (as Flacius reports) he began to denounce him at every occasion as the "architect of a new theology" and an "enemy of the _Augsburg Confession._" At the same time he also endeavored to incite the students in Jena against him. Flacius, in turn, charged Strigel with scheming to establish a Philippistic party in Ducal Saxony. The public breach came when the _Book of Confutation_ was submitted for adoption and publication in the churches and schools. Pastor Huegel refused to read and explain it from the pulpit, and Strigel presented his objections to the Duke, and asked that his conscience be spared. But when Strigel failed to maintain silence in the matter, he as well as Pastor Huegel were summarily dealt with by the Duke. On March 27, 1559, at two o'clock in the morning, both were suddenly arrested and imprisoned. Flacius who was generally regarded as the secret instigator of this act of violence, declared publicly that the arrest had been made without his counsel and knowledge. About six months later (September 5, 1569) Strigel and Huegel after making some doctrinal concessions and promising not to enter into any disputation on the Confutation, were set at liberty. (Planck 4, 591. 604.)

159. Weimar Disputation.

In order to settle the differences, Flacius and his colleagues (Wigand, Judex, Simon Musaeus), as well as Strigel, asked for a public disputation, which John Frederick, too was all the more willing to arrange because dissatisfaction with his drastic procedure against Strigel and Huegel was openly displayed everywhere outside of Ducal Saxony. The disputation was held at Weimar, August 2 to 8, 1560. It was attended by the Saxon Dukes and their entire courts, as well as by a large number of other spectators, not only from Jena, but also from Erfurt, Wittenberg and Leipzig. The subjects of discussion, for which both parties had submitted theses were: Free Will, Gospel, Majorism, Adiaphorism, and Indifferentism (_academica epoche,_ toleration of error). The disputing parties (Flacius and Strigel) agreed that "the only rule should be the Word of God, and that a clear, plain text of the Holy Scriptures was to weigh more than all the inferences and authorities of interpreters" (Planck 4, 606.)

According to the proceedings of the Weimar Disputation, written by Wigand and published by Simon Musaeus 1562 and 1563 under the title: "_Disputatio de Originali Peccato et Libero Arbitrio_ inter M. Flacium Illyr. et Vict. Strigelium Publice Vinariae Anno 1560 Habita," the only questions discussed were free will and, incidentally, original sin. Strigel defended the Melanchthonian doctrine, according to which the causes of conversion are the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, and the will of man feebly assenting to the Gospel and, at the same time, seeking strength from God. He repeated the formula: "Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae assentitur." Flacius, on the other hand, defended the _mere passive_ of Luther, according to which man, before he is converted and endowed with faith, does not in any way cooperate with the Holy Spirit but merely suffers and experiences His operations. At the same time, however, he seriously damaged and discredited himself as well as the sacred cause of divine truth by maintaining that original sin is not a mere accident, such as Strigel maintained, but the very substance of man. The discussions were discontinued after the thirteenth session. The Duke announced that the disputation would be reopened later, charging both parties in the mean time to maintain silence in public,--a compromise to which Flacius and his adherents were loath to consent.

John Wigand and Matthias Judex however continued to enforce the _Book of Confutation_ demanding an unqualified adoption in every point, _per omnia._ When the jurist Matthew Wesenbecius declined to accept the book in this categorical way, he was not permitted to serve as sponsor at a baptism. John Frederick was dissatisfied with this procedure and action of the ministers; and when they persisted in their demands, the autocratic Duke deprived them of the right to excommunicate, vesting this power in a consistory established at Weimar. Flacius and his adherents protested against this measure as tyranny exercised over the Church and a suppression of the pure doctrine. As a result Musaeus, Judex, Wigand, and Flacius were suspended and expelled from Jena, December, 1561. (Gieseler 3, 2, 244. 247.) Their vacant chairs at the university were filled by Freihub, Salmuth, and Selneccer, who had been recommended by the Wittenberg Philippists at the request of the Duke, who now evidently favored a compromise with the Synergists. Strigel, too, was reinstated at Jena after signing an ambiguous declaration.

Amsdorf, Gallus, Hesshusius, Flacius, and the other exiled theologians denounced Strigel's declaration as insincere and in conflict with Luther's book _De Servo Arbitrio,_ and demanded a public retraction of his synergistic statements. When the ministers of Ducal Saxony also declined to acknowledge Strigel's orthodoxy, a more definite "Superdeclaration," framed by Moerlin and Stoessel (but not signed by Strigel), was added as an interpretation of Strigel's declaration. But even now a minority refused to submit to the demands of the Duke, because they felt that they were being deceived by ambiguous terms, such as "capacity" and "aptitude," which the wily Strigel and the Synergists used in the active or positive, and not in the passive sense. These conscientious Lutherans whom the rationalist Planck brands as "almost insane, _beinahe verrueckt,_" were also deposed and banished, 1562. Strigel's declaration of March, 1562 however, maintaining that "the will is passive in so far as God alone works all good, but active in so far as it must be present in its conversion, must consent, and not resist, but accept," showed that he had not abandoned his synergism. In the same year he applied for, and accepted, a professorship in Leipzig. Later on he occupied a chair at the Reformed university in Heidelberg, where he died 1569, at the age of only forty-five years.

In 1567, when John William became ruler of Ducal Saxony, the Philippists were dismissed, and the banished Lutheran pastors and professors (with the exception of Flacius) were recalled and reinstated. While this rehabilitation of the loyal Lutherans formally ended the synergistic controversy in Ducal Saxony, occasional echoes of it still lingered, due especially to the fact that some ministers had considered Strigel's ambiguous declaration a satisfactory presentation of the Lutheran truth with regard to the questions involved. That the synergistic teaching of Melanchthon was continued in Wittenberg appears, for example, from the _Confessio Wittenbergica_ of 1570.

160. Strigel's Rationalistic Principle.

Although at the opening of the disputation the debaters had agreed to decide all questions by clear Scripture-passages alone, Strigel's guiding principle was in reality not the Bible but philosophy and reason. His real concern was not, What does Scripture teach concerning the causes of conversion? but, How may we harmonize the universal grace of God with the fact that only some are converted and saved? Self-evidently Strigel, too, quoted Bible-passages. Among others, he appealed to such texts as John 6, 29; Rom. 1, 16; 10, 17; Luke 8, 18; Heb. 4, 2; Rev. 3, 20; Luke 11, 13; Mark 9, 24; 1 Thess. 2, 13; Jas. 1, 18. But as we shall show later, his deductions were philosophical and sophistical rather than exegetical and Scriptural. Preger remarks: In his disputation Strigel was not able to advance a single decisive passage of Scripture for the presence and cooperation of a good will at the moment when it is approached and influenced (_ergriffen_) by grace. (2, 211.) And the clear, irrefutable Bible-texts on which Flacius founded his doctrine of the inability of natural will to cooperate in conversion, Strigel endeavored to invalidate by philosophical reasoning, indirect arguing, and alleged necessary logical consequences.

At Weimar and in his _Confession_ of December 5 1560, delivered to the Duke soon after the disputation, Strigel argued: Whoever denies that man, in a way and measure, is able to cooperate in his own conversion is logically compelled also to deny that the rejection of grace may be imputed to man, compelled to make God responsible for man's damnation; to surrender the universality of God's grace and call; to admit contradictory wills in God, and to take recourse to an absolute decree of election and reprobation in order to account for the fact that some reject the grace of God and are lost while others are converted and saved. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not say that the will is able to assent to the Word without the Holy Spirit, but that, being moved and assisted by the Spirit, it assents with trepidation. If we were unable to do this, we would not be responsible for not having received the Word. _Si hoc [utcumque assentiri inter trepidationes] non possemus, non essemus rei propter Verbum non receptum._" Again, also at Weimar: "If the will is not able to assent in some way, even when assisted, then we cannot be responsible for rejecting the Word, but the blame must be transferred to another, and others may judge how religious that is. _Si voluntas ne quidem adiuta potest aliquo modo annuere, non possumus esse rei propter Verbum reiectum, sed culpa est in alium transferenda quod quam sit religio sum, alii iudicent._" (Planck 4, 689. 719; Luthardt, _Lehre vom freien Willen,_ 222.)

Over against this rationalistic method of Strigel and the Synergists generally, the Lutherans adhered to the principle that nothing but a clear passage of the Bible can decide a theological question. They rejected as false philosophy and rationalism every argument directed against the clear sense of a clear Word of God. They emphatically objected to the employment of reason for establishing a Christian doctrine or subverting a statement of the Bible. At Weimar, Flacius protested again and again that human reason is not an authority in theological matters. "Let us hear the Scriptures! _Audiamus Scripturam!_" "Let the woman be silent in the Church! _Mulier taceat in ecclesia!_" With such slogans he brushed aside the alleged necessary logical inferences and deductions of Strigel. "You take your arguments from philosophy," he said in the second session, "which ought not to be given a place in matters of religion. _Disputas ex philosophia, cui locus in rebus religionis esse non debet._" Again, at Weimar: "It is against the nature of inquiring truth to insist on arguing from blind philosophy. What else corrupted such ancient theologians as Clement, Origen, Chrysostom, and afterwards also the Sophists [scholastic theologians] but that they endeavored to decide spiritual things by philosophy, which does not understand the secret and hidden mysteries of God. _Est contra naturam inquirendae veritatis, si velimus ex caeca philosophia loqui. Quid aliud corrupit theologos veteres, ut Clementem, Originem, Chrysosthomum et postea etiam Sophistas, nisi quod de rebus divinis ex philosophia voluerunt statuere, quae non intelligit abstrusissima et occultissima mysteria Dei._" "May we therefore observe the rule of Luther: Let the woman be silent in the Church! For what a miserable thing would it be if we had to judge ecclesiastical matters from logic! _Itaque observemus legem Lutheri: Taceat mulier in ecclesia! Quae enim miseria, si ex dialectica diiudicandae nobis essent res ecclesiae!_" (Planck 4, 709.)

In an antisynergistic confession published by Schluesselburg, we read: "This doctrine [of conversion by God's grace alone] is simple, clear, certain, and irrefutable if one looks to God's Word alone and derives the _Nosce teipsum,_ Know thyself, from the wisdom of God. But since poor men are blind, they love their darkness more than the light, as Christ says John 3, and insist on criticizing and falsifying God's truth by means of blind philosophy, which, forsooth, is a shame and a palpable sin, if we but had eyes to see and know.... Whatsoever blind reason produces in such articles of faith against the Word of God is false and wrong. For it is said: _Mulier in ecclesia taceat!_ Let philosophy and human wisdom be silent in the Church." (_Catalogus_ 5, 665f.) Here, too, the sophistical objections of the Synergists are disposed of with such remarks as: "In the first place, this is but spun from reason, which thus acts wise in these matters. _Denn fuers erste ist solches nur aus der Vernunft gesponnen, die weiss also hierin zu kluegeln._" (668.) "This is all spun from reason; but God's Word teaches us better. _Dies ist alles aus der Vernunft spintisiert; Gottes Wort aber lehrt es besser._" (670.)

Evidently Strigel's rationalistic method was identical with that employed by Melanchthon in his _Loci,_ by Pfeffinger, and the Synergists generally. Accordingly, his synergism also could not differ essentially from Melanchthon's. Planck pertinently remarks: "It is apparent from this [argument of Strigel that natural man must have power to cooperate in his conversion because otherwise God would be responsible for his resistance and damnation] that his synergism was none other than that of the Wittenberg school; for was not this the identical foundation upon which Melanchthon had reared his [synergism]?" (4, 690.) Like methods lead to the same results, and _vice versa._ Besides, Strigel had always appealed to the Wittenbergers; and in his _Opinion on the Weimar Confutation_ 1559, Melanchthon, in turn, identified himself with Strigel's arguments. (_C. R._ 9, 766.) The "Confession and Opinion of the Wittenbergers Concerning Free Will--_Confessio et Sententia Wittebergensium de Libero Arbitrio_" of 1561 also maintained the same attitude.

161. Strigel's Theory.

Strigel's views concerning the freedom of man's will in spiritual matters may be summarized as follows: Man, having a will, is a free agent, hence always able to decide for or against. This ability is the "mode of action" essential to man as long as he really is a man and in possession of a will. Even in matters pertaining to grace this freedom was not entirely lost in the Fall. It was impeded and weakened by original sin, but not annihilated. To be converted, man therefore requires that these residual or remaining powers be excited and strengthened rather than that new spiritual powers be imparted or a new will be created. Accordingly, persuasion through the Word is the method of conversion employed by the Holy Spirit. When the will is approached by the Word, incited and assisted by the Spirit, it is able to admit the operations of the Spirit and assent to the Word, though but feebly. Hence, no matter how much of the work of conversion must be ascribed to the Holy Spirit and the Word the will itself, in the last analysis, decides for or against grace. Man is, therefore, not purely passive in his conversion, but cooperates with the Holy Spirit and the Word, not merely after, but also in his conversion, before he has received the gift of faith.

"God who, outside of His essence in external actions, is the freest agent," said Strigel "created two kinds of natures, the one free, the other acting naturally (_naturaliter agentes_). The free natures are the angels and men. Those acting naturally embrace all the rest of the creatures. A natural agent is one that cannot do anything else [than it does], nor suspend its action _e.g._, fire. Men and angels were created differently, after the image of God, that they might be free agents. _Homines et angeli aliter conditi sunt ad imaginem Dei, ut sint liberum agens._" (Planck 4, 669.) This freedom, which distinguishes man essentially from all other creatures, according to Strigel, always implies the power to will or not to will with respect to any object. He says: The act of willing, be it good or evil, always belongs to the will, because the will is so created that it can will or not, without coercion. "_Ipsum velle, seu bonum seu malum, quod ad substantiam attinet, semper est voluntatis; quia voluntas sic est condita, UT POSSIT VELLE AUT NON; sed etiam hoc habet voluntas ex opere creationis quod adhuc reliquum, et non prorsus abolitum et extinctum est, UT POSSIT VELLE AUT NON SINE COACTIONE_." (674.) According to Strigel, the very essence of the will consists in being able, in every instance, to decide in either direction, for or against. Hence the very idea of will involves also a certain ability to cooperate in conversion. (689.)

This freedom or ability to decide _pro_ or _con,_ says Strigel, is the mode of action essential to man, his mode of action also in conversion. And in the controversy on free will he sought to maintain that this alleged mode of action was a part of the very essence of the human will and being. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not wish to detract from the will the mode of action which is different from other natural actions. _Nolo voluntati detrahi modum agendi, qui est dissimilis aliis actionibus naturalibus._" (Planck 4, 668.) Again: "The will is not a natural, but a free agent; hence the will is converted not as a natural agent, but as a free agent.... In conversion the will acts in its own mode; it is not a statue or a log in conversion. Hence conversion does not occur in a purely passive manner. _Voluntas non est agens naturale, sed liberum; ergo convertitur voluntas non ut naturaliter agens, sed ut liberum agens.... Et voluntas suo modo agit in conversione, nec est statua vel truncus in conversione. Et per consequens non fit conversio pure passive._" (Luthardt, 217. 219. 209.)

What Strigel means is that man, being a free agent, must, also in conversion, be accorded the ability somehow to decide for grace. According to the _Formula of Concord_ the words, "man's mode of action," signify "a way of working something good and salutary in divine things." (905, 61.) The connection and the manner in which the phrase was employed by Strigel admitted of no other interpretation. Strigel added: This mode of action marks the difference between the will of man and the will of Satan, for the devil neither endeavors to assent, nor prays to God for assistance, while man does. (Luthardt, 220.) Natural man is by Strigel credited with the power of "endeavoring to assent, _conari assentiri,_" because he is endowed with a will. But shrewd as Strigel was, it did not occur to him that, logically, his argument compelled him to ascribe also to the devils everything he claimed for natural man, since they, too, have a will and are therefore endowed with the same _modus agendi,_ which, according to Strigel, belongs to the very idea and essence of will. Yet this palpable truth, which overthrew his entire theory, failed to open the eyes of Strigel.

If, as Strigel maintained, the human will, by virtue of its nature as a free agent, is, in a way, _able_ to cooperate in conversion, then the only question is how to elevate this ability to an actuality, in other words, how to influence the will and rouse its powers to move in the right direction. Strigel answered: Since the will cannot be forced, moral suasion is the true method required to convert a man. "The will," says he "cannot be forced, hence it is by persuasion, _i.e._, by pointing out something good or evil, that the will is moved to obey and to submit to the Gospel, not coerced, _but somehow willing. Voluntas non potest cogi, ergo voluntas persuadendo, id est ostensione alicuius boni vel mali flectitur ad obediendum et obtemperandum evangelio, non coacta, sed ALIQUO MODO VOLENS._" (Seeberg 4, 491.) Again: "Although God is efficacious through the Word, drawing and leading us efficaciously, yet He does not make assenting necessary for such a nature as the will,--a nature so created that it is able not to assent, if it so wills, and to expel Him who dwells in us. This assent therefore is the work of God and the Holy Spirit, but in so far as it is a free assent, not coerced and pressed out by force, _it is also the work of the will. Etiam si Deus est efficax per Verbum et efficaciter nos trahit et ducit, tamen non affert necessitatem assentiendi tali naturae, qualis est voluntas, id est, quae sic est condita, ut possit non assentiri, si velit, et excutere sessorem. Est igitur hic assensus opus Dei et Spiritus Sancti, sed quatenus est liber assensus, non coactus, expressus vi, EST ETIAM VOLUNTATIS._" (491.) Strigel evidently means: The fact that man is able not to assent to grace of necessity involves that somehow (_aliquo modo_) he is able also to assent, according to man's peculiar mode of action (freedom) he must himself actualize his conversion by previously (in the logical order) willing it, deciding for it, and assenting to it; he would be converted by coercion if his assent to grace were an act of the will engendered and created solely by God, rather than an act effected and produced by the powers of the will when incited and assisted by the Spirit. Man is converted by persuasion only, because God does not create assent and faith in him but merely elicits these acts from man by liberating and appealing to the powers of his will to effect and produce them.

In defending this freedom of the will, Strigel appealed also to the statement of Luther: "The will cannot be coerced;... if the will could be coerced, it would not be volition, but rather nolition. _Voluntas non potest cogi;... si posset cogi voluntas, non esset voluntas sed potius voluntas._" However, what Luther said of the form or nature of the will, according to which it always really wills what it wills, and is therefore never coerced, was by Strigel transferred to the spiritual matters and objects of the will. According to Strigel's theory, says Seeberg, "the will must be free even in the first moment of conversion, free not only in the psychological, but also in the moral sense." (4, 492.) Tschackert, quoting Seeberg remarks that Strigel transformed the natural formal liberty into an ethical material liberty--_"indem die natuerliche formale Freiheit sich ihm unter der Hand [?] verwandelte in die ethische materiale Freiheit._" (524.)

162. Strigel's Semi-Pelagianism.

Strigel's entire position is based on the error that a remnant of spiritual ability still remains in natural man. True, he taught that in consequence of original sin the powers of man and the proper use and exercise of these powers are greatly impeded, weakened, checked, and insulated, as it were, and that this impediment can be removed solely by the operation of the Holy Spirit. "Through the Word the Holy Spirit restores to the will the power and faculty of believing," Strigel declared. (Luthardt, 250.) But this restoration, he said, was brought about by liberating, arousing, inciting, and strengthening the powers inherent in man rather than by divine impartation of new spiritual powers or by the creation of a new good volition.

Strigel plainly denied that natural man is truly spiritually dead. He declared: "The will is so created that it can expel the Holy Spirit and the Word, or, when assisted by the Holy Spirit, can in some manner will and obey--to receive is the act of the will; in this I cannot concede that man is simply _dead--accipere est hominis; in hoc non possum concedere simpliciter mortuum esse hominem._" (Frank 1, 199.) Natural man, Strigel explained, is indeed not able to grasp the helping hand of God with his own hand; yet the latter is not dead, but still retains a minimum of power. (678.) Again: Man is like a new-born child, whose powers must first be strengthened with nourishment given it by its mother, and which, _though able to draw this nourishment out of its mother's breast,_ is yet unable to lift itself up to it, or to take hold of the breast, unless it be given it. (Preger 2, 209.)

With special reference to the last illustration, Flacius declared: "Strigel, accordingly, holds that we have the faculty to desire and receive the food, _i.e._, the benefits of God. Forsooth, you thereby attribute to corrupt man a very great power with respect to spiritual things. Now, then, deny that this opinion is Pelagian." (209.) "Your statements agree with those of Pelagius, yet I do not simply say that you are a Pelagian; for a good man may fall into an error which he does not see." Pelagius held that man, by his natural powers, is able to begin and complete his own conversion; Cassianus, the Semi-Pelagian taught that man is able merely to begin this work; Strigel maintained that man can admit the liberating operation of the Holy Spirit, and that after such operation of the Spirit he is able to cooperate with his natural powers. Evidently, then, the verdict of Flacius was not much beside the mark. Planck though unwilling to relegate Strigel to the Pelagians, does not hesitate to put him down as a thoroughgoing Synergist. (Planck 4, 683f.) Synergism, however, always includes at least an element of Pelagianism.

Strigel illustrated his idea by the following analogy. When garlic-juice is applied to a magnet, it loses its power of attraction, but remains a true magnet, and, when goat's blood is applied, immediately regains its efficaciousness. So the will of man is hindered by original sin from beginning that which is good; but when the impediment has been removed through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the native powers of the will again become efficacious and active. (Tschackert, 524; Planck 4, 672; Preger 2, 198; Luthardt, 211.) Frank remarks: "The example of the temporarily impeded power of the magnet, which was repeated also at this juncture [in the disputation at Weimar], immediately points to the related papal doctrine, for the Catholic Andradius explains the dogma of the _Tridentinum_ to this effect: The free will of natural man may be compared to a chained prisoner who, though still in possession of his locomotive powers, is nevertheless impeded by his fetters." (1, 136.) Also the _Formula of Concord,_ evidently with a squint at Strigel, rejects as a Pelagian error the teaching "that original sin is not a despoliation or deficiency but only an external impediment to these spiritual good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic-juice, whereby its natural power is not removed, but only hindered or that this stain can be easily washed away as a spot from the face or a pigment from the wall." (865, 22.)

163. Strigel's "Cooperation."