Chapter XVIII (2)

The crusade of John Howard marks the real beginning of practical prison reform, which has “transformed prisons from hells into hospitals for recovery,” and revolutionized the entire theory and administration of judicial punishment.[767] The aim and purpose of the modern penitentiary system is to develop self-respect and manhood.[768] To this end the lock-step and striped clothing have been abolished in many prisons, and along with them all cruel and humiliating punishments. The establishment of reform schools, reformatories, and penitentiaries, the introduction of the indeterminate sentence, the proposed creation of courts of rehabilitation, and the founding of the juvenile court,[769] mark the ethical advance which the last century has witnessed in this domain.[770]

_6. International Ethics: the New International Conscience_

[Sidenote: The development of international morality foreshadowed by the earlier development of intranational morality]

One of the most significant of phylogenetic laws is formulated by Haeckel in these words: “The short, quick history of an individual organism is a compressed story of the long, slow history of the species to which the organism belongs.” Now this law holds good for the history of the human species as well as for that of the lower tribes of life. And here it embraces not only the history of the bodily but also that of the psychical development. Consequently the law under which the moral evolution of man is going on may be stated in this way: The history of the development of conscience within a social group (clan, tribe, nation) is a compressed story of the long, slow history of the development of conscience in humanity at large, that is to say, between the groups composing the human race. And since law codes, private and public, are essentially embodiments of the growing and clarifying conscience, this mode of the ethical evolution may be expressed in strictly juristic terms as follows: “The development of international law follows step by step the earlier development of municipal law.”[771]

With this law in mind we may define moral progress in the international domain as the gradual assimilation of international to intranational ethics, or, in other words, the growing conformity of the standard of public morality to that of private morality.

[Sidenote: The gradual moralizing of the relations of the advanced to the backward races: _The White Man’s Burden_]

As thus defined, a special expression of progress in international morality is found in the growing recognition by governments that the obligations of the strong toward the weak are the same for nations as for individuals. A public conscience that is like the best private conscience is constantly becoming more and more a regulative force in the relations of the superior to the inferior races.[772] Unhappily that exploitation of the weaker by the stronger races, which makes up so large a part of the history of the past ages, still goes on; but it is, in general, less grossly unethical than ever before, while with each succeeding generation the protest of the common conscience of the civilized world against all unfair and oppressive treatment of the backward by the more advanced races grows more earnest and insistent.

Good illustrations of this quickening of the public conscience are found in England’s dealings with India and China. In the year 1813 a resolution declaring that England’s first duty in legislating for India was to promote the interests of the people of India was proposed in Parliament, but was defeated. Twenty years later (in 1833) this principle was definitely embodied in a Government of India Act.[773] In 1841–1842 England, at the end of what has been justly characterized as “one of the most dishonorable and detestable wars that ever stained her annals,” compelled China to keep her ports open to the iniquitous opium traffic. Two generations later (in 1906) the House of Commons by resolution unanimously declared the Indian opium trade with China to be “morally indefensible,” and requested the Government to bring it to a speedy end.[774] Five years later England entered into an agreement with China, according to the terms of which the importation of Indian opium into China will cease on or before 1917. This is a notable triumph of the new international conscience.

Our dealings with the island of Cuba since its liberation--opinions may differ in regard to the rightness of our original act of intervention--affords another encouraging illustration of the progress the world has made in international morality. And the same is true of our dealings with the Filipinos, notwithstanding the utterly painful character of the earlier chapters of the story. There has been no responsible official utterance on this subject that has represented our task in our acquired dependency as other than a public trust, as a guardianship to be exercised solely in the interest of the Filipinos as the nation’s wards. The better moral feeling of the nation, intensified in many by deep compunction, has indignantly repudiated all those unofficial utterances which have cynically represented the islands as an inviting field for selfish exploitation by American capitalists, and has demanded that our government in the islands should be inspired and controlled by the spirit of unselfish service. And this ethical spirit has in general marked our administration of the affairs of the islanders. “I believe that I am speaking with historic accuracy and impartiality,” declares ex-President Roosevelt, “when I say that the American treatment of and attitude toward the Filipino people, in its combination of disinterested ethical purpose and sound common sense, marks a new and long stride forward in advance of all steps that have hitherto been taken along the path of wise and proper treatment of weaker by stronger races.” This ethical purpose is especially manifested in the sending out, in the early period of our rule, of five hundred young American teachers to carry to this deeply wronged people the best we have to give--a national act without a parallel in all the history of the past.

It inspires hope in the future to note how far this last step forward carries us away from the starting point on this line of ethical advance. At first the fate of the weaker race was extermination or slavery; then its fate was to be reduced to the condition of a tributary; still later, to be subjected to commercial and industrial exploitation by the conquering people; and lastly, to be made, in theory if not yet in actual practice, the beneficiaries of a benevolent self-sacrificing service, which finds lofty expression in Kipling’s _The White Man’s Burden_:

Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives’ need.

This sentiment would scarcely have found any such response in the common heart and conscience of any past age of human history as it finds in the heart and conscience of our own. But, it must be admitted, the sentiment embodies an ideal yet to be realized, rather than something already attained.

[Sidenote: Progress in war ethics: Hugo Grotius]

But it is in the changes effected in men’s feelings respecting what is morally permissible in warfare that is to be observed the most encouraging progress in international ethics in modern times. This progressive clarification of the moral consciousness may be distinctly traced from the close of the Thirty Years’ War in Germany. In no period of Christian history had war been waged with greater ferocity or with greater contempt of moral rules than during the so-called religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What little gains had been made in the humanization of war during preceding eras seem to have been lost.

This barbarizing of war, however, produced, as all retrogressions in morality do if the moral life is still on the whole virile and sound, a reaction which found expression in the epoch-making work, _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, by the distinguished Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius[775]--a work that has been pronounced “the most beneficent of all volumes ever written not claiming divine inspiration.”[776] The aim of Grotius was not to abolish war,--he did not think universal peace an attainable ideal,--but simply to moderate its excesses and lessen its atrocities, to set limits to the rights of the victor. The age of nationalism had come, and an ethics for nations in their mutual relations must be formulated. Grotius sought a law that all would recognize as binding. The law to which he appealed was the Stoic Law of Nature.[777] As the Stoics had made this law the instrument for the reform of the Roman civil law, so now would Grotius make it the instrument for the reform of the laws of war.[778]

The influence of the work of Grotius was profound and widespread. From the time of its appearance dates a new departure in the humanization of war, and a fresh moral advance in international law.[779] “His ideas,” says Dr. Andrew D. White, “found their way into current discussion, into systems of law, into treaties; and as generations rolled by, the world began to find itself, it hardly knew how, less and less cruel, until men looked back on war as practiced in his time as upon a hideous dream--doubtless much as men in future generations will look back upon the wars of our times.”[780]

The humane provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the establishment of the Red Cross Society, which on the field of battle cares without discrimination for the stricken, are inspiring illustrations of the growth of this new humanitarianism.

[Sidenote: Movement for the abolition of war--a moral issue]

Now this growing sensitiveness of the public conscience which has effected so many mitigations of the barbarities of war has resulted in a widespread and insistent demand that war between civilized nations shall not merely be humanized but that it shall be abolished, that disputes between nations shall be settled as disputes between individuals are settled--by courts of justice.

Without doubt many influences, political, social, and economic,[781] have concurred in creating this great world-wide movement, and in calling into existence the Hague Conferences and the international and national peace congresses of the last decade or two; but among all these forces and motives the one of greatest potency is the awakened and instructed conscience of the world in regard to the criminality of war as an established and legalized method of settling controversies between civilized nations. It is this new conscience and not the new dreadnought to which we must look to abolish war and to keep it abolished. For, like the question of slavery two generations ago, this question of war has become a moral issue, and, like the slavery question, it will give the world no rest until settled in accordance with the demands of the new conscience.

[Sidenote: War an abrogation of the ordinary moral code]

Especially intolerable to the more sensitive conscience of to-day is the assumption that nations may at will suspend or abrogate the ordinary moral code. For, as Lord Morley truly says, “To declare war is to suspend not merely _habeas corpus_ but the Ten Commandments, and some other good commandments besides.”[782] That is to say, war is a suspension of a great part of those rules of morality which, slowly and painfully formulated by the growing moral consciousness of man, have become the guide and standard of ordinary conduct. In war the conscience of the commander is inhibited. “The commander who lost a battle through the activity of his moral nature,” once cynically declared United States Senator Ingalls, “would be the derision and jest of history.” And that is so. The world has not yet ceased to deride those Jews who lost their city to the Romans because their consciences forsooth would not let them fight on the Sabbath day. War cannot be conducted by the rules of ordinary morality.

With a great part of the ordinary moral code suspended, there is substituted for it a war code every maxim of which reveals its archaic, vestigial character, stamps it as a survival from an early savage stage of human development, as a legacy from a long-past age of the historical evolution when morality was as yet only an intratribal thing, that is, when men felt that they owed duties only to members of their own tribe or social group.[783]

[Sidenote: Unfavorable reaction of the ethics of war upon the ethics of peace]

In many ways, some obvious and others subtle and hidden, war works “moral damage” to society, but we here confine ourselves to emphasizing merely the moral loss and hurt resulting from the reaction of its low archaic code upon the more advanced peace code. For, as Professor J. Neville Figgis justly observes, “It is impossible to remove the very notion of morality from international affairs without in the long run undermining it in private life.”[784] What is regarded as right and proper in war will come to be regarded as right and proper in peace. That is to say, the maintenance of a double standard in morals is just as impossible as the maintenance of a double standard in money. By a sort of Gresham’s Law the lower standard will drive out the higher or drag it down to its own low level.

This reaction of the war code upon the ordinary moral code is well illustrated by what takes place when society metes out to persons convicted of crime ferocious and barbarous punishments. In the medieval centuries in Europe when the penalties for offenses were often fiendishly cruel mutilations of the body, such as cutting off the ears, the hands, the lips, or the nose, this judicial procedure was imitated to such a degree by individuals seeking private vengeance that mayhem, that is, the mutilation of an enemy by depriving him of a member, became a crime of such frequent occurrence that it was necessary to make special and severe enactments against it.[785] After society stopped mutilating the bodies of offenders against its laws, this offense of mayhem virtually dropped out of the calendar of private crimes.

In a similar way does the war ethics of the nations react disastrously upon private morality. The slow moral progress of European civilization during the last two or three centuries, compared with its wonderful intellectual and material progress, may with little hesitation be attributed in large part to the unfavorable influence of its war ethics upon its everyday moral code. The war code is applied to politics, to ordinary business, and to the relations of industrial classes. The politician as a politician does a hundred things he would not think of doing as a man, and justifies his acts by appealing to the adage, “Politics is war.” The business man, citing the like maxim, “Business is business,” which means that competition is a species of war and must be conducted on war principles, flings his Christian code to the winds and, pitilessly pushing his competitor to the wall, compasses his financial ruin. It is the same in the struggle between labor and capital. In this struggle acts of violence, like those of the McNamaras, are committed, and the persons who do these things absolve themselves in the forum of their own consciences on the plea that a state of war exists between capital and labor and that this justifies the adoption of war methods. Here doubtless we have the moral psychology of the suffragette movement in England. Indeed, the leaders of this startling propaganda tell us frankly that they are waging war, and that this justifies their suspension of the ordinary rules of conduct. In the light of this avowal the alleged inscrutability of their acts disappears. The movement is simply another illustration of the truth that so long as nations act under the illusion that they may without moral wrong employ violence to obtain justice, just so long will there be individuals who with good conscience will seek justice through violence.

At the same time, however, these same classes and persons who thus in various important spheres of activity adopt the lower standard of war ethics, in all other domains and relationships--in the family, in the Church, and in social intercourse--act in accordance with the higher moral code. The result is a loose synthesis of the two systems, the establishment of a sort of bi-moral code made up of rules and practices mutually inconsistent and irreconcilable. The moral damage resulting from such moral confusion is beyond estimate. It is the inconsistencies and hypocrisies involved in such a bi-moral code that is one ground of Nietzsche’s bitter attack on the ethics of Christendom. Yet, as Professor Figgis says, “Nietzsche deserves the gratitude of all friends of humanity for the service he has done in ... showing that the whole sphere of private life cannot in the long run be different from the ideals accepted in public affairs.”[786]

[Sidenote: Obsolescence of war as a school of morals: the war system an anachronism in modern civilization]

The arraignment of the war system by the awakening conscience of the civilized world has led its advocates to lay the stress of their argument on the moral uses of war. They eulogize war as the nurse of the sturdy, heroic virtues, and hence as an indispensable agency in the moral education of the race. War has, it is true, in past ages been “the supreme theater of human strenuousness,” and it may be true, as is assumed by Professor William James in his _Moral Equivalent of War_, that the qualities of courage, fortitude, and self-devotion to common interests were in the beginning evoked and fostered in the race by war; but whatever may have been the moral uses of war in the past stages of human development, the time is past when the war system can serve the highest ends of civilization. It is an anachronism in the modern world. It has become a drag upon the moral progress of the race. By an ethical necessity the day of its abolition approaches. At a time not remote, as history reckons time, the common conscience of the world will brand war between civilized nations as the greatest of crimes, and will regard the nation that assaults another with intent to commit general slaughter as a criminal nation--as a common enemy of the human race. In that coming and better age men will look with the same incredulous amazement upon our infernal engines and devices for wholesale man-killing that we of this age look upon “the iron virgin of Nuremberg” and the other medieval instruments of torture in the museums of Europe.

To many this optimistic forecast, in the face of the prevailing war spirit and the ever-growing armaments of the nations, may seem oversanguine and incredible. But to think despairingly of the future argues a failure to discern what is really most significant in the international situation to-day. The most significant thing in the ongoings of life at Rome on that memorable day of the year 404 of our era which saw the last gladiatorial combat in the Colosseum was not that, four hundred years after the incoming of Christianity with its teachings of the sanctity of human life, gladiators fought on the arena to make a holiday for Rome; the significant thing was the protest made by the Christian monk Telemachus and sealed by his martyr death,[787] for that announced the birth into the Roman world of a new conscience, and that, through an ethical necessity, meant the speedy abolition of “the human sacrifices of the amphitheater.”

And so to-day the significant thing is not that nineteen hundred years after the advent of a religion of peace and good will among men, gladiator nations still wet the earth with fratricidal blood; the significant thing is the constantly growing protest against it all, for that announces the birth into the modern world of a new international conscience, and that, through an ethical necessity like that which abolished forever the bloody sacrifices of the Colosseum, means the certain and speedy abolition of war as a crass negation of human solidarity and brotherhood, and a venturous denial of a moral order of the world and the sovereignty of conscience.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Henry T. Buckle, _History of Civilization in England_ (1891), vol. i, chap. iv. For a trenchant criticism of Buckle’s contention that there has been no progress in morals during historic times, see article entitled “The Natural History of Morals,” _North British Review_ for December, 1867.

[2] For a discussion of the economic theory, see Edwin R. A. Seligman, _The Economic Interpretation of History_, 2d ed.

[3] _Social Evolution_ (1894), p. 307.

[4] Ralph Barton Perry, _The Moral Economy_ (1909), p. 254.

[5] Immanuel Kant, _Critique of the Practical Reason_; cited by Fisher, _History of the Christian Church_ (1888), p. 623.

[6] “It is probable indeed that every movement of religious reform has originated in some clearer conception of the ideal of human conduct, arrived at by some person or persons.”--T. H. GREEN, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 361.

[7] _Prolegomena to the History of Israel_, tr. Black and Menzies (1885), p. 472; summing up the moral teachings of the prophet Amos.

[8] Wake, _The Evolution of Morality_ (1878), vol. ii, p. 4; Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. ii, p. 743; T. H. Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 237; George Harris, _Moral Evolution_ (1896), p. 79.

[9] T. H. Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 240.

[10] “We cannot explain morality without going to objective morality, which is expressed in the customs and laws, in the moral commands and judgments, conceptions and ideals of the race” (Frank Thilly, “Friedrich Paulsen’s Ethical Work and Influence,” _The International Journal of Ethics_ for January, 1909, p. 150). And so Wundt: “The original source of ethical knowledge is the moral consciousness of man, as it finds objective expression in the universal perceptions of right and wrong, and further, in religious ideas and in customs. The most direct method for the discovery of ethical principles is, therefore, the anthropological method. We use this term in a wider sense than is customary, to include ethnic psychology, the history of primitive man and the history of civilization, as well as the natural history of mankind” (_Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_, tr. Gulliver and Titchener (1908), p. 19). Cf. also Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, pp. 158 ff.

[11] “An ideal is essential to the very existence of morality.”--GEORGE HARRIS, _Moral Evolution_ (1896), p. 54.

[12] “The history of moral ideals and institutions, though hitherto ignored by moralists, seems to me the most important topic in the whole realm of ethics.”--SCHURMAN, _The Ethical Import of Darwinism_ (1887), p. 201.

[13] S. Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_ (1889), p. 354. The same thought is expressed by the writer of “The Natural History of Morals,” _North British Review_ for December, 1867: “The earth is a moral graveyard ... and our virtues and vices will, in turn, be but fossils which the eye of science shall curiously scan, and they will finally crumble into dust, from which the moral harvests of the future shall spring.”

[14] Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 154.

[15] “Effective ideals are elicited by circumstances. But they are not created by them. It is a prejudice of modern sociology, a prejudice which sociology has taken over from biology, to try to explain the inner by the outer.”--G. LOWES DICKINSON, “Ideals and Facts,” _Hibbert Journal_ for January, 1911, p. 266.

[16] “The growth of intellectuality, considered as breadth of view and competence of personal judgment, carries with it normally growth in sensitiveness of feeling and rightness of ethical attitude.”--BALDWIN, _Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Development_ (1897), p. 397.

[17] See Chapter XVIII. “The activity of a free people creates a great number of social relations from which arise new duties and new rights; so that liberty is not less favorable to the development of morality than to that of letters, arts, and sciences, of all the noble interests and high faculties of our nature.”--DENIS, _Histoire des théories et des idées morales dans l’antiquité_ (1879), t. i, p. 10.

[18] _Principles of Economics_, 2d ed., p. 1. “It is not Christianity but industrialism that has brought into the world that strong sense of the moral value of thrift, steady industry, punctuality in observing engagements, constant forethought with a view to providing for the contingencies of the future, which is now so characteristic of the moral type of the most civilized nations.”--LECKY, _The Map of Life_ (1900), pp. 53 f.

[19] _The Moral Ideal_, new and revised edition, p. 19.

[20] “Doubtless the ethical life of the world has suffered much from religion, but it owes to religion immeasurably more than it has suffered from it. Faulty enough indeed the influence has been, but the ethical life of the world has on the whole been greatly reënforced and purified by its religions.”--WILLIAM NEWTON CLARKE, _The Christian Doctrine of God_ (1909), p. 13.

[21] “Morality is the endeavor to realize an ideal” (George Harris, _Moral Evolution_ (1896), p. 54). Not to miss the import of this dictum emphasis must be laid on the word “endeavor”; for, in the words of Professor Green, morality must be regarded “as an effort, not an attainment” (_Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 301).

[22] _Meditations_, tr. Long, xi, 18.

[23] “There is nothing more modern than the critical spirit which dwells upon the difference between the minds of men in one age and in another; which endeavors to make each age its own interpreter, and judge what it did or produced by a relative standard.”--JAMES BRYCE, _The Holy Roman Empire_, 8th ed., p. 261.

[24] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, 5th ed., p. 291.

[25] After long observation of the life of the uncivilized races of Polynesia, Alfred Russel Wallace records as his opinion that “savages act up to their simple code at least as well as we act up to ours” (_The Malay Archipelago_, vol. i, p. 139). “Many strange customs and laws obtain in Zululand, but there is no moral code in all the world more rigidly observed than that of the Zulus” (Russell Hastings Millward in _National Geographic Magazine_ for March, 1909, p. 287).

[26] “The larger morality which embraces all mankind has its basis in habits of loyalty, love, and self-sacrifice which were originally formed and grew strong in the narrow circle of the family or the clan.”--W. ROBERTSON SMITH, _The Religion of the Semites_, 2d ed., p. 54.

[27] _The Religion of the Semites_, 2d ed., p. 274. Cf. Judges ix. 2; 2 Sam. v. 1.

[28] Dudley Kidd, _Savage Childhood_ (1906), p. 74. See also Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_ (1901), vol. ii, p. 79, on the “tribal self.”

[29] W. Robertson Smith, _The Religion of the Semites_, 2d ed., p. 267. See also Coulanges, _The Ancient City_, bk. ii, chap. ix.

[30] Before this stage in civilization has been reached, religion is a hindrance to the widening of the moral sympathies; for in earlier stages “a man is held answerable to his god [only] for wrong done to a member of his own kindred or political community; ... he may deceive, rob, or kill an alien without offense to religion; the deity cares only for his own kinsfolk” (W. Robertson Smith, _The Religion of the Semites_, 2d ed., pp. 53 f.).

[31] It should be carefully noted that this is very different from saying that his life is _im_moral. To pronounce it immoral would be like pronouncing immoral the life of the child, in whom the sense of right and wrong has not yet arisen. The savage is a child not only in intellect but also in moral feeling. As Bagehot says, “We may be certain that the morality of prehistoric man was as imperfect and as rudimentary as his reason” (_Physics and Politics_ (1873), p. 115).

[32] “At the beginning of the developmental series stands the bare animal impulse, stripped of all moral motives; at the end we have the complete interpenetration of organic requirement and moral idea.”--WUNDT, _Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_ (1908), p. 191.

[33] See II, The Ethics of Industrialism, Chapter XVIII.

[34] Respecting certain Brazilian tribes the naturalist Bates remarks: “The goodness of these Indians, like that of most others amongst whom I lived, consisted perhaps more in the absence of active bad qualities than in the possession of good ones; in a word, it was negative rather than positive” (_The Naturalist on the River Amazon_). Cf. Edward Howard Griggs, _The New Humanism_, 6th ed., pp. 103 f.

[35] For the relation of motherhood and infancy to the beginnings of morality, see Fiske, _Cosmic Philosophy_ (1875), vol. ii, pp. 340 ff.

[36] “The spring of virtuous action is the social instinct, which is set to work by the practice of comradeship.”--CLIFFORD, _Lectures and Essays_ (1901), vol. ii, p. 253. Cf. Peabody, _The Approach to the Social Question_ (1909), p. 149.

[37] “This family worship (long-forgotten precursor of our modern family prayers) was always offered to the ancestors at the domestic hearth.”--HELEN BOSANQUET, _The Family_ (1906), p. 18. Cf. Wundt, _Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_ (1908), p. 171.

[38] The blessing offered at the daily family meal is presumptively a survival from the consecrated communal meal of the primitive kinship group.

[39] When such an individual arises he becomes, if circumstances favor, a lawgiver, and the age of law supersedes the age of custom. Morality now consists in obedience to the law.

[40] Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, chap. ii, and passim.

[41] “In early times the solidarity of the kinship is such that it does not occur to the individual to regard as unjust a suffering which he endures in behalf of, or along with, his people.”--EDWARD CAIRD, _The Evolution of Religion_ (1894), p. 37.

[42] Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 283.

[43] The system of collective responsibility arises in part, it is true, from the belief that sin is contagious and infects all persons related to the transgressor. Therefore the innocent members of the family or group of the transgressor may be put out of the way as a merely preventive measure--not as a measure of justice or punishment. But the ethical element is seldom or never absent and it is this which gives the conception its importance for the student of morals.

[44] “Outlawry from the clan is the most effective of all weapons, because in primitive society the exclusion of a man from his kinsfolk means he is delivered over to the first comer absolutely without protection.”--HOBHOUSE, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, p. 90.

[45] Gen. iv. 13, 14.

[46] “Blood atonement ... was one of the very earliest cases we can find in which there was a notion of duty and social obligation.”--SUMNER, _Folkways_ (1907), p. 506.

[47] “It [the feud] is the Southern sense of the solidarity of the family in opposition to extreme Northern individualism.”--WINES, _Punishment and Reformation_ (1895), p. 33.

[48] On the _Lex talionis_ consult Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_ (1906), vol. i, pp. 177 ff.; Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_ (1906), vol. i, pp. 84 ff.; Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_ (1892), vol. i, pp. 369 ff. The principle embodied in the _Lex talionis_ has played a large part in the jurisprudence of all peoples.

[49] _The Religion of the Semites_ (1894), p. 267.

[50] Seeck (_Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt_ (1901), Bd. i, S. 200) reminds us how the ancient German player when he had lost in a game where the stake was his own liberty, honorably gave himself up as the slave of the winner.

[51] _The Truth about the Congo_ (1907), p. 29.

[52] “Throughout tribal life the stranger is a menace; he is a being to be plundered because he is a being who plunders.... Native houses are often left for days or weeks, and it would be easy for any one to enter and rob them. Yet robbery among themselves is not common. To steal, however, from a white employer ... is no sin.”--STARR, _The Truth about the Congo_ (1907), pp. 28 f.

[53] See VI, International Ethics: the New International Conscience, in