Chapter II: The French in Egypt (2)

Bonaparte was as yet ignorant of what was passing in France. None of the despatches from the Directory or from his brothers had reached him, and he was a prey to the keenest anxiety. With a view to obtaining some intelligence, he ordered brigs to cruise about, to stop all merchantmen, and to gain from them information of the occurrences in Europe. He sent to the Turkish fleet a flag of truce, which, under the pretext of negotiating an exchange of prisoners, was for the purpose of obtaining news. Sir Sidney Smith stopped this messenger, treated him exceedingly well, and, perceiving that Bonaparte was ignorant of the disasters of France, took a spiteful pleasure in sending him a packet of newspapers. The messenger returned and delivered the packet to Bonaparte. The latter spent the whole night in devouring the contents of those papers, and informing himself of what was passing in his own country. His determination was immediately taken, and he resolved to embark secretly for Europe, and on August 22nd, taking with him Berthier, Lannes, Murât, Andréossy, Marmont, Berthollet, and Monge, and escorted by some of his guides, he proceeded to a retired spot on the beach, where boats were awaiting them. They got into them and went on board the frigates, _La Muiron_ and _La Carrère_. They set sail immediately, that by daylight they might be out of sight of the English cruisers. Unfortunately it fell calm; fearful of being surprised, some were for returning to Alexandria, but Bonaparte resolved to proceed. Be quiet, said he, we shall pass in safety. Like Cæsar, he reckoned upon his fortune. Menou, who alone had been initiated into the secret, made known in Alexandria the departure of General Bonaparte, and the appointment which he had made of General Kléber to succeed him. This intelligence caused a painful surprise throughout the army. The most opprobrious epithets were applied to this departure. They did not consider that irresistible impulse of patriotism and ambition, which, on the news of the disasters of the republic, had urged him to return to France. They perceived only the forlorn state in which he had left the unfortunate army, which had felt sufficient confidence in his genius to follow him.

Kléber was not fond of General Bonaparte, and endured his ascendency with a sort of impatience, and now he was sorry that he had quitted the banks of the Rhine for the banks of the Nile. The chief command did not counterbalance the necessity of remaining in Egypt, for he took no pleasure in commanding.

Kléber, however, was the most popular of the generals among the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confidence, and somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious commander who had just left them. He returned to Cairo, assumed the command with a sort of ostentation, and took possession of the fine Arabian mansion which his predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekieh Place. But it was not long before the solicitudes of the chief command, which were insupportable to him, the new dangers with which the Turks and the English threatened Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his soul with the most gloomy discouragement.

Kléber, together with Poussielgue, the administrator of the army, at once prepared and addressed despatches to the Directory, placing the condition of the troops, the finances, and the number of the enemy in the most melancholy light. These despatches fell into the hands of the English, and the duplicate reports found their way into the hands of Bonaparte himself. Bonaparte had left instructions with Kléber to meet every possible contingency during his absence, even to the necessity of an evacuation of Egypt. I am going to France, said he, either as a private man or as a public man; I will get reinforcement sent to you. But if by next spring (he was writing in August, 1799) you have received no supplies, no instructions; if the plague has carried off more than fifteen hundred men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable force, which you should be incapable of resisting, presses you hard, negotiate with the vizier: consent even, if it must be so, to an evacuation; subject to one condition, that of referring to the French government; and meanwhile continue to occupy. You will thus have gained time, and it is impossible that, during the interval, you should not have received succour.

The instructions were very sound; but the case foreseen was far from being realised at the time when Kléber determined to negotiate for the evacuation of Egypt. Murad Bey, disheartened, was a fugitive in Upper Egypt with a few Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who, under the government of the Mamluks, shared the sovereignty with him, was then in Lower Egypt towards the frontier of Syria.. He had four hundred horse. Djezzar Pasha was shut up in St. Jean dAcre, and, so far from preparing a reinforcement of men for the army of the grand vizier, he viewed, on the contrary, with high displeasure, the approach of a fresh Turkish army, now that his pashalik was delivered from the French. As for the grand vizier, he was not yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon, and were not at this moment aggressive. At Klébers side was General Menou, who viewed everything under the most favourable colours, and believed the French to be invincible in Egypt, and regarded the expedition as the commencement of a near and momentous revolution in the commerce of the world. Kléber and Menou were both honest, upright men; but one wanted to leave Egypt, the other to stay in it; the clearest and most authentic returns conveyed to them totally contrary significations; misery and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.

In September, 1799, Desaix, having completed the conquest and subjugation of Upper Egypt, had left two movable columns for the pursuit of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming a vassal of France. He then returned to Cairo by the order of Kléber, who wished to make use of his name in those negotiations into which he was about to enter. During these proceedings, the army of the grand vizier, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who convoyed with his squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported by sea, had just arrived off Dami-etta with eight thousand janizaries, and on the first of November, 1799, the landing of the first division of four thousand janizaries was effected. At the first tidings of this disembarkation, Kléber had despatched Desaix with a column of three thousand men; but the latter, uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the victory won,--the Turkish division having been completely destroyed by General Verdier,--and the French filled with unbounded confidence. This brilliant achievement ought to have served to encourage Kléber; unfortunately, he was swayed at once by his own lack of confidence and that of the army. In this disposition of mind, Kléber had sent one of his officers to the vizier (who had entered Syria), to make new overtures of peace. General Bonaparte, with a view to embroiling the vizier with the English, had previously entertained the idea of setting on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were nothing more than a feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and pride. Kléber s advances met with a favourable reception, through the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a prominent part in the affairs of Egypt. This officer had largely contributed to prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean dAcre; he was proud of it, and had devised a _ruse de guerre_ by taking advantage of a momentary weakness to wrest from the French their valuable conquest. With this view, he had disposed the grand vizier to listen to the overtures of Kléber. Kléber, on his part, despatched Desaix and Poussielgue as negotiators to Sir Sidney Smith; for, since the English were masters of the sea, he wished to induce them to take part in the negotiation, so that the return to France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney manifested a disposition to enter into arrangements, acting as Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, and attributing to himself a power which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of Lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople. Poussielgue was an advocate for evacuation; Desaix just the reverse. The conditions proposed by Kléber were unreasonable: not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what was given up in giving up Egypt, but because they were not feasible. Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this. Officers treating for a mere suspension of arms could not include topics of vast extent in their negotiation, such as the demand for the possession of the Venetian Islands, and the annulment of the Triple Alliance. But it was urgently necessary to settle two points immediately: the departure of the wounded and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix solicited safe-conduct; and secondly, a suspension of arms, for the army of the grand vizier, though marching slowly, would soon be in presence of the French. It had actually arrived before the fort of El Arish, the first French post on the frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to surrender. The negotiations, in fact, had been going on for a fortnight on board _Le Tigre_, while floating at the pleasure of the winds off the coasts of Syria and Egypt: the parties had said all they had to say, and the negotiations could not be continued to any useful purpose without the concurrence of the grand vizier. Sir Sidney, availing himself of a favourable moment, pushed off in a boat which landed him on the coast, after incurring some danger, and ordered the captain of _Le Tigre_ to meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were to be put ashore, if the conferences were to be transferred to the camp of the grand vizier.

At the moment when the English commodore reached the camp, a horrible event had occurred at El Arish. The grand vizier had collected around him an army of seventy or eighty thousand fanatic Mussulmans. The Turks were joined by the Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who had some time before retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by a long circuit from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had become the auxiliaries of their former adversaries. The English had made for this army a sort of field-artillery, drawn by mules. The fort of El Arish, before which the Turks were at this moment, was, according to the declaration of General Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt; Alexandria was the other.

The Turkish advanced-guard having reached El Arish, Colonel Douglas, an English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the commandant, to surrender. The culpable sentiments which the officers had too much encouraged in the army then burst forth. The soldiers in the garrison at El Arish, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave Egypt, declared to the commandant that they would not fight, and that he must make up his mind to surrender the fort.

The gallant Cazals indignantly refused, and a struggle with the Turks ensued. During this contest, the recreants, who insisted on surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks; these ferocious enemies, once hoisted up into the fort, rushed, sword in hand, upon those who had given them admission into the fort, and slaughtered a great number of them. The others, brought back to reason, joined the rest of the garrison, and, defending themselves with desperate courage, were most of them killed. A small number obtained quarter, thanks to that humane and distinguished officer, Colonel Douglas.

It was now the 30th of December: the letter written by Sir Sidney Smith to the grand vizier, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arish. Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings: this barbarous massacre of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made him fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time in sending explanations to Kléber, both in his own name and that of the grand vizier, and he added the formal assurance that all hostility should cease during the negotiations.

Kléber, when informed of the massacre of El Arish, did not manifest as much indignation as he ought to have done; he was aware that, if he was too warm upon that subject, all the negotiations might be broken off. He was more urgent than ever for a suspension of arms; and, at the same time, by way of precaution, and to be nearer to the theatre of the conferences, he left Cairo, and transferred his headquarters to Salahieh, on the very border of the desert, two days march from El Arish.

In the meantime, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by contrary winds, had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th, and to reach El Arish before the 13th.

The evacuation and its conditions soon became the sole subject of negotiation. After long discussions it was agreed that all hostility should cease for three months; that those three months should be employed by the vizier in collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Abukir, and Alexandria, the vessels requisite for the conveyance of the French army; by General Kléber, in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the contiguous provinces, and in concentrating his troops about the point of embarkation; that the French should depart with the honours of war; that they should cease to impose contributions; but that, in return, the French army should receive three thousand purses, equivalent at that time to three million francs, and representing the sum necessary for its subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh, Salahieh, and the Belbeys, forming the frontier of Egypt towards the desert of Syria, were to be given up ten days after the ratification; Cairo forty days after.

The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing more to be done but sign it. Kléber, who had a vague feeling of his fault, determined, in order to cover it, to assemble a council of war, to which all the generals of the army were summoned. The council met on the 21st of January, 1800. The minutes of it still exist. Desaix, although deeply grieved, was swept along by the torrent of popular opinion, gave way to it himself, and affixed his signature on the 28th of January to the convention of El Arish.

Meanwhile preparations were being made for departure; Sir Sidney Smith had returned to his ship. The vizier advanced and took possession, consecutively, of the entrenched positions of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeys, which Kléber, in haste to execute the convention, faithfully delivered up to him. Kléber returned to Cairo to make his preparations for departure, to call in the troops that were guarding Upper Egypt, to concentrate his army, and then to direct it upon Alexandria and Rosetta at the time stipulated for embarkation.

While these events were occurring in Egypt, the English cabinet had received advice of the overtures made by General Kléber to the grand vizier and to Sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French army was reduced to the last extremity, it lost no time in sending off an express order not to grant any capitulation unless they surrendered themselves prisoners of war. These orders, despatched from London on the 17th of December, reached Admiral Keith in the island of Minorca in the first days of January, 1800; and, on the 8th of the same month, the admiral hastened to forward to Sir Sidney Smith the instructions which he had just received from the government. He lost no time in writing to Kléber, to express his mortification, to apprise him honestly of what was passing, to advise him to suspend immediately the delivery of the Egyptian fortresses to the grand vizier, and to conjure him to wait for fresh orders from England before he took any definite resolutions. Unfortunately, when these advices from Sir Sidney arrived at Cairo, the French army had already executed in part the treaty of El Arish.

Kléber instantly countermanded all the orders previously given to the army. He brought back from Lower Egypt to Cairo part of the troops that had already descended the Nile; he ordered his stores to be sent up again; he urged the division of Upper Egypt to make haste to rejoin him, and gave notice to the grand vizier to suspend his march towards Cairo, otherwise he should immediately commence hostilities. The grand vizier replied that the convention of El Arish was signed; that it must be executed; that, in consequence, he should advance towards the capital. At the same instant, an officer sent from Minorca with a letter from Lord Keith to Kléber, arrived at the headquarters. Kléber, fired with indignation at the demand for surrender, caused Lord Keiths letter to be inserted in the order of the day, adding to it these few words: Soldiers, to such insults there is no other answer than victory. Prepare for action.

Agents from Sir Sidney had hastened up to interpose between the French and the Turks, and to make fresh proposals of accommodation. Letters, they said, had just been written to London, and, when the convention of El Arish was known there, it would be ratified to a certainty; in this situation, it would not be right to suspend hostilities, and wait. To this the grand vizier and Kléber consented, but on conditions that were irreconcilable. The grand vizier insisted that Cairo should be given up to him; Kléber, on the contrary, that the vizier should fall back to the frontier. Under these conditions, fighting was the only resource.

On the 20th of March, 1800, in the plain of Heliopolis, ten thousand soldiers, by superiority in discipline and courage, dispersed seventy or eighty thousand foes. Kléber gave orders for the pursuit on the following day. When he had ascertained with his own eyes that the Turkish army had disappeared, he resolved to return and reduce the towns of Lower Egypt, and Cairo in particular, to their duty.

He arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Important events had occurred there since his departure. The population of that great city, which numbered nearly three hundred thousand inhabitants, fickle, inflammable, inclined to change, had followed the suggestions of Turkish emissaries, and fallen upon the French the moment they heard the cannon at Heliopolis. Pouring forth outside the walls during the battle, and seeing Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey, with some thousand horse and janizaries, they supposed them to be the conquerors. Taking good care not to undeceive the inhabitants, the Turks affirmed that the grand vizier had gained a complete victory, and that the French were exterminated. At these tidings, fifty thousand men had risen in Cairo, at Bulak, and at Gizeh, and Cairo became a scene of plunder, rapine, and murder.

During these transactions, General Friant arrived, detached from Belbeys, and lastly Kléber himself. Though conqueror of the grand viziers army, Kléber had a serious difficulty to surmount to subdue an immense city, peopled by three hundred thousand inhabitants, partly in a state of revolt, occupied by twenty thousand Turks, and built in the Oriental style; that is to say, having narrow streets, divided into piles of masonry, which were real fortresses. These edifices, receiving light from within, and exhibiting without nothing but lofty walls, had terraces instead of roofs, from which the insurgents poured a downward and destructive fire. Add to this that the Turks were masters of the whole city, excepting the citadel and the square of Ezbekieh, which, in a manner, they had blockaded by closing the streets that ran into it with embattled walls.

In this situation, Kléber showed as much prudence as he had just shown energy in the field. He resolved to gain time, and to let the insurrection wear itself out. The insurgents could not fail at length to be undeceived respecting the general state of things in Egypt, and to learn that the French were everywhere victorious, and the viziers army dispersed. Nassif-Pashas Turks, Ibrahim Beys Mamluks, and the Arab population of Cairo could not agree together long. For all these reasons, Kléber thought it advisable to temporise and to negotiate.

While he was gaining time, he completed his treaty of alliance with Murad Bey. He granted to him the province of Said, under the supremacy of France, on condition of paying a tribute equivalent to a considerable part of the imposts of that province. Murad Bey engaged, moreover, to fight for the French; and the French engaged, if they should ever quit the country, to facilitate for him the occupation of Egypt. Murad Bey faithfully adhered to the treaty which he had just signed, and began by driving from Upper Egypt a Turkish corps which had occupied it. The insurgents of Cairo obstinately refused to capitulate, and an attack by main force was, therefore, indispensable for completing the reduction of the city, during which several thousand Turks, Mamluks, and insurgents were killed, and four thousand houses were destroyed by fire. Thus terminated that sanguinary struggle, which had commenced with the battle of Heliopolis on the 20th of March, and which ended on the 25th of April with the departure of the last lieutenants of the vizier, after thirty-five days fighting between twenty thousand French on one side, and, on the other, the whole force of the Ottoman empire, seconded by the revolt of the Egyptian towns.

In the Delta all the towns had returned to a state of complete submission. Murad Bey had driven from Upper Egypt the Turkish detachment of Dervish Pasha. The vanquished everywhere trembled before the conqueror, and expected a terrible chastisement. Kléber, who was humane and wise, took good care not to repay cruelties with cruelties. The Egyptians were persuaded that they should be treated harshly; they conceived that the loss of life and property would atone for the crime of those who had risen in revolt. Kléber called them together, assumed at first a stern look, but afterwards pardoned them, merely imposing a contribution on the insurgent villages. Cairo paid ten million francs, a burden far from onerous for so large a city, and the inhabitants considered themselves as most fortunate to get off so easily. Eight millions more were imposed upon the rebel towns of Lower Egypt. The army, proud of its victories, confident in its strength, knowing that General Bonaparte was at the head of the government, ceased to doubt that it would soon receive reinforcements. Kléber had in the plain of Heliopolis made the noblest amends for his momentary faults.

He entered upon a second conquest, showing clemency and humanity on all sides, and everywhere he laboured hard to encourage the arts and industries and agriculture. He assembled the administrators of the army, the persons best acquainted with the country, and turned his attention to the organisation of the finances of the colony. He restored the collection of the direct contributions to the Kopts, to whom it had formerly been entrusted, and imposed some new customs duties and taxes on articles of consumption. He gave orders for the completion of the forts constructing around Cairo, and set men to work at those of Lesbeh, Damietta, Burlos, and Rosetta, situated on the sea-coast. He pressed forward the works of Alexandria, and imparted fresh activity to the scientific researches of the Institute of Egypt, and a valuable mass of information was embodied in the great French work, the Description de lEgypte. From the cataracts to the mouths of the Nile, everything assumed the aspect of a solid and durable establishment. Two months afterwards, the caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Darfur began to appear again at Cairo.

But a deplorable event snatched away General Kléber in the midst of his exploits and of his judicious government. He was assassinated in the garden of his palace by a young man, a native of Aleppo, named Suleiman, who was a prey to extravagant fanaticism.

With Klébers death, Egypt was lost for France. Menou, who succeeded him, was very far beneath such a task. The English offered to make good the convention of El Arish, but Menou refused, and England prepared for an invasion, after attempting vainly to co-operate with the Turks.

Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who had been appointed as British commissioner, landed with the English army alone at Abukir. After fierce skirmishing, the French and English met on the plains of Alexandria. In the frightful conflict which ensued, Sir Ralph Abercrombie was slain, but the battle ended with the retreat of the French. Damietta surrendered on April 19th. The French were now divided, while Menou hesitated. General Hutchinson took the place of the deceased British commander. A great battle was fought at Cairo, which was won by the British, and the capital itself now fell into their hands. General Hutchinson then closed in upon Alexandria; and, after hard fighting, Menou at length surrendered. The French troops were allowed to return to France with all their belongings, except the artillery, August 27, 1801.