Chapter III: The Conversion of Rome (6)

89 “That quick sensibility which is the groundwork of all advances
towards perfection increases the pungency of pains and
vexations.”—Tucker’s _Light of Nature_, ii. 16, § 4.

90 This position is forcibly illustrated by Mr. Maurice in his fourth
lecture _On Conscience_ (1868). It is manifest that a tradesman
resisting a dishonest or illegal trade custom, an Irish peasant in a
disturbed district revolting against the agrarian conspiracy of his
class, or a soldier in many countries conscientiously refusing in
obedience to the law to fight a duel, would incur the full force of
social penalties, because he failed to do that which was illegal or
criminal.

91 See Brown _On the Characteristics_, pp. 206-209.

92 “A toothache produces more violent convulsions of pain than a
phthisis or a dropsy. A gloomy disposition ... may be found in very
worthy characters, though it is sufficient alone to embitter
life.... A selfish villain may possess a spring and alacrity of
temper, which is indeed a good quality, but which is rewarded much
beyond its merit, and when attended with good fortune will
compensate for the uneasiness and remorse arising from all the other
vices.”—Hume’s Essays: _The Sceptic_.

93 At the same time, the following passage contains, I think, a great
deal of wisdom and of a kind peculiarly needed in England at the
present day:—“The nature of the subject furnishes the strongest
presumption that no better system will ever, for the future, be
invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from
the selfish affections, and reduce all the various emotions of the
human mind to a perfect simplicity. The case is not the same in this
species of philosophy as in physics. Many an hypothesis in nature,
contrary to first appearances, has been found, on more accurate
scrutiny, solid and satisfactory.... But the presumption always lies
on the other side in all enquiries concerning the origin of our
passions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The
simplest and most obvious cause which can there be assigned for any
phenomenon, is probably the true one.... The affections are not
susceptible of any impression from the refinements of reason or
imagination; and it is always found that a vigorous exertion of the
latter faculties, necessarily, from the narrow capacity of the human
mind, destroys all activity in the former.”—Hume’s _Enquiry
Concerning Morals_, Append. II.

94 “The pleasing consciousness and self-approbation that rise up in the
mind of a virtuous man, exclusively of any direct, explicit,
consideration of advantage likely to accrue to himself from his
possession of those good qualities” (Hartley _On Man_, vol. i. p.
493), form a theme upon which moralists of both schools are fond of
dilating, in a strain that reminds one irresistibly of the
self-complacency of a famous nursery hero, while reflecting upon his
own merits over a Christmas-pie. Thus Adam Smith says, “The man who,
not from frivolous fancy, but from proper motives, has performed a
generous action, when he looks forward to those whom he has served,
feels himself to be the natural object of their love and gratitude,
and by sympathy with them, of the esteem and approbation of all
mankind. And when he looks backward to the motive from which he
acted, and surveys it in the light in which the indifferent
spectator will survey it, he still continues to enter into it, and
applauds himself by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed
impartial judge. In both these points of view, his conduct appears
to him every way agreeable.... Misery and wretchedness can never
enter the breast in which dwells complete
self-satisfaction.”—_Theory of Moral Sentiments_, part ii. ch. ii. §
2; part iii. ch. iii. I suspect that many moralists confuse the
self-gratulation which they suppose a virtuous man to feel, with the
delight a religious man experiences from the sense of the protection
and favour of the Deity. But these two feelings are clearly
distinct, and it will, I believe, be found that the latter is most
strongly experienced by the very men who most sincerely disclaim all
sense of merit. “Were the perfect man to exist,” said that good and
great writer, Archer Butler, “he himself would be the last to know
it; for the highest stage of advancement is the lowest descent in
humility.” At all events, the reader will observe, that on
utilitarian principles nothing could be more pernicious or criminal
than that modest, humble, and diffident spirit, which diminishes the
pleasure of self-gratulation, one of the highest utilitarian motives
to virtue.

95 Hartley has tried in one place to evade this conclusion by an appeal
to the doctrine of final causes. He says that the fact that
conscience is not an original principle of our nature, but is formed
mechanically in the manner I have described, does not invalidate the
fact that it is intended for our guide, “for all the things which
have evident final causes, are plainly brought about by mechanical
means;” and he appeals to the milk in the breast, which is intended
for the sustenance of the young, but which is nevertheless
mechanically produced. (_On Man_, vol. ii. pp. 338-339.) But it is
plain that this mode of reasoning would justify us in attributing an
authoritative character to any habit—e.g. to that of avarice—which
these writers assure us is in the manner of its formation an exact
parallel to conscience. The later followers of Hartley certainly
cannot be accused of any excessive predilection for the doctrine of
final causes, yet we sometimes find them asking what great
difference it can make whether (when conscience is admitted by both
parties to be real) it is regarded as an original principle of our
nature, or as a product of association? Simply this. If by the
constitution of our nature we are subject to a law of duty which is
different from and higher than our interest, a man who violates this
law through interested motives, is deserving of reprobation. If on
the other hand there is no natural law of duty, and if the pursuit
of our interest is the one original principle of our being, no one
can be censured who pursues it, and the first criterion of a wise
man will be his determination to eradicate every habit
(conscientious or otherwise) which impedes him in doing so.

_ 96 On Human Nature_, chap. ix. § 10.

_ 97 Enquiry concerning Good and Evil._

98 This theory is noticed by Hutcheson, and a writer in the _Spectator_
(No. 436) suggests that it may explain the attraction of
prize-fights. The case of the pleasure derived from fictitious
sorrow is a distinct question, and has been admirably treated in
Lord Kames’ _Essays on Morality_. Bishop Butler notices (_Second
Sermon on Compassion_), that it is possible for the very intensity
of a feeling of compassion to divert men from charity by making them
“industriously turn away from the miserable;” and it is well known
that Goethe, on account of this very susceptibility, made it one of
the rules of his life to avoid everything that could suggest painful
ideas. Hobbes makes the following very characteristic comments on
some famous lines of Lucretius: “From what passion proceedeth it
that men take pleasure to behold from the shore the danger of those
that are at sea in a tempest or in fight, or from a safe castle to
behold two armies charge one another in the field? It is certainly
in the whole sum joy, else men would never flock to such a
spectacle. Nevertheless, there is both joy and grief, for as there
is novelty and remembrance of our own security present, which is
delight, so there is also pity, which is grief. But the delight is
so far predominant that men usually are content in such a case to be
spectators of the misery of their friends.” (_On Human Nature_, ch.
ix. § 19.) Good Christians, according to some theologians, are
expected to enjoy this pleasure in great perfection in heaven. “We
may believe in the next world also the goodness as well as the
happiness of the blest will be confirmed and advanced by reflections
naturally arising from the view of the misery which some shall
undergo, which seems to be a good reason for the creation of those
beings who shall be finally miserable, and for the continuation of
them in their miserable existence ... though in one respect the view
of the misery which the damned undergo might seem to detract from
the happiness of the blessed through pity and commiseration, yet
under another, a nearer and much more affecting consideration, viz.
that all this is the misery they themselves were often exposed to
and in danger of incurring, why may not the sense of their own
escape so far overcome the sense of another’s ruin as quite to
extinguish the pain that usually attends the idea of it, and even
render it productive of some real happiness? To this purpose,
Lucretius’ _Suave mari_,” etc. (_Law’s notes to his Translation of
King’s Origin of Evil_, pp. 477, 479.)

99 See e.g. _Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers_, essay iii. ch. v.

100 The error I have traced in this paragraph will be found running
through a great part of what Mr. Buckle has written upon morals—I
think the weakest portion of his great work. See, for example, an
elaborate confusion on the subject, _History of Civilisation_, vol.
ii. p. 429. Mr. Buckle maintains that all the philosophers of what
is commonly called “the Scotch school” (a school founded by the
Irishman Hutcheson, and to which Hume does not belong), were
incapable of inductive reasoning, because they maintained the
existence of a moral sense or faculty, or of first principles,
incapable of resolution; and he enters into a learned enquiry into
the causes which made it impossible for Scotch writers to pursue or
appreciate the inductive method. It is curious to contrast this view
with the language of one, who, whatever may be the value of his
original speculations, is, I conceive, among the very ablest
philosophical critics of the present century. “Les philosophes
écossais adoptèrent les procédés que Bacon avait recommandé
d’appliquer à l’étude du monde physique, et les transportèrent dans
l’étude du monde moral. Ils firent voir que l’induction baconienne,
c’est-à-dire, l’induction précédée d’une observation scrupuleuse des
phénomènes, est en philosophie comme en physique la seule méthode
légitime. C’est un de leurs titres les plus honorables d’avoir
insisté sur cette démonstration, et d’avoir en même temps joint
l’exemple au précepte.... Il est vrai que le zèle des philosophes
écossais en faveur de la méthode d’observation leur a presque fait
dépasser le but. Ils ont incliné à renfermer la psychologie dans la
description minutieuse et continuelle de phénomènes de l’âme sans
réfléchir assez que cette description doit faire place à l’induction
et au raisonnement déductif, et qu’une philosophie qui se bornerait
à l’observation serait aussi stérile que celle qui s’amuserait à
construire des hypothèses sans avoir préalablement observé.”—Cousin,
Hist. de la Philos. Morale au xviiime Siècle, Tome 4, p. 14-16.
Dugald Stewart had said much the same thing, but he was a Scotchman,
and therefore, according to Mr. Buckle (_Hist. of Civ._ ii. pp.
485-86), incapable of understanding what induction was. I may add
that one of the principal objections M. Cousin makes against Locke
is, that he investigated the origin of our ideas before analysing
minutely their nature, and the propriety of this method is one of
the points on which Mr. Mill (_Examination of Sir W. Hamilton_) is
at issue with M. Cousin.

101 M. Ch. Comte, in his very learned _Traité de Législation_, liv. iii.
ch. iv., has made an extremely curious collection of instances in
which different nations have made their own distinctive
peculiarities of colour and form the ideal of beauty.

102 “How particularly fine the hard theta is in our English
terminations, as in that grand word death, for which the Germans
gutturise a sound that _puts you in mind of nothing but a loathsome
toad_.”—Coleridge’s _Table Talk_, p. 181.

103 Mackintosh, _Dissert._ p. 238.

104 Lord Kames’ _Essays on Morality_ (1st edition), pp. 55-56.

105 See Butler’s _Three Sermons on Human Nature_, and the preface.

106 Speaking of the animated statue which he regarded as a
representative of man, Condillac says, “Le goût peut ordinairement
contribuer plus que l’odorat à son bonheur et à son malheur.... Il y
contribue même encore plus que les sons harmonieux, parce que le
besoin de nourriture lui rend les saveurs plus nécessaires, et par
conséquent les lui fait goûter avec plus de vivacité. La faim pourra
la rendre malheureuse, mais dès qu’elle aura remarqué les sensations
propres à l’apaiser, elle y déterminera davantage son attention, les
désirera avec plus de violence et en jouira avec plus de
délire.”—_Traité des Sensations_, 1re partie ch. x.

107 This is one of the favourite thoughts of Pascal, who, however, in
his usual fashion dwells upon it in a somewhat morbid and
exaggerated strain. “C’est une bien grande misère que de pouvoir
prendre plaisir à des choses si basses et si méprisables ... l’homme
est encore plus à plaindre de ce qu’il peut se divertir à ces choses
si frivoles et si basses, que de ce qu’il s’afflige de ses misères
effectives.... D’ou vient que cet homme, qui a perdu depuis peu son
fils unique, et qui, accablé de procès et de querelles, était ce
matin si troublé, n’y pense plus maintenant? Ne vous en étonnez pas;
il est tout occupé à voir par où passera un cerf que ses chiens
poursuivent.... C’est une joie de malade et de
frénétique.”—_Pensées_ (Misère de l’homme).

108 “Quæ singula improvidam mortalitatem involvunt, solum ut inter ista
certum sit, nihil esse certi, nec miserius quidquam homine, aut
superbius. Cæteris quippe animantium sola victus cura est, in quo
sponte naturæ benignitas sufficit: uno quidem vel præferenda cunctis
bonis, quod de gloria, de pecunia, ambitione, superque de morte, non
cogitant.”—Plin. _Hist. Nat._ ii. 5.

109 Paley, in his very ingenious, and in some respects admirable,
chapter on happiness tries to prove the inferiority of animal
pleasures, by showing the short time their enjoyment actually lasts,
the extent to which they are dulled by repetition, and the cases in
which they incapacitate men for other pleasures. But this
calculation omits the influence of some animal enjoyments upon
health and temperament. The fact, however, that health, which is a
condition of body, is the chief source of happiness, Paley fully
admits. “Health,” he says, “is the one thing needful ... when we are
in perfect health and spirits, we feel in ourselves a happiness
independent of any particular outward gratification.... This is an
enjoyment which the Deity has annexed to life, and probably
constitutes in a great measure the happiness of infants and brutes
... of oysters, periwinkles, and the like; for which I have
sometimes been at a loss to find out amusement.” On the test of
happiness he very fairly says, “All that can be said is that there
remains a presumption in favour of those conditions of life in which
men generally appear most cheerful and contented; for though the
apparent happiness of mankind be not always a true measure of their
real happiness, it is the best measure we have.”—_Moral Philosophy_,
i. 6.

110 A writer who devoted a great part of his life to studying the deaths
of men in different countries, classes, and churches, and to
collecting from other physicians information on the subject, says:
“À mesure qu’on s’éloigne des grands foyers de civilisation, qu’on
se rapproche des plaines et des montagnes, le caractère de la mort
prend de plus en plus l’aspect calme du ciel par un beau crépuscule
du soir.... En général la mort s’accomplit d’une manière d’autant
plus simple et naturelle qu’on est plus libre des innombrables liens
de la civilisation.”—Lauvergne, _De l’agonie de la Mort_, tome i.
pp. 131-132.

111 “I will omit much usual declamation upon the dignity and capacity of
our nature, the superiority of the soul to the body, of the rational
to the animal part of our constitution, upon the worthiness,
refinement, and delicacy of some satisfactions, or the meanness,
grossness, and sensuality of others; because I hold that pleasures
differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity.”—Paley’s _Moral
Philosophy_, book i. ch. vi. Bentham in like manner said, “Quantity
of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry,” and he
maintained that the value of a pleasure depends on—its (1)
intensity, (2) duration, (3) certainty, (4) propinquity, (5) purity,
(6) fecundity, (7) extent (_Springs of Action_). The recognition of
the “purity” of a pleasure might seem to imply the distinction for
which I have contended in the text, but this is not so. The purity
of a pleasure or pain, according to Bentham, is “the chance it has
of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind: that is
pain if it be a pleasure, pleasure if it be a pain.”—_Morals and
Legislation_, i. § 8. Mr. Buckle (_Hist. of Civilisation_, vol. ii.
pp. 399-400) writes in a somewhat similar strain, but less
unequivocally, for he admits that mental pleasures are “more
ennobling” than physical ones. The older utilitarians, as far as I
have observed, did not even advert to the question. This being the
case, it must have been a matter of surprise as well as of
gratification to most intuitive moralists to find Mr. Mill fully
recognising the existence of different kinds of pleasure, and
admitting that the superiority of the higher kinds does not spring
from their being greater in amount.—_Utilitarianism_, pp. 11-12. If
it be meant by this that we have the power of recognising some
pleasures as superior to others in kind, irrespective of all
consideration of their intensity, their cost, and their
consequences, I submit that the admission is completely incompatible
with the utilitarian theory, and that Mr. Mill has only succeeded in
introducing Stoical elements into his system by loosening its very
foundation. The impossibility of establishing an aristocracy of
enjoyments in which, apart from all considerations of consequences,
some which give less pleasure and are less widely diffused are
regarded as intrinsically superior to others which give more
pleasure and are more general, without admitting into our estimate a
moral element, which on utilitarian principles is wholly
illegitimate, has been powerfully shown since the first edition of
this book by Professor Grote, in his _Examination of the Utilitarian
Philosophy_, chap. iii.

112 Büchner, _Force et Matière_, pp. 163-164. There is a very curious
collection of the speculations of the ancient philosophers on this
subject in Plutarch’s treatise, _De Placitis Philos._

113 Aulus Gellius, _Noctes_, x. 23. The law is given by Dion. Halicarn.
Valerius Maximus says, “Vini usus olim Romanis feminis ignotus fuit,
ne scilicet in aliquod dedecus prolaberentur: quia proximus a Libero
patre intemperantiæ gradus ad inconcessam Venerem esse consuevit”
(Val. Max. ii. 1, § 5). This is also noticed by Pliny (_Hist. Nat._
xiv. 14), who ascribes the law to Romulus, and who mentions two
cases in which women were said to have been put to death for this
offence, and a third in which the offender was deprived of her
dowry. Cato said that the ancient Romans were accustomed to kiss
their wives for the purpose of discovering whether they had been
drinking wine. The Bona Dea, it is said, was originally a woman
named Fatua, who was famous for her modesty and fidelity to her
husband, but who, unfortunately, having once found a cask of wine in
the house, got drunk, and was in consequence scourged to death by
her husband. He afterwards repented of his act, and paid divine
honours to her memory, and as a memorial of her death, a cask of
wine was always placed upon the altar during the rites. (Lactantius,
_Div. Inst._ i. 22.) The Milesians, also, and the inhabitants of
Marseilles are said to have had laws forbidding women to drink wine
(Ælian, _Hist. Var._ ii. 38). Tertullian describes the prohibition
of wine among the Roman women as in his time obsolete, and a taste
for it was one of the great trials of St. Monica (_Aug. Conf._ x.
8).

114 “La loi fondamentale de la morale agit sur toutes les nations bien
connues. Il y a mille différences dans les interprétations de cette
loi en mille circonstances; mais le fond subsiste toujours le même,
et ce fond est l’idée du juste et de l’injuste.”—Voltaire, _Le
Philosophe ignorant_.

115 The feeling in its favour being often intensified by filial
affection. “What is the most beautiful thing on the earth?” said
Osiris to Horus. “To avenge a parent’s wrongs,” was the
reply.—Plutarch _De Iside et Osiride_.

116 Hence the Justinian code and also St. Augustine (_De Civ. Dei_, xix.
15) derived servus from “servare,” to preserve, because the victor
preserved his prisoners alive.

117 “Les habitants du Congo tuent les malades qu’ils imaginent ne
pouvoir en revenir; _c’est, disentils, pour leur épargner les
douleurs de l’agonie_. Dans l’île Formose, lorsqu’un homme est
dangereusement malade, on lui passe un nœud coulant au col et on
l’étrangle, _pour l’arracher à la douleur_.”—Helvétius, _De
l’Esprit_, ii. 13. A similar explanation may be often found for
customs which are quoted to prove that the nations where they
existed had no sense of chastity. “C’est pareillement sous la
sauvegarde des lois que les Siamoises, la gorge et les cuisses à
moitié découvertes, portées dans les rues sur les palanquins, s’y
présentent dans des attitudes très-lascives. Cette loi fut établie
par une de leurs reines nommée Tirada, qui, _pour dégoûter les
hommes d’un amour plus déshonnête_, crut devoir employer toute la
puissance de la beauté.”—_De l’Esprit_, ii. 14.

118 “The contest between the morality which appeals to an external
standard, and that which grounds itself on internal conviction, is
the contest of progressive morality against stationary, of reason
and argument against the deification of mere opinion and habit.”
(Mill’s _Dissertations_, vol. ii. p. 472); a passage with a true
Bentham ring. See, too, vol. i. p. 158. There is, however, a schism
on this point in the utilitarian camp. The views which Mr. Buckle
has expressed in his most eloquent chapter on the comparative
influence of intellectual and moral agencies in civilisation diverge
widely from those of Mr. Mill.

119 “Est enim sensualitas quædam vis animæ inferior.... Ratio vero vis
animæ est superior.”—Peter Lombard, _Sent._ ii. 24.

120 Helvétius, _De l’Esprit_, discours iv. See too, Dr. Draper’s
extremely remarkable _History of Intellectual Development in Europe_
(New York, 1864), pp. 48, 53.

121 Plutarch, _De Cohibenda Ira._

122 Lactantius, _Div. Inst._ i. 22. The mysteries of the Bona Dea
became, however, after a time, the occasion of great disorders. See
Juvenal, Sat. vi. M. Magnin has examined the nature of these rites
(_Origines du Théâtre_, pp. 257-259).

123 The history of the vestals, which forms one of the most curious
pages in the moral history of Rome, has been fully treated by the
Abbé Nadal, in an extremely interesting and well-written memoir,
read before the Académie des Belles-lettres, and republished in
1725. It was believed that the prayer of a vestal could arrest a
fugitive slave in his flight, provided he had not got past the city
walls. Pliny mentions this belief as general in his time. The
records of the order contained many miracles wrought at different
times to save the vestals or to vindicate their questioned purity,
and also one miracle which is very remarkable as furnishing a
precise parallel to that of the Jew who was struck dead for touching
the ark to prevent its falling.

124 As for example the Sibyls and Cassandra. The same prophetic power
was attributed in India to virgins.—Clem. Alexandrin. _Strom._ iii.
7.

125 This custom continued to the worst period of the empire, though it
was shamefully and characteristically evaded. After the fall of
Sejanus the senate had no compunction in putting his innocent
daughter to death, but their religious feelings were shocked at the
idea of a virgin falling beneath the axe. So by way of improving
matters “filia constuprata est prius a carnifice, quasi impium esset
virginem in carcere perire.”—Dion Cassius, lviii. 11. See too,
Tacitus, _Annal._ v. 9. If a vestal met a prisoner going to
execution the prisoner was spared, provided the vestal declared that
the encounter was accidental. On the reverence the ancients paid to
virgins, see Justus Lipsius, _De Vesta et Vestalibus_.

126 See his picture of the first night of marriage:—

“Tacitè subit ille supremus
Virginitatis amor, primæque modestia culpæ
Confundit vultus. Tunc ora rigantur honestis
Imbribus.”

_Thebaidos_, lib. ii. 232-34.

127 Bees (which Virgil said had in them something of the divine nature)
were supposed by the ancients to be the special emblems or models of
chastity. It was a common belief that the bee mother begot her young
without losing her virginity. Thus in a fragment ascribed to
Petronius we read,

“Sic sine concubitu textis apis excita ceris
Fervet, et audaci milite castra replet.”

Petron. _De Varia Animalium Generatione._

So too Virgil:—

“Quod neque concubitu indulgent nec corpora segnes
In Venerem solvunt aut fœtus nixibus edunt.”—_Georg._ iv. 198-99.

Plutarch says that an unchaste person cannot approach bees, for they
immediately attack him and cover him with stings. Fire was also
regarded as a type of virginity. Thus Ovid, speaking of the vestals,
says:—

“Nataque de fiamma corpora nulla vides:
Jure igitur virgo est, quæ semina nulla remittit
Nec capit, et comites virginitatis amat.”

“The Egyptians believed that there are no males among vultures, and
they accordingly made that bird an emblem of nature.”—Ammianus
Marcellinus, xvii. 4.

128 “La divinité étant considérée comme renfermant en elle toutes les
qualités, toutes les forces intellectuelles et morales de l’homme,
chacune de ces forces ou de ces qualités, conçue séparément,
s’offrait comme un Être divin.... De-là aussi les contradictions les
plus choquantes dans les notions que les anciens avaient des
attributs divins.”—Maury, _Hist. des Religions de la Grèce antique_,
tome i. pp. 578-579.

129 “The Church holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop from
heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are
upon it to die of starvation in extremest agony, so far as temporal
affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost,
but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful
untruth, though it harmed no one, or steal one poor farthing without
excuse.”—Newman’s _Anglican Difficulties_, p. 190.

130 There is a remarkable dissertation on this subject, called “The
Limitations of Morality,” in a very ingenious and suggestive little
work of the Benthamite school, called _Essays by a Barrister_
(reprinted from the _Saturday Review_).

131 The following passage, though rather vague and rhetorical, is not
unimpressive: “Oui, dit Jacobi, je mentirais comme Desdemona
mourante, je tromperais comme Oreste quand il veut mourir à la place
de Pylade, j’assassinerais comme Timoléon, je serais parjure comme
Épaminondas et Jean de Witt, je me déterminerais au suicide comme
Caton, je serais sacrilége comme David; car j’ai la certitude en
moi-même qu’en pardonnant à ces fautes suivant la lettre l’homme
exerce le droit souverain que la majesté de son être lui confère; il
appose le sceau de sa divine nature sur la grâce qu’il
accorde.”—Barchou de Penhoen, _Hist. de la Philos. allemande_, tome
i. p. 295.

132 This equivocation seems to me to lie at the root of the famous
dispute whether man is by nature a social being, or whether, as
Hobbes averred, the state of nature is a state of war. Few persons
who have observed the recent light thrown on the subject will
question that the primitive condition of man was that of savage
life, and fewer still will question that savage life is a state of
war. On the other hand, it is, I think, equally certain that man
necessarily becomes a social being in exact proportion to the
development of the capacities of his nature.

133 One of the best living authorities on this question writes: “The
asserted existence of savages so low as to have no moral standard is
too groundless to be discussed. Every human tribe has its general
views as to what conduct is right and what wrong, and each
generation hands the standard on to the next. Even in the details of
their moral standards, wide as their differences are, there is yet
wider agreement throughout the human race.”—Tylor on Primitive
Society, _Contemporary Review_, April 1873, p. 702.

134 The distinction between innate faculties evolved by experience and
innate ideas independent of experience, and the analogy between the
expansion of the former and that of the bud into the flower has been
very happily treated by Reid. (_On the Active Powers_, essay iii.
chap. viii. p. 4.) Professor Sedgwick, criticising Locke’s notion of
the soul being originally like a sheet of white paper, beautifully
says: “Naked man comes from his mother’s womb, endowed with limbs
and senses indeed well fitted to the material world, yet powerless
from want of use; and as for knowledge, his soul is one unvaried
blank; yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand,
and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its
tinge from accident but design, and comes forth covered with a
glorious pattern.” (_On the Studies of the University_, p. 54.)
Leibnitz says: “L’esprit n’est point une table rase. Il est tout
plein de caractères que la sensation ne peut que découvrir et mettre
en lumière au lieu de les y imprimer. Je me suis servi de la
comparaison d’une pierre de marbre qui a des veines plutôt que d’une
pierre de marbre tout unie.... S’il y avait dans la pierre des
veines qui marquassent la figure d’Hercule préférablement à d’autres
figures, ... Hercule y serait comme inné en quelque façon, quoiqu’il
fallût du travail pour découvrir ces veines.”—_Critique de l’Essai
sur l’Entendement._

135 The argument against the intuitive moralists derived from savage
life was employed at some length by Locke. Paley then adopted it,
taking a history of base ingratitude related by Valerius Maximus,
and asking whether a savage would view it with disapprobation.
(_Moral Phil._ book i. ch. 5.) Dugald Stewart (_Active and Moral
Powers_, vol. i. pp. 230-231) and other writers have very fully
answered this, but the same objection has been revived in another
form by Mr. Austin, who supposes (_Lectures on Jurisprudence_, vol.
i. pp. 82-83) a savage who first meets a hunter carrying a dead
deer, kills the hunter and steals the deer, and is afterwards
himself assailed by another hunter whom he kills. Mr. Austin asks
whether the savage would perceive a moral difference between these
two acts of homicide? Certainly not. In this early stage of
development, the savage recognises a duty of justice and humanity to
the members of his tribe, but to no one beyond this circle. He is in
a “state of war” with the foreign hunter. He has a right to kill the
hunter and the hunter an equal right to kill him.

136 Everyone who is acquainted with metaphysics knows that there has
been an almost endless controversy about Locke’s meaning on this
point. The fact seems to be that Locke, like most great originators
of thought, and indeed more than most, often failed to perceive the
ultimate consequences of his principles, and partly through some
confusion of thought, and partly through unhappiness of expression,
has left passages involving the conclusions of both schools. As a
matter of history the sensual school of Condillac grew professedly
out of his philosophy. In defence of the legitimacy of the process
by which these writers evolved their conclusions from the premisses
of Locke, the reader may consult the very able lectures of M. Cousin
on Locke. The other side has been treated, among others, by Dugald
Stewart in his _Dissertation_, by Professor Webb in his
_Intellectualism of Locke_, and by Mr. Rogers in an essay reprinted
from the _Edinburgh Review_.

137 I make this qualification, because I believe that the denial of a
moral nature in man capable of perceiving the distinction between
duty and interest and the rightful supremacy of the former, is both
philosophically and actually subversive of natural theology.

138 See the forcible passage in the life of Epicurus by Diogenes
Laërtius. So Mackintosh: “It is remarkable that, while, of the three
professors who sat in the Porch from Zeno to Posidonius, every one
either softened or exaggerated the doctrines of his predecessor, and
while the beautiful and reverend philosophy of Plato had in his own
Academy degenerated into a scepticism which did not spare morality
itself, the system of Epicurus remained without change; his
disciples continued for ages to show personal honour to his memory
in a manner which may seem unaccountable among those who were taught
to measure propriety by a calculation of palpable and outward
usefulness.”—_Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy_, p. 85, ed. 1836.
See, too, Tennemann (_Manuel de la Philosophie_, ed. Cousin, tome i.
p. 211).

139 Thus e.g. the magnificent chapters of Helvétius on the moral effects
of despotism, form one of the best modern contributions to political
ethics. We have a curious illustration of the emphasis with which
this school dwells on the moral importance of institutions in a
memoir of M. De Tracy, _On the best Plan of National Education_,
which appeared first towards the close of the French Revolution, and
was reprinted during the Restoration. The author, who was one of the
most distinguished of the disciples of Condillac, argued that the
most efficient of all ways of educating a people is, the
establishment of a good system of police, for the constant
association of the ideas of crime and punishment in the minds of the
masses is the one effectual method of creating moral habits, which
will continue to act when the fear of punishment is removed.

140 An important intellectual revolution is at present taking place in
England. The ascendency in literary and philosophical questions
which belonged to the writers of books is manifestly passing in a
very great degree to weekly and even daily papers, which have long
been supreme in politics, and have begun within the last ten years
systematically to treat ethical and philosophical questions. From
their immense circulation, their incontestable ability and the power
they possess of continually reiterating their distinctive doctrines,
from the impatience, too, of long and elaborate writings, which
newspapers generate in the public, it has come to pass that these
periodicals exercise probably a greater influence than any other
productions of the day, in forming the ways of thinking of ordinary
educated Englishmen. The many consequences, good and evil, of this
change it will be the duty of future literary historians to trace,
but there is one which is, I think, much felt in the sphere of
ethics. An important effect of these journals has been to evoke a
large amount of literary talent in the lawyer class. Men whose
professional duties would render it impossible for them to write
long books, are quite capable of treating philosophical subjects in
the form of short essays, and have in fact become conspicuous in
these periodicals. There has seldom, I think, before, been a time
when lawyers occupied such an important literary position as at
present, or when legal ways of thinking had so great an influence
over English philosophy; and this fact has been eminently favourable
to the progress of utilitarianism.

141 There are some good remarks on this point in the very striking
chapter on the present condition of Christianity in Wilberforce’s
_Practical View_.

142 See Reid’s _Essays on the Active Powers_, iii. i.

143 I say usually proportioned, because it is, I believe, possible for
men to realise intensely suffering, and to derive pleasure from that
very fact. This is especially the case with vindictive cruelty, but
it is not, I think, altogether confined to that sphere. This
question we shall have occasion to examine when discussing the
gladiatorial shows. Most cruelty, however, springs from callousness,
which is simply dulness of imagination.

144 The principal exception being where slavery, coexisting with
advanced civilisation, retards or prevents the growth of industrial
habits.

145 See Mr. Laing’s _Travels in Sweden_. A similar cause is said to have
had a similar effect in Bavaria.

146 This has been, I think, especially the case with the Austrians.

147 See some remarkable instances of this in Cabanis, _Rapports du
Physique et du Moral de l’Homme_.

148 Diog. Laërt. _Pythag._

149 Plutarch, _De Profectibus in Virt._

150 Diog. Laërt. _Stilpo._

151 Clem. Alexand. _Strom._ vii.

152 Cicero, _De Nat. Deorum_, i. 1.

153 Lactant. _Inst. Div._ i. 5.

154 “Pythagoras ita definivit quid esset Deus: Animus qui per universas
mundi partes, omnemque naturam commeans atque diffusus, ex quo omnia
quæ nascuntur animalia vitam capiunt.”—Ibid. Lactantius in this
chapter has collected several other philosophic definitions of the
Divinity. See too Plutarch, _De Placit. Philos._ Tertullian explains
the stoical theory by an ingenious illustration: “Stoici enim volunt
Deum sic per materiem decucurrisse quomodo mel per favos.”—Tert. _De
Anima_.

155 As Cicero says: “Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit, deos.”—_De
Nat. Deor._ i. 44.

156 Sometimes, however, they restricted its operation to the great
events of life. As an interlocutor in Cicero says: “Magna dii
curant, parva negligunt.”—Cic. _De Natur. Deor._ ii. 66. Justin
Martyr notices (_Trypho_, i.) that some philosophers maintained that
God cared for the universal or species, but not for the individual.
Seneca maintains that the Divinity has determined all things by an
inexorable law of destiny, which He has decreed, but which He
Himself obeys. (_De Provident._ v.)

157 See on this theory Cicero, _De Natur. Deor._ i. 42; Lactantius,
_Inst. Div._ i. 11.

158 Diog. Laërt. _Vit. Zeno._ St. Aug. _De Civ. Dei_, iv. 11. Maximus of
Tyre, _Dissert._ x. (in some editions xxix.) § 8. Seneca, _De
Beneficiis_, iv. 7-8. Cic. _De Natur. Deor._ i. 15. Cicero has
devoted the first two books of this work to the stoical theology. A
full review of the allegorical and mythical interpretations of
paganism is given by Eusebius, _Evang. Præpar._ lib. iii.

159 St. Aug. _De Civ._ vii. 5.

160 Plin. _Hist. Nat_. ii. 1.

161 “Nec vero Deus ipse qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi
potest nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segregata ab omni
concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, ipsaque prædita motu
sempiterno.”—_Tusc. Quæst_. i. 27.

162 Senec. _Quæst. Nat._ ii. 45.

163 “Estne Dei sedes, nisi terra et pontus et aër.
Et cœlum et virtus? Superos quid quærimus ultra?
Jupiter est quodcumque vides, quodcumque moveris.”

_Pharsal._ ix. 578-80.

164 “Quæve anus tam excors inveniri potest, quæ illa, quæ quondam
credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat?”—Cic. _De Nat. Deor._
ii. 2.

“Esse aliques Manes et subterranea regna ...
Nec pueri credunt nisi qui nondum ære lavantur.”

Juv. _Sat._ ii. 149, 152.

See on this subject a good review by the Abbé Freppel, _Les Pères
Apostoliques_, leçon viii.

165 Cicero, _De Leg._ i. 14; Macrobius, _In. Som. Scip._ i. 10.

166 See his works _De Divinatione_ and _De Nat. Deorum_, which form a
curious contrast to the religious conservatism of the _De Legibus_,
which was written chiefly from a political point of view.

167 Eusebius, _Præp. Evang._ lib. iv.

168 The oracles first gave their answers in verse, but their bad poetry
was ridiculed, and they gradually sank to prose, and at last ceased.
Plutarch defended the inspiration of the bad poetry on the ground
that the inspiring spirit availed itself of the natural faculties of
the priestess for the expression of its infallible truths—a theory
which is still much in vogue among Biblical critics, and is, I
believe, called dynamical inspiration. See Fontenelle, _Hist. des
Oracles_ (1st ed.), pp. 292-293.

169 See the famous description of Cato refusing to consult the oracle of
Jupiter Ammon in Lucan, _Phars._ ix.; and also Arrian, ii. 7. Seneca
beautifully says, “Vis deos propitiare? bonus esto. Satis illos
coluit quisquis imitatus est.”—_Ep._ xcv.

170 Cicero, _De Divin_. ii. 24.

171 Aulus Gellius, _Noct. Att._ xv. 22.

172 See a long string of witticisms collected by Legendre, _Traité de
l’Opinion, ou Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de l’Esprit humain_
(Venise, 1735), tome i. pp. 386-387.

173 See Cicero, _De Natura Deorum_; Seneca, _De Brev. Vit._ c. xvi.;
Plin. _Hist. Nat._ ii. 5; Plutarch, _De Superstitione_.

174 “Olim truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum,
Cum faber, incertus scamnum faceretne Priapum,
Maluit esse Deum.”

_Sat._ I. viii. 1-3.

175 There is a very curious discussion on this subject, reported to have
taken place between Apollonius of Tyana and an Egyptian priest. The
former defended the Greek fashion of worshipping the Divinity under
the form of the human image, sculptured by Phidias and Praxiteles,
this being the noblest form we can conceive, and therefore the least
inadequate to the Divine perfections. The latter defended the
Egyptian custom of worshipping animals, because, as he said, it is
blasphemous to attempt to conceive an image of the Deity, and the
Egyptians therefore concentrate the imagination of the worshipper on
objects that are plainly merely allegorical or symbolical, and do
not pretend to offer any such image (_Philos. Apoll. of Tyana_, vi.
19). Pliny shortly says, “Effigiem Dei formamque quærere
imbecillitatis humanæ reor” (_Hist. Nat._ ii. 5). See too Max.
Tyrius, Diss. xxxviii. There was a legend that Numa forbade all
idols, and that for 200 years they were unknown in Rome (Plutarch,
_Life of Numa_). Dion Chrysostom said that the Gods need no statues
or sacrifices, but that by these means we attest our devotion to
them (_Orat._ xxxi.). On the vanity of rich idols, see Plutarch, _De
Superstitione_; Seneca, _Ep._ xxxi.

176 1 Lact. _Inst. Div._ vi. 25.

177 Dion. Halic. ii.; Polyb. vi. 56.

178 St. Aug. _De Civ. Dei_, iv. 31.

179 Epictetus, _Enchir._ xxxix.

180 Cicero, speaking of the worship of deified men, says, “indicat
omnium quidem animos immortales esse, sed fortium bonorumque
divinos.”—_De Leg._ ii. 11. The Roman worship of the dead, which was
the centre of the domestic religion, has been recently investigated
with much ability by M. Coulanges (_La Cité antique_).

181 On the minute supervision exercised by the censors on all the
details of domestic life, see Aul. Gell. _Noct._ ii. 24; iv. 12, 20.

182 Livy, xxxix. 6.

183 Vell. Paterculus, i. 11-13; Eutropius, iv. 6. Sallust ascribed the
decadence of Rome to the destruction of its rival, Carthage.

184 Plutarch, _De Adulatore et Amico_.

185 There is much curious information about the growth of Roman luxury
in Pliny (_Hist. Nat._ lib. xxxiv.). The movement of decomposition
has been lately fully traced by Mommsen (_Hist. of Rome_); Döllinger
(_Jew and Gentile_); Denis (_ Hist. des Idées morales dans
l’Antiquité_); Pressensé (_Hist. des trois premiers Siècles_); in
the histories of Champagny, and in the beautiful closing chapters of
the _Apôtres_ of Renan.

186 Sueton. _Aug._ xvi.

187 Ibid. _Calig._ v.

188 Persius, _Sat._ ii.; Horace, _Ep._ i. 16, vv. 57-60.

189 See, on the identification of the Greek and Egyptian myths,
Plutarch’s _De Iside et Osiride_. The Greek and Roman gods were
habitually regarded as identical, and Cæsar and Tacitus, in like
manner, identified the deities of Gaul and Germany with those of
their own country. See Döllinger, _Jew and Gentile_, vol. ii. pp.
160-165.

190 “Ego deûm genus esse semper dixi et dicam cœlitum; Sed eos non
curare opinor quid agat hominum genus.”

Cicero adds: “magno plausu loquitur assentiente populo.”—_De Divin._
ii. 50.

191 Plutarch, _De Superstitione_.

192 St. Aug. _De Civ. Dei_, vi. 6; Tertul. _Apol._ 15; Arnobius, _Adv.
Gentes_, iv.

193 “Pars alia et hanc pellit, astroque suo eventus assignat, nascendi
legibus; semelque in omnes futuros unquam Deo decretum; in reliquum
vero otium datum. Sedere cœpit sententia hæc pariterque et eruditum
vulgus et rude in eam cursu vadit. Ecce fulgurum monitus, oraculorum
præscita, aruspicum prædicta, atque etiam parva dictu, in auguriis
sternumenta et offensiones pedum.”—_Hist. Nat._ ii. 5. Pliny himself
expresses great doubt about astrology giving many examples of men
with different destinies, who had been born at the same time, and
therefore under the same stars (vii. 50). Tacitus expresses complete
doubt about the existence of Providence. (_Ann._ vi. 22.) Tiberius
is said to have been very indifferent to the gods and to the worship
of the temples, being wholly addicted to astrology and convinced
that all things were pre-ordained. (_Suet. Tib._ lxix.)

194 Ammianus Marcellinus, xxviii.

_ 195 De Profectibus in Virt._ It was originally the custom at Roman
feasts to sing to a pipe the actions and the virtues of the greatest
men. (Cic. _Tusc. Quæst._ iv.)

196 E.g. Epictetus, _Ench._ lii. Seneca is full of similar exhortations.

197 According to Cicero, the first Latin work on philosophy was by the
Epicurean Amafanius. (_Tusc. Quæst._ iv.)

198 See on the great perfection of the character of Epicurus his life by
Diogenes Laërtius, and on the purity of the philosophy he taught and
the degree in which it was distorted and misrepresented by his Roman
followers. Seneca _De Vita Beata_, c. xii. xiii. and _Ep._ xxi.
Gassendi, in a very interesting little work entitled _Philosophiæ
Epicuri Syntagma_, has abundantly proved the possibility of uniting
Epicurean principles with a high code of morals. But probably the
most beautiful picture of the Epicurean system is the first book of
the _De Finibus_, in which Cicero endeavours to paint it as it would
have been painted by its adherents. When we remember that the writer
of this book was one of the most formidable and unflinching
opponents of Epicureanism in all the ancient world, it must be owned
that it would be impossible to find a grander example of that noble
love of truth, that sublime and scrupulous justice to opponents,
which was the pre-eminent glory of ancient philosophers, and which,
after the destruction of philosophy, was for many centuries almost
unknown in the world. It is impossible to doubt that Epicureanism
was logically compatible with a very high degree of virtue. It is, I
think, equally impossible to doubt that its practical tendency was
towards vice.

199 Mr. Grote gives the following very clear summary of Plato’s ethical
theory, which he believes to be original:—“Justice is in the mind a
condition analogous to good health and strength in the body.
Injustice is a condition analogous to sickness, corruption,
impotence in the body.... To possess a healthy body is desirable for
its consequences as a means towards other constituents of happiness,
but it is still more desirable in itself as an essential element of
happiness _per se_, i.e., the negation of sickness, which would of
itself make us miserable.... In like manner, the just mind blesses
the possessor twice: first and chiefly by bringing to him happiness
in itself; next, also, as it leads to ulterior happy results. The
unjust mind is a curse to its possessor in itself and apart from
results, though it also leads to ulterior results which render it
still more a curse to him.”—Grote’s _Plato_, vol. iii. p. 131.
According to Plutarch, Aristo of Chio defined virtue as “the health
of the soul.” (_De Virtute Morali._)

200 “Beata est ergo vita conveniens naturæ suæ; quæ non aliter
contingere potest quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetuâ
possessione sanitatis suæ.”—Seneca, _De Vita Beata_, c. iii.

201 The famous paradox that “the sage could be happy even in the bull of
Phalaris,” comes from the writings not of Zeno but of
Epicurus—though the Stoics adopted and greatly admired it. (Cic.
_Tusc._ ii. See Gassendi, _Philos. Epicuri Syntagma_, pars iii. c.
1.)

202 “Sed nescio quomodo dum lego assentior; cum posui librum et mecum
ipse de immortalitate animorum cœpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa
elabitur.”—Cic. _Tusc._ i.

203 Sallust, _Catilina_, cap. li.

204 See that most impressive passage (_Hist. Nat._ vii. 56). That the
sleep of annihilation is the happiest end of man is a favourite
thought of Lucretius. Thus:

“Nil igitur mors est, ad nos neque pertinet hilum,
Quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur.”—iii. 842.

This mode of thought has been recently expressed in Mr. Swinburne’s
very beautiful poem on _The Garden of Proserpine_.

205 Diog. Laërtius. The opinion of Chrysippus seems to have prevailed,
and Plutarch (_De Placit. Philos._) speaks of it as that of the
school. Cicero sarcastically says, “Stoici autem usuram nobis
largiuntur, tanquam cornicibus: diu mansuros aiunt animos; semper,
negant.”—_Tusc. Disp._ i. 31.

206 It has been very frequently asserted that Antigonus of Socho having
taught that virtue should be practised for its own sake, his
disciple, Zadok, the founder of the Sadducees, inferred the
non-existence of a future world; but the evidence for this whole
story is exceedingly unsatisfactory. The reader may find its history
in a very remarkable article by Mr. Twisleton on _Sadducees_, in
Smith’s _Biblical Dictionary_.

207 On the Stoical opinions about a future life see Martin, _La Vie
future_ (Paris, 1858); Courdaveaux _De l’immortalité de l’âme dans
le Stoïcisme_ (Paris, 1857); and Alger’s _Critical Hist. of the
Doctrine of a Future Life_ (New York, 1866).

208 His arguments are met by Cicero in the _Tusculans_.

209 See a collection of passages from his discourses collected by M.
Courdaveaux, in the introduction to his French translation of that
book.

210 Stobæus, _Eclog. Physic._ lib. i. cap. 52.

211 In his consolations to Marcia, he seems to incline to a belief in
the immortality, or at least the future existence, of the soul. In
many other passages, however, he speaks of it as annihilated at
death.

212 “Les Stoïciens ne faisaient aucunement dépendre la morale de la
perspective des peines ou de la rémunération dans une vie future....
La croyance à l’immortalité de l’âme n’appartenait donc, selon leur
manière de voir, qu’à la physique, c’est-à-dire à la
psychologie.”—Degerando, _Hist. de la Philos._ tome iii. p. 56.

213 “Panætius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime
disputavit, quemque nos, correctione quadam adhibita, potissimum
secuti sumus.”—_De Offic._ iii. 2.

214 Marcus Aurelius thanks Providence, as for one of the great blessings
of his life, that he had been made acquainted with the writings of
Epictetus. The story is well known how the old philosopher warned
his master, who was beating him, that he would soon break his leg,
and when the leg was broken, calmly remarked, “I told you you would
do so.” Celsus quoted this in opposition to the Christians, asking,
“Did your leader under suffering ever say anything so noble?” Origen
finely replied, “He did what was still nobler—He kept silence.” A
Christian anchorite (some say St. Nilus, who lived in the beginning
of the fifth century) was so struck with the _Enchiridion_ of
Epictetus, that he adapted it to Christian use. The conversations of
Epictetus, as reported by Arrian, are said to have been the
favourite reading of Toussaint l’Ouverture.

215 Tacitus had used this expression before Milton: “Quando etiam
sapientibus cupido gloriæ novissima exuitur.”—_Hist._ iv. 6.

216 Two remarkable instances have come down to us of eminent writers
begging historians to adorn and even exaggerate their acts. See the
very curious letters of Cicero to the historian Lucceius (_Ep. ad
Divers._ v. 12); and of the younger Pliny to Tacitus (_Ep._ vii.
33). Cicero has himself confessed that he was too fond of glory.

217 “Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem;
Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.”—Ennius.

218 See the beautiful description of Cato’s tranquillity under insults.
Seneca, _De Ira_, ii. 33; _De Const. Sap._ 1, 2.

_ 219 De Officiis_, iii. 9.

_ 220 Tusc._ ii. 26.

221 Seneca, _De Vit. Beat._ c. xx.

222 Seneca, _Ep._ cxiii.

223 Seneca, _Ep._ lxxxi.

224 Persius, _Sat._ i. 45-47.

225 Epictetus, _Ench._ xxiii.

226 Seneca, _De Ira_, iii. 41.

227 Seneca, _Cons. ad Helv._ xiii.

228 Marc. Aur. vii. 67.

229 Marc. Aur. iv. 20.

230 Pliny, _Ep._ i. 22.

231 “Non dux, sed comes voluptas.”—_De Vit. Beat._ c. viii.

232 “Voluptas non est merces nec causa virtutis sed accessio; nec quia
delectat placet sed quia placet delectat.”—Ibid., c. ix.

233 Peregrinus apud Aul. Gellius, xii. 11. Peregrinus was a Cynic, but
his doctrine on this point was identical with that of the Stoics.

234 Marc. Aurel. ix. 42.

235 Marc. Aurel. v. 6.

236 Seneca, however, in one of his letters (_Ep._ lxxv.), subtilises a
good deal on this point. He draws a distinction between affections
and maladies. The first, he says, are irrational, and therefore
reprehensible movements of the soul, which, if repeated and
unrepressed, tend to form an irrational and evil habit, and to the
last he in this letter restricts the term disease. He illustrates
this distinction by observing that colds and any other slight
ailments, if unchecked and neglected, may produce an organic
disease. The wise man, he says, is wholly free from moral disease,
but no man can completely emancipate himself from affections, though
he should make this his constant object.

_ 237 De Clem._ ii. 6, 7.

238 “Peccantes vero quid habet cur oderit, cum error illos in hujusmodi
delicta compellat?”—Sen. _De Ira_, i. 14. This is a favourite
thought of Marcus Aurelius, to which he reverts again and again.
See, too, Arrian, i. 18.

239 “Ergo ne homini quidem nocebimus quia peccavit sed ne peccet, nec
unquam ad præteritum sed ad futurum pœna referetur.”—Ibid. ii. 31.
In the philosophy of Plato, on the other hand, punishment was
chiefly expiatory and purificatory. (Lerminier, _Introd. à
l’Histoire du Droit_, p. 123.)

240 Seneca, _De Constant. Sap._ v. Compare and contrast this famous
sentence of Anaxagoras with that of one of the early Christian
hermits. Someone told the hermit that his father was dead. “Cease
your blasphemy,” he answered, “my father is immortal.”—Socrates,
_Eccl. Hist._ iv 23.

241 Epictetus, _Ench._ 16, 18.