Chapter XX (2)

[129] Seuthês, in the Anabasis of Xenophôn (vii. 2, 33),
describes how, when an orphan youth, he formerly supplicated
Mêdokos, the Thracian king, to grant him a troop of followers,
in order that he might recover his lost dominions, ἐκαθεζόμην
ἐνδίφριος αὐτῷ ἱκέτης δοῦναί μοι ἄνδρας.

Thucydidês gives an interesting description of the arrival of
the exile Themistoklês, then warmly pursued by the Greeks on
suspicion of treason, at the house of Admêtus, king of the
Epirotic Molossians. The wife of Admêtus herself instructed
the fugitive how to supplicate her husband in form: the child
of Admêtus was placed in his arms, and he was directed to sit
down in this guise close by the consecrated hearth, which was
of the nature of an altar. While so seated, he addressed his
urgent entreaties to Admêtus for protection: the latter raised
him up from the ground and promised what was asked. “That (says
the historian) was the most powerful form of supplication.”
Admêtus,—ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ υἱέος, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ ~μέγιστον ἱκέτευμα~ ἦν τοῦτο (Thuc.
i. 136). So Têlephus, in the lost drama of Æschylus called
Μυσοὶ, takes up the child Orestês. See Bothe’s Fragm. 44; Schol.
Aristoph. Ach. 305.

In the Odyssey, both Nausikaa and the goddess Athênê instruct
Odysseus in the proper form of supplicating Alkinous: he first
throws himself down at the feet of queen Arêtê, embracing her
knees and addressing to her his prayer, and then, without waiting
for a reply, sits down among the ashes on the hearth,—ὣς εἰπὼν,
κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάρῃ ἐν κονίῃσι,—Alkinous is dining with a
large company: for some time both he and the guests are silent:
at length the ancient Echenêus remonstrates with him on his
tardiness in raising the stranger up from the ashes. At his
exhortation, the Phæakian king takes Odysseus by the hand, and,
raising him up, places him on a chair beside him: he then directs
the heralds to mix a bowl of wine, and to serve it to every one
round, in order that all may make libations to Zeus Hiketêsios.
This ceremony clothes the stranger with the full rights and
character of a suppliant (Odyss. vi. 310; vii. 75, 141, 166):
κατὰ νόμους ἀφικτόρων, Æschyl. Supplic. 242.

That the form counted for a great deal, we see evidently marked:
but of course supplication is often addressed, and successfully
addressed, in circumstances where this form cannot be gone
through.

It is difficult to accept the doctrine of Eustathius (ad Odyss.
xvi. 424), that ἱκέτης is a _vox media_ (like ξεῖνος), applied
as well to the ἱκετάδοχος as to the ἱκέτης, properly so called:
but the word ἀλλήλοισιν, in the passage just cited, does seem to
justify his observation: yet there is no direct authority for
such use of the word in Homer.

The address of Theoclymenos, on first preferring his supplication
to Telemachus, is characteristic of the practice (Odyss. xv.
260); compare also Iliad, xvi. 574, and Hesiod. Scut. Hercul.
12-85.

The idea of the ξεῖνος and the ἱκέτης run very much together. I
can hardly persuade myself that the reading ἱκέτευσε (Odyss. xi.
520) is truly Homeric: implying as it does the idea of a pitiable
sufferer, it is altogether out of place when predicated of the
proud and impetuous Neoptolemus: we should rather have expected
ἐκέλευσε. (See Odyss. x. 15.)

The constraining efficacy of special formalities of supplication,
among the Scythians, is powerfully set forth in the Toxaris
of Lucian: the suppliant sits upon an ox-hide, with his hands
confined behind him (Lucian, Toxaris c. 48, vol. iii. p. 69,
Tauchn.)—the μεγίστη ἱκετηρία among that people.

The sense of obligation towards the gods manifests itself separately in habitual acts of worship, sacrifice, and libations, or by votive presents, such as that of the hair of Achilles, which he has pledged to the river-god Spercheius,[130] and such as the constant dedicated offerings which men who stand in urgent need of the divine aid first promise and afterwards fulfil. But the feeling towards the gods also appears, and that not less frequently, as mingling itself with and enforcing obligations towards some particular human person. The tie which binds a man to his father, his kinsman, his guest, or any special promisee towards whom he has taken the engagement of an oath, is conceived in conjunction with the idea of Zeus, as witness and guarantee; and the intimacy of the association is attested by some surname or special appellation of the god.[131] Such personal feelings composed all the moral influences of which a Greek of that day was susceptible,—a state of mind which we can best appreciate by contrasting it with that of the subsequent citizen of historical Athens. In the view of the latter, the great impersonal authority, called “The Laws,” stood out separately, both as guide and sanction, distinct from religious duty or private sympathies: but of this discriminated conception of positive law and positive morality,[132] the germ only can be detected in the Homeric poems. The appropriate Greek word for human laws never occurs. Amidst a very wavering phraseology,[133] we can detect a gradual transition from the primitive idea of a personal goddess Themis, attached to Zeus, first to his sentences or orders called Themistes, and next by a still farther remove to various established customs, which those sentences were believed to sanctify,—the authority of religion and that of custom coalescing into one indivisible obligation.

[130] Iliad, xxiii. 142.

[131] Odyss. xiv. 389.—

Οὐ γὰρ τοὔνεκ᾽ ἐγώ σ᾽ αἰδέσσομαι, οὐδὲ φιλήσω,
Ἀλλὰ Δία ξένιον δείσας, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐλεαίρων.

[132] Nägelsbach (Homerische Theologie, Abschn. v. s. 23) gives
a just and well-sustained view of the Homeric ethics: “Es ist
der charakteristische Standpunkt der Homerischen Ethik, dass die
Sphären des Rechts, der Sittlichkeit, und Religiosität, bey dem
Dichter, durchaus noch nicht auseinander fallen, so dass der
Mensch z. B. δίκαιος seyn konnte ohne θεουδὴς zu seyn—sondern in
unentwickelter Einheit beysammen sind.”

[133] Νόμοι, _laws_, is not an Homeric word; νόμος, _law_, in the
singular, occurs twice in the Hesiodic Works and Days (276, 388).

The employment of the words δίκη, δίκαι, θέμις, θέμιστες, in
Homer, is curious as illustrating the early moral associations,
but would require far more space than can be given to it in
a note; we see that the sense of each of these words was
essentially fluctuating. _Themis_, in Homer, is sometimes
decidedly a _person_, who exercises the important function of
opening and closing the agora, both of gods and men (Iliad, xx.
4: Odyss. ii. 68), and who, besides that, acts and speaks (Iliad,
xiv. 87-93): always the associate and companion of Zeus, the
highest god. In Hesiod, (Theog. 901,) she is the wife of Zeus:
in Æschylus, (Prometh. 209,) she is the same as Γαῖα: even in
Plato, (Legg. xi. p. 936,) witnesses swear (to want of knowledge
of matters under inquest) by Zeus, Apollo, and Themis. Themis _as
a person_ is probably the oldest sense of the word: then we have
the plural θέμιστες (connected with the verb τίθεμι, like θεσμὸς
and τεθμὸς), which are (not persons, but) special appurtenances
or emanations of the supreme god, or of a king acting under him,
analogous to and joined with the sceptre. The sceptre, and the
θέμιστες or the δίκαι constantly go together (Iliad, ii. 209;
ix. 99): Zeus or the king is a judge, not a lawmaker; he issues
decrees or special orders to settle particular disputes, or to
restrain particular men; and, agreeable to the concrete forms
of ancient language, the decrees are treated as if they were a
collection of ready-made substantive things, actually in his
possession, like the sceptre, and prepared for being delivered
out when the proper occasion arose: δικασπόλοι, οἵτε θέμιστας
Πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται (Il. i. 238), compared with the two passages
last cited: Ἄφρονα τοῦτον ἀνέντας, ὃς οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα (Il.
v. 761), Ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (Odyss. ix.
215). The plural number δίκαι is more commonly used in Homer
than the singular: δίκη is rarely used to denote Justice, an
an abstract conception; it more often denotes a special claim
of right on the part of some given man (Il. xviii. 508). It
sometimes also denotes, simply, established custom, or the known
lot,—δμώων δίκη, γερόντων, θείων βασιλήων, θεῶν (see Damm’s
Lexicon, _ad voc._) θέμις is used in the same manner.

See, upon this matter, Platner, De Notione Juris ap. Homerum, p.
81, and O. Müller, Prolegg. Mythol. p. 121.

The family relations, as we might expect, are set forth in our pictures of the legendary world as the grand sources of lasting union and devoted attachment. The paternal authority is highly reverenced: the son who lives to years of maturity, repays by affection to his parents the charge of his maintenance in infancy, which the language notes by a special word; whilst on the other hand, the Erinnys, whose avenging hand is put in motion by the curse of a father or mother, is an object of deep dread.[134]

[134] Οὐδὲ τοκεῦσι Θρέπτρα φίλοις ἀπέδωκε (Il. iv. 477): θρέπτρα
or θρεπτήρια (compare Il. ix. 454; Odyss. ii. 134; Hesiod, Opp.
Di. 186).

In regard to marriage, we find the wife occupying a station of great dignity and influence, though it was the practice for the husband to purchase her by valuable presents to her parents,—a practice extensively prevalent among early communities, and treated by Aristotle as an evidence of barbarism. She even seems to live less secluded and to enjoy a wider sphere of action than was allotted to her in historical Greece.[135] Concubines are frequent with the chiefs, and occasionally the jealousy of the wife breaks out in reckless excess against her husband, as may be seen in the tragical history of Phœnix. The continence of Laërtês, from fear of displeasing his wife Antikleia, is especially noticed.[136] A large portion of the romantic interest which Grecian legend inspires is derived from the women: Penelopê, Andromachê, Helen, Klytæmnêstra, Eriphylê, Iokasta, Hekabê, etc., all stand in the foreground of the picture, either from their virtues, their beauty, their crimes, or their sufferings.

[135] Aristot. Polit. ii. 5, 11. The ἔδνα, or present given by
the suitor to the father, as an inducement to grant his daughter
in marriage, are spoken of as very valuable,—ἀπερείσια ἔδνα (Il.
xi. 244; xvi. 178; xxii. 472): to grant a daughter without ἔδνα
was a high compliment to the intended son-in-law (Il. ix. 141:
compare xiii. 366). Among the ancient Germans of Tacitus, the
husband gave presents, not to his wife’s father, but to herself
(Tacit. Germ. c. 18): the customs of the early Jews were in this
respect completely Homeric; see the case of Shechem and Dinah
(Genesis, xxxiv. 12) and others, etc.; also Mr. Catlin’s Letters
on the North American Indians, vol. i. Lett. 26, p. 213.

The Greek ἔδνα correspond exactly to the _mundium_ of the Lombard
and Alemannic laws, which is thus explained by Mr. Price (Notes
on the Laws of King Ethelbert, in the Ancient Laws and Institutes
of England, translated and published by Mr. Thorpe, vol. i. p.
20): “The Longobardic law is the most copious of all the barbaric
codes in its provisions respecting marriage, and particularly
so on the subject of the Mund. From that law it appears that
the Mundium was a sum paid over to the family of the bride, for
transferring the tutelage which they possessed over her to the
family of the husband: ‘Si quis pro muliere liberâ aut puellâ
mundium dederit et ei tradita fuerit ad uxorem,’ etc. (ed.
Rotharis, c. 183.) In the same sense in which the term occurs in
these dooms, it is also to be met with in the Alemannic law: it
was also common in Denmark and in Sweden, where the bride was
called a mund-bought or a mund-given woman.”

According to the 77th Law of King Ethelbert (p. 23), this _mund_
was often paid in cattle: the Saxon daughters were πάρθενοι
ἀλφεσίβοιαι (Iliad, xviii. 593).

[136] Odyss. i. 430: Iliad, ix. 450: see also Terpstra,
Antiquitas Homerica, capp. 17 and 18.

Polygamy appears to be ascribed to Priam, but to no one else
(Iliad, xxi. 88).

Not only brothers, but also cousins, and the more distant blood-relations and clansmen, appear connected together by a strong feeling of attachment, sharing among them universally the obligation of mutual self-defence and revenge, in the event of injury to any individual of the race. The legitimate brothers divide between them by lot the paternal inheritance,—a bastard brother receiving only a small share; he is, however, commonly very well treated,[137] though the murder of Phokus, by Telamon and Pêleus, constitutes a flagrant exception. The furtive pregnancy of young women, often by a god, is one of the most frequently recurring incidents in the legendary narratives; and the severity with which such a fact, when discovered, is visited by the father, is generally extreme. As an extension of the family connection, we read of larger unions, called the phratry and the tribe, which are respectfully, but not frequently, mentioned.[138]

[137] Odyss. xiv. 202-215: compare Iliad, xi. 102. The primitive
German law of succession divided the paternal inheritance among
the sons of a deceased father, under the implied obligation to
maintain and portion out their sisters (Eichhorn, _Deutsches
Privat-Recht_. sect. 330).

[138] Iliad, ii. 362.—

Ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος,
Ὃς πολέμου ἔραται, etc. (Il. ix. 63.)

These three epithets include the three different classes of
personal sympathy and obligation: 1. The Phratry, in which
a man is connected with father, mother, brothers, cousins,
brothers-in-law, clansmen, etc.; 2. The θέμιστες, whereby he is
connected with his fellow-men who visit the same agora; 3. His
Hestia, or Hearth, whereby he becomes accessible to the ξεῖνος
and the ἱκέτης:—

Τῷ δ᾽ Ὀδυσεὺς ξίφος ὀξὺ καὶ ἄλκιμον ἔγχος ἔδωκεν,
~Ἀρχὴν~ ξεινοσύνης προσκηδέος· οὐδὲ τραπέζῃ
Γνώτην ἀλλήλοιν. (Odyss. xxi. 34.)

The generous readiness with which hospitality is afforded to the stranger who asks for it,[139] the facility with which he is allowed to contract the peculiar connection of guest with his host, and the permanence with which that connection, when created by partaking of the same food and exchanging presents, is maintained even through a long period of separation, and even transmitted from father to son—these are among the most captivating features of the heroic society. The Homeric chief welcomes the stranger who comes to ask shelter in his house, first gives him refreshment, and then inquires his name and the purpose of his voyage.[140] Though not inclined to invite strangers to his house, he cannot repel them when they spontaneously enter it craving a lodging.[141] The suppliant is also commonly a stranger, but a stranger under peculiar circumstances; who proclaims his own calamitous and abject condition, and seeks to place himself in a relation to the chief whom he solicits, something like that in which men stand to the gods. Onerous as such special tie may become to him, the chief cannot decline it, if solicited in the proper form: the ceremony of supplication has a binding effect, and the Erinnys punish the hardhearted person who disallows it. A conquered enemy may sometimes throw himself at the feet of his conqueror, and solicit mercy, but he cannot by doing so acquire the character and claims of a suppliant properly so called: the conqueror has free discretion either to kill him, or to spare him and accept a ransom.[142]

[139] It must be mentioned, however, that when a chief received a
stranger and made presents to him, he reimbursed to himself the
value of the presents by collections among the people (Odyss.
xiii. 14; xix. 197): ἀργαλέον γὰρ ἕνα προικὸς χαρίσασθαι, says
Alkinous.

[140] Odyss. i. 123; iii. 70, etc.

[141] Odyss. xvii. 383.—

Τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
Ἄλλον γ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῶνδ᾽, οἳ δημιόεργοι ἔασιν, etc.;

which breathes the plain-spoken shrewdness of the Hesiodic Works
and Days, v. 355.

[142] See the illustrative case of Lykaon, in vain craving mercy
from Achilles. (Iliad, xxi. 64-97. Ἀντί τοι εἶμ᾽ ἱκέταο, etc.)

Menelaus is about to spare the life of the Trojan Adrastus, who
clasps his knees and craves mercy, offering a large ransom,—when
Agamemnôn repels the idea of quarter, and kills Adrastus with his
own hand: his speech to Menelaus displays the extreme of violent
enmity, yet the poet says,—

Ὣς εἰπὼν, παρέπεισεν ἀδελφείου φρένας ἥρως,
~Αἴσιμα παρειπὼν~, etc.

Adrastus is not called an ἱκέτης, nor is the expression used in
respect to Dolon (Il. x. 456), nor in the equally striking case
of Odysseus (Odyss. xiv. 279), when begging for his life.

There are in the legendary narratives abundant examples of individuals who transgress in particular acts even the holiest of these personal ties, but the savage Cyclops is the only person described as professedly indifferent to them, and careless of that sanction of the gods which in Grecian belief accompanied them all.[143] In fact, the tragical horror which pervades the lineage of Athamas or Kadmus, and which attaches to many of the acts of Hêraklês, of Pêleus and Telamon, of Jasôn and Mêdea, of Atreus and Thyestês, etc., is founded upon a deep feeling and sympathy with those special obligations, which conspicuous individuals, under the temporary stimulus of the maddening Atê, are driven to violate. In such conflict of sentiments, between the obligation generally reverenced and the exceptional deviation in an individual otherwise admired, consists the pathos of the story.

[143] Odyss. ix. 112-275.

These feelings—of mutual devotion between kinsmen and companions in arms—of generous hospitality to the stranger, and of helping protection to the suppliant,—constitute the bright spots in a dark age. We find them very generally prevalent amongst communities essentially rude and barbarous,—amongst the ancient Germans as described by Tacitus, the Druses in Lebanon,[144] the Arabian tribes in the desert, and even the North American Indians.

[144] Tacit. German. c. 21. “Quemeunque mortalium arcere tecto,
nefas habetur: pro fortunâ quisque apparatis epulis excipit: cum
defecêre qui modo hospes fuerat, monstratur hospitii et comes,
proximam domum non invitati adeunt: nec interest—pari humanitate
accipiuntur. Notum ignotumque, quantum ad jus hospitii, nemo
discernit.” Compare Cæsar, B. G. vi. 22.

See about the Druses and Arabians, Volney, Travels in Egypt and
Syria, vol. ii. p. 76, Engl. Transl.; Niebuhr, Beschreibung von
Arabien, Copenh. 1772, pp. 46-49.

Pomponius Mela describes the ancient Germans in language not
inapplicable to the Homeric Greeks: “Jus in viribus habent,
adeo ut ne latrocinii quidem pudeat: _tantum_ hospitibus boni,
mitesque supplicibus.” (iii. 3.)

“The hospitality of the Indians is well known. It extends even
to strangers who take refuge among them. They count it a most
sacred duty, from which no one is exempted. Whoever refuses
relief to any one, commits a grievous offence, and not only makes
himself detested and abhorred by all, but liable to revenge from
the offended person. In their conduct towards their enemies
they are cruel and inexorable, and, when enraged, bent upon
nothing but murder and bloodshed. They are, however, remarkable
for concealing their passions, and waiting for a convenient
opportunity of gratifying them. But then their fury knows no
bounds. If they cannot satisfy their resentment, they will even
call upon their friends and posterity to do it. The longest space
of time cannot cool their wrath, nor the most distant place of
refuge afford security to their enemy.” (Loskiel, History of the
Mission of the United Brethren among the North American Indians,