Chapter XVI (2)

[Footnote 1: On Hartmann cf. Volkelt in _Nord und Süd_, July, 1881; the same, _Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus_, 1873; Vaihinger, _Hartmann_, _Dühring und Lange_, 1876; R. Koeber, _Das philosophische System Ed. v, Hartmann_, 1884; O. Pfleiderer, critique of the _Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (Im neuen Reich)_, 1879; L. von Golther, _Der moderne Pessimismus_, 1878; J. Huber, _Der Pessimismus_, 1876; Weygoldt, _Kritik des philosophischen Pessimismus der neuesten Zeit_, 1875; M. Venetianer, _Der Allgeist_, 1874; A Taubert (Hartmann's first wife), _Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner_, 1873; O. Plümacher, _Der Kampf ums Unbewusste_ (with a chronological table of Hartmann literature appended), 1881; the same, _Der Pessimismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart_, 1884; Krohn, _Streifzüge_ (see above); Seydel (see above). During the year 1882 four publications appeared under the title _Der Pessimismus und die Sittenlehre_, by Bacmeister, Christ, Rehmke, and H. Sommer (2d ed., 1883). [English translation of _Truth and Error in Darwinism_ in the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, vols. xi.-xiii., and of _The Religion of the Future_, by Dare, 1886; cf. also Sully's _Pessimism_, chap. v.--TR.]]

In polemical relation, on the one hand, to the naïve realism of life, and, on the other, to the subjective idealism of Kant, or rather of the neo-Kantians, the logical conclusion of which would be absolute illusionism, Hartmann founds his "transcendental realism," which mediates between these two points of view (the existence and true nature of the world outside our representations is knowable, if only indirectly; the forms of knowledge, in spite of their subjective origin, have a more than subjective, a transcendental, significance) by pointing out that sense-impressions, which are accompanied by the feeling of compulsion and are different from one another, cannot be explained from the ego, but only by the action of things in themselves external to us, _i.e._, independent of consciousness, and themselves distinct from one another. The causality of things in themselves is the bridge which enables us to cross the gulf between the immanent world of representations and the transcendent world of being. The causality of things in themselves proves their reality, their difference at different times, their changeability and their temporal character; change, however, demands something permanent, existence, an existing, unchangeable, supra-temporal, and non-spatial substance (whether a special substance for each thing in itself or a common one for all, is left for the present undetermined). My action upon the thing in itself assures me of its causal conditionality or necessity; the various affections of the same sense, that there are many things in themselves; the peculiar form of change shown by some bodies, that these, like my body, are united with a soul. Thus it is evident that, besides the concept of cause, a series of other categories must be applied to the thing in itself, hence applied transcendentally.

The "speculative results" obtained by Hartmann on an "inductive" basis are as follows: The _per se (Ansich)_ of the empirical world is the Unconscious. The two attributes of this absolute are the active, groundless, alogical, infinite will, and the passive, finite representation (Idea); the former is the ground of the _that_ of the world, the latter the ground of its purposive _what_ and _how_. Without the will the representation, which in itself is without energy, could not become real, and without the representation (of an end) the will, which in itself is without reason, could not become a definite willing (relative or immanent dualism of the attributes, a necessary moment in absolute monism). The empirical preponderance of pain over pleasure, which can be shown by calculation,[1] proves that the world is evil, that its non-existence were better than its existence; the purposiveness everywhere perceptible in nature and the progress of history toward a final goal (it is true, a negative one) proves, nevertheless, that it is the best world that was possible (reconciliation of eudemonistic pessimism with evolutionistic optimism). The creation of the world begins when the blind will to live groundlessly and fortuitously passes over from essence to phenomenon, from potency to act, from supra-existence to existence, and, in irrational striving after existence, draws to itself the only content which is capable of realization, the logical Idea. This latter seeks to make good the error committed by the will by bringing consciousness into the field as a combatant against the insatiable, ever yearning, never satisfied will, which one day will force the will back into latency, into the (antemundane) blessed state of not-willing. The goal of the world-development is deliverance from the misery of existence, the peace of non-existence, the return from the will and representation, become spatial and temporal, to the original, harmonious equilibrium of the two functions, which has been disturbed by the origin of the world or to the antemundane identity of the absolute. The task of the logical element is to teach consciousness more and more to penetrate the illusion of the will--in its three stages of childlike (Greek) expectation of happiness to be attained here, youthful (Christian) expectation of happiness to be attained hereafter, and adult expectation of happiness to be attained in the future of the world-development--and, finally, to teach it to know, in senile longing after rest, that only the doing away with this miserable willing, and, consequently, with earthly existence (through the resolve of the majority of mankind) can give the sole attainable blessedness, freedom from pain. The world-process is the incarnation, the suffering, and the redemption of the absolute; the moral task of man is not personal renunciation and cowardly retirement, but to make the purposes of the Unconscious his own, with complete resignation to life and its sufferings to labor energetically in the world-process, and, by the vigorous promotion of consciousness, to hasten the fulfillment of the redemptive purpose; the condition of morality is insight into the fruitlessness of all striving after pleasure and into the essential unity of all individual beings with one another and with the universal spirit, which exists in the individuals, but at the same time subsists above them. "To know one's self as of divine nature, this does away with all divergence between selfwill and universal will, with all estrangement between man and God, with all undivine, that is, merely natural, conduct."

[Footnote 1: Cf. Volkelt, _Ueber die Lust als höchsten Werthmassstab_ (in the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. lxxxviii.), 1886, and O. Pfleiderer, _Philosophy of Religion_, vol. ii. p. 249 _seq_.]

Religion, which, in common with philosophy, has for its basis the metaphysical need for, or the mystical feeling of, the unity of the human individual and the world-ground, needs transformation, since in its traditional forms it is opposed to modern culture, and the merging of religion (as a need of the heart) in metaphysics is impossible. The religion of the future, for which the way has already been prepared by the speculative Protestantism of the present, is _concrete monism_ (the divine unity is transcendent as well as immanent in the plurality of the beings of earth, every moral man a God-man), which includes in itself the abstract monism (pantheism) of the Indian religions and the Judeo-Christian (mono-) theism as subordinate moments. (The original henotheism and its decline into polytheism, demonism, and fetichism was followed by--Egyptian and Persian, as well as Greek, Roman, and German--naturalism, and then by supernaturalism in its monistic and its theistic form. The chief defect of the Christian religion is the transcendental-eudemonistic heteronomy of its ethics.) The _Religion of Spirit_ divides into three parts. The psychology of religion considers the religious function in its subjective aspect, faith as a combined act of representation, feeling, and will, in which one of these three elements may predominate--though feeling forms the inmost kernel of the theoretical and practical activities as well--and, as the objective correlate of faith, grace (revealing, redeeming, and sanctifying), which elevates man above peripheral and phenomenal dependence on the world, and frees him from it, through his becoming conscious of his central and metaphysical dependence upon God. The metaphysics of religion (in theological, anthropological, and cosmological sections) proves by induction from the facts of religion the existence, omnipotence, spirituality, omniscience, righteousness, and holiness of the All-one, which coincides with the moral order of the world. Further, it proves the need and the capacity of man for redemption from guilt and evil--here three spheres of the individual will are distinguished, one beneath God, one contrary to God, and one conformable to God, or a natural, an evil, and a moral sphere--and, preserving alike the absoluteness of God and the reality of the world, shows that it is not so much man as God himself, who, as the bearer of all the suffering of the world, is the subject of redemption. The ethics of religion discusses the subjective and objective processes of redemption, namely, repentance and amendment on the part of the individual and the ecclesiastical _cultus_ of the future, which is to despise symbols and art.

It is to Hartmann's credit, though the fact has not been sufficiently appreciated by professional thinkers, that in a time averse to speculation he has devoted his energies to the highest problems of metaphysics, and in their elaboration has approached his task with scientific earnestness and a comprehensive and thorough consideration of previous results. Thus the critique of ethical standpoints in the historical part of the _Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness_, especially, contains much that is worthy of consideration; and his fundamental metaphysical idea, that the absolute is to be conceived as the unity of will and reason, also deserves in general a more lively assent than has been accorded to it, while his rejection of an infinite consciousness has justly met with contradiction. It has been impossible here to go into his discussions in the philosophy of nature--they cannot be described in brief--on matter (atomic forces), on the mechanical and teleological views of life and its development, on instinct, on sexual love, etc., which he very skillfully uses in support of his metaphysical principle.

%3. From the Revival of the Kantian Philosophy to the Present Time.%

%(a) Neo-Kantianism, Positivism, and Kindred Phenomena.%--The Kantian philosophy has created two epochs: one at the time of its appearance, and a second two generations after the death of its author. The new Kantian movement, which is one of the most prominent characteristics of the philosophy of the present time, took its beginning a quarter of a century ago. It is true that even before 1865 individual thinkers like Ernst Reinhold of Jena (died 1855), the admirer of Fries, J.B. Meyer of Bonn, K.A. von Reichlin-Meldegg, and others had sought a point of departure for their views in Kant; that K. Fischer's work on Kant (1860) had given a lively impulse to the renewed study of the critical philosophy; nay, that the cry "Back to Kant" had been expressly raised by Fortlage (as early as 1832 in his treatise _The Gaps in the Hegelian System_), and by Zeller (p. 589). But the movement first became general after F.A. Lange in his _History of Materialism_ had energetically advocated the Kantian doctrine according to his special conception of it, after Helmholtz[1] (born 1821) had called attention to the agreement of the results of physiology with those of the Critique of Reason, and at the same time Liebmann's youthful work, _Kant and the Epigones_, in which every chapter ended with the inexorable refrain, "therefore we must go back to Kant," had given the strongest expression to the longing of the time.

[Footnote 1: Helmholtz: _On Human Vision_, 1855; _Physiological Optics_, 1867; _Sensations of Tone_, 1863, 4th ed., 1877 [English translation by Ellis, 2d ed., 1885].]

Otto Liebmann (cf. also the chapter on "The Metamorphoses of the A Priori" in his _Analysis of Reality_) sees the fundamental truth of criticism in the irrefutable proof that, space, time, and the categories are functions of the intellect, and that subject and object are necessary correlates, inseparable factors of the empirical world, and finds Kant's fundamental error, which the Epigones have not corrected, but made still worse, in the non-concept of the thing in itself, which must be expelled from the Kantian philosophy as a remnant of dogmatism, as a drop of alien blood, and as an illegitimate invader which has debased it.

According to Friedrich Albert Lange[1] (1828-75; during the last years of his life professor at Marburg), materialism, which is unfruitful and untenable as a principle, a system, and a view of the world, but useful and indispensable as a method and a maxim of investigation, must be supplemented by formal idealism, which, rejecting all science from mere reason limits knowledge to the sensuous, to that which can be experienced, yet at the same time conceives the formal element in the sense world as the product of the organization of man, and hence makes objects conform to our representations. Above the sensuous world of experience and of mechanical becoming, however, the speculative impulse to construction, rounding off the fragmentary truth of the sciences into a unified picture of the whole truth, rears the ideal world of that which ought to be. Notwithstanding their indefeasible certitude, the Ideas possess no scientific truth, though they have a moral value which makes them more than mere fabrics of the brain: man is framed not merely for the knowledge of truth, but also for the realization of values. But since the significance of the Ideas is only practical, and since determinations of value are not grounds of explanation, science and metaphysics or "concept poetry" (_Begriffsdichtung_) must be kept strictly separate.

[Footnote 1: F.A. Lange: _Logical Studies_, 1877. Cf. M. Heinze in the _Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophic_, 1877, and Vaihinger in the work cited above, p. 610 note.]

Friedrich Paulsen of Berlin (born in 1846; cf. pp. 330, 332, note) sees in the Kantian philosophy the foundation for the philosophy of the future. A profounder Wolff (the self-dominion of the reason), a Prussian Hume (the categories of the understanding are not world-categories; rejection of anthropomorphic metaphysics), and a German Rousseau (the primacy of the will, consideration of the demands of the heart; the good will alone, not deeds nor culture, constitutes the worth of man; freedom, the rights of man) in one person, Kant has withdrawn from scientific discussion the question concerning the dependence of reality on values or the good, which is theoretically insoluble but practically to be answered in the affirmative, and given it over to faith. Kant is in so far a positivist that he limits the mission of knowledge to the reduction of the temporo-spatial relations of phenomena to rules, and declares the teleological power of values to be undemonstrable. But science is able to prove this much, that the belief in a suprasensible world, in the indestructibility of that which alone has worth, and in the freedom of the intelligible character, which the will demands, is not scientifically impossible. Since, according to formal rationalism, the whole order of nature is a creation of the understanding, and hence atomism and mechanism are only forms of representation, valid, no doubt, for our peripheral point of view, but not absolutely valid, since, further, the empirical view of the world apart from the Idea of the divine unity of the world (which, it is true, is incapable of theoretical realization) would lack completion, the immediate conviction of the heart in regard to the power of the good is in no danger of attack from the side of science, although this can do no further service for faith than to remove the obstacles which oppose it. The will, not the intellect, determines the view of the world; but this is only a belief, and in the world of representation, the intelligible world, with which the will brings us into relation, can come before us only in the form of symbols.--While Albrecht Krause (_The Laws of the Human Heart, a Formal Logic of Pure Feeling_, 1876) and A. Classen (_Physiology of the Sense of Sight_, 1877) are strict followers of Kant, J. Volkelt (_Analysis of the Fundamental Principles of Kant's Theory of Knowledge_, 1879) has traced the often deplored inconsistencies and contradictions in Kant down to their roots, and has shown that in Kant's thinking, which has hitherto been conceived as too simple and transparent, but which, in fact, is extremely complicated and struggling in the dark, a number of entirely heterogeneous principles of thought (skeptical, subjectivistic, metaphysico-work, rationalistic, _a priori_, and practical motives) are at which, conflicting with and crippling one another, make the attainment of harmonious results impossible. Benno Erdmann (p. 330) and Hans Vaihinger (pp. 323 note, 331) have given Kant's principal works careful philological interpretation.

Among the various differences of opinion which exist within the neo-Kantian ranks, the most important relates to the question, whether the individual ego or a transcendental consciousness is to be looked upon as the executor of the _a priori_ functions. In agreement with Schopenhauer and with Lotze, who makes the subjectivity of space, time, and the pure concepts parallel with that of the sense qualities, Lange teaches that the human individual is so organized that he must apprehend that which is sensuously given under these forms. Others, on the contrary, urge that the individual soul with its organization is itself a phenomenon, and consequently cannot be the bearer of that which precedes phenomena--space, time, and the categories as "conditions" of experience are functions of a pure consciousness to be presupposed. The antithesis of subject and object, the soul and the world, first arises in the sphere of phenomena. The empirical subject, like the world of objects, is itself a product of the _a priori_ forms, hence not that which produces them. To the transcendental group belong Hermann Cohen[1] in Marburg, A. Stadler[2], Natorp, Lasswitz (p.17), E. König (p. 17), Koppelmann (p. 330), Staudinger (p. 331). Fritz Schultze of Dresden is also to be counted among the neo-Kantians (_Philosophy of Natural Science_, 1882; _Kant and Darwin_, 1875; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Materialism_, 1881; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Spiritualism_, 1883; _Comparative Psychology_, i. 1, 1892).

[Footnote 1: Cohen: _Kant's Theory of Experience_, 1871, 2d ed., 1886; _Kant's Foundation of Ethics_, 1877; _Kant's Foundation of Aesthetics_, 1889.]

[Footnote 2: Stadler: _Kant's Teleology_, 1874; _The Principles of the Pure Theory of Knowledge in the Kantian Philosophy_, 1876; _Kant's Theory of Matter_, 1883.]

The German positivists[1]:--E. Laas of Strasburg (1837-85), A. Riehl of Freiburg in Baden (born 1844), and R. Avenarius of Zurich (born 1843)--develop their sensationalistic theory of knowledge in critical connection with Kant. Ernst Laas defines positivism (founded by Protagoras, advocated in modern times by Hume and J.S. Mill, and hostile to Platonic idealism) as that philosophy which recognizes no other foundations than positive facts (_i.e._, perceptions), and requires every opinion to exhibit the experiences on which it rests. Its basis is constituted by three articles of belief: (1) The correlative facts, subject and object, exist and arise only in connection (objects are directly known only as the contents of a consciousness, _cui objecta sunt_, subjects only as centers of relation, as the scene or foundation of a representative content, _cui subjecta sunt_: outside my thoughts body does not exist as body, nor I myself as soul). (2) The variability of the objects of perception. (3) Sensationalism--all specific differences in consciousness must be conceived as differences in degree, all higher mental processes and states, including thought, as the perceptions and experiences, transformed according to law, of beings which feel, have wants, possess memory, and are capable of spontaneous motion. The subject coincides with its feeling of pleasure and pain, from which sensation is distinguished by its objective content. The illusions of metaphysics are scientifically untenable and practically unnecessary. Various yearnings, wants, presentiments, hopes, and fancies, it is true, lead beyond the sphere of that which can be checked by sense and experience, but for none of their positions can any sufficient proof be adduced. As physics has discarded transcendent causes and learned how to get along with immanent causes, so ethics also must endeavor to establish the worth of moral good without excursions into the suprasensible. The ethical obligations arise naturally from human relations, from earthly needs. The third volume of Laas's work differs from the earlier ones by conceding the rank of facts to the principles of logic as well as to perception. Aloys Riehl opposes the theory of knowledge (which starts from the fundamental fact of sensation) as scientific philosophy to metaphysics as unscientific, and banishes the doctrine of the practical ideals from the realm of science into the region of religion and art. Richard Avenarius defends the principle of "pure experience." Sensation, which is all that is left as objectively given after the removal of the subjective additions, constitutes the content, and motion the form of being.

[Footnote 1: Laas: _Idealism and Positivism_, 1879-84. Riehl: _Philosophical Criticism_, 1876-87; Address _On Scientific and Unscientific Philosophy_, 1883. Avenarius (p. 598): _Philosophy as Thought concerning the World according to the Principle of Least Work_, 1876; _Critique of Pure Experience_, vol. i. 1888, vol. ii. 1890; _Man's Concept of the World_, 1891. C. Göring (died 1879; _System of Critical Philosophy_, 1875) may also be placed here.]

With the neo-Kantians and the positivists there is associated, thirdly, a coherent group of noëtical thinkers, who, rejecting extramental elements of every kind, look on all conceivable being as merely a conscious content. This monism of consciousness is advocated by W. Schuppe of Greifswald (born 1836; _Noëtical Logic_, 1878), J. Rehmke, also of Greifswald (_The World as Percept and Concept_, 1880; "The Question of the Soul" in vol. ii. of the _Zeitschrift für Psychologie_, 1891), A. von Leclair (_Contributions to a_ _Monistic Theory of Knowledge_, 1882), and R. von Schubert-Soldern (_Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge_, 1884; _On the Transcendence of Object and Subject_, 1882; _Foundations for an Ethics_, 1887). J. Bergmann[1] in Marburg (born 1840) occupies a kindred position.

[Footnote 1: Bergmann: _Outlines of a Theory of Consciousness_, 1870; _Pure Logic_, 1879; _Being and Knowing_, 1880; _The Fundamental Problems of Logic_, 1882; _On the Right_, 1883; _Lectures on Metaphysics_, 1886; _On the Beautiful_, 1887; _History of Philosophy_, vol. i., _Pre-Kantian Philosophy_, 1892.]

It is the same scientific spirit of the time, which in the fifties led many who were weary of the idealistic speculations over to materialism, that now secures such wide dissemination and so widespread favor for the endeavors of the neo-Kantians and the positivists or neo-Baconians, who desire to see metaphysics stricken from the list of the sciences and replaced by noëtics, and the theory of the world relegated to faith. The philosophy of the present, like the pre-Socratic philosophy and the philosophy of the early modern period, wears the badge of physics. The world is conceived from the standpoint of nature, psychical phenomena are in part neglected, in part see their inconvenient claims reduced to a minimum, while it is but rarely that we find an appreciation of their independence and co-ordinate value, not to speak of their superior position. The power which natural science has gained over philosophy dates essentially from a series of famous discoveries and theories, by which science has opened up entirely new and wide outlooks, and whose title to be considered in the formation of a general view of reality is incontestable. To mention only the most prominent, the following have all posited important and far-reaching problems for philosophy as well as for science: Johannes Müller's (Müller died 1858) theory of the specific energies of the senses, which Helmholtz made use of as an empirical confirmation of the Kantian apriorism; the law of the conservation of energy discovered by Robert Mayer (1842, 1850; Helmholtz, 1847, 1862), and, in particular, the law of the transformation of heat into motion, which invited an examination of all the forces active in the world to test their mutual convertibility; the extension of mechanism to the vital processes, favored even by Lotze; the renewed conflict between atomism and dynamism; further, the Darwinian theory[1] (1859), which makes organic species develop from one another by natural selection in the struggle for existence (through inheritance and adaptation); finally, the meta-geometrical speculations[2] of Gauss (1828), Riemann (_On the Hypotheses which lie at the Basis of Geometry_, 1854, published in 1867), Helmholtz (1868), B. Erdmann (_The Axioms of Geometry_, 1877). G. Cantor, and others, which look on our Euclidean space of three dimensions as a special case of the unintuitable yet thinkable analytic concept of a space of _n_ dimensions. The circumstance that these theories are still largely hypothetical in their own field appears to have stirred up rather than moderated the zeal for carrying them over into other departments and for applying them to the world as a whole. Thus, especially, the Darwinians[3] have undauntedly attempted to utilize the biological hypothesis of the master as a philosophical principle of the world, and to bring the mental sciences under the point of view of the mechanical theory of development, though thus far with more daring and noise than success. The finely conceived ethics of Höffding (p. 585) is an exception to the rule which is the object of this remark.

[Footnote 1: A critical exposition of the modern doctrine of development and of the causes used to explain it is given by Otto Hamann, _Entwickelungslehre und Darwinismus_, Jena, 1892. Cf. also, O. Liebmann, _Analysis der Wirklichkeit_; and Ed. von Hartmann (above, p. 610). [Among the numerous works in English the reader may be referred to the article "Evolution," by Huxley and Sully, _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th ed., vol. viii.; Wallace's _Darwinism_, 1889; Romanes, _Darwin and after Darwin_, i. _The Darwinian Theory_, 1892; and Conn's _Evolution of To-day_, 1886.--TR.]]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Liebmann, _Analysis der Wirklichkeit_, 2d ed., pp. 53-59. G. Frege (_Begriffsschrift_, 1879; _The Foundations of Arithmetic_, 1884; _Function and Concept_, 1891; "On Sense and Meaning" in the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie,_ vol. c. 1892) has also chosen the region intermediate between mathematics and philosophy for his field of work. We note, further, E.G. Husserl, _Philosophy of Arithmetic_, vol. i., 1891.]

[Footnote 3: Ernst Haeckel of Jena (born 1834; _General Morphology_, 1866; _Natural History of Creation_, 1868 [English, 1875] I _Anthropogeny_, 1874; _Aims and Methods of the Development History of To-day_, 1875; _Popular Lectures_, 1878 _seq_.--English, 1883), G. Jäger, A. Schleicher _(The Darwinian Theory and the Science of Language_, 1865), Ernst Krause (Carus Sterne, the editor of _Kosmos_) O. Caspari, Carneri (_Morals and Darwinism_, 1871), O. Schmidt, Du Prel, Paul Rée (_The Origin of the Moral Feelings_, 1877; _The Genesis of Conscience_, 1885; _The Illusion of Free Will_, 1885); G.H. Schneider (_The Animal Will_, 1880; _The Human Will_, 1882; _The Good and III of the Human Race_, 1883).]

Besides the theory of knowledge, in the elaboration of which the most eminent naturalists[1] participate with acuteness and success, psychology and the practical disciplines also betray the influence of the scientific spirit. While sociology and ethics, following the English model, seek an empirical basis and begin to make philosophical use of statistical results (E.F. Schäffle, _Frame and Life of the Social Body_, new ed., 1885; A. von Oettingen, _Moral Statistic in its Significance for a Social Ethics_, 3d ed., 1882), psychology endeavors to attain exact results in regard to psychical life and its relation to its physical basis--besides Fechner and the Herbartians, W. Wundt and A. Horwicz should be mentioned here. Wundt and, of late, Haeckel go back to the Spinozistic parallelism of material and psychical existence, only that the latter emphasizes merely the inseparability _(Nichtohneeinander)_ of the two sides (the cell-body and the cell-soul) with a real difference between them and a metaphysical preponderance of the material side, while the former emphasizes the essential unity of body and soul, and the higher reality of the spiritual side.

[Footnote 1: Helmholtz, Virchow (born 1821), Zöllner (1834-82; _On the Nature of Comets_, 1872), and Du Bois-Reymond (born 1818), who, in his lectures _On the Limits of the Knowledge of Nature_, 1872, and _The Seven World-riddles_, 1880 (both together in 1882, and reprinted in the first series of his _Addresses_, 1886), looks on the origin of life, the purposive order of nature, and thought as problems soluble in the future, but declares, on the other hand, that the nature of matter (atoms) and force _(actio in distant)_, the origin of motion, the genesis of consciousness (of sensation, together with pleasure and pain) from the knowable conditions of psychical life, and the freedom of the will, are absolute limits to our knowledge of nature.]

%(b) Idealistic Reaction against the Scientific Spirit.%--In opposition to the preponderance of natural science and the empirico-skeptical tendency of the philosophy of the day conditioned by it, an idealistic counter-movement is making itself increasingly felt as the years go on. Wilhelm Dilthey[1] abandons metaphysics as a basis, it is true, but (with the assent of Gierke, _Preussische Jahrbücher_, vol. liii. 1884) declares against the transfer of the method of natural science to the mental sciences, which require a special foundation. In spite of his critical rejection of metaphysics, Wilhelm Windelband in Strasburg (born 1848; _Preludes_, 1884) is, like Dilthey, to be counted among the idealists. In opposition to the individualism of the positivists, the folk-psychologists--at their head Steinthal and Lazarus (p. 536); Gustav Glogau[2] in Kiel (born 1844) is an adherent of the same movement--defend the power of the universal over individual spirits. The spirit of the people is not a phrase, an empty name, but a real force, not the sum of the individuals belonging to the people, but an encompassing and controlling power, which brings forth in the whole body processes (_e.g._, language) which could not occur in individuals as such. It is only as a member of society that anyone becomes truly man; the community is the subject of the higher life of spirit.

[Footnote 1: Dilthey: _Introduction to the Mental Sciences_, part i., 1883; _Poetic Creation_ in the Zeller _Aufsätze_, 1887; "Contributions to the Solution of the Question of the Origin of our Belief in the Reality of the External World, and its Validity," _Sitzungsberichte_ of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, 1890; "Conception and Analysis of Man in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries" in the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vols. iv., v., 1891-92.]

[Footnote 2: Glogau: _Sketch of the Fundamental Philosophical Sciences_ (part i., _The Form and the Laws of Motion of the Spirit_, 1880; part ii., _The Nature and the Fundamental Forms of Conscious Spirit_, 1888); _Outlines of Psychology_; 1884.]

If folk-psychology, whose title but imperfectly expresses the comprehensive endeavor to construct a psychology of society or of the universal spirit, is, as it were, an empirical confirmation of Hegel's theory of Objective Spirit, Rudolf Eucken[1] (born 1846), pressing on in the Fichtean manner from the secondary facts of consciousness to an original real-life, endeavors to solve the question of a universal becoming, of an all-pervasive force, of a supporting unity ("totality") in the life of spirit (neither in a purely noëtical nor a purely metaphysical, but) in a noölogical way, and demands that the fundamental science or doctrine of principles direct its attention not to cognition by itself, but to the activity of psychical life as a whole.

[Footnote 1: Eucken: _The Unity of Spiritual Life in the Consciousness and Deeds of Humanity_, 1888; _Prolegomena_ to this, 1885. A detailed analysis of the latter by Falckenberg is given in the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. xc, 1887; cf. above, pp. 17 and 610.]

We have elsewhere discussed the more recent attempts to establish a metaphysic which shall be empirically well grounded and shall cautiously rise from facts.[1] In regard to the possibility of metaphysics three parties are to be distinguished: On the left, the positivists, the neo-Kantians, and the monists of consciousness, who deny it out of hand. On the right, a series of philosophers--e.g., adherents of Hegel, Herbart, and Schopenhauer--who, without making any concessions to the modern theory of knowledge, hold fast to the possibility of a speculative metaphysics of the old type. In the center, a group of thinkers who are willing to renounce neither a solid noëtical foundation nor the attainment of metaphysical conclusions--so Eduard von Hartmann, Wundt,[2] Eucken, Volkelt (pp. 590, 617). Otto Liebmann (born 1840; _On the Analysis of Reality_, 1876, 2d ed., 1880; _Thoughts and Facts_, Heft i. 1882) demands a sharp separation between the certain and the uncertain and an exact estimation of the degree of probability which theories possess; puts the principles of metaphysics under the rubric of logical hypothesis; and, in his _Climax of the Theories_, 1884, calls attention to the fact that experiential science, in addition to axioms necessarily or apodictically certain and empeiremes possessing actual or assertory certainty, needs, further, a number of "interpolation maxims," which form an attribute of our type of intellectual organization _(i.e._, principles, according to the standard of which we supplement the fragmentary and discrete series of single perceptions and isolated observations by the interpolation of the needed intermediate links, so that they form a connected experience). The most important of these maxims are the principles of real identity, of the continuity of existence, of causality, and of the continuity of becoming. Experience is a gift of the understanding; the premises, as a rule, latent in ordinary consciousness, on whose anticipatory application our experience is based throughout, assert something absolutely incapable of being experienced. If, in order to the production of a "pure experience," we eliminate all subjective additions of the understanding contained in experiential thought (all that cannot be present at the moment or locally at hand, in short, all that cannot be the direct object and content of actual observation), this breaks up into an unordered, unconnected aggregate of discontinuous perceptual fragments; in order that a complete and articulated condition of experience may result, these fragments (the purely factual content of observation, the incoherent matter of perception) must be supplemented and connected by very much that is not observed.

[Footnote 1: R. Falckenberg, _Ueber die gegenwärtige Lage der deutschen Philosophie_, inaugural address at Erlangen, Leipsic, 1890.]

[Footnote 2: Wundt: _Essays_, 1885, including "Philosophy and Science"; _System of Philosophy_, 1889. On the latter cf. Volkelt's paper in the _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xxvii. 1891; and on the _Essays_ a notice by the same author in the same review, vol. xxiii. 1887.]

Further, a reaction against crude naturalism is observable in the practical field, though political economists (Roscher) and jurists take a more active part in it than the philosophers. Personally R. von Jhering (1818-92; _Purpose in Law_, 2 vols., 1877-83, 2d ed., 1884-86) stands on idealistic ground, although, rejecting the nativistic and formalistic theory, he is in principle an adherent of "realism," of the principle of interest and social utility (the moral is that Which is permanently useful to society).

Finally, similar motives underlie the growing interest in the history of philosophy. The idealistic impulse seeks the nourishment which the un-metaphysical present denies to it from the great works of the past, and hopes, by keeping alive the classical achievements of previous times, to enhance the consciousness of the urgency and irrepressibleness of the highest questions, and to awaken courage for renewed attempts at their solution. Thus the study of history enters the service of systematic philosophy.

%(c) The Special Philosophical Sciences.%--The more the courage to attack the central problems of philosophy has been paralyzed by the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge and the coming-in of the positivistic spirit, the more lively has been the work of the last decades in the special departments: the transfer of the center of gravity from metaphysics to the particular sciences is the most prominent characteristic of the philosophy of the time. Logic sees century-old convictions shattered and new foundations arising. Psychology has entered into competition with physiology in regard to the discovery of the laws of the psychical functions which depend on bodily processes, while metaphysical questions are forced into the background and there is a growing distrust of the reliability of inner observation. The philosophy of religion is favored with undiminished interest and aesthetics, after long neglect, with a renewal of attention; the philosophy of history is about to reconquer its former rights. There is, moreover, an especially lively interest in ethics; and the investigation of the history of philosophy is more widely extended than ever before. We will close our sketch with a short survey of the particular disciplines.

In the department of _logic_ the following should be mentioned as classical achievements: the works of Christoph Sigwart of Tübingen (vol. i. 1873, 2d ed., 1889; vol. ii. 1878), of Lotze (p. 605), and of Wundt (vol. i. _Erkenntnisslehre_, 1880; vol. ii. _Methodenlehre_, 1883). Besides these, Bergmann (p. 620), Schuppe (p. 619), and Benno Erdmann (_Logik_, vol. i. 1892) deserve notice.

In _psychology_ the following writers have made themselves prominent: Wilhelm Wundt at Leipsic (born 1832), _Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie_, 1874, 3d ed., 1887; A. Horwicz, _Psychologische Analysen auf physiologischer Grundlage_, 1872 _seq_.; Franz Brentano in Vienna (born 1838), _Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte_, vol. i. 1874; Carl Stumpf of Munich (born 1848), _Ueber den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung_, 1873, _Tonpsychologie_, vol. i. 1883, vol. ii. 1890; Theodor Lipps of Breslau (born 1851), _Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens_, 1883. The following may be mentioned in the same connection: J.H. Witte, _Das Wesen der Seele_, 1888; H. Münsterberg, _Die Willenshandlung_, 1888, _Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie_, 1889 _seq_,; Goswin K. Uphues at Halle, _Wahrnehmung und Empfindung_, 1888, _Ueber die Erinnerung_, 1889; H. Schmidkunz, _Psychologie der Suggestion_, 1892; H. Ebbinghaus, the co-editor of the _Zeitschrift für Psychologie una Physiologie der Sinnesorgane_, 1890 _seq_.; H. Spitta; Max Dessoir, _Der Hautsinn_, in the _Archiv für Anatomie una Physiologie_, 1892. The following works are psychological contributions to the theory of knowledge: E.L. Fischer, _Theorie der Gesichtswahrnehmung_, 1891; Hermann Schwarz, _Das Wahrnehmungsproblem_, 1892. Finally we may add A. Dorner in Königsberg, _Das menschliche Erkennen_, 1887; and E.L. Fischer, _Die Grundfragen der Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1887.

The literature of _moral philosophy_ has been substantially enriched by Wundt, _Ethik_, 1886, 2d ed., 1892; and Friedrich Paulsen, _System der Ethik_, 1889, 2d ed., 1891. We may mention, further, Baumann (p. 601); Schuppe, _Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie_, 1882; Witte, _Freiheit des Willens_, 1882; G. Class in Erlangen, _Ideale und Güter_, 1886; Richard Wallaschek, _Ideen zur praktischen Philosophic_, 1886; F. Tönnies in Kiel, _Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft_, 1887; A. Döring, _Philosophische Güterlehre_, 1888; Th. Ziegler, _Sittliches Sein und Werden_, 2d ed., 1890; G. Simmel, _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, vol. i. 1892.

Of the newer works in the field of _aesthetics_, in addition to A. Zeising's _Aesthetische Forschungen_, 1855, C. Hermann's _Aesthetik_, 1875, and Hartmann's _Philosophie des Schönen_, 1887, we may mention the _Einleitung in die Aesthetik_ of Karl Groos, 1892, and the following by Lipps: _Der Streit über die Tragödie_, 1890; _Aesthetische Faktoren der Raumanschauung_, 1891; the essay _Psychologie der Komik (Philosophische Monatshefte_, vols. xxiv.-xxv. 1888-89), and _Aesthetische Litteraturberichte_, (in the same review, vol. xxvi. 1890 _seq_.).

Among the writers and works on the _philosophy of history_ we may note Conrad Hermann in Leipsic (born 1819), _Philosophie der Geschichte_, 1870; Bernheim, _Geschichtsforschung und Geschichtsphilosophie_, 1880; Karl Fischer, _Ist eine Philosophie der Geschichte wissenschaftlich erforderlich bezw. möglich?_ Dillenburg Programme, 1889; Hinneberg, _Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft_ in Sybel's _Historische Zeitschrift_, vol. lxiii. 1889; A. Dippe, _Das Geschichtsstudium mit seinen Zielen und Fragen_, 1891; Georg Simmel, _Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie_, 1892.

In the _philosophy of religion_, which is discussed especially by the theologians, a neo-Kantian and a neo-Hegelian tendency confront each other. The former, dividing in its turn, is represented, on the one hand, by the Ritschlian school--W. Herrmann in Marburg (_Die Metaphysik in der Theologie_, 1876, _Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit_, 1889), J. Kaftan in Berlin (_Das Wesen der christlichen Religion_, 1881)--and, on the other, by R.A. Lipsius in Jena (born 1830; _Dogmatik_, 1876, 2d ed., 1879; _Philosophie und Religion_, 1885). The latter is represented by A.E. Biedermann of Zurich (1819-85; _Christliche Dogmatik_, 1868; 2d ed., 1884-85), a pupil of W. Vatke, and by Otto Pfleiderer of Berlin (born 1839; _Religionsphilosophie_, 1879; 2d ed., 1883-4). The neo-Kantians base religion exclusively on the practical side of human nature, especially on the moral law, derive it from the contrast between external dependence on nature and the inner freedom or supernatural destination of the spirit, and wish it preserved from all intermixture with metaphysics. According to the neo-Hegelians, on the contrary, the theoretical element in religion is no less essential; and is capable of being purified, of being elevated from the form of representation, which is full of contradictions, into the adequate form of pure thought, capable, therefore, of reconciliation with philosophy. Hugo Delff (_Ueber den Weg zum Wissen und zur Gewissheit zu gelangen_, 1882; _Die Hauptprobleme der Philosophie und Religion_, 1886) follows Jacobi's course.

Among the numerous works on the _history of philosophy_, besides the masterpieces of Zeller, J.E. Erdmann, and Kuno Fischer, the following are especially worthy of attention:

Cl. Bäumker in Breslau, _Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie_, 1890; H. Bonitz, _Platonische Studien_, 3d ed., 1886, _Aristotelische Studien_, 1862 _seq., Index Aristotelicus_, 1870, _Kleine Schriften_; P. Deussen (born 1845), _Das System der Vedanta_, 1883, H. Diels in Berlin, _Doxographi Graeci_, 1879; Eucken in Jena (p. 17), _Die Methode der aristotelischen Forschung_, 1872, Address _Ueber den Werth der Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1874; J. Freudenthal in Breslau (born 1839, pp. 63, 118), _Hellenistische Studien, 3 Hefte_, 1879, _Ueber die Theologie des Xenophanes_, 1886; M. Heinze in Leipsic, _Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie_, 1872; G. Freiherr von Hertling in Munich (born 1843), _Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles_, 1871, _Albertus Magnus_, 1880; H. Heussler in Basle (p. 65 note), _Der Rationalismus des XVII. Jahrhunderts in seinen Beziehungen zur Eniwickelungslehre_, 1885; Fr. Jodl in Prague (born 1849; pp. 16, 221 note); A. Krohn (1840-89), _Sokrates und Xenophon_, 1874, _Der platonische Staat_, 1876, _Die platonische Frage_, 1878--on Krohn, an obituary by Falckenberg in the _Biographisches Jahrbuch für Alterthumskunde, Jahrg_. 12, 1889; P. Natorp (pp. 88 note, 598), _Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum_, 1884; Edmund Pfleiderer in Tübingen (born 1842; p. 113 note[1]), _Empirismus und Skepsis im D. Humes Philosophie_, 1874, _Die Philosophie des Heraklit im Lichte der Mysterienidee_, 1886; K. von Prantl (1820-88), _Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande_, 4 vols., 1855-70; Carl Schaarschmidt (pp. 88 note, 117-118); _Johannes Sarisberiensis_, 1862, _Die Sammlung der platonischen Schriften_, 1866; L. Schmidt in Marburg (born 1824), _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, 1881; Gustav Schneider, _Die platonische Metaphysik_, 1884; H. Siebeck in Giessen, _Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen_, 1873, 2d ed., 1888, _Geschichte der Psychologie_, part i. 1880-84; Chr. von Sigwart (born 1830; pp. 17, 118); Heinrich von Stein in Rostock (born 1833), _Sieben Bücher zur Geschichte des Platonismus_, 1862-75; Ludwig Stein in Berne, editor of the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, founded in 1877, _Die Psychologie der Stoa_, I. _Metaphysisch-Anthropologischer Theil_, 1886, II. _Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1888, _Leibniz und Spinoza_, 1890; L. Strümpell, _Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie_, 1854, 1861; Susemihl in Greifswald, _Die Politik des Aristoteles_, Greek and German with notes, 1879, further, a series of essays on Plato and Aristotle; Teichmüller (p. 601); Trendelenburg (pp. 600-601), _Aristotelis de Anima_, 2d ed., by Belger. 1887; Th. Waitz, _Aristotelis Organon_, 1844-46; J. Walter in Königsberg, _Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen Philosophie_, 1874, _Geschichte der Aesthetik im Alterthum_, 1892; Tob. Wildauer in Innsbruck, _Die Psychologie des Willens bei Sokrates, Platon, und Aristoteles_, 1877, 1879; W. Windelbund in Strasburg (pp. 15-16), _Geschichte der alten Philosophie_, 1888; Theob. Ziegler in Strasburg, _Geschichte der christlichen Ethik_, 1886, 2d ed., with index, 1892; Rob. Zimmermann (pp. 19 note, 331, 536), _Studien und Kritiken_, 1870.

%4. Retrospect.%

In order to avoid the appearance of arbitrary construction we have been sparing with references of a philosophico-historical character. In conclusion, looking back at the period passed over, we may give expression to some convictions concerning the guiding threads in the development of modern philosophy, though these here claim only the rights of subjective opinion.

A mirror of modern culture, and conscious of its sharp antithesis to Scholasticism, modern philosophy in its pre-Kantian period is pre-eminently characterized by naturalism. Nature, as a system of masses moved according to law, forms not only the favorite object of investigation, but also the standard by which psychical reality is judged and explained. The two directions in which this naturalism expresses itself, the mechanical view of the world, which endeavors to understand the universe from the standpoint of nature and all becoming from the standpoint of motion,[1] and the intellectualistic view, which seeks to understand the mind from the standpoint of knowledge, are most intimately connected. Where the general view of the All takes form and color from nature, a content and a mission can come to the mind from no other source than the external world; whether we (empirically) make it take up the material of representation from without or (rationalistically) make it create an ideal reproduction of the content of external reality from within, it is always the function of knowledge, conceived as the reproduction of a completed reality, which, since it brings us into contact with nature, advances into the foreground and determines the nature of psychical activity. As is conceivable, along with dogmatic faith in the power of the reason to possess itself of the reality before it and to reconstrue it in the system of science, and with triumphant references to the mathematical method as a guaranty for the absolute certainty of philosophical knowledge, the noëtical question emerges as to the means by which, and the limits within which, human knowledge is able to do justice to this great problem. Descartes gave out the programme for all these various tendencies--the mechanical explanation of nature, the absolute separation of body and soul (despiritualization of matter), thought the essence of the mind, the demand for certain knowledge, armed against every doubt, and the question as to the origin of ideas. Its execution by his successors shows not only a lateral extension in the most various directions (the dualistic view of the world held by the occasionalists, the monistic or pantheistic view of Spinoza, the pluralistic or individualistic view of Leibnitz; similarly the antithesis between the sensationalism of Locke and Condillac and the rationalism of Spinoza and Leibnitz), but also a progressive deepening of problems, mediated by party strife which puts every energy to the strain. What a tremendous step from the empiricism of Bacon to the skepticism of Hume, from the innate ideas of Descartes to the potential _a priori_ of Leibnitz! From the moment when the negative and positive culminations of the pre-Kantian movement in thought--Hume and Leibnitz--came together in one mind, the conditions of the Kantian reform were given, just as the preparation for the Socratic reform had been given in the skepticism of the Sophists and the [Greek: nous] principle of Anaxagoras.

[Footnote 1: Even for Leibnitz the mind is a machine (_automaton spirituale_), and psychical action a movement of ideas.]

Kant, who dominates the second period of modern philosophy down to the present time, is related to his predecessors in a twofold way. In his criticism he completes the noëtical tendency, and at the same time overcomes naturalism, by limiting the mechanical explanation (and with it certain knowledge, it is true) to phenomena and opposing moralism to intellectualism. Nature must be conceived from the standpoint of the spirit (as its product, for all conformity to law takes its origin in the spirit), the spirit from the standpoint of the will. Metaphysics, as the theory of the _a priori_ conditions of experience, is raised to the rank of a science, while the suprasensible is removed from the region of proof and refutation and based upon the rock of moral will. In the positive side of the Kantian philosophy--the spirit the law-giver of nature, the will the essence of spirit and the key to true reality--we find its kernel, that in it which is forever valid. The conclusions on the absolute worth of the moral disposition, on the ultimate moral aim of the world, on the intelligible character, and on radical evil, reveal the energy with which Kant took up the mission of furnishing the life-forces opened up by Christianity--which the Middle Ages had hidden rather than conserved under the crust of Aristotelian conceptions entirely alien to them, and the pre-Kantian period of modern times had almost wholly ignored--an entrance into philosophy, and of transforming and enriching the modern view of the world from this standpoint. Kant's position is as opposite and superior to the specifically modern, to the naturalistic temper of the new period, as Plato stands out, a stranger and a prophet of the future, above the level of Greek modes of thought. More fortunate, however, than Plato, he found disciples who followed further in the direction pointed out by that face of the Janus-head of his philosophy which looked toward the future: the ethelism of Fichte and the historicism of Hegel have their roots in Kant's doctrine of the practical reason. These are acquisitions which must never be given up, which must ever be reconquered in face of attack from forces hostile to spirit and to morals. In life, as in science, we must ever anew "win" ethical idealism "in order to possess it." As yet the reconciliation of the historical and the scientific, the Christian and the modern spirit is not effected. For the inbred naturalism of the modern period has not only asserted itself, amalgamated with Kantian elements, in the realistic metaphysics and mechanical psychology of Herbart and in the system of Schopenhauer, as a lateral current by the side of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, but, under the influence of the new and powerful development of the natural sciences, has once more confidently risen against the traditions of the idealistic school, although now it is tempered by criticism and concedes to the practical ideals at least a refuge in faith. The conviction that the rule of neo-Kantianism is provisional does not rest merely on the mutability of human affairs. The widespread active study of the philosophy of the great Königsberger gives ground for the hope that also those elements in it from which the systems of the idealists have proceeded as necessary consequences will again find attention and appreciation. The perception of the fact that the naturalistico-mechanical view represents only a part, a subordinate part, of the truth will lead to the further truth, that the lower can only be explained by the higher. We shall also learn more and more to distinguish between the permanent import of the position of fundamental idealism and the particular form which the constructive thinkers have given it; the latter may fall before legitimate assaults, but the former will not be affected by them. _The revival of the Fichteo-Hegelian idealism by means of a method which shall do justice to the demands of the time by a closer adherence to experience, by making general use of both the natural and the mental sciences, and by an exact and cautious mode of argument--this seems to us to be the task of the future_. The most important of the post-Hegelian systems, the system of Lotze, shows that the scientific spirit does not resist reconciliation with idealistic convictions in regard to the highest questions, and the consideration which it on all sides enjoys, that there exists a strong yearning in this direction. But when a deeply founded need of the time becomes active, it also rouses forces which dedicate themselves to its service and which are equal to the work.

THE END.

* * * * *

INDEX.

Abbt Absolute, the Fichte on Schelling on F. Krause on Schleiermacher on Hegel on Fortlage on Spencer on Böstrom on Strauss on Feuerbach on the theistic school on Lotze on Hartmann on See also God the Unconditioned Achillini Adamson, R. Aesthetics of Home (Lord Kames) of Burke of Baumgarten of Herder of Kant of Schiller of Schelling of Hegel of J.F. Fries of Herbart of Schopenhauer Agnosticism, of Spencer Agricola, R. Agrippa of Nettesheim Ahrens, H. Alexandrists Allihn Althusius Anderson Angiulli, A. Annet, P. Antal, G. von Antinomies, the of Kant his antinomy of aesthetic judgment and of teleological judgment Apelt, E.F. _A priori_, the in Kant in Kant and the post-Kantians nature, in Schelling in J.F. Fries Beneke on Herbart on J.S. Mill on Spencer's doctrine of the racial origin of Opzoomer on _Cf_. Ideas Aquinas, Thomas Ardigò, R. Aristotelians, the opponents of Arnauld Arnoldt, E. Associationalism of Hartley and Priestley of Hume of the Mills of Bain Ast, G.A.F. Atomism in modern physics in Gassendi and Descartes in Boyle Leibnitz on Attributes in Descartes Spinoza's doctrine of Auerbach Augustine Avenarius, R. Averroists

Baader, F. (von), and Schelling system of Bach, J. Bacmeister Bacon, Francis a beginner of modern philosophy, doctrine of, in relation to Locke