Chapter VIII (2)

These troops did not effect their junction without experiencing proofs of the national feeling, which might have taught them in how severe as well as hateful a contest the insatiable ambition of Buonaparte had wantonly engaged them. In passing through La Mancha they found that the sick, whom Dupont had left at Manzanares, had been killed; and they did not enter the little town of Valdepe as without a severe contest: the inhabitants embarrassed the invader’s cavalry by chains, which they stretched across the streets, and kept up a brisk fire from the houses, from which they were not dislodged till the French set the town in flames. When the advanced guard attempted to pass the Sierra Morena, they found an irregular force well posted and entrenched in the tremendous defiles of that great line of mountains, and they were compelled to fall back upon the main body. Notwithstanding this warning, the French entered upon the pass without precaution, in full confidence that even the strength of the situation would not enable the Spaniards to withstand them; and this presumption cost them many lives which might well have been spared. The first brigade and the cavalry were allowed to pass an ambush, which was laid among the trees and rocks, in advance of the entrenchment; a fire was then opened upon the second, and the French suffered three discharges before they were ready to act in return. Their _Voltigeurs_ then dislodged the enemy from their vantage ground; the works were forced with a loss, according to the French account, of 900 on the part of the defendants; and the invaders leaving a detachment to secure the defiles, crossed the mountains, and entered Andalusia. Vedel, with his division, was stationed at Carolina; Gobert occupied the large and ancient village of Baylen, about four leagues farther on, nearly half way between Vedel and Dupont, who had his head-quarters at Andujar. A _tête-du-pont_ was constructed to command the passage of the river there, and another at the village of Manjibar, between Baylen and Jaen.

♦CUESTA AND BLAKE ADVANCE AGAINST THE FRENCH.♦

While the intrusive government believed that by this junction its army in Andalusia was so strengthened, that the defeat of the Spaniards was certain if they could be brought to action, an opportunity was afforded it of striking a great blow in Castille, by which the way to the capital was laid open. A force considerable in numbers had been raised in Galicia, and arms and stores in abundance had now been supplied by Great Britain. Filangieri exerted himself in training these new levies, and gave orders for forming entrenchments at Manzanal; a position of extraordinary strength on the heights above Astorga. Whether this preparation for defensive war, when the people were too eager to be led against the enemy, renewed the suspicions which his conduct on St. Ferdinand’s day had excited; or whether private malice, as has been asserted, was at work for his destruction; he was murdered by some of his soldiers at Villa Franca, in the Bierzo, and the command of the Galician army then devolved upon D. Joaquin Blake, an officer of Irish parentage. Advancing to Benevente he formed a junction with the army of Castille and Leon, which Cuesta, with that characteristic energy which on such occasions he was capable of exerting, had collected after his defeat at Cabezon. The two generals disagreed in opinion; Blake dreaded the discipline of the French, and would therefore have avoided a general action; Cuesta relied upon the courage of his countrymen, and was eager to engage: he took the command, as being superior in rank, and they proceeded, in no good understanding with each other, in a direction which threatened Burgos. Nothing could have been more conformable to the wishes of the enemy; and Marshal Bessieres, in the expectation of sure victory, marched against them with the divisions of Generals Mouton and Merle, and General Lasalles’ division of cavalry, in all 12,000 men.

♦M. BESSIERES DEFEATS THEM AT RIO SECO.

JULY 14.♦

He found them posted near Medina del Rio Seco, an ancient, and, in former days, a flourishing city, and containing now in its decay some 8000 inhabitants. The numbers of the Spanish army have been variously stated from 14,000 to 40,000. They attacked the enemy’s infantry with such determined ardour that they forced them to give way; won four pieces of artillery, spiked them, and set up their shout of victory, ... too soon; for the French cavalry charged their left wing, and by their great superiority decided the day, but not till after a most severe contest. Few bloodier battles have ever been fought in proportion to the numbers in the field, even if the force of the Spaniards be taken at its highest estimate: upon the best authority, that of the neighbouring priests, it is affirmed that 27,000 bodies were buried. The stores and artillery were taken, but the victors were not in a condition to complete the rout of the defeated army, and take advantage of the dissension between the two generals.

♦THE WAY TO MADRID OPENED BY THIS VICTORY.♦

When Buonaparte received intelligence of this victory, he said, “it is the battle of Villa Viciosa. Bessieres has placed Joseph upon the throne:” and calculating with contempt the farther resistance which might be expected, he added, “Spain has now some 15,000 men left, and some old blockhead to command them.” Little did he know of Spain and of the Spaniards. The battle of Rio Seco did not intimidate even the men who were defeated there; but the enormities which the French committed in the city increased, if that were possible, the hatred with which the whole nation regarded them. The people of that city, unsuspicious of the future, had illuminated their houses, when the French on their entrance into the country arrived there, and some of the troops had been quartered among them. This did not save them from the worst horrors of war.

♦JOSEPH ENTERS MADRID.♦

The way to Madrid was now open, and the Intruder proceeded on his journey thither without molestation. He had been proclaimed in that city on Santiago’s day, and the circumstances had been such as were little likely to encourage his partizans. The great standard-bearer and his son withdrew from the capital, rather than incur the guilt and contract the degradation of bearing part in the ceremony. Joseph and his train arrived on the evening of the 20th, ... all the troops being under arms to receive him, a most necessary part of the parade. Nothing indeed could be more striking than the contrast between the popular feeling on this day, and on that when Ferdinand, only four months before, made his entrance as king! Then the streets swarmed with the population of the whole surrounding country, and all the power and exertions of the magistrates were required to repress the general enthusiasm; now what few demonstrations of joy were made were procured by the direct interference of authority, the officers going from door to door to call upon the inhabitants, and even with this interference the houses were but just sufficiently decorated to save the inhabitants from vexation which they would otherwise have incurred. The money which was scattered among the populace lay in the streets where it fell, for the French themselves to pick up; and the theatres, which were thrown open to the people, were left to be filled by Frenchmen.

♦FEARS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦

Yet every possible means had been used to prepare the metropolis for his reception, and keep down the spirit of the inhabitants by fraud and force. The publication of news from the provinces was prevented by the severest measures, and if any of the patriots’ manifestos found their way to Madrid, to print, copy, read, or listen to them, was declared and punished as high treason. A paper was forged in the Bishop of Santander’s name, recommending the people to receive with gratitude the King and the army, who were come to regenerate them. Revolution, they were told, was one of those indispensable remedies which must be employed when abuses had proceeded to a length which could not be restricted by the ordinary resources of public law. It was a species of war declared by the people against their own government to remove the established authority, when, either from ignorance or disinclination, it was not exercised for the general advantage. Happily for Spain, it was spared the necessity of passing through the calamities which other countries had experienced in this inevitable process; and it had only to receive a new government under the authority of the protector of the nations of Europe. In spite of these artifices and false representations, in spite also of all the measures taken to keep the inhabitants in ignorance of what was passing in the provinces, the agitation of the public continued; and a new edict was issued, enacting, that all strangers arriving in the metropolis should, within four and twenty hours, send in their names to the police, with an account of their occupations, the places from whence they came, and their motives for visiting Madrid.

♦THE COUNCIL OF CASTILLE DEMUR AT THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE.♦

The intrusive government had hoped that the battle of Rio Seco, and the terrible slaughter which had there been made of the Spaniards, would intimidate the nation, and convince them that all opposition to the new dynasty must be unavailing. In this expectation they were soon undeceived. The battle, bloody as it was, proved that the Spaniards were not to be discouraged by any defeat, however severe; and the Intruder, on his arrival in Madrid, experienced a resistance in a quarter where he looked only for pliancy and submission. The Council of Castille, when it was called upon to swear to the constitution, demurred; and avowed that it had not circulated the constitutional act, which it had been ordered to do by an edict from Vittoria: a transfer of the succession from one family to another, it maintained, could not be made without the authority and intervention of the nation: nor would the Members of the Council swear to the new constitution, because they were not the representatives of the nation; the Cortes were, and the Cortes had not accepted it. Now it would be a manifest infraction of the most sacred rights, if in a matter of such importance, relating not to the introduction of a new law, but to the extinction of all their former codes, and the formation of new ones in their stead, they should take an oath of observance before the nation should have signified its acceptance. The Junta of Bayonne had not been convoked to form codes and laws, but to treat of the advantages which they could obtain for the respective bodies or provinces by which they were deputed.

This was the point at which the Council had determined to make their stand. Many and great concessions they had previously made, yielding to compulsion, and trusting or hoping that political considerations, if worthier motives failed, might even yet prevent Buonaparte from effecting his designs of usurpation. But all temporizing was now at an end. The oath was to supply the invalidities of the forced abdications, to cover all the injustice and villany by which the Royal Family had been ensnared, to sanction the insolent intrusion of a stranger upon the throne, and bind the nation in honour and in conscience to support him there. It had already been ordered that no person in any public employ should receive his salary, or enjoy any of the emoluments of his office, till he had taken the oath. The Council therefore resolved now to stand forward, and give an example to those, who, like themselves, were within the power of the intrusive government, of the resistance which it was their duty to oppose. Their written memorial was laid before Joseph Buonaparte, who, upon hearing that the oath had not been taken, refused to read it, and directed Azanza to demand of them an immediate compliance with his decree; requiring that if the Council would not unanimously obey, as many as were obedient, though they should be the minority, should, without delay, subscribe the written oath. ♦JULY 26.♦ This order was twice repeated on the following day; and on the day after, the Council returned a dilatory reply, stating that it was a matter of conscience, and advising that as such it should be propounded to the chief universities, or other bodies or communities, as the Kings of Spain were wont to do in arduous points, which were to be decided not upon legal reasons alone, but upon theological considerations also; or that a Junta of the most approved Canonists and Theologians should be appointed, before whom the Council would send ministers to dispute the case. When this demand was delivered strong measures were meditated in return: an example, it was said, must be made of the Council, which might operate as a warning to all minor bodies and individuals; and it was generally believed that they would not escape death or banishment into France. But the policy of gaining time and trusting to events proved fortunate in this instance; and they were delivered from danger when all further arts of procrastination would have failed, by the splendid success of their countrymen in Andalusia, which compelled the Intruder and his ministers to consult their own safety by immediate flight.

♦G. CASSAGNE ENTERS JAEN.♦

When Vedel and Gobert had effected their junction with Dupont, it was thought proper, for the security of his position at Andujar, to occupy the old city of Jaen, the Aurigi, Oringe, or Oningis of the ancient Spaniards, in latter ages the capital of a Moorish kingdom, taken from the Mahommedans by King St. Ferdinand, famous afterwards for its silk manufactories; and still, though its trade and population had declined, containing some 12,000 inhabitants. It is situated on the skirts of the Sierra, and at the foot of Mount Jabaluez, in one of the happiest parts of a delightful country. The French had already made one of their plundering visits there; ♦JULY 1.♦ and when General Cassagne was now sent with a brigade consisting of 1300 men to take possession of the city and maintain it, a number of armed peasants awaited his approach among the fields and gardens without the walls. Their defence was ill planned and ill conducted; they fired their musquets repeatedly before the enemy were within shot, and took flight at the first discharge of the French artillery, many of them throwing away their cartridges to disencumber themselves of any thing which might impede their escape. The city was entered without any resistance from the inhabitants; and while one party of the assailants, singing the song of Roland, scaled the heights to attack an old castle, the others found an easier way to it through the town: it was abandoned at their approach, and they placed a garrison there.

♦HE IS COMPELLED TO EVACUATE IT, AND RETURNS TO BAYLEN.♦

The French, conformably to the system upon which they began this wicked war, put to death the peasants who fell into their hands. One of these victims excited admiration even in his murderers; he asked for life in a manner not unbecoming a Spaniard in such a cause: finding that no mercy was to be expected, he wrapt his cloak around his head and began his prayers; and when the bullet cut them short, fell and expired without a cry, or groan, or struggle. These military murders were not unrevenged. On the first day after the arrival of the French, the Spaniards increased in number, regular troops came to their assistance, and some smart skirmishes took place at the outposts. Early on the ensuing morning they surprised the castle; most of the garrison chose rather to leap from a high crag, at the imminent hazard of life or limbs, than to fall into the hands of an enemy to whom they had given such provocation; the others were put to death, and some of them barbarously tortured before that relief was given. Encouraged by this success, the Spaniards entered the city; a terrible fire was kept up upon the enemy from roofs and windows; the French were driven out, they formed upon some level ground in front of the town, where the Spanish cavalry charged them, and their guns were taken and retaken. The French occupied the same ground from which they had first driven the peasantry, and which was covered with stubble and with sheaves of corn, for there had been no time to carry in the harvest when these invaders approached. The sheaves took fire during the action, the cartridges which had been left there by the Spaniards exploded, threw the French into disorder, and killed and scorched many of them; and the whole field was presently in flames, out of which the wounded in vain endeavoured to crawl upon their broken limbs.

This action continued from an early hour in the morning till four or five in the afternoon, when the French again forced their way into the city; they pillaged it, they committed the foulest enormities upon the nuns and other women who had not taken flight in time; and in many places they set the houses and convents on fire. But the invaders had now learnt in what kind of war they were engaged; that they had provoked a national resistance, and that victory brought with it so little advantage, that when they had won the field, they were masters only of the ground on which they stood. The Spaniards were preparing for another attack, to avoid which General Cassagne ordered a retreat under cover of the night. The French families who resided in Jaen, suffering now for the crimes of their countrymen, abandoned their property and their homes to save their lives, and put themselves under the protection of the retreating troops. They had been thrown into prison on the morning when the invaders were first expelled, and that precautionary measure on the part of the magistrate might probably have failed to save them from the fury of an unreasoning multitude. As many of the wounded as could be carried by the dragoons’ horses were removed, the rest were left to their fate, for the French had no other means of transport; but most of those who were removed died on the way from the heat of the ensuing day’s journey and the pain of their wounds. ♦MEMOIRES D’UN SOLDAT, T. I. 145–168.♦ Their whole loss, as stated by themselves, amounted to a fourth part of their number. They were not pursued, and they effected their retreat to Baylen.

♦PREPARATIONS OF G. CASTAÑOS.♦

Dupont’s situation became now every day more insecure, for at this time neither men nor means were wanting to the Spaniards in Andalusia, nor prudence to direct their efforts in the wisest way. ♦CONDE DE MAULE, T. XIII. P. 9.♦ The city of Cadiz alone supplied a donative of more than a million dollars and 5000 men; and as the men were mostly employed in filling up old regiments, the army was not weakened by having great part of its ostensible force consisting in raw levies. The general, Castaños, acted steadily upon the principles which the Junta of Seville had laid down; he harassed the enemy by detachments on all sides, cut them off from supplies, and allowed them no opportunity of coming to a regular engagement; and thus, while the difficulties and distresses of the French were continually increasing, the Spaniards acquired habits of discipline, and obtained confidence in themselves and in their officers. Castaños even attempted to reform the Spanish army, and introduce among them that moral and religious discipline by which Cromwell, and the great Gustavus before him, made their soldiers invincible. He issued an order for banishing all strumpets from the camp and sending them to a place of correction and penitence; he called upon the officers to set their men an example, by putting away the plague from themselves, and dismissing all suspicious persons; he charged the chaplains to do their duty zealously, and threatened condign punishment to any person, of what rank soever, who should act in contempt of these orders. Such irregularities, he said, would draw down the divine anger, and make the soldiers resemble in licentiousness the French, who for their foul abominations were justly hated by God and man; and it would be in vain to gather together armies, if at the same time they gathered together sins, and thereby averted from themselves the protection of the Almighty, which alone could ensure them the victory over their enemies. Happy would it have been for Spain if this principle had been steadily pursued; the foundations of that moral reformation might then have been laid, without which neither the strength nor the prosperity of any country can be stable.

♦DUPONT’S DISPATCHES INTERCEPTED.♦

Dupont might have secured his retreat across the Sierra Morena, if he had not relied too confidently upon his actual strength and the reputation of the French arms, and if he had not still hoped for succours from Junot. His force, though reduced by sickness, and the harassing service in which it was engaged, amounted to 16,000 effective men, enough to have defeated the Spaniards if they had been rash enough to engage in a general action, and more than he could well provide for. A large convoy from Toledo, together with all his hospital stores, was intercepted in the mountains. His men were fain to reap the standing corn, and make it into bread for themselves; the peasantry, whom they would otherwise have compelled to perform this work, having left the harvest to take arms against them, and bear a part in the defence of their country. He wrote pressingly for reinforcements; it was now, he said, nearly a month that he had occupied the position at Andujar; the country was exhausted, it was with extreme difficulty that he could obtain the scantiest subsistence for his army; the enemy were acquiring strength and courage to act upon the offensive: the anniversary of their great victory at the Navas de Tolosa was at hand, and to this the Spaniards, from religious, national, and local feelings, attached great importance. Every moment which he was compelled to waste in inaction increased the evil. Surely at such a crisis it would be prudent to neglect all partial movements of the insurgents for the purpose of enabling him to act in Andalusia with a sufficient force; if the enemy were permitted to acquire strength so as to keep the field, their example would be followed by all the provinces, and by all the Spanish troops throughout the kingdom; whereas one victory obtained over them here would go far towards the subjugation of Spain. These letters fell into the hands of the Spaniards; but if they had reached their destination, it was not in Savary’s power to have reinforced him.

♦PLAN FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH.♦

On the 11th of July a council of war was held by Castaños, and it was determined that a division of 9000 good troops, under General Reding, should proceed by way of Menjibar to attack the enemy at Baylen, where Gobert was stationed for the purpose of guarding the road to Carolina, and maintaining a communication with Madrid. The Marqués de Coupigny, with 5000, was to proceed by La Higuereta and Villanueva, toward the same point, and co-operate with Reding; and Lieut.-Colonel D. Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon, with a corps of 2000, was to go by Marmolejo, and act against the enemy if they attempted to escape by the Sierra. Castaños himself occupied the Visos de Andujar, a strong and advantageous position, of which he thought it necessary to retain possession, though the troops were without tents, there was a want of water, and the heat excessive. But this position enabled him to keep Dupont upon the alarm, and prevent him from acting against Reding and Coupigny, while they interposed between him and the two other divisions of his army. ♦JULY 16.♦ Reding succeeded in driving the enemy from their _tête-du-pont_ at Menjibar, and from the positions which they took up one after another between that place and Baylen, disputing their ground skilfully and well. Gobert was killed, one cannon and the baggage in the encampment taken. During these operations some of the Spaniards died from excessive heat and exertion; and in the afternoon Reding retired to Menjibar, and crossing the Guadalquiver again on the following day, effected a junction, on the third morning, with Coupigny, who had beaten the French from a strong post near Villanueva. Their intention was to have attacked Baylen; but Dufour, who succeeded to the command of Gobert’s division, had evacuated that place, finding himself unable to maintain it, and fallen back to unite with Vedel, at Carolina.

♦BATTLE OF BAYLEN.♦

One part of the Spanish commander’s plan had thus been accomplished, and, in pursuance of his arrangements, Reding and Coupigny prepared to march from Baylen upon Andujar, and there attack the main body of the French on one side, while the reserve of the Spanish army was ready to act against it from the Visos. Dupont meantime had formed the same intention of placing a part of the enemy’s force between two fires; and on the night of the 18th, as soon as darkness had closed, the French marched from Andujar, after plundering the inhabitants of whatever was portable, and took the road toward Baylen. ♦JULY 19.♦ Reding was preparing to begin his march when the enemy arrived at three in the morning, and fell upon him, thinking to take him by surprise. The attack was made vigorously, and might probably have been successful, had not the Spaniards, because of their intended movement, been in some degree of readiness. The foremost companies both of horse and foot were engaged hand to hand; but the Spaniards rapidly took their stations, and repelled the assailants at all points. When day broke they were in possession of the high ground, and the French were forming their columns to renew the attack in a situation which was not exposed to the Spanish artillery. In this renewed attack both parties conducted themselves with the greatest intrepidity. Several times the assailants broke the enemy’s lines, and fighting with the resolution of men who had never known what it was to be defeated, they once made way to the batteries. But the Spaniards stood firm, they knew that reinforcements were at hand, and that if they kept their ground, the situation of the French was desperate; they had confidence in their leaders and in their own strength, and, above all, that thorough assurance of the justice of their cause, which, when other points are equal, will inevitably turn the scale. The action was long and bloody; it continued till noon without any other interruption than what arose from occasional recession and the formation of new columns. Dupont then, and the other generals, putting themselves at the head of their men, made a last charge with the most determined bravery; they were, however, once more repulsed. By this time they had lost 2000 men, besides those who were wounded. Dufour, who was with this part of the army, was killed, and Dupont himself wounded. No hope of victory remained, and no possibility of escape, the French therefore proposed to capitulate; and the arrival of the Spanish reserve, under D. Manuel de la Peña, at this point of time, enabled the victors to dictate their own terms.

♦SURRENDER OF THE FRENCH ARMY.♦

Dupont’s intention of marching from Andujar had been so well concealed till the moment of its execution, that though that city contained some 14,000 inhabitants, no information was conveyed to the Spaniards on the adjacent heights, nor were they apprized of his movements till two in the ensuing morning, when he had been five hours on his march. Castaños immediately ordered La Peña to pursue him with the reserve and some corps of the third division. Upon his arrival he learnt that a capitulation had been proposed, upon which he referred the French negotiators to the commander-in-chief, and took such a position as effectually to surround the defeated army. The answer which Castaños returned was, that the French must surrender themselves prisoners of war, and no other terms would be granted; that because of the manner in which they had sacked the towns which they had entered, he would allow the general and officers to retain nothing more than their swords, and each a single portmanteau with apparel for his use; but that in other respects they should be treated like their squadron at Cadiz, in a manner conformable to Spanish generosity. And he required that Dupont should capitulate not only for the troops who had been actually engaged, but for the two other divisions also. The next day was spent in adjusting the terms; and on the 21st Castaños and the Conde de Tilly, as the representative of the Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies, a title which the Junta of Seville at this time arrogated, advised the Junta that Dupont and his division were made prisoners of war, and that all the other French between the summit of the Sierra Morena and Baylen were to evacuate the peninsula by sea.

♦TERMS OF THE SURRENDER.♦

These, however, though thus officially announced to the Junta, and by them made known to Lord Collingwood, were not the terms which had been signed, and the cause of this misstatement has never been explained. There could have been no motive for deceiving the French by promising them better conditions than it was intended to observe, for the enemy were absolutely at their mercy; so confessedly indeed, that when La Peña made a threatening movement to accelerate the treaty, Dupont sent him word that if he thought proper to attack them no defence would be made. The most probable conjecture which can be offered seems to be, that the French negotiators, Generals Chavert and Marescot, had sufficient address not only to make the Spaniards relax the tone of severe justice which was at first assumed, but also in the course of drawing up the capitulation, to obtain modifications in the latter articles, by which the intention of the former was set aside; that Tilly and Castaños had been thus led to make greater concessions than they were themselves aware of, and had no suspicion when they communicated to the Junta the result of the treaty, that one part of it, and that the most important, was actually annulled by the other. The capitulation began by stating that their excellencies the Conde de Tilly and Castaños had agreed with the French plenipotentiaries upon these conditions, as desiring to give proofs of their high esteem for his excellency General Dupont, and the army under his command, for the brilliant and glorious defence which they had made when completely surrounded by a very superior force. The troops under General Dupont were to remain prisoners of war, except the division of Vedel; that division, and all the other French troops in Andalusia who were not included in the former article, should evacuate Andalusia, and take with them the whole of their baggage; but to prevent all cause of uneasiness while they were passing through the country, they should leave their artillery and other arms in charge of the Spanish army, to be delivered to them at the time of their embarkation; their horses, in order to save the trouble of transporting them, should be purchased by the Spaniards at a price agreed upon by two commissioners, one of each nation. The other troops, who were made prisoners, were to march out of the camp with the honours of war, with two guns at the head of each battalion, and the soldiers with their muskets, which they were to surrender to the Spaniards at the distance of four hundred toises from the camp. All the French troops in Andalusia were to proceed by stated journeys, not exceeding four leagues a day, and with proper intervals of rest, to Sanlucar and Rota, there to be embarked in Spanish vessels and transported to Rochefort; the Spanish army guaranteeing the safety of their march. The generals and officers were to retain their arms, and the soldiers their knapsacks. The generals should retain a coach and a baggage cart each, the officers of the staff a coach only, free from examination, but without breaking the regulations and laws of the kingdom: all carriages which they had taken in Andalusia were excepted, and the observance of this exception was left to the French General Chavert. Whereas many of the soldiers in different places, and especially at the taking of Cordoba, notwithstanding the orders of the generals and the care of the officers, had committed excesses which were usual and inevitable when cities resisted at the time that they were taken (thus carefully was the article worded by the able French negotiators), the generals and officers were to take proper measures for delivering up any church vessels which might have been carried away as booty, if any there were. Any thing omitted in this capitulation which might add to the accommodation of the French during their passage through the country and their tarriance in it, should be added as supplementary to these articles.

♦DIFFICULTY OF EXECUTING THEIR TERMS.♦

The French displayed more address in the management of this capitulation than they had shown in the campaign. During the battle of Baylen, Vedel was near enough with his division to hear the firing, but he had received no intelligence of Dupont’s movements, and did not move toward the scene of action till the firing had ceased. The French soldiers endeavoured to account for their defeat by vague accusations of treachery, by the want of a good understanding between the two generals, and by the alleged misconduct of Dupont, in making his corps attack one after another, instead of charging with his whole force, and in leaving too strong a detachment to guard the spoils with which he and the superior officers had enriched themselves. The more than likely supposition, that his messengers had been intercepted, would explain the want of co-operation, and the other charges may safely be dismissed. That when they were at the enemy’s mercy they should have obtained such favourable terms may indeed appear surprising, even though the French have exceeded all other people in the art of obtaining good terms under the most unfavourable circumstances. It is more easy to perceive why the conditions were not observed; for in fact it was impossible to observe them. Nothing could be done at that time in opposition to the will of the people; and an universal cry had gone forth against invaders who had set towns and villages on fire, pillaging wherever they went, plundering churches and convents, violating women, and putting to death the people whom they took in arms. The Andalusians were exasperated against the French because of these atrocities, as well as by that general feeling of indignation which the cause of the quarrel, the murders at Madrid, and the whole course of transactions at Bayonne, so justly excited. The Junta had issued a regular declaration of war against France, but the people knew and felt that this was not an ordinary war, and that no formalities could make it so; that the invaders had entered their country not in open hostility as fair and honourable enemies, but perfidiously and basely in the character of allies; and that by the complicated wickedness of their cause and their conduct they had forfeited all claim to the courtesies and observances of civilized war. They regarded Dupont’s army rather as criminals than as soldiers, ... men who had laid down their arms, but who could not lay down their crimes; and in that state of general feeling, if the Junta of Seville, or any other persons in authority, had attempted to perform the conditions of the capitulation, they would have been suspected of treachery, and might probably have fallen victims, like Solano, to the fury of the populace.

Aware of this, and yet withheld from breaking the capitulation by that national sense of honour which the revolution had not continued long enough to destroy, the Junta hesitated how to act, like men who, under the pretext of necessity, would willingly have done what, as an avowed and voluntary act, they were ashamed to do. ♦THE JUNTA APPLY TO LORD COLLINGWOOD AND SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.♦ They were deliberating whether to observe the treaty when Castaños and Morla arrived at Seville. The former felt that his country’s honour and his own would be wounded by the breach of faith which was meditated, and he opposed it with the frankness of an upright mind. Morla, on the contrary, supported the popular opinion; and the Junta, deferring to it in fear, or in inclination, circulated a paper, wherein it was affirmed that, both Vedel and Dupont had broken the capitulation, that it was impossible to fulfil it, and that even if possible, it ought not to be fulfilled. This paper, composed by an officer of high rank, who was probably envious of Castaños, was sent by the Junta to Lord Collingwood and to Sir Hew Dalrymple, in the hope of obtaining their sanction for a mode of conduct which they themselves secretly felt to be unworthy.

Lord Collingwood had not been satisfied with the terms granted to Vedel: he was not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances to understand why an inferior[41] division should have been allowed to capitulate after the principal force had been defeated; and he perceived that these troops might again reach the frontiers of Spain in a week after they were landed at Rochefort. But although these were his feelings, nevertheless, when he was applied to from Cadiz for assistance in transporting Vedel’s men to France, he replied, that he would order seamen to fit out Spanish merchant vessels for that purpose, as there were not more English transports in those parts than were required for the conveyance of our own troops. It proved, however, that Spanish vessels were not to be found; and the answer of Lord Collingwood, when his opinion upon the fulfilment of the terms was directly called for, was, that although he was sorry such a treaty, or indeed any treaty, should have been made with the French General, it was his opinion that all treaties, when once solemnly ratified, should be held sacred, and the conditions observed as far as possible. The present engagement was one which it was not possible to perform, and therefore annulled itself. Sir Hew Dalrymple’s answer was still less satisfactory to those persons who sought a British sanction for breaking the terms. His opinion, he said, exactly coincided with what must have been that of the Spanish and French Generals by whom the capitulation was sanctioned, namely, that it was binding on the contracting parties, as far as the means of carrying it into execution were in the power of each. He hoped that the laws of honour, and not the rules of political expediency, continued still to govern the conduct of soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; and certainly the surrender of General Vedel’s corps could only be justified by the confidence he placed in that honour which characterized the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, particularly one newly-formed, is, said he, a valuable part of its property, and ought not to be lightly squandered. And perhaps the question might be argued even on grounds of expediency.

♦CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DUPONT AND MORLA.♦

Disappointed in these applications, but yielding to the real difficulty of the case, the Junta made no preparations for transporting the French troops; and Dupont at length addressed a letter to Morla, as Captain-general of the Province, complaining of this, and of orders which had been given to examine the baggage of the general and other officers at Lebrixa. Morla beginning, as he usually did, with a declaration of his own honour and veracity, replied, that neither the capitulation, nor the approbation of the Junta, nor an express order from their beloved King himself, could make that possible which was not so. There were neither transports for his army, nor means of procuring them; and what greater proof of this could there be than that the prisoners taken in the squadron were detained at a great expense, because the Spaniards were unable to remove them? ♦1808. AUGUST.♦ General Castaños, when he promised to obtain a passport from the English for this army, could promise no more than that he would earnestly ask for it; and this he had done: but how could the French commander believe that the English would let an army pass which would certainly carry on the war in some other point, or perhaps in the very same? I am persuaded, he pursued, that neither the general nor your excellency supposed such a capitulation would be executed; his object was to relieve himself from embarrassment, yours to obtain conditions which, impossible as they were, would render your inevitable surrender honourable. Each effected his desire, and now the imperious law of necessity must be obeyed. The national character permits no other law than this with the French; it will not allow us to use the law of retaliation. Your excellency compels me to speak bitter truths.... What right has such an army to require the impossible fulfilment of a capitulation? ... an army which has entered Spain professing friendship and alliance, imprisoned our King and his Royal Family, sacked his palaces, murdered and robbed his subjects, ravaged his country, and despoiled him of his crown! If you do not wish to draw upon yourself more and more the just indignation of the people, which I am exerting myself to restrain; you will cease to advance such intolerable pretensions, and endeavour by your conduct to abate the strong sense of the horrors so recently committed at Cordoba. He added, that the orders for examining the baggage came from the Supreme Junta, and were indispensable.

A large sum of money had been found in possession of a private soldier, and Morla reminded the French general how greatly such a fact would provoke the rage of the populace. The discovery of some church plate, which was brought to light by the fall of a package at Santa Maria, roused the popular feeling beyond all farther endurance, and they immediately seized upon the whole baggage. Dupont upon this wrote angrily to Morla, demanding the restoration of the equipage, money, and effects of every kind belonging to himself and the other superior officers; invoking the principle of honour and probity, and saying, that jealous as he was for the glory of the Spaniards, the horrible excesses of the Spanish mob had made him groan. ♦AUGUST 14.♦ Undoubtedly, replied Morla, the conduct of the people has grieved me greatly; not that the act itself was wrong, but because it manifested a distrust of their government; because they took the administration of justice into their own hands; because it might have happened that in their fury they might have performed the vile and horrid office of the executioner, and have stained themselves and their compatriots by shedding that blood which had been spared on the field of battle. This is the cause of my concern, and on this account I proposed, as a thing expedient for the safety of your excellency and of those who accompanied you, that your equipages should undergo a prudent examination before they left Lebrixa, and advised you that nothing but submission and a discreet demeanour could save you from the indignation of the people. But it never was my intention, and still less the Supreme Junta’s, that your excellency and your army should carry out of Spain the fruit of your rapacity, cruelty, and impiety. How could you conceive this possible? How could you suppose us to be so stupid and insensible? Could a capitulation which speaks only of your equipage, give you the property of the treasures which your army has accumulated by means of murders, profanation of all sacred things, cruelties and violence of every kind, in Cordoba and in other cities? Is there any reason, law, or principle which enjoins that faith, or even humanity should be observed towards an army which entered an allied and friendly kingdom under false pretences, seized its innocent and beloved King with all his family by fraud and treachery; extorted from him a renunciation in favour of their own sovereign, ... a renunciation impossible in itself, ... and because the nation would not submit to this forced and invalid transfer, proceeded to plunder palaces and towns, to profane and sack the churches, murdering the ministers of the altar, violating nuns, carrying rape every where, seizing every thing of value which they could transport, and destroying what they were not able to bring away! Is it possible that such persons as these, when deprived of a booty, the very sight of which ought to fill them with compunction and horror, should have the effrontery to appeal to the principles of honour and probity! My natural moderation has made me hitherto write to your excellency with a certain degree of respect; but I could not refrain from tracing a slight sketch of your conduct, in reply to your extraordinary demands, ... demands which amount to this, ... do you plunder the temples and houses of Cadiz to reimburse me for what the people of the Puerto have taken from me, and what I took from Cordoba, with every circumstance of atrocity, violence, and brutality. Let your excellency lay aside such expectations, and be contented that the noble character of the Spanish nation withholds it from performing the vile office of the executioner. He concluded by saying, that every attention should be paid to the personal safety and convenience of the French general; and that he would use all endeavours in his power to have him sent to France with the least possible delay.

♦TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS.♦

Dupont, when the first danger from the populace was over, had reason for his own sake to rejoice that the capitulation was not carried into effect. Enraged as Buonaparte was at the first signal defeat which his armies had sustained, he well knew that no opportunity of vindicating himself would be allowed him, and Admiral Villeneuve’s example was before his eyes. Most of the Swiss in his army, the officers excepted, entered the Spanish service; the more willingly, because General Reding, who had borne so conspicuous a part in the victory, was their countryman. But, in truth, it was to them a matter of indifference on which side they were engaged, and in whatever action they were present the victor was sure to find recruits. Many, however, as well as many of the Germans who were taken at the same time, were allowed to engage as agricultural labourers. But toward the French the vindictive feeling of the people was never mitigated. The troops who escorted them with difficulty saved them from being torn to pieces by the peasantry; the murder of a Frenchman, so strong a hatred had their atrocities excited, was regarded as a meritorious act; untold numbers disappeared in consequence of this persuasion; and at Lebrixa a whole detachment, eighty in number, were massacred at one time, upon a cry of danger, absurd indeed, but sufficient to give the cowardly rabble a plea for gratifying that cruelty which is every where the characteristic of depraved and brutalized man. Letters were addressed to Morla from Madrid and various parts of Spain, some requiring that Dupont and the other French generals should be put to death, others that the whole of the prisoners should suffer, as an example which the public good demanded, and which justice called for. Some of these letters, by their ill writing and incorrect language, indicated from what base hands they came; others were the elaborate composition of men whom the very hatred of cruelty had made cruel, and who pleaded for a massacre in the same spirit of perverted zeal which had produced the Inquisition and the horrors of St. Bartholomew’s day. These letters were so numerous that Morla thought proper publicly to reply to them, representing that such an act would not only bring on reprisals, but would fix a lasting stain upon the Spaniards. He took that opportunity of excusing himself from any concern in the breach of the capitulation, desiring it might be understood that he neither executed, nor desired to execute the supreme power; but that it was the Junta of Seville which, for weighty reasons, not fit to be made public, had delayed the transportation of Dupont and the other French generals. “I,” said he, “had only to obey; for it is not in my character or manner of thinking ever to resist a constituted authority; such resistance can only occasion civil dissensions, which are the greatest evil a nation can suffer, and which I shall never spare any sacrifice to avoid.”

♦REJOICINGS FOR THE VICTORY AT BAYLEN.♦

By the battle of Baylen Andalusia was left in peace. Castaños had made a vow to dedicate the victory to King St. Ferdinand, who won Seville from the Moors, and lying inshrined in the magnificent mosque of that city, which he converted to a Christian church, is venerated there with especial devotion. The ceremony was performed with great pomp, and the French eagles were offered at the shrine of the canonized King and conqueror, as trophies of the most signal victory which had been achieved in Andalusia since his time.

♦MOVEMENTS OF BESSIERES AFTER THE BATTLE OF RIO SECO.♦

Among the papers which fell into the hands of the Spaniards were dispatches from Madrid, recalling Dupont to protect the capital against the army of Galicia and Castille and Leon, then advancing against it. These dispatches were written before the battle of Rio Seco, where Cuesta’s fatal rashness exposed that army to destruction. The Spanish generals separated after their defeat, and Cuesta complained that he was abandoned by the Galician force. He retired with his part of the army to Leon, and knowing that that city could not be defended, instructed the Leonese Junta to remove to Astorga; but Astorga itself was not more secure, and they withdrew across the mountains to Ponferrada. Cuesta then dispersed his infantry on the frontiers of Asturias, and retreated with the cavalry into Castille, cutting his way through the enemy’s rear-guard. Marshal Bessieres meantime reaped the fruits of his victory by seizing arms and stores which, in consequence of this rash action, were only brought from England to fall into the enemy’s hands. He found large depôts at Villalpando and Benevente; then turning southward to Zamora, was informed there that Cuesta had ordered his troops to rendezvous at Mayorga. Deceived by this information, to Mayorga he went, and there a deputation from Leon waited upon him to solicit his clemency. At Leon also he found arms and ammunition to a great amount, which, if not imprudently accumulated there, were carelessly abandoned.

♦CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BESSIERES AND BLAKE.♦

Blake was thought to have given proof of great military talents both in the action and in the retreat; and Marshal Bessieres, hoping that so severe a defeat would convince him all farther resistance must be ineffectual, endeavoured to win him over to the Intruder’s service. For this purpose he wrote to him, under the pretext of assuring him that the prisoners should be well treated; and he took that opportunity for urging him to obey the act of abdication, and acknowledge King Joseph Napoleon. ♦JULY 24.♦ The Spanish general made answer, he acknowledged no other sovereign than Ferdinand of Bourbon, or his legitimate heirs; and if that unfortunate family should be altogether extinguished, his allegiance would then be due to the people of Spain, lawfully represented in a general Cortes. These, he said, were the sentiments of the whole army and of the whole nation; and he warned Bessieres against the error of mistaking the forced submission of towns which were occupied by French troops, for a real change of opinion in the inhabitants. “Undeceive therefore,” said he, “your Emperor; and if it be true that he has a philanthropic mind, he will renounce the project of subduing Spain. Whatever partial successes he may obtain, it is evident that his brother never can reign in this country; unless he reign over a desert, covered with the blood of the Spaniards, and of the troops employed on this unjust enterprise.”

♦1808. JULY.♦