Chapter XXIV (2)

Cuesta now proposed that half the British army should march against Soult, while the other half maintained the post at Talavera. Sir Arthur said he was ready either to go or stay with the whole British army, but he would not divide it; the choice was left to him, and he preferred going, thinking his own troops were most likely to accomplish the object of the march, perhaps even without a contest. It appears that he was not aware of the enemy’s force: Cuesta estimated it at twelve or fourteen thousand, and Sir Arthur did not at that time suppose it to be larger. He preferred the alternative of going for another reason also, feeling it of more importance to him that the communication through Plasencia should be opened than it was to the Spaniards, though highly important to them also. The movements of Victor in front induced him to suppose that the enemy, despairing of any better success at Talavera than they had already experienced, intended to fall upon Sir R. Wilson, and force a passage by Escalona: thus to act in concert with Soult between the Alberche and the Tietar. Sir Robert also felt himself seriously menaced, and some letters which he intercepted gave him sufficient information to ascertain that these were the plans of the enemy; he therefore informed the British General that he should remove his artillery to St. Roman, occupy the Panada with 300 men, a strong height behind Montillo with 600 more, from whence there was a good retreat to St. Valuela, and return with the rest to a position, in readiness either to occupy Valuela, or obey such instructions as he might receive. In this state of things, Sir Arthur perceived how possible it was that Cuesta might be forced to quit Talavera before he could return to it, and this made him uneasy for his hospital. At all events, he thought it too far advanced. He therefore entreated Cuesta to make a requisition for carts, and remove the wounded as expeditiously as was consistent with their safety, by first sending them to an intermediate station at no great distance, from whence they might gradually be passed to the place which should ultimately be fixed upon. He wrote to Bassecourt, requesting that he, with that division which had been dispatched to secure the passes after they had been lost, would halt at Centiello, and watch the vale of Plasencia; and he again recommended to the Spanish commander, that Venegas should be ordered to threaten Madrid by the road of Arganda, that being the only means whereby it was possible to alarm the enemy, and make him divide his forces.

♦AUG. 3.

CUESTA DETERMINES TO FOLLOW SIR ARTHUR.♦

Having thus taken every precaution, he marched to Oropesa, with the intention of either compelling Soult to retreat, or giving him battle. At five in the evening he learned that the enemy were at Naval Moral, not more than eighteen miles distant; thus having placed themselves between him and the bridge of Almaraz, as if they meant to cut off his retreat across the Tagus. An hour afterwards dispatches came from Talavera, inclosing an intercepted letter from Jourdan to Soult, wherein the latter was told that the British army was at least 25,000 strong, and yet he was ordered to bring it to action wherever he could find it; from this Cuesta inferred that Soult could not have less than 30,000 men, and this was the precise number at which the friar, on whom the letter had been found, stated his army. But the most grievous part of the intelligence was, that Victor was again advancing, and had reached St. Olalla, and that Cuesta, seeing himself threatened both in front and in flank, and apprehending the British would require assistance, was determined to march and join them. Painful as it was thus to abandon the wounded, he considered that he must have abandoned them if he were driven from the position, and that position being now open on the left, he did not think himself able to maintain it. Sir Arthur immediately wrote to represent that the danger was far less imminent than Cuesta apprehended; the enemy, he thought, were not likely to attack Talavera, nor to occupy the British long. It would be time to march when they knew that the French had forced their way at Escalona, or were breaking up from St. Olalla. Victor was certainly alone, and Sebastiani and the Intruder occupied by Venegas. At all events he urged him to delay his march till the next day, send off his commissariat and baggage before him, and halt in the woods till the wounded were arrived at the bridge of Arzobispo. Soult’s force, he said, was certainly overrated.

Sir Arthur’s mistake upon this subject arose from his being ignorant that Mortier had formed a junction with this army. He supposed that it consisted only of the corps of Soult and Ney, who had brought out of Galicia 18,000 men, the remains of 36,000 with which they entered that country. Cuesta, however, was better informed; and he himself altered his opinion of the enemy’s force when he considered the positive orders which the Intruder had given for attacking the British army, supposing it to consist ♦CUESTA JOINS THE BRITISH.♦ of 25,000 men. Cuesta had not asked Sir Arthur’s advice, and did not wait to receive it: he left Talavera before it reached him, marched all night, and joined the British at Oropesa soon after daylight on the 4th. His apprehension of danger to himself was well founded: it was not without great exertions and heavy loss that the combined armies had repulsed the French at Talavera; well, therefore, might he despair of withstanding them alone if they returned to the attack. But the danger which by this hasty retreat he averted from himself, he brought upon Venegas and Sir Arthur; and the latter, in addition to the mortification of having his wounded fall into the hands of the enemy, saw himself exposed to an attack in front and in rear at the same time by two armies, each superior ♦THEY RETREAT ACROSS THE TAGUS.♦ to his own. It was absolutely necessary to retreat, otherwise nothing but two victories could extricate the troops from their perilous situation, and they were little capable of extraordinary exertions, not having had their full allowance of provisions for several days. The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed, and when the Marquess de la Reyna abandoned his post at the pass, he made for this point, with the intention of removing the bridge of boats that had been placed there; the boats indeed might be still in the river, but it was thought impossible to reach Almaraz without a battle. If he moved on to give the enemy battle, the French from Talavera would break down the bridge of Arzobispo, and thus intercept the only way by which a retreat was practicable; the same danger would be incurred if he took a position at Oropesa. Nothing remained, therefore, but to cross at Arzobispo, while it was yet in his power, and take up a defensive post upon the Tagus: the sooner a defensive line should be taken, the more likely were the troops to be able to defend it. On the day, therefore, that Cuesta formed his unfortunate junction, Sir Arthur retreated by this route, and crossed. Cuesta followed on the night of the 5th.

♦COL. MACKINNON REMOVES SOME OF THE WOUNDED.♦

Sir Arthur had left Colonel Mackinnon in command at Talavera with the charge of the sick and wounded, amounting, with those attached to the hospital, to about 5000 persons. On the evening of one day the charge had been given him, and on the next at noon Cuesta informed him that Soult was at Plasencia with 30,000 men, and that Victor was in his front, only six leagues distant; the monk who discovered their plans, being the bearer of a letter from the Intruder to Soult, was in the room: it was his intention to retire at dusk with the Spanish army and join Sir Arthur, and the hospital had better be got off before that time. Colonel Mackinnon had been instructed, in case of such necessity, to make for Merida by way of the Puente del Arzobispo: but it was with difficulty he could procure from Cuesta seven waggons to remove a few of the wounded. There was no alternative but to recommend those whom there was no possibility of removing to the honour and humanity of the French commanders; and Colonel Mackinnon, who had lived in France, and was in every respect one of the most accomplished officers in the British army, did this in a manner which was believed to have had great effect in obtaining for them the humane and honourable treatment they received. All who were able to march were ordered to assemble at three that afternoon, and proceed to Calera that night, ... a town which the French had completely destroyed. The next day they were overtaken at Arzobispo by the British army, and instead of passing the night there, as had been intended, were ordered to proceed. Forty bullock-cars were added to their means of transport, but in such ill repair for some of the worst roads in the world, that only eleven of them reached Deleitosa. A more difficult six days’ march could hardly be conceived, and the difficulty was of a kind more trying to a brave and feeling mind than danger. There was only a commissary’s clerk to provide for them, and the runaway Spaniards were plundering the small magazines in all the villages. Reports that the French had crossed the Tagus, and were in their front, alarmed his men, who were in no condition for the field, and many of them took to the mountains. Mackinnon mustered his force in a convent near Deleitosa; it consisted then of 2000 men, and these he conducted to Elvas, without magazines, with no assistance from the magistrates, who, on the contrary, sometimes evinced a hostile disposition; and with such want of humanity on the part of the people (made callous by selfishness, and selfish by necessity), that he was often obliged to use violent means, or the men must have been starved.

♦DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT ARZOBISPO.♦

The British army was now stationed at Deleitosa, whence they could defend the point of Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. Cuesta remained at Arzobispo; but so little in concert with Sir Arthur, that he moved his head-quarters, and suffered three days to elapse without sending him any information of his plans or movements. On the night of the 7th, he removed to Peraleda de Garbin, leaving two divisions of infantry and Alburquerque’s division of cavalry to defend the passage of the river. This was an imprudent measure, for the enemy were in force on the left bank; they had already attempted to win the bridge, and were now erecting batteries. The bridge was barricaded, and defended by several batteries with embrasures connected by a covered way, and upon these works the general relied with such confidence, that he thought he might safely withdraw the greater part of his army to more convenient quarters. Cuesta ought to have understood the nature of this post; he had been blamed for abandoning it in the former part of the year: satisfied, however, with having fortified the bridge, he never thought of examining whether ♦AUG. 8.♦ the river might not be fordable. Mortier, who commanded the corps of the French which led the pursuit, erected batteries to call off the attention of the Spaniards, while he ordered the chief of his staff, Dombrowsky, with two good ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 524.♦ swimmers, to sound the Tagus. His officer of engineers had observed, that when the Spanish horse were brought to drink they went some way into the river; trial was made where this indication promised some hope of success, and a good ford, passable even for infantry, was found there, not two hundred yards above the bridge and the Spanish batteries. Soult, who had now come up, resolved to effect the passage in the heat of the day, when the Spaniards would be taking their mid-day sleep, and might be surprised. He calculated upon a carelessness which he was sure to find. The Spaniards relied upon the river for their defence, never having deemed it needful to ascertain how far it might be relied on: the passage was accomplished almost as soon as they were aware of the attempt; the works of the bridge were taken in the rear, some of the Spanish artillerymen were cut down ♦NAYLIES, 174.♦ at their guns, and others, in a manner not to be justified by any laws of war, were compelled to turn them upon their countrymen; the works were presently demolished, and the way opened for Girard’s infantry. Alburquerque’s cavalry were reposing under some trees, a short league from the scene of action; at the first alarm they ♦NAYLIES, 175.♦ hastened to support their countrymen; and their charge was made with such resolution and effect, that Soult is said to have thought of firing grape upon them through his own men, as the only means of repelling them. But succours came to the French in time for preventing this atrocious expedient; and the Spaniards, horse and foot alike, retreated, or rather fled through a mountainous country, which favoured their escape, leaving their ammunition, their baggage, and the whole of their artillery. The slain were estimated by the French at 1600 men, most of whom were cut down in a pursuit from which the enemy returned with every man his sabre red with blood. Some of the French were drowned in the passage, their other loss was trifling. The same frightful circumstance as at Talavera occurred after the action; the herbage took fire; the wind spread the flames far and wide, among stubble, dry shrubs, and groves of ♦NAYLIES, 177.♦ ilex and of olives; ... on all sides the cries of the wounded were heard; and through the night muskets, which the fugitives had thrown away, went off, cartridges took fire, and cassoons of artillery exploded.

♦MOVEMENTS OF MARSHAL NEY.♦

The commonest precaution might have saved the Spaniards from this defeat, in which, though the loss of men was not great, that of artillery and ammunition was considerable, and the moral effect upon the troops of more importance than either. It seems, indeed, that Soult advanced to Arzobispo in the sole hope of profiting by the negligence of the Spanish commanders to strike some such blow; for the enemy had no intention at this time of carrying the war into Extremadura, finding Almaraz too well defended, and the fords, which were said to exist below the bridge, impassable. Ney had formed the design of crossing them, and taking possession of the defiles of Deleitosa and Xaraicejo, thus to cut off the retreat of the English toward Portugal; but those points were secured by Sir Arthur, as well as the passage of the river, and the French Marshal was ordered back to Salamanca to secure that part of the country, in concert with Kellermann, against the Duque del Parque and the Conde de Noroña, who had been prevented from occupying the enemy on that side for want of artillery and cavalry; the former, however, was now beginning to act on the offensive. Ney began his march on the 9th to the Puerto de Baños, in his way towards Old Castille; and this brought him in contact with Sir Robert Wilson.

♦ACTION WITH SIR R. WILSON AT THE PUERTO DE BAÑOS.♦

When the British commander left Talavera, Cuesta’s advanced guard was in communication with Sir Robert, and that officer was informed of the intended retreat of the Spaniards, that he might in like manner fall back. But he was advanced too far for this to be practicable; after a long march through the mountains, he found himself, on the night of the 14th, six leagues from Arzobispo; the high road between Oropesa and Talavera was to be crossed, and Victor was in possession of Talavera; thinking it, therefore, too late to reach Arzobispo, he determined to move by Puerto de San Julien and Centinello, and cross the Tietar toward the mountains. On the 11th he reached Baños, and had set out the following morning on the road of Grenadilla, to restore by this route his communication with the allied armies, when a cloud of dust was perceived on the road of Plasencia, and a peasant assured him it proceeded from a body of the enemy. Readily believing what was so probable, he turned back, and took post in front of Baños, placing 200 Spanish infantry under Colonel Grant in advance of Aldea Nueva. The enemy’s chasseurs and voltigeurs advanced in considerable bodies under General Lorset; and Grant, after a resistance in which the Spaniards demeaned themselves gallantly, was compelled to fall back. The French then attempted to cut off Sir Robert’s own legion, which was posted between Aldea Nueva and Baños: he had strengthened his position by every means which the time allowed, so that they could only advance gradually, and with severe loss from the fire of musketry which was kept up upon them. At length part of the Merida battalion on the right gave way, and a road was thus left open by which the position might have been turned. Then Sir Robert ordered a retreat upon the heights above Baños, and from thence sent to secure the road of Monte Mayor, which turned the Puerto de Baños, a league in the rear, and by which the French were directing a column. Don Carlos d’Espagna came up at this time with his battalion of light infantry, took post along the heights commanding the road to Baños, and enabled Sir Robert to detach a party to the mountain on the left, commanding the main road. On the Extremadura side this Puerto is not a pass of such strength as on the side of Castille. Sir Robert had no artillery, and the French were not less than treble the number of his troops; nevertheless he maintained his ground for nine hours. At six in the evening, three columns of the enemy succeeded in gaining the height on the left; his post was then no longer tenable, and he retired along the mountains, leaving open the main road, along which a considerable column of cavalry immediately hastened. It came in sight of the battalion of Seville, which had been left at Bejar with orders to follow on the morrow; but when Sir Robert was obliged to retire, and the action commenced, he ordered it to the pass to watch the Monte Mayor road and the heights on the rear of his left. As soon as the French cavalry came nigh, an officer with some dragoons rode on, and called out to the Spanish commanders to surrender. They were answered by a volley that killed the whole party; the Spaniards then began to mount the heights; they were attacked and surrounded by two bodies, one of horse, the other of foot; but they succeeded in cutting their way through, and Ney, having forced the pass, hastened on to Salamanca. Sir Robert’s loss was not considerable, and after halting two days at Miranda de Castañas, to rest his men, and collect those who were dispersed, he proceeded on his way.

♦THE FRENCH ENTER TALAVERA.♦

The retreat of Cuesta from Talavera, however much both the former and subsequent conduct of that general may deserve censure, was, under his circumstances, at least an excusable measure. About 1500 of the wounded were left, whom there was no time to remove; most of whom, indeed, were not in a state to bear removal. Cuesta had hardly begun his march before the French were in sight. When Victor entered the town, he found some of the wounded, French and English alike, lying on the ground in the Plaza. After complimenting the English, and observing that they understood the laws and courtesies of war, he told them there was one thing which they did not understand, and that ♦VICTOR BEHAVES WELL TO THE ENGLISH WOUNDED.♦ was how to deal with the Spaniards. He then sent soldiers to every house, with orders to the inhabitants immediately to receive and accommodate the wounded of the two nations, who were lodged together, one English and one Frenchman; and he expressly directed that the Englishman should always be served first. Many had already died in the square, and the stones were covered with blood; Victor ordered the townsmen to come with spades and besoms, remove and bury the dead, and cleanse the Plaza; he was speedily obeyed, and then the French said the place was fit for them to walk in. This was done a few hours after they entered the town. The next day the troops were assembled at noon, and liberty of pillaging for three hours was allowed them. Every man was provided with a hammer and a small saw for this purpose in his knapsack, and they filed off by beat of drum in regular parties to the different quarters of the town upon this work, as a business with which they were well acquainted. Nothing escaped their search: they discovered corn enough to supply the French army for three months; these magazines had been concealed both from the Spanish and English generals, and the owners were now punished for their treachery to their countrymen and their allies, by the loss of the whole. Dollars enough to load eight mules were also found hidden beneath some broken wheels and rubbish in a yard belonging to one of the convents.

♦MURDER OF THE BISHOP OF CORIA.♦

The behaviour of Victor to the wounded English deserves more especially to be mentioned, because Soult was carrying on the war with unrelenting barbarity. From Plasencia he laid waste the fertile vale in which that city stands with fire and sword. Serradilla, Pasanon, Arroyo-Molinos, El Barrado, Garganta la Olla, Texada, Riolobos, Malpartida, and La Oliva, were burnt by his troops, who, when they were not otherwise employed, went out upon the highways, robbed every person whose ill fortune compelled them to travel in this miserable country, and usually killed those whom they robbed. D. Juan Alvarez de Castro, the Bishop of Coria, in his eighty-sixth year, was murdered by these wretches. When Lapisse, in the month of June, marched from Salamanca to Alcantara, the Bishop with great difficulty and fatigue escaped; but the hardships which he then underwent were too much for one in such extreme old age, and when Soult quartered himself in this part of the country, he was confined to his bed in the village of Los Hoyos. Had he been removed he must have died upon the road; it was, therefore, not a matter of choice but of necessity that he should remain and take his chance. Three of his clergy and some of his domestics remained with him; and a few old men took refuge under the same roof, thinking the presence of their venerable pastor would render it a safe asylum. The French entered the village, and took possession of the house where the old prelate lay in bed. His chaplains met them, and intreated protection for their spiritual father, and his domestics waited upon them, hoping to obtain favour, or at least to escape injury. But after these ruffians had eaten and drunk what was set before them, they plundered the house of every thing which could be converted to their own use, and destroyed whatever they could not carry away. Then they fell upon the unhappy people of the house, one of whom they killed, and wounded six others; lastly, they dragged the Bishop from his bed, and discharged two muskets into his body.

♦VENEGAS’S ARMY KEPT IN INACTION BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.♦

The plans of the enemy on the side of Extremadura were effected; they who had so lately trembled for Madrid had seen the allied armies recross the Tagus, and they gave themselves credit for the fortunate issue of a campaign, in which, if it had not been for the misconduct of the Spanish General and of the Central Junta, they must have been driven to the Ebro. On the side of La Mancha they were not less successful. Venegas, on the 14th of July, had received orders to occupy the attention of the enemy, and divert them from the allied armies as much as possible, without endangering himself In consequence he advanced his army from El Moral, Ynfanles, Puerto Elano, and Valdepeñas, to Damiel, La Solana, El Corral de Caraquel, and Manzanares, keeping his head-quarters still at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and expecting intelligence which would justify him in advancing to Consuegra and Madrilejos. At this time he supposed it was the intention of the combined armies to march upon Madrid; and when the want both of provisions and means of transport rendered it impossible for the British army to proceed, Cuesta gave him no intelligence of this, thereby exposing him to be destroyed, if the French, instead of marching upon Talavera, had directed their attack against him. Cuesta’s whole conduct respecting the British army was so utterly unreasonable, that it can only be accounted for by ascribing it to obstinacy and incapacity. The wants of the British army were palpable; he had them before his eyes, and could at any moment have satisfied himself of the truth of every complaint which he received; yet he concealed the real state of things both from his own government and from Venegas, to both of whom it was of such essential importance that they should be accurately informed. The Spanish government received true intelligence from Mr. Frere, and in consequence they dispatched a courier to Venegas, directing him to suspend his operations, and take up a defensive position. Cuesta’s neglect rendered it prudent to dispatch these orders; but one evil produced another. Two hours after the arrival of the courier, Venegas received intelligence of the victory of Talavera, which was the more unexpected, because the Intruder, true to the French system, had published an Extraordinary Gazette, stating that he had defeated the allied armies on the 26th. Venegas ordered Te Deum to be sung in the neighbouring churches, and celebrated the victory by a general discharge: but he failed to improve it; and, instead of considering that the circumstances under which the Junta had dictated his instructions were now entirely changed, he adhered strictly to them, and lost the opportunity of advancing to Madrid; thus consummating the series of blunders by which a campaign so well planned, and a victory so bravely won, were rendered fruitless. Had he pushed for that city immediately, he might have entered it; Sir Robert Wilson would have joined him there, the resources of the city would have been secured for the allies, and the recovery of the capital would have raised the whole country far and near against the French. If Alburquerque had commanded this army, the momentous opportunity would not have been lost.

♦HIS USELESS ATTEMPT UPON TOLEDO.♦

Venegas therefore remained with his vanguard at Aranjuez, and his head-quarters at Ocaña, while another division of his army under Lacy was employed in an idle attempt upon Toledo, which, as he did not choose to destroy the houses from whence the enemy fired at him, because it was a Spanish town, could not possibly succeed, and therefore ought not to have been made. On the third day after the battle Cuesta wrote to Venegas, directing him to advance upon Madrid. “This operation,” he said, “must oblige Victor to detach a large part of his force toward the capital, in which case the allies would pursue him to that city, and if any unforeseen accident should compel Venegas to retire, he might retreat by Arganda and along the skirts of the mountains.” This letter was written at eleven at night. Twelve hours afterwards Cuesta forwarded a second dispatch, stating that Victor’s army had marched in the direction of Torrijos and Toledo. Venegas, upon receiving the first, ordered his whole force to unite at Aranjuez, meaning to lose no time in reaching the capital. The contents of the second staggered him; if the enemy marched for Toledo, they would fall on his rear-guard; if they went through Torrijos direct upon Madrid, they had the start, and would get between him and that city. He determined, therefore, still to collect his force in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez, and there wait for fresh orders; and he reminded Cuesta how indispensably necessary it was that their movements should be combined.

♦VENEGAS COMPLAINS OF CUESTA.♦

His army was collected on the night of the 3d, leaving only 600 foot and 200 horse in the neighbourhood of Toledo. The next day he received another dispatch from Cuesta, telling him of his march from Talavera to reinforce Sir Arthur. This letter was written with preposterous confidence; he was going, he said, to secure the victory against Soult, after which they should return to attack Victor. Meantime he advised Venegas to bear in mind, that general actions with better disciplined troops than their own did not suit them. Venegas felt the danger of his own situation, but his prevailing feelings were indignation and resentment at the multiplied proofs of incapacity which Cuesta had given. He wrote to his government, stating “that he was thus left to himself with an army inferior in number to the enemy, and, by the acknowledgement of the captain-general, inferior in discipline also: how much more deeply should he have been committed, if, in obedience to that general’s orders, he had marched upon Madrid, relying on the promised support of the allied armies!” The reflection was just as well as natural; but Venegas ought to have reflected also, that if he had marched upon Madrid in time, that support would not have failed him. He added that no choice was left, save of commencing a retreat, which would dispirit the troops and destroy the national enthusiasm in all the places which they had occupied and must now abandon. Consequences like these, which were immediately before his eyes, made him determine to remain where he was, and fight if he were attacked, preferring to be cut to pieces rather than submit to a shameful flight.

♦THE INTRUDER’S MOVEMENTS AFTER THE BATTLE.♦

The enemy were well aware of the danger to which they had been exposed from the army of La Mancha. The Intruder, after his defeat at Talavera, retreated to Santa Olalla, leaving Victor to take up a position behind the Alberche, and watch the combined armies. The next day he moved to Bargas and Olias, near Toledo. On the night of the 31st, he received advices from Victor, who, being alarmed by Sir Robert Wilson’s movements, was about to fall back to Maqueda; at the same time he learnt that Venegas was collecting his force at Aranjuez and threatening Madrid. Alarmed at this, he ordered Sebastiani and the corps of reserve to take up a position at Illescas, from whence they might either advance rapidly to support Victor, or to attack Venegas. Victor’s next advices expressed further fears from the troops at Escalona, whose force he supposed to be far greater than it was: “If the enemy advanced in that direction,” he said, “as seemed probable, he should retire to Mostoles.” Joseph, trembling for the capital, moved to that place himself in the night between the 3d and 4th: Mostoles is only twelve miles from Madrid, ... so near had the scene of action been brought. From thence, having learnt that Victor’s apprehensions had subsided, he turned back on the following night to Valdemoro, summoned Sebastiani thither, and ordered an attack to be made upon Venegas.

♦VENEGAS PREPARES FOR BATTLE AT ARANJUEZ.♦

That general expected such an attack from the moment when he was apprised of Cuesta’s retreat. At daybreak on the 5th, he went from his head-quarters at Tembleque to reconnoitre the position at Aranjuez. The Queen’s Bridge was the only one which had not been broken down; his first measure was to recall Lacy with the advanced guard from Puente Largo on the Xarama, that he might secure his retreat over this bridge in time; then he resolved to occupy the range of heights adjacent to Ontigola, beginning from Mount Parnaso, and to defend the passage of the river. Having directed these measures, he returned to his quarters, leaving Giron in command of the three divisions upon the Tagus. Three hours had hardly elapsed before Giron sent word that large columns of horse and foot and artillery were marching upon Puente Largo, and that some had already crossed the Xarama; this was followed by tidings that a great dust was seen in the direction of the ford of Añover. It could not now be doubted that a serious attack was about to be made; the ford would certainly be attempted, and Venegas was apprehensive that he should be assailed in the rear at the same time by troops from Toledo. He therefore ordered Lacy to cross the Queen’s Bridge, and break it down; and marched his reserve from Ocaña to the height on the left of the road between that town and Aranjuez, where they might be ready to resist an attack on the side of Toledo or the ford, and to support the retreat of the other divisions, who, if they found themselves unable to guard the river, were instructed to retreat to Ocaña; but their orders were to defend the passage to the utmost, and maintain every position inch by inch.

Lacy could not commence his retreat soon enough to avoid an attack; a strong body of cavalry from the Cuesta de la Reyna fell upon his rear, but they resisted the enemy, and, retiring in good order over the Queen’s Bridge, broke it down, and took post upon some heights which protected it: the bridge itself was defended by Don Luis Riquelme with three battalions and four pieces of cannon; another battalion was stationed in the Plaza de S. Antonio. D. Miguel Antonio Panes, a captain of artillery, only son of the Marquis of Villa Panes, defended the broken Puente de Barcas with two eight-pounders and two companies. Other troops were stationed at the ford of the Infante Don Antonio’s garden, at the Puente Verde, at the Vado Largo, or broad ford, and in the Calle de la Reyna. A reserve was placed on each side the road to Ocaña, and in the walks immediately adjoining the palace, on the left of which the whole of the cavalry stood ready to charge the enemy in case they should win the passage of the river, or attack the Spaniards in the rear by a party which might have crossed at some remoter point.

♦ARANJUEZ AND ITS GARDENS.♦

The ground whereon a battle has been fought is never passed over by an intelligent traveller without producing a meditative train of thought, however transient, even if the scene has no other interest; but when the local circumstances are remarkable, the impressions become deeper and more durable, especially if the war were one in which, after any lapse of time, the heart still feels a lively concern. Aranjuez had been for nearly two centuries the spring residence of the Spanish court. It stands in a rich and lovely country, where the Xarama falls into the Tagus, in what was once a peninsula. Charles V. had built a hunting-seat there, which Philip III. enlarged into a palace, yet such a palace as was designed for comfort and comparative retirement, rather than for splendour. In his time a canal was made between the two rivers, partly with the intent of giving the place a character of safety, that the King might be secure there with no larger body of guards than his dignity required. Succeeding monarchs each added something to the embellishment of the grounds, and Charles IV., when Prince of Asturias, made a garden which was called by his name. Aranjuez itself was a poor village till the time of Grimaldi’s administration, when a town was built there under his directions, and partly on the Dutch plan; the streets being long, spacious, straight, and uniform, with rows of trees, for beauty and for shade, ... only the canals were wanting. The population had increased to some 10,000 persons, who depended in great measure for their prosperity upon the annual residence of the court.

The pride of Aranjuez was in its gardens; they were in the French style, but with a charm which that style derived from a Spanish climate. Long and wide avenues were overbowered with elms, which loved the soil, and which, by the stateliness of their growth, and the deep umbrage of their ample branches, repaid the care with which water from the Tagus was regularly conducted to their roots. That river also supplied numerous fountains, each in the centre of some area, square or circular, hex- or oct-angular, where, in peaceful times, at all hours of the day, some idlers or ruminators were seen on the marble benches, enjoying the shade, and the sight and the sound of the water, which was thrown up by statues of all kinds, appropriate or preposterous, beasts, harpies, sea-horses, Tritons, and heathen gods and goddesses, in jets or curvilinear shoots, intersecting each other, falling in regular forms, sparkling as they played, cooling the air around, and diffusing a sense of freshness even in the hottest noon. In some places the loftiest trees were made to bear a part in these devices of wanton power, the pipes being conveyed to their summit; in others the fountains set music in motion when they played. There was one fountain which served as a monument of one of the proudest victories that had ever been achieved by Spain, the central part being formed from a block of marble which had been taken in one of the Turkish ships at Lepanto.

But this was a place where the strength of vegetation made art appear subordinate, and the magnificence which all these elaborate embellishments produced was subservient to delight and comfort. The elms, which were the largest of their kind, had attained a growth which nothing but artificial irrigation in a genial soil and hot climate could have given them. The poplar and the tamarisk flourished in like manner; the latter grew along the banks of the Tagus with peculiar luxuriance. Every approach to Aranjuez was shaded with trees, from which avenues branched off in all directions, opening into glades, and diversified with bowers. Nor was this royal expenditure directed only to the purposes of splendid enjoyment. The Spanish Kings, with an intention better than the success which attended it, endeavoured to improve the agriculture of the country, by setting their subjects an example upon the royal domains. The best fruits in the Peninsula were cultivated for sale in the royal gardens; the finest oil in Spain was produced there, and wine from vineyards of the choicest grapes was collected in cellars of unequalled extent. They had attempted also to naturalize the camel there, and at one time from two to three hundred of these animals fed in the royal pastures, and were occasionally employed for burthen. But though they bred, and appeared to thrive there, the experiment was given up; the native animals, which are reared with so much less cost and care, being better suited to the soil, and surface, and climate of Spain.

The banks of the Tagus at Aranjuez, and the gardens which it had so long been the pride and pleasure of the Spanish Kings to embellish, were now to be made the scene of war. About two in the afternoon the French appeared upon the right bank, and began the attack along the whole line. They opened a heavy fire on all points, but more especially upon the ford of Don Antonio’s garden, and the reserve from the walks were sent to strengthen that post. Panes at the Puente de Barcas was struck by a ball, which carried away his leg; a glance convinced him that the wound was mortal: “Comrades,” said he, “stand by these guns till death ... I am going to heaven:” and, as they bore him from the field, the only anxiety he expressed was, that another officer should take his place without delay. Don Gaspar Hermosa succeeded him, after planting a mortar at the Puente ford in the midst of the enemy’s fire. The Spanish artillery was excellently served this day, and frequently silenced that of the French. One mortar placed in the thicket opposite the islet, made great havoc among the enemy. Lacy, perceiving his own post secure, and that the main attack was made upon the left, at the Puente Verde, the gardens of the Prince and of Don Antonio, removed his division thither without waiting for orders. The firing continued till the approach of night, when the French, baffled in all their attempts, retired. The loss of the Spaniards was between two and three hundred; they computed that of the French at three hundred killed, and about a thousand wounded. The French force consisted of fourteen or fifteen thousand, being the whole of Sebastiani’s corps. They themselves carefully avoided all mention of the action, saying only that they worsted the advanced guard of Venegas, and drove it beyond the Tagus. Giron, who commanded, was rewarded with the rank of camp-martial; and the Junta testified its sense of the heroism of Panes, who died a few hours after he was wounded, by exempting the title in his family from the duties called _lanzas_ and _medias anatas_ for ever, appointing his father a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and ordering a letter to be written to him, as a document to be preserved in the archives of his house, expressing, in the most honourable terms, the sense which the country entertained of the services rendered to it both by father and son.

♦DELIBERATIONS CONCERNING THE ARMY OF LA MANCHA.♦

The French after this repulse recrossed the Xarama, and, as Venegas had foreseen, prepared to attack him from the other side. According to their official statement, they thought it would be a long and difficult work to rebuild the bridges at Aranjuez, and that it would be less dangerous to force the passage of the Tagus at Toledo, where the Spaniards remained masters of the bridge. The Spanish General, therefore, disposed his troops at Aranjuez, Ocaña, La Guardia, and Tembleque, ready to march, as circumstances might require, to some point where he could only be attacked in front, and might be freed from the apprehension that the enemy would cut off his retreat by way of Toledo, and, having disabled him, penetrate to the Sierra Morena, the armies of Cuesta and Sir Arthur being too far off to prevent them. The necessity of retreating was indeed obvious; and the Junta were of opinion that he had no other course left than that of abandoning La Mancha, and taking post at the pass of Despeñaperros. Mr. Frere thought it would be better, if La Mancha were untenable, to occupy the passes with a part of his army only (for it was not to be supposed that at this time the French could make any serious attempt upon Andalusia), and march with or detach the rest upon the left of the enemy, through a country which they had never been able to occupy, Cuenca, Molina, and as far as Arragon; a movement upon the two former points would threaten the capital, upon the latter it would give the Spaniards a decided superiority in that quarter, and interrupt the communication of the French with France. In the present state of things, Mr. Frere perceived how desirable it was that the Spaniards should have as many small armies as possible; their system of military subsistence and discipline being so imperfect, defeats became dangerous, and even destructive, in proportion to the size of the army; in small bodies they were comparatively of little importance: in small bodies the Spaniards had almost uniformly been successful; and such diversions would harass and distract the French, and waste their force.

♦VENEGAS RESOLVES TO ATTACK THE ENEMY.♦

Mr. Frere spoke upon this plan to one of the leading members of the war department, and would have delivered in his advice in writing, if Marquis Wellesley had not at that time been daily expected to arrive at Seville and supersede him. This circumstance, and the confidence which Venegas expressed in the spirit of his troops (for he seemed disposed to risk a battle rather than abandon La Mancha,) induced him to wait for the Marquis’s arrival; and then it was too late. For on the same day that Mr. Frere recommended this proposed diversion, Venegas received advices from the fifth division, under General Zerain, by Toledo, that the French had received a reinforcement of 8000 ♦AUG. 8.♦ men, and were about to attack him. Upon this the general ordered the fourth division from Tembleque to advance to his support. While they were on their way, Sebastiani, having collected ♦AUG. 9.♦ his whole corps at Toledo, attacked Zerain, who retreated in good order to Sonseca, and from thence turned to Almonacid to join the troops which had been sent to his assistance. At Almonacid Venegas assembled his whole army on the 10th, and believing that the number of the enemy did not exceed 14,000, the same reasons which had made him stand his ground at Aranjuez, after the retreat of the combined armies, induced him once more to give the French battle. He could not bear to abandon the people of La Mancha, who had welcomed him with enthusiasm on his advance: he knew how injurious it was, not merely to the general character of an army, but to the individual feelings of the soldiery, to be perpetually giving way before the enemy, losing ground, and losing reputation and hope also; and his success at Aranjuez made him confident in the courage and conduct of his troops. Before he delivered his own opinion, he summoned the different chiefs of division to council, and they perfectly accorded with his pre-determination. This was on the 10th; he resolved to let the troops rest the next day, that they might recover from their march, and it was agreed to attack the enemy at daybreak on the 12th. Meantime it was supposed more accurate information of their number might be obtained.

♦HE IS ATTACKED BY THEM.♦

Delay has ever been the bane of the Spanish councils, and Venegas should have remembered, that in offensive war every thing depends upon celerity. Victor had now opened a communication with Soult, and the Intruder being thus delivered from all fear of the allied armies, joined Sebastiani, with the reserve, on the 9th. While Venegas was deliberating, his position was reconnoitred; and on the morning of the day which he had allowed for rest he was attacked by an army of little less than double the force at which he had computed it. The Spaniards, however, were not taken by surprise. The right wing, under Vigodet, extended to some rising ground beyond the village of Almonacid: the centre, consisting of two divisions, under Camp-marshal Castejon, were in the plain before the village. Lacy commanded the left, which was supported by a height, detached from the range of hills that run north and south, beginning at Toledo. Giron was stationed, with three battalions, as a reserve, behind the centre; the rest of his division were posted, part on the heights to the left, part at an advanced battery, and the remainder upon the Castle hill, behind the village. The cavalry, under Camp-marshals the Marquis of Gelo, D. Tomas Zerain, and the Viscount de Zolina, were placed in two bodies, one on each wing.

♦BATTLE OF ALMONACID.♦

The Intruder was in the field; but Sebastiani was the real commander. That general perceived that the event of the day depended upon the possession of the hill on the Spaniards’ left, and he ordered Laval to attack it with his two divisions. Laval formed in close columns, by divisions and brigades, and attacked the hill both in front and on the right at once. The French suffered considerably in this attack. Count Sobolesky and another chief of battalion were killed, several of equal rank wounded; but they had the advantage of numbers as well as discipline. The colonel who commanded on the hill was wounded, and before Giron could reach the spot with the reserve, the battalions which were posted there gave way. These battalions, instead of rallying when they found themselves supported, confused the troops who came to support them. The height, upon which the fate of the day depended, was lost; and the enemy, having won it, attacked the Spaniards in flank. Lacy upon this wheeled to face the enemy, and for a while withstood them; 200 cavalry, led by Don Nicholas Chacon, charged one of their columns, which, forming itself into a square, withstood the attack; and Chacon, having his horse shot under him, and some of his best officers and soldiers killed, was compelled to withdraw. In the centre the enemy were equally successful, and at length the Spaniards fell back along the whole of their line. Nevertheless the ground was well contested, and Venegas took up a second position behind Almonacid, supported by the Castle hill. Here he was presently attacked at all points; his cavalry made another charge, which failed for lack of numbers, not of spirit, and the general then perceived that there was no hope of recovering the day. He therefore commenced his retreat, and ordered Vigodet, whose division was at this time the least exposed, to bring up and cover the rear. Vigodet performed this service with great coolness, recovered and spiked one of the cannon which had been taken, and began at length to fall back himself in good order. At this time some ammunition carts, which were blown up on his right, that they might not fall into the enemy’s hands, frightened the horses of the little cavalry which covered his own retreat, and the French, taking advantage of their confusion, charged him vigorously. The second in command of the division, D. Francisco de Reyna, checked the pursuers, while Vigodet rallied the scattered horse, and collected about 1000 men, under whose protection he left the field. They retreated by different routes to Herencia, meaning to fall back to Manzanares, Membrilla, and Solana. As far as Herencia the movement was effected in good order, only a few soldiers, straggling from their ranks to drink at the few wells in that arid country; but when the van reached Manzanares, a cry arose that the French had got before them on the road of Valdepeñas, to cut off their retreat. This false report, either originating in treason or in cowardice, spread through the troops: from that moment subordination was at an end, and they forfeited the credit which had been gained in the action, by dispersing.

Sebastiani stated the loss of the Spaniards at 4000 killed, 4000 prisoners, an immense number wounded, 100 ammunition waggons, and thirty-five pieces of cannon. The whole of the artillery and baggage was certainly lost; but the number of prisoners was grossly exaggerated, because the Spaniards did not disperse till they had accomplished their retreat; and the French, with that inconsistency which so often betrayed the falsehood of their official accounts, admitted that none of their corps could be overtaken. He gave no account of his own loss; Venegas estimated it at 8000, ... an exaggeration as great as that of the French general; but that the French suffered severely was evident, because they were long crippled for any further operations. Venegas retired to La Carolina, his men assembled at the passes of the Sierra, and in a few days he was again at the head of a respectable army. The enemy had now effected every thing which they proposed; they had driven Cuesta and the British beyond the Tagus on one side, and on the other had recovered possession of La Mancha; and the Intruder, rejoicing in the issue of a campaign, which opened under such inauspicious aspects, returned triumphantly to Madrid. The disgrace of Talavera sate easy upon the French; ... with their usual contempt of truth, they affirmed that they had won the victory; and the situation of the contending armies a few weeks after the battle gave credit to the impudent assertion.