Chapter XXVII: Part IV: AIR.—The Atmosphere. Winds and Storms.—Dew, Clouds, and (4)

[236] All the circumstances attending their surrender ought to be related. The incident is thus feelingly chronicled by Captain Johnson: “Two days after the death of Shah Soojah, the people of Caubul demanded that our hostages, who had been left under charge of Mahomed Zemaun Khan, should be given up to the care of the son of the late High Priest, Meer Hadjee. The former noble-hearted gentleman, than whom no father could have behaved more tenderly to his children, begged and entreated with tears that the separation should not take place—adding that he was willing to give up his own family to the popular will, but not the English gentlemen who had been entrusted to his care, and who were his honoured guests—that he would, if the people so willed it, make over to them his own son, with his sword round his neck, and his turban for a winding-sheet, to be dealt with according to their pleasure; but that force alone should deprive him of the society of his friends. When all entreaties failed, he hoped to work upon the feelings of the party at the conference by telling them that their chief and his own sister and relations were in the hands of the British Government, and that vengeance would assuredly be dealt upon them if the English gentlemen sustained the slightest injury. On this, a grey-bearded old gentleman told him and the rest that they might make their minds perfectly easy as regarded the Afghan prisoners in India, as it was contrary to the uses of Englishmen to hurt a hair of the heads of their captives. The clamour of the people prevailed over all that the Newab could urge, and with many a bitter feeling did this amiable man make over the hostages to Meer Hadjee, with prayers and entreaties to the latter that he would behave kindly to them; and at the same time he sent with them to the latter’s house all the females of his family, as the surest means of their protection; for however excited a Mussulman population may be, it is seldom or ever that they violate a harem.”—[_Captain Johnson’s MS. Journal._]

[237] Mohun Lal’s own account of his sufferings is worth quoting: “I have the honour to address you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that Akbar Khan, on the night of the 11th inst. (July), put me in charge of Moollah Said, Atchekzye, in whose house I was forced to lay down, and a couch placed over me, on which the people jumped, and are beating me with sticks in a very unmerciful manner. Akbar wants 30,000 rupees from me—says, otherwise, that he will pull out my eyes. All my body has been severely beaten. I cannot promise anything without government’s order, but see myself destroyed.... All my feet is wounded by bastinadoing.”—[_Mohun Lal to Sir R. Shakespear: July 14, 1842. MS. Records._] “I suffer very much. Sometimes I am pinioned and a heavy stone is placed on my back, whilst the red pepper is burnt before my nose and eyes. Sometimes I am bastinadoed. In short, I suffer every conceivable agony. He wants 30,000 rupees, out of which he has hitherto got 12,000, after using me very rudely. The remainder, if not paid in the course of ten days, he says he will pull out my eyes, and burn my body with a hot iron.”—[_Mohun Lal to Sir R. Shakespear: July 17. MS. Records._]

[238] The cause of this hasty removal is to be found in Akbar’s suspicions that the Jabbar Khail, the most powerful of the western Ghilzye clans, intended to carry off the prisoners and sell them to General Pollock on their own account. This plot really existed, and had been suggested to the chiefs of the Jabbar Khail by Captain Mackenzie during his journeys to and from Jellalabad.

[239] They were turned out of the fort, indeed, to make room for the prisoners, to the infinite annoyance of the unhappy chief, who made every possible excuse for not receiving them, but was overruled by Akbar Khan, who obtained admittance for them, in the first instance, on the plea that he only required accommodation for the night, and then urged that the fort would suit them better than any other place in the neighbourhood. It was altogether a most unfortunate occurrence for Ali Mahomed, as, subsequently, on the advance of the British, the fort was levelled with the ground, and the garden destroyed.

[240] “I attach much weight,” wrote Lord Ellenborough, at the end of May, “to what Major Sleeman says of the disposition of the Mahomedans; but I am surprised that it has not occurred to him and to others, that whatever may be the disposition of the Mahomedans, it is the absence, not the presence of our troops, of whom more than three-fourths are Hindoos, that alone can lead the Mahomedans to act against us. The danger is in the position of the army, almost without communication with India, too far off to return quickly at any season, unable from the season to return now, without adequate supplies of food or carriage. This is the danger which all the great statesmen in India would perpetuate if they could, and while they maintain it, destroy the confidence of the Sepoy and ruin our finances. _If I save this country, I shall save it in spite of every man in it who ought to give me support, but I will save it in spite of them all._”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[241] Some readers, not having maps before them, will better understand the nature of this retirement if I liken it to the case of a man wishing to retire from Reigate to London, and taking Dover and Canterbury in his way.

[242] The services rendered by Mr. Robertson to his country, at this time, have never been adequately acknowledged, except by General Pollock himself, who never lost an opportunity of expressing his gratitude for the assistance he had derived from the exertions of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces. Mr. Robertson, aware of the difficulty of collecting camels in sufficient number for the purposes of the army, ordered letters to be addressed to the principal collectors in Upper India, calling upon them to purchase as many ponies and mules as they could get together in their several districts. And it was in no small measure owing to these exertions that Pollock was at length enabled to advance.

[243] _Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: July 4, 1842. Published Papers._

[244] _Mr. Maddock to General Nott: July 4, 1842, and Lord Ellenborough, same date. Published Papers._

[245] “If I have not,” wrote Pollock, “lived long enough to judge of the propriety of an act for which I alone am responsible, the sooner I resign the command as unfit the better. I assure you that I feel the full benefit of being unshackled and allowed to judge for myself.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[246] A letter, too, was sent by Captain Troup to Akbar Khan with a request that he would forward it to Nott. A few harmless lines were written in ink; and much important matter in rice-water, to be brought out by the application of iodine. The employment of Akbar Khan himself, as the medium of communication between the two Generals, who were contemplating his destruction, is not one of the least amusing incidents of the war.

[247] Pollock was afraid that Nott would have commenced his retreat before the receipt of the despatch of July 4. “My movement will of course depend,” he wrote in a confidential letter to Mr. Robertson on the 10th of August, “on General Nott’s ability to meet me. Our late accounts from that quarter are not favourable. They say that General Nott is bent on retiring, and I very much fear that he will have made several marches to the rear before the government despatch can reach him.... I ought by this time to have heard from General Nott, in reply to my letter by the first of the five messengers. If he is not coming on, my negotiations for the prisoners will be a very simple affair; but it must ever be a subject of regret that he should so hastily retire, and at such a time, while he commands an army in every respect efficient, and amounting to about 15,000 men.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[248] It was reported in camp, and subsequently set forth in the local journals, that some women had been violated by our soldiery. “But,” says Captain Macgregor, “I made the strictest inquiry into the matter, both from the Afghan chiefs who were with me, and from the inhabitants of the village, but could not trace in the slightest degree any just foundation for the report in question. Had there been any, it would doubtless have formed a subject of great grievance to the people, who are so very jealous of the honour of their women.”—[_Captain Macgregor’s Report on the Operations in the Shinwarree districts. MS. Records._]

[249] _Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records._

[250] There was no need to cut them down. It was sufficient to cut deep rings through the bark to the heart of the tree; for they seldom survived the operation. There is something in this so repugnant to our civilised and Christian ideas of righteous retribution, that it is only just that I should give in this place the explanation of an act, perpetrated, indeed, upon other occasions, in the words of an officer equally gallant and humane. “All the injury,” said Captain Macgregor, “that we could do to their forts and houses could, with facility, in a short time be repaired by them. From their proximity to the hills, they could always obtain timber in abundance; and where water is plentiful they could rebuild easily the bastions we might blow up; and therefore a greater degree of punishment than this seemed to be necessary, and was completely within our power, if we destroyed their trees—a measure which seems barbarous to a civilised mind; but in no other way can the Afghans be made to feel equally the weight of our power, for they delight in the shade of their trees. They are to be seen under them in groups, during the summer, all day long, talking, reading, weaving, and sleeping. Even women and children seek the shade of their trees. The Afghan mountaineer is not tangible to us in any other way. He removes his herds, flocks, and property to the hills on the shortest notice; and flies before our troops to places where he is inaccessible to them. The Goolai people, moreover, were deserving of no mercy. The amount of treasure they had plundered (viz., 18,000 or 20,000 rupees) was considerable. They had been very pertinacious in attacking Captain Ferris’s cantonment; and equally so, subsequently, our troops at Jellalabad. Therefore the Brigadier determined at once to commence the work of destruction, desired that neither fort, house, tree, grain, nor _boosa_ should be spared to them. This assuredly was the best plan for preventing the necessity of harsh measures in future. Working parties from the brigade were accordingly appointed for this purpose.”—[_Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records._]

[251] _Report of Brigadier Monteith: July 27, 1842. Published Papers._

[252] “It is impossible,” wrote General Pollock, “to guess how this mission may succeed, because, in dealing with Afghans, you deal with treachery and deceit; but appearances are as fair as they can be for the release of the prisoners. Captain Troup says that if it had depended on Mahomed Akbar alone, some of the ladies would have been sent with him; but Mahomed Shah appears to be a bitter enemy of ours—much more so than I had reason to suppose. The man who has come with Captain Troup was selected in opposition to the wish of Mahomed Akbar, who wished to send Dost Mahomed Khan, a brother of Mahomed Shah. Dost Mahomed was objected to by the chiefs as being too bigoted to his own party, whereas Hadjee Buktear Khan was considered neutral. He is a Candahar man—has been at Bombay and others of our settlements, and is better acquainted with the European character than the other.”—[_Jellalabad, July 15. MS. Correspondence._]

[253] “Captain Troup,” wrote General Pollock, “is still here. I am glad that, in proposing terms, I insisted on having the guns, for I think there is almost a certainty of an objection being made to that, in which case, of course, I can back out.... On this occasion I have written nothing.”—[_Jellalabad, July 18. MS. Correspondence._]

[254] “I have my camp in two lines,” he wrote a few days afterwards to Pollock, “the cavalry facing the river, and rear to the water—the front of our encampment an open stony plain—_a good place for a fight_. The left of our line rests on a small hill that commands a view all round.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[255] The Governor-General, however, seems to have considered it not wholly improbable that the contemplated military movement upon Caubul would be suspended by the favourable conclusion of the negotiations with the enemy; and actually authorised Pollock to exercise his discretion in ordering Nott to retire by Quettah, even though the march upon Ghuznee and Caubul had been commenced.—[_Lord Ellenborough to General Pollock: July 29, 1842._] Subsequently the Governor-General seemed to awaken to a sense of the extraordinary character of this suggestion, for he wrote to General Pollock to say that he “could hardly imagine the existence of circumstances which could justify the diversion of Major-General Nott’s army from the route of Ghuznee and of Caubul, when his intention of marching by that route shall have been once clearly indicated.”—[_Lord Ellenborough to General Pollock: August 26, 1842._]

[256] _MS. Correspondence._

[257] Nott’s letter was despatched on the 27th of July. It comprised but a few lines:

“Candahar, July 27, 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—You will have received a copy of a letter from the Governor-General under date the 4th instant, to my address, giving me the option of retiring a part of my force to India _viâ_ Caubul and Jellalabad. I have determined to take that route, and will write to you fully on the subject as soon as I have arranged for carriage and supplies.—Yours truly, W. NOTT.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[258] The force consisted of the 3rd Dragoons; the 1st Native Cavalry; a squadron of the 5th and of the 10th ditto, with the head-quarters; 600 Sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry; her Majesty’s 31st Regiment; the 33rd Regiment of Native Infantry; the whole of Sir Robert Sale’s and of Colonel Tulloch’s brigades; with seventeen guns, a company of Sappers and Miners, and a regiment of Bildars (Pioneers) under Mr. Mackeson. A small force was left (chiefly for want of carriage) at Gundamuck, and the rest remained in garrison at Jellalabad.

[259] In this affair we lost seven men killed, and about fifty wounded. Among the latter were four officers, Major Huish (26th Native Infantry), Captain Edwards (9th Foot), Captain Tait (Irregular Cavalry), Ensign Robertson (37th Native Infantry).

[260] With regard to the destruction committed at Mammoo Khail, see Appendix.

[261] “Hurrah!” he wrote; “this is good news. _All_ here are prepared to meet your wishes to march as light as possible. _I_ take no carriage from the Commissariat; and our officers are doubling up _four_ in a small hill tent, and are sending all to the rear that they can dispense with.... _I am so excited that I can scarce write._”—[_General Sale to General Pollock: Futtehabad, August 16, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[262] _General Sale to General Pollock: August 18, 1842. MS. Correspondence._

[263] Pollock had received no later intelligence from Nott’s camp than that contained in the brief letter of July 27, though he had despatched ten messengers to the westward. It was not until midnight of the 6th-7th of September that letters from Nott’s camp were received by Pollock at Gundamuck.

[264] To many of his letters to General Pollock, Futteh Jung signed his name in English characters.

[265] Akbar Khan compelled the Prince to write to Pollock: “I have given to Sirdar Mahomed Akbar the full and entire management of all my property and affairs of every description, and have resigned to him in perpetuity full power to judge and settle all questions on all points. Whatever arrangement he may make with the English Government I agree to confirm, and no alteration shall be made.” And again: “The arrangements which have been made with Captain Troup and Hadjee Buktear have been all approved of by me. I have delegated all powers over my country and wealth to the Wuzeer, Mahomed Akbar Khan, Barukzye!” But the Prince took the first opportunity to write privately to the General: “My friend, it will have been evident to you that in this matter I have been compelled to act thus. I did not even know that Captain Troup and Hadjee Buktear had been sent, and I had not the slightest knowledge of the proposals made by them. Captain Troup is well aware of this, since we had never met, nor had any of my confidential people been employed between us.”—[_Futteh Jung to General Pollock: Translation. July 21, 1842. MS. Records._] This letter was evidently written in a state of painful alarm. It concludes with the words: “You must be very careful not to let it be known that I have written to you; since, should these villains hear of it, they would put me and my family to death.” In reply to this letter, Pollock expressed his surprise that, “notwithstanding his Majesty’s friendship, the good-will of the chiefs, and the unanimity of the people at Caubul, still they cannot prevent the treachery of one man from causing dissension between the two governments, and that they are unable to show their good-will to us by releasing our prisoners.” To this, on the 1st of August, Futteh Jung replied: “You express surprise at my many well-wishers not being able to find a remedy for one evil-disposed person. You write: ‘If this could be effected, a great object would be obtained.’ Eminent in rank! You write truly. But in a religious war, a father cannot trust his son—a son, his father.”

[266] In consequence of this act, Aga Mahomed became a marked man. His father was assassinated, and he and his brother cut down by order of Akbar. Being ruined, he found his way to Hindostan, and became the guest of an English officer, who obtained from the Government a pension of twelve rupees a month for him. He served on the late expedition to Bushire, and died leaving a helpless widow, like himself, a convert to Christianity.

[267] A squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry; a squadron, and the head-quarters of the 10th Light Cavalry; the left wings of the 33rd and 60th N.I., with two guns of the 3rd troop 2nd brigade of Horse Artillery, were left at Gundamuck.

[268] They, however, diverted themselves with a little internal mutiny—rising up against the Sikh general, Gholab Singh Provindea, and burning his tent. The poor old man, in an extremity of terror, sought refuge under Pollock’s skirts.

[269] _General Pollock’s Report._

[270] _General Pollock’s Report._

[271] For an account of the operations of the second division of Pollock’s army, see Lieutenant Greenwood’s “Narrative of the late Victorious Campaign in Afghanistan, under General Pollock.”

[272] Captains Troup and Bygrave, when the other prisoners were sent to Bameean, had been taken by Akbar Khan to the Balla Hissar—but had subsequently been permitted to remove themselves to Ali Mahomed’s force, where Captain and Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Trevor, with their children, had been left, on account of sickness, under charge of Dr. Campbell.

[273] They required Troup, however, to write a letter to General Pollock making known Akbar Khan’s wishes, and inclosing one from the Sirdar himself. The letters were sent, but the messengers returned some days afterwards, declaring that they had not been able to penetrate the British camp.—[_Captain Troup to General Pollock. MS. Correspondence._]

[274] Bygrave had before gone on to Tezeen with Sir-Bolund Khan.

[275] _Captain Troup to General Pollock. MS. Correspondence._ See Appendix.

[276] Nothing could have been better than the conduct of the troops throughout the whole of these operations. “I think no officer,” wrote Pollock, in a private letter, on the 23rd of September, “could possibly have had finer regiments under his command than I have had, and to them do I owe all my success, which, as far as I am able to judge, has been so far complete. I hope the Governor-General may think so, and I shall be satisfied.” In this letter, the difficulties with which Pollock had to contend, from the scarcity of cattle, are thus detailed. “I have had,” he wrote, “great difficulties to contend against even to the last, from the great want of carriage-cattle. At Gundamuck, after my first engagement with the enemy, I found myself so reduced in cattle, that, to enable me to take on only fourteen days’ supplies, I was obliged to leave at that place two horse-artillery guns, two squadrons of cavalry, and two wings of Native infantry; and yet with all this, all the camp-followers, public and private, were compelled to carry eight days’ supplies. The fighting men carried three. The 1st Cavalry carried eight days’ supplies on their horses. The rest of the cavalry carried three or four days’. In this way we were enabled to move.... The night before I left Gundamuck, I received an official letter and a survey report, setting forth that the whole of the camels of one regiment were unserviceable, and that they could not get up even without their loads. This was rather provoking, for I have only three Native regiments with me. My answer was short. ‘Tell the commanding officer, that if his regiment can’t march, he will relieve the two wings ordered to remain behind, and who are willing to go forward on any terms.’ The regiment marched, and I heard no more about their camels. After our last engagement with the enemy (it was a severe struggle) we had 160 killed and wounded; and again carriage was in requisition. The spare horses of the cavalry were had recourse to; and I lent my own riding-horse to one poor fellow.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[277] “The view from the look-out in the city,” wrote Rawlinson in his journal, “was now very fine. The hillocks on the right were crowned with masses of horsemen, numbering apparently about 1500—a crowd of footmen occupied the rocky heights in front of our line and beyond, the shoulder of the Peer-Paee-Mal hill was covered with human beings thick as a flight of locusts, bodies of horse continually debouching round the shoulder and pushing on to join their comrades on the right.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[278] Nott, in his public despatches, was always somewhat chary of his praise, but in his private letters he delighted to dwell upon the achievements of his Sepoy regiments. Writing to Hammersley about this affair of the 29th of May, he said: “You will hear enough of our affair of the 29th with the enemy. The troops behaved well, and I am really surprised that our loss was so trifling; but I have remarked that the Afghans fire high. Our Sepoys are noble fellows—1000 are fully equal to 5000 Afghans or more. A detail of the 1st Cavalry, under Chamberlaine, behaved very well indeed. The enemy had 8000 men in position and 2000 in reserve. We had 1500 of all arms in the field. The enemy have broken up. I expect Wymer back in a day or two, when I will drive the rebels out of the Candahar district. How I should like to go to Caubul! It is wonderful that the people in Hindostan should be so panic-struck; and they seem to believe that our Sepoys cannot stand the Afghans. Now, I am quite sure, and should like to try it to-morrow, that 5000 Bengal Sepoys would lick 25,000 Afghans.”—[_General Nott to Lieutenant Hammersley: June 2, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[279] It is said that the widow of Akrum Khan, who was executed at Candahar in the preceding autumn, was in the field, riding her husband’s charger, and bearing a Ghazee standard. Lieutenant Rattray writes: “As the enemy drew near, a white object was observed in the centre of their front ranks, which seemed the rallying-point for the Ghazees, chieftains, Moollahs, kettle-drums, and standard-bearers. This proved to be no less a personage than the heroic widow of the slaughtered Akrum Khan. Throwing aside her timid nature with her ‘Boorkha,’ she had left the sacred privacy of the Zenana for the foremost rank in the battle-field, had bestrode her husband’s charger, and with his standard in her hand had assembled the tribes.”

[280] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ It appears that early in June the enemy’s suspicions of our intended withdrawal were confirmed in a curious manner, and that they seemed then to think of terms. Rawlinson says: “It appears that when the entire party of the Douranee chiefs were on the point of dissolution, a Hindostanee deserter joined the camp from the town, saying that he and his comrades had received letters from India, stating positively that orders had been sent up for our retirement. The man, in fact, explained in detail all our plans—the abandonment and destruction of Khelat—the march of the brigade to bring up camels from Quettah—and he even asserted that we were preparing to destroy the four corner bastions of the city and the gateways, and that we should leave in a month hence. This decided the chiefs on dropping their offers of accommodation, and holding on until events became more developed.”

[281] It is to be borne in mind that the supreme political authority had been vested by the Indian Government in the General. Nott, however, was not inclined to interfere in the political management of affairs, and Rawlinson continued to conduct them very much as he had done before the order was issued; but he referred all important questions to the General, who, for the most part, deferred to the opinions of his more experienced political associate.

[282] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._

[283] “The particular object to be gained by adopting this latter route it was difficult to divine, and the generally-received impression among the officers—perhaps because the one most desired—was that our General was to lead us on to Caubul, and that the mention of Dehra Ismael Khan was merely to throw dust in the eyes of the natives. Indeed, it was afterwards accounted for, whether justly or not, by this fact, that if the Lohaunies, upon whom we were dependent for a large proportion of our camels, had had an idea that our intention was to have marched on Ghuznee and Caubul, they would have declined accompanying our army.”—[_Neill’s Recollections._]

[284] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: Ghuznee, September 7. MS. Correspondence._

[285] “We accordingly marched on unmolested to our encamping-ground, and as we passed the source of the Turnuck, with the precipitous hill on our left, and the strong grounds intersected with bogs and canals, and supported by forts upon our right, every one acknowledged that there was no better defensible position on the entire road from Candahar to Caubul.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[286] “The General first learnt of what was going on about two o’clock, when an orderly came back from Captain Delamain reporting that no enemy was in sight, and asking for orders. The General immediately ordered the troops back. Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Brett galloped in, saying that about 2000 of the enemy had appeared in front of Captain Delamain, and were too strongly posted on some rising ground to be attacked. The General again ordered the troops back. A third orderly came galloping, to say the cavalry were engaged; and very shortly afterwards other men came from the field, declaring our Horse to be annihilated. The General now went out with all the troops, for the enemy’s force was reported to be above 7000, and we expected them to be flushed with their success. The horse artillery reached first, and Leslie took the command. We came up shortly afterwards, and found the cavalry still in a body, but having evidently suffered a defeat.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[287] “The General now turned down to some forts, from which some shots were reported to have been fired. The villagers all came out with Korans and ropes round their necks, praying for quarter. The General granted quarter, but sent in the light company of the 40th to search the houses. A shot was fired from some Ghazee in the place, and orders were then given for an indiscriminate massacre. The women and children were spared, but I suppose 100 of the villagers were butchered. I do not think the men were to blame—had they supposed themselves committed, they would have fled to the hills before the troops moved out, but no doubt there were _Ghazees_ in the place, desperate men who had no wish to save their own lives, provided they could destroy an infidel, and to the infatuation of these few men were the others sacrificed. Five Commissariat camels were found inside, so that parties in the fort had certainly been plundering; and as we approached the place, I remarked a Moollah from one of the Boorjes, evidently haranguing the people and urging them to die as Ghazees. It has been a most unsatisfactory business altogether, and a few more such affairs will compromise us seriously.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[288] Reeves and Bury—“Reeves was shot. Bury was cut down. Mackenzie received a severe sabre-wound in the elbow joint of his right arm.... Ravenscroft had been shot before the charge; but the wound turns out not to be dangerous. Malet had a very narrow escape. His hunting-cap (round which a shawl was wound) saved him, but he was slightly wounded in the face. Christie was ridden over in the confusion and lost his horse, but was remounted by one of his Native officers and saved.”—[_Major Rawlinson to Major Outram Ghuznee, September 7, 1842. MS. Records._]

[289] He declared that one of them was Nott’s.

[290] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: September 7, 1842. MS. Correspondence._

[291] Fired, however, from a height, the balls never ricocheted, and did but little mischief.

[292] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: September 7, 1842. MS. Records._

[293] _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._

[294] _General Nott’s Official Despatch._

[295] “The extensive village or town of Roza is situated about two miles from Ghuznee, and is lovely to behold. When this city was taken by the force under my command, Roza was full of inhabitants—men, women, and children. My troops were encamped close to its walls. Its gardens and its houses were full of property; its barns and farmyards were well stored; its orchards were loaded with fruit; its vineyards bent beneath a rich and ripe vintage; the property taken from our murdered soldiers of the Ghuznee garrison were seen piled in its dwellings.... Four days the victorious Candahar army remained encamped close to this village, with all these temptations before it, and at its mercy; but not a particle of anything was taken from the Afghans. The fruit brought for sale was paid for at a rate far above its value. No man nor living thing was injured.”—[_General Nott to the Adjutant-General: Lucknow, April 4, 1843._]

[296] “An active and spirited enemy might have annoyed us exceedingly during this movement; but the Afghans appeared to have lost all heart from the affair of the morning, and a little cavalry skirmishing was all that occurred.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[297] “The enemy appear to have been unable to traverse their big gun sufficiently to bring it to bear on our new position; and I suspect, also, they must have expended their shot, for the last two rounds which were fired as we were changing ground, and which fell short, were old shells of ours filled with earth.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[298] Colonel Palmer and the other British officers had been carried to Caubul.

[299] The engineer officers fathomed the great well in the citadel, and found fifty-one feet of water in it. The bottom of the well is believed to be below the level of the river, so that it could not be drained. The fear of a failure of water ought not, therefore, to have driven Palmer to surrender. He might easily have secured the possession of the well by running a covered way from it, and protecting it with his guns.

[300] “I visited Roza in the evening, took another copy of the Cufic inscription upon Mahmoud’s tomb, and had a long conversation with the Moollahs of the shrine. They assert that the tomb was constructed in its present state immediately after Mahmoud’s death; that it remained intact during the Ghuzneevide and Ghooride dynasties, but that when Ghenghiz Khan, in his pursuit of Jellaladeen, threatened Ghuznee, the inhabitants heaped the tomb over with earth and ruins to preserve it from desecration, and deserted the place. They further pretend that the tomb thus remained buried until the time of Sultan Abdool Rizak, the grandson or great-grandson of Timour, to whom the spot was revealed in a vision, and who excavated and repaired the place, and dedicated to it rich endowments of lands. The endowments remained, they say, till the time of Nadir, when they were resumed by the government, and since that time the establishment at the tomb has been dependent for support upon a few gardens attached to the village, and the voluntary offerings of devotees. The Moollahs uphold that the gates are really those of Somnauth, and that the inscriptions on the tomb date from the time of the son of Mahmoud; but this I hold to be morally impossible, for although the Cufic may possibly be of the form used in that age (which, however, I doubt), the inscription in the Nuskh character on the reverse of the sarcophagus, which details the precise date of the Sultan’s death, is obviously of a much later age. From many circumstances, I feel positively certain that the tomb does not boast a higher antiquity than that of Sultan Abdool Rizak, who built the present walls of Ghuznee, and who is himself buried in a rude mausoleum on the outskirts of the village of Roza. The gates, therefore, are certainly not those of Somnauth; but it is of course the interest of the Moollahs to keep up the delusion, and to affect for the spot the odour both of sandal and sanctity. I was much struck by the crowds of pilgrims, Mussulman officers in our ranks, who thronged the tomb during my visit there to make the _Ziarut_.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[301] Major Rawlinson’s account of the removal of the gates is very interesting. “We moved our camp,” he writes, “this morning from the west to the east of Roza, preparatory to fairly setting out on the march to Caubul; and during the day the measure was carried into effect of removing the gates of Mahmoud’s tomb. The work was performed by Europeans, and all possible delicacy was observed in not desecrating the shrine further than was absolutely necessary. The guardians of the tomb, when they perceived our object, retired to one corner of the court and wept bitterly; and when the removal was effected, they again prostrated themselves before the shrine and uttered loud lamentations. Their only remark was: ‘You are lords of the country, and can of course work your will on us; but why this sacrilege? Of what value can these old timbers be to you; while to us they are as the breath of our nostrils?’ The reply was: ‘The gates are the property of India—taken from it by one conqueror, they are restored to it by another. We leave the shrine undesecrated, and merely take our own.’ The sensation is less than might have been expected; and no doubt the Moollahs, who have had the guardianship of the tomb for generations in their family, will be the chief sufferers by the measure. I doubt if the Afghan tribes lately risen from obscurity to power, and holding the country rather as conquerors than citizens, possess that feeling of unity with each other, and identity with the interests they are supposed to protect, to view the abduction of the gates as a material outrage. The act may be made use of by the priesthood to excite fanaticism against us; but if the Barukzye chiefs could only retain their darling plaything, power, they would care little about the gates of Somnauth. With Shah Soojah the case was different. As the representative of the Suddozye family, aiming at the reconsolidation of monarchical power, he could not but view the demand of Runjeet Singh for the gates as a national indignity, powerfully affecting his own personal and political interests. At present, religious excitement is alone to be apprehended from our carrying off these trophies. I call them trophies, although assured that they are spurious, for the belief in their genuineness is, politically considered, the same as if they really were so.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[302] The enemy harassed our camp at night, firing on our picquets, and working us other annoyance. “I doubt the policy,” wrote Rawlinson, “of our firing a few forts and going no further. It exasperates the Afghans without intimidating them. I believe that we should either have abstained altogether from retribution, or have carried fire and sword before us.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[303] “The attack upon the heights and their subsequent abandonment,” says Major Rawlinson, “might have led to unpleasant consequences, had not the news of Akbar’s defeat arrived just in time to prevent Shumshoodeen from availing himself of this advantage. We were all most anxious to have gone straight on to Mydan, and to have attacked Shumshoodeen in his position, throwing the light companies along the heights to the left, which were already in our possession, the whole way down to the Mydan gorge; but the General would not stir beyond the place he had first marked out for his encampment, for fear of harassing the cattle.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[304] _MS. Notes._—See also the following from Rawlinson’s Journal: “As it appeared desirable that a direct communication should be established between the camps as soon as possible, I proposed to the General, on arriving at Urghundeh, that I should ride in and see General Pollock. My offer was accepted, and I immediately put on an Afghan dress, and escorted by the Parsewans who had come out to the camp, rode in through the town to the race-course, where I found the Jellalabad force encamped. I experienced no sort of difficulty or inconvenience on the road, being generally taken for an Afghan. I now learnt from General Pollock that there were no fresh orders from Lord Ellenborough regarding the establishment of an Afghan Government; in fact, that he was prohibited from pledging the government to recognise any one, but that still, as Futteh Jung had thrown himself on our protection, and that as it was absolutely necessary something like a government should be established, in order to enable us to obtain supplies (the Jellalabad Commissariat being entirely exhausted) as well as to facilitate our subsequent departure, General Pollock had resolved to give Futteh Jung such indirect assistance as he was able. In this view he had recommended the Kuzzilbash and Douranee chiefs to tender their allegiance to him, and he had so far given him his countenance as to accompany him to the Balla Hissar in the morning, and even, as the Shah elect took his seat on the throne, to fire a royal salute, ostensibly for the remounting of the British colours on the citadel of Caubul, but of course, in the apprehension of the Afghans, as an honorary recognition by us of the new monarch’s accession. I met Macgregor in my way to the camp, coming into the Balla Hissar with all the chiefs to make their salaam to Shah Futteh Jung as he is now called, and I now hear that Macgregor, who conducts all the political duties of General Pollock’s camp, endeavoured, in a private audience which he had of his Majesty after the Durbar, to come to an explanation with him regarding our inability to support him with men, money, or arms, and the necessity, in consequence, of his relying entirely on his own resources. At first sight, it appears to me out of the question that Futteh Jung should be able to hold his own after our departure, and I see no great object even in making the attempt, but I cannot yet form a proper judgment.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[305] Shakespear, with characteristic gallantry, had volunteered for this service. The Kuzzilbashes had tendered their services to Pollock.

[306] “_September 14._—As we find that the prisoners have certainly been carried off to Bameean, and the Kuzzilbashes are disposed to assist us in their recovery, while General Pollock is not likely to encounter further opposition on his march upon Caubul, it was suggested to the General to-day that he should despatch a brigade from Urghundeh, where the Bameean road strikes off, to form a support for our party, assisted by the Hazarehs, to fall back upon. He would not, however, listen to this proposal, declaring that he had only one object in view, that of marching his force to India _viâ_ Caubul, without turning to the right or left; and that he considered, from the tenor of all Lord Ellenborough’s despatches, the recovery of the prisoners to be a matter of indifference to government.”

“_September 15._—It was again to-day urged upon the General to send a brigade to Bameean, or in that direction, to assist in the rescue of the prisoners, but he seems to have made up his mind that he will not separate his force unless positively ordered to do so by higher authority.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[307] _Statement of Lieutenant Mayne—MS. Correspondence of Officers on the Staff of General Nott._—The only apologetic explanation of this which has yet reached me is to be found in the assertion, that Mayne’s escort crowded on Nott’s staff. Mayne posted his horsemen on the reverse flank, and it is his belief that they were not in the way of the staff.

[308] _MS. Correspondence._

[309] They had been joined by their fellow-captives from Ghuznee. See note in the Appendix. It may be mentioned that John Conolly, the last of three ill-fated brothers, had died at Caubul on the 7th of August, deeply deplored by all who had served with him in Afghanistan.

[310] “_August 28._—Every hamlet and fort we passed after daybreak poured forth its inhabitants to stare and wonder at the Feringhee prisoners. Not an uncivil word or gesture have I ever heard or seen in all our wanderings; but, on the contrary, many a sympathising word and look has been expressed, and especially by people who had previously any knowledge of us.”

“_August 29._—On passing the above fort (of Mustapha Khan, Kuzzilbash), where Saleh Mahomed and I were the first to arrive, I was most agreeably surprised by the owner bringing out two or three large trays full of excellent cakes and sweetmeats, and begging I would distribute them among the ladies and children—expressing at the same time the most unfeigned sympathy for all of us. To people in our unfortunate situation, a civil word even is well appreciated, but such a mark of kindness as this worthy Persian showed us, is not easily forgotten. His very look bespoke him a man of generous and kindly feeling. Our little fellow-prisoners—both boys and girls—had such a feast as they have not had for many a day. On arriving at our bivouac, another Kuzzilbash, who had a fort close by, hearing from Ahmed Khan that I wanted to buy a horse, brought me one for sale. As I was, however, afraid of running out of funds, I told him my fears. His reply was, ‘I know you, and I will be satisfied with your note of hand. I am a relation of Naib Sheriff Khan.’ This was a mark of confidence I could not have expected in such dangerous times, when my life is not worth twenty-four hours’ purchase. I did not take the animal.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative. MS._]

[311] “The commandant of our guard appears very civil and inclined to oblige us in every possible way—at any rate he is so to me. I was quite delighted to hear him talk in such enthusiastic terms of my deceased and lamented friend Hopkins (his former commanding officer). On asking him why he deserted with his company to Dost Mahomed in September, 1840, his reply was, that he was disgusted with the abusive language used towards him by the European non-commissioned officers; and I do not doubt that this had a great effect in alienating him from our service, although certainly not the immediate cause of his desertion. Saleh Mahomed is a good-humoured, jolly fellow, and without any prejudices against us Kaffirs. He is a soldier of fortune, cares little whom he serves, has been to Bokhara, Yarkund, and was at the taking of Kokund a few months ago. Rode with him the whole march, and was much amused at his traveller’s tales. He is the greatest hero in his own estimation I ever came across. There is no end to his feats of valour, to which I am a ready listener, for two reasons: _firstly_, that I am amused; _secondly_, that he is flattered by my being so good a listener—by which I hope to turn him to good account.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._]

[312] The words of the bond may be thus translated:—

“We gentlemen, Pottinger, Johnson, Mackenzie, and Lawrence, in the presence of God and Jesus Christ, do enter into the following agreement with Saleh Mahomed Khan:—Whenever Saleh Mahomed Khan shall free us from the power of Mahomed Akbar Khan, we agree to make him (Saleh Mahomed Khan) a present of 20,000 rupees, and to pay him monthly the sum of 1000 rupees; likewise to obtain for him the command of a regiment in the government service; and we attest that this agreement is not false; and should we have spoken falsely then will we acknowledge ourselves to be false men, even in the presence of Kings.

“E. POTTINGER, C. MACKENZIE,
“H. JOHNSON, G. ST. P. LAWRENCE.”

—[_Translated from the counterpart of the Agreement given by Saleh Mahomed to Captain Johnson._]

[313] The agreement is thus worded:—“We, whose signatures are hereunto attached, do bind ourselves to pay into the hands of Major Pottinger and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, on condition of our release being effected by an arrangement with Saleh Mahomed Khan, such a number of months’ pay and allowances as they shall demand from us—such pay and allowances to be rated by the scale at which we shall find ourselves entitled to draw from the date of our release from captivity. We, who are married, do further agree to pay the same amount for our wives and families as for ourselves. We, whose husbands are absent, do pledge ourselves in proportion to our husbands’ allowances.” The agreement is drawn up on half-a-sheet of foolscap paper, in the hand-writing of Captain Johnson. The names of all the prisoners (officers and ladies) are attached to it; the first being that of Brigadier Shelton. There is a codicil to it, signed by Lady Macnaghten and Mrs. Sturt, in these words:—“We, who are widows, do pledge ourselves to pay such sums as may be demanded from us by Major Pottinger and Captains Lawrence and Johnson in furtherance of the above scheme”—“In our prison at Bameean: 11th September, 1842.”—[_MS. Records._]

[314] The European soldiers at Bameean were so reduced by sickness as to be scarcely able to hold a musket. And they had lost all heart.

[315] “In order,” says Captain Johnson, from whose Narrative these details are taken, “to show as imposing a front as possible, there was no rear rank.”

[316] Seeing that Saleh’s Mahomed’s men wore our English belts and pouches, the soldiers of Nott’s division were disposed to fall upon them. It was intimated to the commandant that it would be expedient to remove them out of the way of danger.

[317] “On passing the corner of the street where I formerly lived, I could not forego the desire of looking on the ruins of a house in which I had passed a period of two years of happiness. Although I had expected to see the whole place unroofed, I was not prepared for such a scene of desolation. Not one brick was left standing on another in either my house or that of Sir Alexander Burnes (the adjoining one). They were nothing but a heap of dirt, covering the mouldering remains of our unfortunate people. A spot was pointed out to me in Sir Alexander’s garden as that in which his body had been interred.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._]

[318] “_September 19._—Our Sepoys and camp-followers, taking their cue, I fancy, from their officers, are very unruly, and commit extensive depredations on the lands and villages near our camp; and as the property thus plundered chiefly belongs to the Kuzzilbash chiefs, General Pollock, who relies mainly on these people for the consolidation of the new government, is subject to great embarrassment. I have a sort of misgiving that Caubul will, after all, be destroyed. In the present state of feeling, any accidental quarrel would lead to a general rush upon the town, and the Sepoys once there, massacre and conflagration would assuredly follow. General Pollock, by proclamations of encouragement, has been endeavouring to persuade the Caubullees to return to their houses and re-open their shops; but, after all that has happened, it is difficult to persuade the townspeople that we do not aim at retribution, and the proceedings about our camp at Char Deh are anything but calculated to allay their suspicions; the city continues, therefore, more than half closed, and supplies are procurable with difficulty.”

“_September 20._—Our men have been plundering to-day as usual about the camp, and in some scuffle which took place at Deh Afshur, four of the Kuzzilbashes, with Khassim Khan, a chief, were slain by the Sepoys.”

“_September 21._—The fort of Mahomed Meerza, one of our worst enemies, was given up to plunder, and we did not even respect the property at Aliabad, which belongs to Gholam Mahomed Khan, the lately appointed minister.... The townspeople had returned in small numbers to the town, and had re-opened their shops; but owing to the affair at Deh Afshur, I believe, a panic seized the people, and every one fled, believing that orders had been issued for a general massacre.”

“_September 22._—The depredations of the Sepoys and followers from this camp continue, notwithstanding all the efforts that are made to repress them. The Kuzzilbashes cannot help believing that we encourage these excesses, and in consequence they are not half satisfied of General Pollock’s sincerity.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[319] The General forwarded a translation of the letter to Nott, who sent it back with his comments. The charges and the denials appear in the Appendix as they were forwarded to Pollock’s camp.

[320] He asked Mayne, on the 17th, when that officer appeared in his camp, as mentioned at page 347, how many days’ supplies General Pollock had with him? and when Mayne replied that he believed the General had about a week’s supplies for his troops, “What business, then,” asked Nott, “has General Pollock up at Caubul with only a week’s supplies?” Mayne, of course, made no answer.

[321] A considerable body of Kuzzilbashes, under the command of Shah-zadah Shahpoor and Khan Shereen Khan, the whole in charge of Captain Colin Mackenzie, had accompanied M’Caskill’s force, and co-operated with much effect, especially in rescuing a number of sepoys and camp-followers of Elphinstone’s force from slavery. General Pollock had appointed Captain Mackenzie to this important duty in consequence of Lord Ellenborough’s request that he would select that officer or John Conolly, if within his reach, for any political mission that might be called for, even to the important duty of accompanying General Nott’s force, if it were expedient for that officer to return by a different route from Pollock’s. On reaching Hindostan, however, Mackenzie met with the same neglect and injustice as the other “children of another Government.”

[322] See Papers in the Appendix.

[323] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._

[324] “On the 9th our engineers set to work to blow up and destroy the _Char Chutta_. The cry went forth that Caubul was given up to plunder. Both camps rushed into the city, and the consequence has been the almost total destruction of all parts of the town, except the Gholam-Khana quarter and the Balla Hissar.... Numbers of people (about 4000 or 5000) had returned to Caubul, relying on our promises of protection—rendered confident by the comparative immunity they had enjoyed during the early part of our sojourn here, and by the appearance, ostentatiously put forth, of an Afghan Government. They had many of them re-opened their shops. These people have been now reduced to utter ruin. Their goods have been plundered, and their houses burnt over their heads. The Hindoos in particular, whose numbers amount to some 500 families, have lost everything they possess, and they will have to beg their way to India in rear of our columns. The Chundarwal has had a narrow escape. Safeguards have been placed at the different gates; but I doubt not if our parties of plunderers would not have forced an entrance had not the Gholam Khana stood to their arms, and showed and expressed a determination to defend their property to the last.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]