Chapter XIII

THE RUSSIAN BEAR AT BAY--THE LAST ACT OF THE
TRAGIC WAR.

Nearer and nearer to the great fortress crept now the works of the allied armies. The grip of death was tightening on the brave defenders of Sebastopol.

Brave? ah yes; give them their due. Their sufferings at this time were greater even than our own, and under our fire at least two hundred of them fell every day.

Around and in the ruined heaps of their batteries the unburied dead still lay in heaps, and sickness, too, was rife.

But now the great and final tug of war must shortly come.

Could nothing be done even yet by their field forces? This is the question the enemy asked himself.

A council of war was held on the ninth of August, and at this it was determined to attack our allies on the upper part of the river Tchernaya.

This was to be the last stand of the Bear at bay--in the open, that is.

The French had 18,000 men and 48 guns on the heights of Fedioukine; the Italians or Sardinians--our new allies--were near Tchorgoum, with 9,000 men and 36 guns; in the valley to the rear were the Turks, with a reserve of 10,000.

The Russians, under Gortschakoff, held the M'Kenzie heights, and on the night of the fifteenth of August they were reinforced by regiments from the Belbek.

The Russian army was divided into two. One wing, of 13,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, and 62 guns, was under command of General Read, and was on the right. It moved on to attack the French. General Liprandi had the left wing, divided into two columns, one of which followed Read; the other, commanded by Belgrade, was ordered to descend in another direction, and halt on the road to Tchorgoum.

Next day, at sunrise, the battle was commenced by the driving in of the Sardinian outposts. Things opened fairly well for Gortschakoff. But the goddess Fortuna had surely deserted the Russian cause; for General Read, mistaking an order, suddenly advanced upon the French without their position having been cannonaded.

Both his divisions were driven back with great slaughter, and although the battle raged long after this, as soon as Gortschakoff saw that the French reserves, as well as the Turks, were being hurried up for action, he knew that all hope was past, and so retreated.

The losses on the French and Sardinian sides amounted to nearly 2,000 killed and wounded; but those of the Russians showed how terrible had been the slaughter entailed by General Read's mistake. Three general officers and 36 others were killed, 160 officers were wounded, and of the rank and file over 6,000 were killed or wounded. Would Gortschakoff, now that he saw his game was almost lost, give up Sebastopol?

At first he was greatly disheartened by the result of the battle, and evidently intended to do so; but he changed his mind, after a visit to the interior of the fortress itself.

This visit of Russia's great general to Sebastopol would have been called by sailors an inspection.

The only marvel is that, after the ghastly sights he witnessed therein, he did not, if only out of pity for the poor, brave defenders, give up the place at once.

The city proper had been demolished, houses were in ruins, public buildings destroyed, whole streets reduced to chaos. Dismounted guns could not be replaced even at night, owing to the fire of our mortar batteries; the embrasures could not be repaired; nor could the parapets that, cracked and broken, lay in the ditches, be rebuilt. But, worst of all, the poor wounded men that had fallen by day had to lie amidst heaps of slain till night permitted their being removed. It is needless to say that the hospitals were crowded with sick and wounded; for the death-rate at that time, from shot and shell and sickness, must have been from 700 to 800 every day.

And in spite of all this, Gortschakoff determined to re-garrison with half his army from M'Kenzie heights, and defend the works to the very last extremity, as "the only honourable course that remained to him."

The last words are the tactician's own. And yet he knew that in--at the outside--six weeks' time he must succumb, and yield up Sebastopol. So these tactics were surely unwise; nor was Gortschakoff's resolve in accordance with true honour.

I need say nothing about the saving of life that the capitulation of Sebastopol, just after the battle of Tchernaya, would have effected to the allies. The Russian general could not have been expected to think of these, except to wish them utterly annihilated. But what I do say--and I believe that my young readers will agree with me--is that, in abandoning the great fortress at this time, Gortschakoff could have sheathed a sword of honour; while, by continuing the contest, the sword which he finally sheathed was one incrusted with murder.

* * * * *

The bombardment was now continued, and erelong the Malakoff tower and the works adjoining were silenced.

Our trenches were difficult to work, and their advancement towards the Redan was soon put an end to by the rocks. As the French soil was soft, they had worked up to within about forty yards of the Malakoff. Further they could not get.

It was now agreed at a council of war that the time had come for the final and grand assault. That chosen by Pelissier for the advance of the French was exactly at noon, at which hour he knew the relief of the works he had to take was always carried out--one garrison being first marched out, and then the other or fresh one marched in. At noon, therefore, the Malakoff would have fewer defenders.

A glance, at the map or plan will show you the work the French had before them, which was certainly no child's play. One division was told off to attack the Malakoff, a second the Curtain, and a third the Little Redan. These would be supported by brigades.

The Central Bastion was to be attacked by no less than four divisions well supported. These were to break through the rear of the bastion or works near it, and capture the Flagstaff Bastion.

Everything being arranged, the cannonade was once more resumed on the fifth of September.

It continued on the 6th and 7th, the mortars roaring on all night. It was, indeed, a circle of fire--a _feu d'enfer_.

Todleben tells us that a mortar set fire to a line-of-battle ship on the night of the 7th, which burned till nearly morning, and that the blue and ghastly light from which--for the ship contained a large cargo of spirits--shone along the ramparts, making on the minds of the brave defenders a most painful impression.

Our own special work was the capture of the Redan, and it was, considering our isolated position and want of cover, almost a forlorn hope, being undertaken chiefly, we are told, as a mere distraction of the enemy in favour of the French.

General Codrington himself was deputed to make the attack with his Light Division, and with the Second Division, commanded by Markham--the whole numbering about 3,000 men. Other parts of the same division, and also the Third and Fourth Divisions, were held in reserve in the third parallel.

* * * * *

Hardly had it gone twelve o'clock on the eighth of September when Bosquet's first line made a wild dash for the Malakoff. Pelissier had certainly chosen his time right well, for not a shot was fired upon Bosquet's men, so completely taken by surprise were the Russians. The Zouaves were first in the attack, and right quickly did they rush the ditch and mount the escarp; those within were speedily put to sword or bayonet, and this end of the great fort was thus taken completely.

But they were not to have such easy work after all, for each traverse or cross-work, running for 380 yards behind the tower, had to be fought for separately and taken singly.

The Russians had been living in caves and holes dug beneath the batteries, and they quickly came to the defence of the fort. The struggle was terrible and bloody in the extreme. Often when the Zouaves had taken a traverse they were hurled back; only, however, to rest for a minute, and again to dash in.

Meanwhile MacMahon's forces had stormed the place from the eastern face, and broken in at the rear of the traverses. Attacked thus, both in front and rear, soon the whole was in possession of our French allies.

But again and again Russian reserves were hurried up to retake this fort. But all in vain; and so, seeing the hopelessness of the attempt, Gortschakoff finally caused his troops to retire.

This fearful tulzie had lasted for four hours, and deeply and dearly had the brave Frenchmen paid for their victory, over 3,000 having been killed and wounded.

The brigades sent against the Little Redan and the Curtain were not so successful; for though they stormed and took the first lines of these works, they found other lines of defence stretching behind, and these were so strongly defended by the Russian field batteries and by the ships, that the French were decimated, and obliged at last to withdraw to their trenches, which by this time were crowded with their wounded. So ended the chief French attacks.

* * * * *

But how about our own attack upon the Redan? The question must be faced. It is asked; let it be answered. We were _beaten_. Certainly we may put the blame on the mismanagement of the attack, and on the forces and difficulties against us. And we can point to the bravery of our soldiers and sailors in crossing the open space, amidst a _feu d'enfer_ of grape shot, round shot, case, and musketry. We even got into the work; but the reserves did not come to time, and so we retreated--I fear not in the best of order--suffering as much in the retreat as in the advance.

Had not the French spiked the guns in the Malakoff which commanded the Redan, but turned them against that fort, things might have ended in a different way.

As soon as possible after regaining their trenches, the British, beaten out of the Redan, recommenced their fire against that fort. The capture of it was postponed till next day, when, English regiments having failed to dispose of it, Sir Colin Campbell and his brave and indomitable Highlanders were to have had a chance. Being myself a Scot and a Celt, may I be forgiven, even by those of my readers who dwell south of the Tweed, for believing that the kilties would have been a little more successful?

The left wing of the French, I should inform the reader, failed in all their attacks on the flanking works of the Central Bastion, and were finally ordered by General Pelissier to desist in their fruitless efforts.

Meanwhile, even before sunset, Gortschakoff was withdrawing his forces across a bridge that had purposely been built, and by means of boats to the north and therefore safe side of the great harbour. He had begun to retreat early in the afternoon, and before next day the whole army was across, and with them as many of the wounded as could be borne.

But what a night of terror and suffering that must have been to 2,000 desperately-wounded men, who were left behind in a huge hospital all helpless and alone! For throughout the darkness of night explosion after explosion of the magazines took place--thirty-five in all were blown up by the enemy--and the city took fire in every place where there was anything to burn, adding to the scene a terror that is indescribable. The last explosion was the loudest and most dreadful of all, and with it the very earth shook all around. It was the blowing up of the bridge.

Our losses were very great, those of the French treble, while altogether the Russians lost over 13,000 men.

But about those 2,000 wounded men? Ah! one's heart bleeds to think of their sad story. The doctors must, in many cases, have rushed in panic from the poor wretches without completing their operations; for when, forty-eight hours after the great day of battle, the Russian vessel _Vladimir_, under a flag of truce, came over to beg for the rest of their wounded, only 500 of them were found alive--many whose limbs were but half amputated being found lying face down in their own blood on the floor, where they had died in agony unutterable.

All the ships of war that had not been sunk were burned by the Russians themselves, and as their blackened and fiery hulls sunk hissing beneath the water, the curtain may have been said to drop on the last scene of this tragic and terrible war.