Chapter VI: Conclusion

_Against the Law of Leptines_ (355 B.C.). One might pursue
the argument and show that in no single respect is the law
proper or expedient for you; but, that you may comprehend
the whole question at once, and that I may have done
speaking, do what I now advise. Make your comparison;
consider what will happen to you if you condemn the law,
and what if you do not; then keep in mind what you think
will be the consequence in either event, that you may
choose the better course. If now you condemn the law, as we
advise, the deserving will have their rights from you; and
if there be any undeserving party, as I grant there may be,
such a one, besides being deprived of his honour, will
suffer what penalty you think proper according to the
amended statute, while the commonwealth will appear
faithful, just, true to all men. Should you decide in its
favour, which I trust you will not, the good will be
wronged on account of the bad, the undeserving will be the
cause of misfortune to others, and suffer no punishment
themselves, while the commonwealth (contrary to what I said
just now) will be universally esteemed faithless, envious,
base. It is not meet, O Athenians, that for so foul a
reproach you should reject fair and honourable advantages.
Remember, each of you individually will share in the
reputation of your common judgment. It is plain to the
bystanders and to all men that in the court Leptines is
contending with us, but in the mind of each of you jurymen
generosity is arrayed against envy, justice against
iniquity, all that is virtuous against all that is base. If
you follow the wiser counsels, and give judgment in my
favour, you will yourselves have the credit of a proper
decision, and will have voted what is best for the
commonwealth; and should occasion ever arise, you will not
lack men willing at their own risk to defend you.

You must give your earnest attention to these things, and
be careful that you are not forced into error. Many a time,
O Athenians, instead of it being proved to you that
measures were just, they have been extorted from you by the
clamour and violence and impudence of the speakers. Let not
this happen now; it would not be well. What you have
determined to be just, keep in mind and remember until you
vote, that you may give your votes conscientiously against
evil counsellors. I marvel when you punish with death those
who debase the coin, if you will give ear to persons who
render the whole commonwealth false and treacherous. You
will not surely! O Jupiter and the gods!

I have nothing more to add, as you seem fully to understand
what has been said.

_On the Navy Boards_ (354 B.C.). Not to trouble you, men of
Athens, with over-many words, I will give you a summary of
my advice and retire. I bid you prepare yourselves against
existing enemies, and I declare that with this same force
you should resist the king and all other people, if they
attempt to injure you; but never inflict an injustice
either in word or deed. Let us look that our actions, and
not our speeches on the platform, be worthy of our
ancestors. If you pursue this course you will do service
not only to yourselves but also to them who give the
opposite counsel, since you will not be angry with them
afterward for your errors committed now.

A COMPLETE SPEECH

_The First Olynthiac_ (349 B.C.). I believe, men of Athens,
you would give much to know what is the true policy to be
adopted in the present matter of inquiry. This being the
case, you should be willing to hear with attention those
who offer you their counsel. Besides, that you will have
the benefit of all preconsidered advice, I esteem it part
of your good fortune that many fit suggestions will occur
to some speakers at the moment, so that from them all you
may easily choose what is profitable.

The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud
that you must yourselves take these affairs in hand if you
care for their success. I know not how we seem disposed in
the matter. My own opinion is, vote succour immediately,
and make the speediest preparations for sending it off from
Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before;
send also ambassadors to announce this, and watch the
proceedings. For the danger is that this man, being
unscrupulous and clever at turning events to account,
making concessions when it suits him, threatening at other
times (his threats may well be believed), slandering us and
urging our absence against us, may convert and wrest to his
use some of our main resources. Though, strange to say,
Athenians, the very cause of Philip's strength is a
circumstance favorable to you. His having it in his sole
power to publish or conceal his designs, his being at the
same time general, sovereign, paymaster, and everywhere
accompanying his army, is a great advantage for quick and
timely operations in war; but for a peace with the
Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it has a contrary
effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians that now they are
fighting not for glory or for a slice of territory, but to
save their country from destruction and servitude. They
know how he treated those Amphipolitans who surrendered to
him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him admittance.
And generally, I believe, a despotic power is mistrusted by
free states, especially if their dominions are adjoining.
All this being known to you, Athenians, all else of
importance considered, I say you must take heart and
spirit, and apply yourselves more than ever to the war,
contributing promptly, serving personally, leaving nothing
undone. No plea or pretence is left you for declining your
duty. What you were all so clamorous about, that the
Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has of
itself come to pass, and in a way most advantageous to you.
For, had they undertaken the war at your instance, they
might have been slippery allies, with minds but half
resolved, perhaps; but since they hate him on a quarrel of
their own, their enmity is like to endure on account of
their fears and their wrongs. You must not then, Athenians,
forego this lucky opportunity, nor commit the error which
you have often done heretofore. For example, when we
returned from succouring the Euboeans, and Hierax and
Stratocles of Amphipolis came to this platform, urging us
to sail and receive possession of their city, if we had
shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the safety of
Euboea you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of
all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that
Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and the other places
(not to waste time in enumerating them) were besieged, had
we to any one of these in the first instance carried prompt
and reasonable succour, we should have found Philip far
more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting
the present and imagining the future would shift for
itself, we, O men of Athens, have exalted Philip, and made
him greater than any King of Macedon ever was. Here, then,
is come a crisis, that of Olynthus, self-offered to the
state, inferior to none of the former. And methinks, men of
Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done
for us, notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might
with reason be grateful to them. Our numerous losses in way
may justly be charged to our own negligence; but that they
happened not long ago, and that an alliance to
counterbalance them is open to our acceptance, I must
regard as manifestations of divine favour. It is much the
same as in money matters. If a man keep what he gets he is
thankful to fortune; if he lose it by imprudence, he loses
withal his memory of the obligations. So in political
affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget even
the good which the gods send them, for every prior event is
judged commonly by the last result. Wherefore, Athenians,
we must be exceedingly careful of our future measures, that
by amendment therein we may efface the shame of the past.
Should we abandon these men too, and Philip reduce
Olynthus, let any one tell me what is to prevent him
marching where he pleases? Does any of you, Athenians,
compute or consider the means by which Philip, originally
weak, has become great? Having first taken Amphipolis, then
Pydna, Potidaea next, Methone afterward, he invaded
Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pherae, Pagasae,
Magnesia, everywhere exactly as he pleased, he departed for
Thrace, where, after displacing some kings and establishing
others, he fell sick; again recovering, he lapsed not into
indolence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. I omit
his expeditions to Illyria and Paeonia, that against
Arymbas, and some others.

Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That you,
Athenians, may feel and understand both the folly of
continually abandoning one thing after another, and the
activity which forms part of Philip's habit and existence,
which makes it impossible for him to rest content with his
achievements. If it be his principle ever to do more than
he has done, and yours to apply yourselves vigorously to
nothing, see what the end promises to be. Heavens! which of
you is so simple as not to know that the war yonder will
soon be here if we are careless? And should this happen, I
fear, O Athenians, that as men who thoughtlessly borrow on
large interest, after a brief accommodation, lose their
estate, so will it be with us; found to have paid dear for
our idleness and self-indulgence, we shall be reduced to
many hard and unpleasant shifts, and struggle for the
salvation of our country.

To censure, I may be told, is easy for any man; to show
what measures the case requires is the part of a
counsellor. I am not ignorant, Athenians, that frequently
when any disappointment happens you are angry, not with the
parties in fault, but with the last speakers on the
subject; yet never, with a view to self-protection, would I
suppress what I deem for your interest. I say, then, you
must give a twofold assistance here: first, save the
Olynthians their towns, and send our troops for that
purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's country with ships and
other troops; omit either of these courses, and I doubt the
expedition will be fruitful. For, should he, suffering your
incursion, reduce Olynthus, he will easily march to the
defense of his kingdom; or, should you only throw succour
into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out of danger at home,
keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he must in time
prevail over the besieged. Your assistance, therefore, must
be effective and twofold.

Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money:
you have money, Athenians; you have a larger military fund
than any people, and you receive it just as you please. If
you will assign this to your troops you need no further
supply; otherwise you need a further, or rather you have
none at all. How then? some man may exclaim; do you move
that this be a military fund? Verily, not I. My opinion,
indeed, is that there should be soldiers raised, and a
military fund, and one and the same regulation for
receiving and performing what is due; only you just without
trouble take your allowance for the festivals. It remains,
then, I imagine, that all just contribute; if much be
wanted, much; if little, little. Money must be had; without
it nothing proper can be done. Other persons propose other
ways and means. Choose which you think expedient, and put
hands to work while it is yet time.

It may be well to consider and calculate how Philip's
affairs now stand. They are not, as they appear, or as an
inattentive observer might pronounce, in very good trim, or
in the most favourable position. He would never have begun
this war had he imagined he must fight. He expected to
carry everything on the first advance, and has been
mistaken. This disappointment is one thing that troubles
and dispirits him; another is the state of Thessaly. That
people were always, you know, treacherous to all men, and
just as they ever have been they are to Philip. They have
resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasae, and have
prevented his fortifying Magnesia; and I was told they
would no longer allow him to take the revenue of their
harbours and markets, which they say should be applied to
the public business of Thessaly, not received by Philip.
Now, if he be deprived of this fund, his means will be much
straitened for paying his mercenaries. And surely we must
suppose that Paeonians and Illyrians, and all such people,
would rather be free and independent than under subjection,
for they are unused to obedience, and the man is a tyrant.
So report says, and I can well believe it, for undeserved
success leads weak-minded men into folly; and thus it
appears often that to maintain prosperity is harder than to
acquire it. Therefore must you, Athenians, looking on his
difficulty as your opportunity, assist cheerfully in the
war, sending embassies where required, taking arms
yourselves, exciting all other people, for if Philip got
such an opportunity against us, and there was a war on our
frontier, how eagerly think you he would attack you! Then
are you not ashamed that the very damage which you suffer,
if he had the power, you dare not seize the moment to
inflict on him?

And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now
the choice whether you shall fight there, or he in your
country. If Olynthus hold out, you will fight there and
distress his dominions, enjoying your own home in peace. If
Philip take that city, who shall then prevent his marching
here? Thebans? I wish it be not too harsh to say they will
be ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who can not
defend their own country without your assistance. Or some
other ally? But, good sir, he will not desire! Strange,
indeed, if, what he is thought foolhardy for prating now,
this he would not accomplish if he might. As to the vast
difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs
no argument. If you were obliged to be out yourselves for
thirty days only, and take the necessaries for camp-service
from the land (I mean without an enemy therein), your
agricultural population would sustain, I believe, greater
damage than what the whole expense of the late war amounted
to. But if a war should come, what damage must be expected?
There is the insult, too, and the disgrace of the thing,
worse than any damage to right-thinking men.

On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our
succour, and drive off the war yonder; the rich, that,
spending a little from the abundance which they happily
possess, they may enjoy the residue in security; the young,
that, gaining military experience in Philip's territory,
they may become redoubtable champions to preserve their
own; the orators, that they may pass a good account of
their statesmanship, for on the result of measures will
depend your judgment of their conduct. May it for every
cause by prosperous!

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "Speech-Making," page 1. By Edwin Gordon Lawrence (The
A. S. Barnes Company).

[2] St. Matthew, vi:22.