Chapter V: How the Czecho-Slovaks at Home Assisted the Allies

From the foregoing chapters it is clear that by continuous misrule and by the attempt to reduce the Czecho-Slovak nation to impotence through terrorism and extermination during this war, the Habsburgs have created a gulf between themselves and their Czecho-Slovak subjects which can never again be bridged over. Realising this, and seeing that since Austria has voluntarily sold herself to Berlin their only hope for a better future lies in the destruction of the political system called Austria-Hungary, the Czecho-Slovaks have from the beginning staked their all on the victory of the Entente, towards which they have contributed with all possible means at their disposal.

1. Since they could not think of revolting, the Czecho-Slovaks at home tried to paralyse the power of Austria in every way. Not only individuals but also Czech banks and other institutions refused to subscribe to the war loans. Their newspapers published official reports with reluctance, and between the lines laid stress on news unfavourable to Austria so as to keep up the spirit of the people. Czech peasants refused to give up provisions, and thus the Czechs, who already before the war boycotted German goods, accelerated the present economic and financial ruin of Austria.

2. Politically, too, they contributed to the internal confusion of the Dual Monarchy, and to-day their opposition forms a real menace to the existence of Austria. Czech political leaders unanimously refused to sign any declaration of loyalty to Austria, and they never issued a single protest against Professor Masaryk and his political and military action abroad. On several occasions they even publicly expressed their sympathies and approval of this action. For nearly three years they prevented the opening of the Austrian Parliament which would have been to their prejudice. Only after the Russian Revolution, when Austria began to totter and her rulers were apprehensive lest events in Russia should have a repercussion in the Dual Monarchy, did the Czechs decide to speak out and exerted pressure to bring about the opening of the Reichsrat, where they boldly declared their programme, revealed Austria's rule of terror during the first three years of war, and by their firm opposition, which they by and by induced the Poles and Yugoslavs to imitate, they brought about a permanent political deadlock, menacing Austria's very existence internally and weakening her resistance externally.

3. But the most important assistance the Czechs rendered to the Allies was their refusal to fight for Austria.

Out of 70,000 prisoners taken by Serbia during the first months of the war, 35,000 were Czechs. Of these, 24,000 perished during the Serbian retreat, and 8000 died of typhoid fever and cholera at Asinara. The remaining 3000 were transferred to France and voluntarily joined the Czecho-Slovak army.

Over 300,000 Czecho-Slovaks surrendered voluntarily to Russia whom they regarded as their liberator. Unfortunately the old regime in Russia did not always show much understanding of their aspirations. They were scattered over Siberia, cut off from the outer world, and often abandoned to the ill-treatment of German and Magyar officers. It is estimated that over thirty thousand of them perished from starvation. It was only after great efforts, after the Russian Revolution, and especially when Professor Masaryk himself went to Russia, that the Czecho-Slovak National Council succeeded in organising a great part of them into an army. Finally, when Austria desired to strike a death-blow at Italy in 1918, and began again to employ Slav troops, she failed again, and this failure was once more to a large extent caused by the disaffection of her Slav troops, as is proved by the Austrian official statements. Indeed, whenever Austria relied solely on her own troops she was always beaten, even by the "contemptible" Serbians. The Czechs and other Slavs have greatly contributed to these defeats by their passive resistance. It was only the intervention of German troops which saved Austria from an utter collapse in 1915, and which prevented the Czechs from completing their aim of entirely disorganising the military power of Austria. Slav regiments have since then been intermixed with German and Magyar troops. The Slavs receive their ammunition only at the front, where they are placed in the foremost ranks with Germans or Magyars behind them, so that they are exposed to a double fire if they attempt to surrender. Nevertheless, up to 1916 some 350,000 Czechs out of a total of 600,000 in the Austrian army surrendered to the Allies.

4. From the very beginning of the war Czech soldiers showed their real feelings. They were driven to fight against the Russians and Serbs who were their brothers by race and their sincere and devoted friends. They were driven to fight for that hated Austria which had trampled their liberties underfoot for centuries past, and for a cause which they detested from the bottom of their hearts. They were driven to fight in the interests of their German and Magyar enemies against their Slav brothers and friends under terrible circumstances.

In September, 1914, the 8th Czech Regiment refused to go to the front until threatened by the German troops. The 11th Czech Regiment of Pisek refused to march against Serbia and was decimated. The 36th Regiment revolted in the barracks and was massacred by German troops. The 88th Regiment, which made an unsuccessful attempt to surrender to Russia, was shot down by the Magyar Honveds. A similar fate befell the 13th and 72nd Slovak Regiments.

On the other hand, many Czech troops succeeded in surrendering. The 35th Regiment of Pilsen went over to the Russians in a body half-an-hour after arriving at the front. Soon after, the 28th Regiment of Prague surrendered _en masse_, having been "fetched" by the Czechs fighting on the Russian side. Immediately afterwards the Austrian commander-in-chief issued an order of the day in which he declared.

"On April 3, 1915, almost the whole of the 28th Regiment surrendered
without fighting to a single enemy battalion.... This disgraceful act
not only destroys the reputation of this regiment, but necessitates its
name being struck off the list of our army corps, until new deeds of
heroism retrieve its character. His Apostolic Majesty has accordingly
ordered the dissolution of this regiment, and the deposition of its
banners in the army museum."

And indeed "new deeds of heroism" did follow. A fresh battalion was founded composed of Czech youths who were sent to the Isonzo front and exposed in a dangerous position to deadly artillery fire. Almost the whole battalion was thus unscrupulously wiped out. Only eighteen of them survived. This was followed by a new imperial order saying that the disgrace of the 28th Regiment was "atoned for" by the "sacrifice" of this regiment on the Isonzo.

As regards Italy, over 20,000 Czechs surrendered voluntarily on the Italian front up to 1917, and 7000 during the last offensive on the Piave in June, 1918. Of recent cases we need mention only the "treachery of Carzano," where, on September 18, 1917, some Czech officers went over to the Italians, communicated to them the Austrian plans of campaign and led them against the Austrians whose front was thus successfully broken through. This incident was not the only one of its kind. It has been repeated several times by Czech officers whenever they found an opportunity of going over to the Italians. During the offensive of June, 1918, the Austrian press openly attributed the Austrian failure to "Czech treachery," asserting that the plan of the offensive was communicated to the Italian headquarters staff by Czecho-Slovak officers. This the Austrian military authorities themselves admitted later, when they published the following official statement, which appeared in the German press on July 28:

"On the morning of June 15, we started a vigorous offensive on the
whole front between the Tyrolese mountains and the Adriatic, with a
power that can be attained only by complete co-operation of all the
units and with an accurate execution and a common and uniform action.
But, just at the beginning of the attack, it became apparent that the
enemy were making a counter-attack according to a well-defined plan, as
in the case of a projected vigorous offensive. It was also found out
that the enemy was perfectly aware of the extent, the day and the hour
of our attack. The intended surprise, so important for the success of
an offensive, has thus failed. In due course Italy also obtained, from
documents which some deserters handed to the Italian high command,
information which gave her a sufficiently precise idea of our
dispositions. English, French and Italian officers and men captured by
us declare unanimously that their regiments were advised on the evening
of June 14 that the Austrian offensive would start at two o'clock on
the following morning.

"The exact time of the beginning of our offensive must have been
betrayed by _Yugoslav and Czech deserters_. The enemy took steps
against the bombardment by means of gas, which was expected. These
steps later proved insufficient. As an example we may mention only the
following facts: The battalion of bersaglieri received, at 3.20 on June
14, a quantity of ammunition at 72 to 240 cartridges per man. The
Pinerolo Brigade took up fighting position at 2 o'clock at night. An
order, captured late on July 14, said: 'According to reports received,
the enemy will commence early on June 15 their bombardment preparations
for attack. At midnight hot coffee and meat conserves will be
distributed. The troops will remain awake, armed and prepared to use
their gas-masks.'

"For some time now the Italian command have tried to disorganise our
troops by high treasonable propaganda. In the Italian prisoners-of-war
camps the Slavs are persuaded by promises and corruption to enlist in
the Czecho-Slovak army. This is done in a way prohibited by law. Their
ignorance of the international situation and their lack of news from
home, partly caused by Italian censorship, are exploited by means of
propaganda without scruples. An order of the 5th Italian Army Corps
(1658 Prot. R. J.) of May 14, 1918, refers to active propaganda by
Czecho-Slovak volunteers with the object of disorganising the
Austro-Hungarian army. The Italian military authorities on their part
deceive the Czecho-Slovaks by telling them of the continuous disorders
and insurrections in Bohemia. In the above-mentioned order it is
asserted that in the corps to which it is addressed, as well as in
other corps, some attempts of the Czecho-Slovak elements have been
successful in causing confusion among enemy ranks. _Some of our
Czecho-Slovak soldiers deserted and went over to the Italians_. Others
remained in touch with them and declared themselves ready to stay in
our positions as a source of ferment for future insurrections. Although
the high treason miscarried owing to the heroic resistance which our
troops, without distinction of nationality, offered to the enemy, it is
nevertheless true that some elements succumbed to the treacherous enemy
propaganda.

"The gunner Rudolf Paprikar, of the machine gun section, according to
reports of the 8th Army Corps jumped off the river bank into the Piave
below Villa Jacur and swam across under danger of being drowned. He
betrayed the position, strength and composition of his sector, and
through observation and spying, he acquired some valuable information
by which our projected attack against Montello was disclosed. Further,
he revealed to the enemy some very secret preparations for the crossing
of the river Piave, and also supplied him with plans of the
organisation of troops, battery positions, etc.

"The principal part in the treachery is attributed by the Italian high
command, not without reason, to Lieutenant Karel Stiny of an infantry
regiment, who deserted near Narenta. It appears from the detailed
Italian official report in which his statements are embodied, that he
betrayed all our preparations on the Piave and provided the enemy with
a great deal of most important information. Let us mention further that
Stiny in his mendacious statements to the Italian command about the
Austro-Hungarian situation at the front and in the interior, followed
the line of all traitors in order to appear in a favourable light. It
is characteristic that in his declaration about our offensive he said
that many Austro-Hungarian troops would have surrendered if it had not
been for the German and Bulgarian bayonets behind their backs.

"_It is proved by various documents to what extent the Czechs have
forgotten their honour and duty_. By breaking their oath to Austria and
her emperor and king, they have also forgotten all those who were with
them at the front, and they are responsible for the blood of our
patriots and the sufferings of our prisoners in Italy. The false glory
which is attributed to them by the Italian command, who have lost all
sense of the immorality of these proceedings, cannot efface the eternal
crime which history always attaches to the names of traitors."

5. We could give many proofs of the great service the Czecho-Slovaks rendered the Allies by their surrenders. But for our purpose it will be sufficient to quote only some more admissions of the Germans and Magyars themselves.

Count Tisza admitted that Czech troops could not be relied upon, and Count Windischgraetz stated that the chief of staff dare not use them except when mixed with Magyars and Germans.

Deputy Urmanczy declared in the Budapest Parliament on September 5, 1916, that during the first encounters with Rumania, a Czech regiment retired without the slightest resistance, provided themselves with provisions, entered a train and disappeared. The men went over to Rumania. He blamed the Czechs for the Austrian reverse in Transylvania.

On June 22, 1917, when the case of deputy Klofac was discussed by the Immunity Committee of the Reichsrat, General von Georgi, Austrian Minister for Home Defence, according to the Czech organ _Pozor_ of June 24, described

"... the conditions prevailing in the army, especially the behaviour of
certain Czech regiments, and brought forward all the material which had
been collected against the Czechs since the outbreak of the war, and
which had been used against them. He referred to the 28th and 36th
Regiments as well as to eight other Czech regiments which had
voluntarily surrendered to the Russians. He mentioned also that Czech
officers, not only those in reserve but also those on active service,
including some of the highest ranks of the staff, surrendered to the
enemy; in one instance fourteen officers with a staff officer thus
surrendered. Czech soldiers in the Russian and French armies, as well
as in other enemy armies, are fighting for the Entente and constitute
legions and battalions of their own. The total number of Czechs in the
enemy armies exceeds 60,000. In the prisoners' camps in the enemy
countries, non-German prisoners were invited to join the enemy's ranks.
Czech legions and battalions are composed almost entirely of former
prisoners of war. The minister further went on to describe the
propaganda of the Czechs abroad, the activity of Czech committees in
enemy and neutral countries, especially in Russia and Switzerland. He
also mentioned the case of Pavlu, a Czech soldier, who in a Russian
newspaper described how he penetrated the Austrian trenches in the
uniform of an Austrian officer, annihilated the occupants and after a
successful scouting reconnaissance returned to the Russian ranks. The
minister described the attitude of the 'Sokols' and the Czech teachers.
The tenor of his speech was that Klofac is responsible for the
anti-Austrian feeling of the Czech nation and that therefore he should
not be released."

When the Russian offensive of July, 1917, started, Herr Hummer, member of the Austrian Reichsrat, addressed the following interpellation to the Austrian Minister for Home Defence:

"Is the Austrian Minister for Home Defence aware that in one of the
early engagements of the new Russian offensive, the 19th Austrian
Infantry Division, which consists almost entirely of Czecho-Slovaks and
other Slavs, openly sided with the enemies of Austria by refusing to
fight against the Russians and by surrendering as soon as an
opportunity offered itself?"

The most interesting document in regard to the attitude of Czecho-Slovaks during the war is the interpellation of ninety German Nationalist deputies (Schurf, Langenhahn, Wedra, Richter, Kittinger and others), of which we possess a copy. It contains 420 large-size printed pages, and it is therefore impossible for us to give a detailed account of it. The chapters of this interpellation have the following headings:

1. The dangers of Pan-Slavistic propaganda.
2. The situation at the outbreak of the war.
3. Motives for the arrest of Kramar.
4. The behaviour of Czechs in Austria:
_(a)_ Demonstrations of Czech national spirit in Prague;
_(b)_ Czech school-books;
_(c)_ Czech officials;
_(d)_ The activities of the "Sokols";
_(e)_ What happened at Litomerice and elsewhere;
_(f)_ The Czech attitude towards war loans;
_(g)_ The Zivnostenska Banka and the war loans;
_(h)_ The financial policy of the Zivnostenska Banka;
_(i)_ The Czechs and war emergency affairs;
_(k)_ The Czechs and the question of food supplies.
5. The anti-Austrian attitude of Czechs abroad:
_(a)_ In France;
_(b)_ In England;
_(c)_ In Russia;
_(d)_ In America;
_(e)_ In Switzerland;
_(f)_ The campaign of Professor Masaryk;
_(g)_ The Czech secret intelligence service.
6. The conduct of Czech soldiers on the battlefield.
7. Military consequences.
8. Some recent documents.

According to the _Neue Freie Presse_ of June 6, 1918, the Austrian Minister for Home Defence made the following important admissions in reply to the part of this interpellation concerning the Czech contribution to the defeats of Austria:

"The 36th Regiment, according to unanimous reports of the high command,
failed to do its duty in May, 1915, on the Russian front, and thereby
caused a heavy defeat of other detachments. This regiment was dissolved
by the imperial decree of July 16, 1915.

"The unsuccessful fighting and heavy losses of the 19th Division in the
battle north of Tarnopol between September 9 and 11, 1915, were caused
by the weak resistance of the 35th Regiment.... During the battles of
June 29 to July 2, 1917, near Zloczow the resistance offered by this
regiment was weak.

"As regards Regiment No. 28 of Prague, according to the statement of
regimental commanders, it appears that the whole detachment, without
firing a single shot, was taken prisoner by a single enemy battalion,
or rather was brought by that battalion from its position."

And in this policy Czech soldiers continue by surrendering voluntarily to the Entente troops whenever they have the opportunity.