Chapter XXVIII: Appendix: A (1)

Being a Further Discussion of General Custer’s Course in the Little Big
Horn Campaign.[112]

I.

Whether General Custer did, or did not, obey General Terry’s orders; whether these orders were, or were not, well considered, and such as could be carried out; whether, if General Custer did disobey General Terry’s orders he was warranted in so doing by the circumstances in which he found himself, are questions of the deepest interest to the student of military matters and the historian thereof. I presume the problem they present will never be authoritatively settled, and that men will continue to differ upon these questions until the end of time.

The matter has been discussed, pro and con, at great length on many occasions. A number of books and magazine articles have been written upon different phases of the situation. I have come to the conclusion indicated in my own article, as I said, against my wish. In view of his heroic death in the high places of the field, I would fain hold General Custer, for whom I have long cherished an admiration which I still retain, entirely innocent. I have only come to this conclusion after a rigid investigation including the careful weighing of such evidence as I could secure upon every point in question.

This evidence consists, first, of a great variety of printed matter; second, of personal conversations with soldiers and military critics, which, as any record of it would necessarily be hearsay and secondhand, I have not set down hereafter save in one instance; third, of letters which have been written me by officers who, from their participation in the campaign, or from unusual opportunities to acquire knowledge concerning it which they have enjoyed, have become possessed of information which they were willing to give to me.

The object of this appendix is to set down, so that it may be here preserved in permanent and available form for future reference, such evidence in these letters as may be pertinent and useful; also to refer the student, who desires to go deeper into the subject, to some of the more valuable printed accounts which are easily accessible.

I am glad that some of the communications I have received, notably those from Colonel Godfrey, make a stout defense of General Custer. Perhaps upon consideration of Colonel Godfrey’s points and arguments, which are not only strong and well taken, but also admirably put, the critic may be inclined to differ from my conclusion. For the sake of General Custer’s fame, I sincerely hope so. I should be glad to be proved to be mistaken.

Without specifically noting the various descriptions of the campaign and battle, which are interesting, but irrelevant to my purpose,[113] Custer’s conduct has been critically considered at some length—by persons whose standing requires that their opinions should be respectfully received—in several publications which I note in such order as best serves the purpose of this discussion without regard to the order in which they appeared.

Colonel Edward S. Godfrey,[114] U. S. A., now commanding the Ninth Cavalry, who, as a lieutenant, commanded K Troop, in Benteen’s battalion, which joined that of Reno in the battle of the 26th of June, 1876, wrote a most interesting account of the battle, containing some valuable reflections upon some disputed points, which was published in the _Century Magazine_, Vol. XLIII., No. 3, January, 1892. To this article, in the same number, were appended certain comments by Major-General James B. Fry, U. S. A., since deceased.

This article and these comments came to the notice of Major-General Robert P. Hughes, U. S. A. (retired), then Colonel and Inspector-General. General Hughes was General Terry’s aide-de-camp during the Little Big Horn Campaign. He wrote an exhaustive criticism on Fry’s comments to Godfrey’s article, which was in effect a discussion of the main proposition that Custer disobeyed his orders and thereby precipitated the disaster, for which he was therefore responsible. This campaign was also considered in an article by Dr. E. Benjamin Andrews, president of the University of Nebraska, who was then president of Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, which appeared in _Scribner’s Magazine_ for June, 1895. A fuller reference to Dr. Andrews’ position will be made later.

General Hughes’ article was offered to the _Century_, but was not accepted, and was finally published in the _Journal of the Military Service Institution_, Vol. XVIII., No. 79, January, 1896.

Among the many books in which the matter has been discussed, three only call for attention.

In “THE STORY OF THE SOLDIER,” by Brigadier-General George A. Forsyth, U. S. A. (retired), the following comment appears:

“Under the peculiar condition of affairs, bearing in mind the only
information he could possibly have had concerning Sitting Bull’s
forces, was Custer justified, in a military sense and within the
scope of his orders, in making the attack?

“In the opinion of the writer he was within his orders, and fully
justified from a military standpoint in so doing.”

General Forsyth gives no reason for his decision, but it is to be presumed that he did not arrive at that decision hastily and carelessly, and as he is a very able and distinguished officer and military critic, due weight should be accorded his views.

In “THE UNITED STATES IN OUR OWN TIME,” by Dr. E. Benjamin Andrews, published by Chas. Scribner’s Sons, edition of 1903, pages 190–1–2–3, there is a concise discussion of the question, based on the article in _Scribner’s Magazine_, referred to above, with some additional reflections on General Hughes’ paper.

In “PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, U. S. A.,” chapter xv., pages 198–210, there is a further discussion by the Lieutenant-General, lately in command of the United States Army.

In order clearly to understand what follows the student should refer to each of the sources mentioned and examine carefully into what is therein set forth. It is not practicable to quote all these authors at length. I have corresponded with every one of the authors mentioned except General Fry. I print their letters to me, having made no change except once in a while breaking a page into paragraphs and supplying a missing word here and there which had no especial bearing upon the point at issue. Some of the letters were written in pencil amid press of duties. Most of these documents I print without comment. It is necessary, however, that I should call attention to some features brought out by the correspondence.

President Andrews says, in the book referred to:

“Much turns on the force of Custer’s written orders, which, judged
by usual military documents of the kind, certainly gave Custer a
much larger liberty than Colonel Hughes supposed. There is an
affidavit of a witness who heard Terry’s and Custer’s last
conversation together at the mouth of the Rosebud, just before
Custer began his fatal ride. Terry said: ‘Use your own judgment and
do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do,
Custer, hold on to your wounded.’”

General Miles says, in his book:

“But we have positive evidence in the form of an affidavit of the
last witness who heard the two officers in conversation together on
the night before their commands separated, and it is conclusive on
the point at issue. This evidence is that General Terry returned to
General Custer’s tent,[115] after giving him the final order, to say
to him that on coming up to the Indians he would have to use his own
discretion and do what he thought best. This conversation occurred
at the mouth of the Rosebud, and the exact words of General Terry,
as quoted by the witness, are:

“’Custer, I do not know what to say for the last.’

“Custer replied: ‘Say what you want to say.’

“Terry then said: ‘Use your own judgment, and do what you think best
if you strike the trail; and, whatever you do, Custer, hold on to
your wounded.’

“This was a most reasonable conversation for the two officers under
the circumstances. One had won great distinction as a general in the
Civil War; was an able lawyer and department commander, yet entirely
without experience in Indian campaigns. The other had won great
distinction as one of the most gallant and skilful division
commanders of cavalry during the war, commanding one of the most
successful divisions of mounted troops; he had years of experience
on the plains and in handling troops in that remote country, and he
had fought several sharp engagements with hostile Indians.”

If General Terry spoke such words to General Custer the last thing before Custer’s departure, those remarks have a very important, almost a decisive, bearing on the matter at issue. The only question then existing would be, how far the verbal order ought to be considered as superseding the written one. _It is my opinion that the charge that Custer disobeyed orders would fall to the ground if the truth of the alleged remarks could be established._ By giving him this verbal order, Terry would make Custer an absolutely free agent. The vital importance of establishing this affidavit is therefore obvious.

I call attention to the fact that Terry nowhere refers to this conversation, which it would be incumbent upon a gentleman to declare immediately Custer was charged with disobeying Terry’s written order, and that Terry, in that portion of his report which is quoted by me on page 225, virtually not only fails to exculpate but actually charges that Custer did disobey his order, by saying he did the very thing that he was not expected to do.

To establish this affidavit, I wrote to President Andrews, asking his authority for stating that such an affidavit existed and requesting a copy of it. Here is his reply. I insert it without comment.

The University of Nebraska, Chancellor’s Office,
Lincoln, November 22d, ’03.

My Dear Sir:

Replying to your esteemed favor of the eleventh inst. I regret to
say that I have no means of recalling with certainty the source of
my information touching the Custer affidavit. My impression is,
however, that my informant was Gen. Miles, with whom I communicated
on the subject while I was writing my account. I also conversed
personally with Hughes and with a very intimate friend, now
deceased, of Gen. Terry’s.

I shall be extremely pleased to read your views upon this subject.

Very truly yours,
E. BENJ. ANDREWS.

I also wrote to General Miles and received the following reply from him:

1736 N Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C., November 20, 1903.

My Dear Sir:

In reply to your two letters, you will find in my book, “Personal
Recollections, or from New England to the Golden Gate,” published by
Werner & Co., Akron, Ohio, perhaps all the information you will
require. I can not give the time now to going over the campaign in
detail. I presume you will find the book in most libraries.[116] You
will notice in it a chapter on the Custer campaign. General Custer
did not disobey orders. When General Terry divided his command,
taking one portion of it with him up the Yellowstone, and sending
General Custer with the other portion far out in the Indian country,
it necessarily put from seventy-five to one hundred miles between
the two commands, and therefore placed upon General Custer the
responsibility of acting on the offensive or defensive, for he could
have been attacked by the whole body of the combined tribes, and, on
the other hand, if he allowed them to escape without attacking them,
he would have been severely censured. It would be silly to suppose
that Indian chiefs like Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse would permit
two columns to march around over the country with infantry, cavalry,
wagon trains, etc.,[117] and wait for them to come up on both sides
simultaneously, and one must believe the American people very
gullible if they thought such a proposition had military merit.

Yours very truly,
NELSON A. MILES.

I immediately wrote General Miles a second letter asking him for the name of the affiant and any statement he might be willing to make about the affidavit. I pointed out to him what he very well knew—the prominence given to the story in his own book indicates that—the importance of the affidavit in establishing General Custer’s position and defending him against the charge of disobedience. I received no answer to this letter.

Meanwhile the question of the affidavit was taken up by General Hughes in his several communications to me which appear below.

In order not to break the thread of the discourse I will anticipate events and here insert a third letter which I wrote to General Miles, after carefully considering General Hughes’ remarks. The letter was sent to General Miles by registered mail. I hold the registry receipt showing that he received it. To this inquiry I have as yet received no reply.

455 East 17th Street, Flatbush,
Brooklyn, N. Y., March 30th, 1904.

Lieutenant-General NELSON A. MILES, U. S. A.,
1736 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

My Dear General Miles:

A few months since I addressed to you a letter asking you for the
name of the person, alluded to in your book, who made the affidavit
as to the last remark of General Terry to General Custer. This
letter has probably never reached you since I have never received
any answer to it.

The statement is questioned by a number of officers, and in the
interest of historical accuracy and for the sake of bringing forward
every particle of evidence tending to clear General Custer of the
charges which are made against him in that campaign, I most
respectfully ask you to give me the name of the affiant together
with such other statements concerning the affidavit as may be
conclusive. How did you become possessed of the affidavit, for
instance? Did you see it? Did you know the affiant? Was he a person
whose testimony was to be implicitly relied upon? Is he alive now?
In short, any information concerning it will be most acceptable as
well as most useful.

Very sincerely yours,
CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY.

I do not desire to comment on General Miles’ refusal further than to say that if he has in his possession the affidavit he should either submit it to the inspection of impartial observers, give it to historians, state who made it, where it was made, furnish a certified copy of it to the public, or otherwise establish it. If he is not willing to do this he should at least say why he is not willing. I submit that no man, whatever his rank or station, ought to make statements which affect the fame and reputation of another man _without giving the fullest publicity to his sources of information, or stating why the public must be content with a simple reference thereto_.

While I am on the subject of the affidavit, I call the student’s attention to a possible suggestion in Colonel Godfrey’s second communication below.

It is twenty-eight years since the Battle of the Little Big Horn. If the alleged affiant is now alive, what reason can exist to prevent him coming out and acknowledging his affidavit? If he is dead, why should secrecy about it longer exist? Why does not General Miles break his silence? _The whole matter turns on the production of this affidavit, with satisfactory evidence as to the character of the affiant._

The other position taken in General Miles’ letter above, which of course is a summary of his views as set forth in his book, is discussed later on by General Woodruff.

II.

I now refer the student to the following letter in answer to one from me asking information and calling General Hughes’ attention to President Andrews’ book, which has just been reissued in a new and amplified edition:

New Haven, Conn.,
18th Nov., 1903.

Dear Sir:

Your letter of the 13th was duly received. I had not heard of Dr. E.
Benjamin Andrews’ book prior to receipt of your letter, but have
looked it up since.

After a careful examination of what he says about the Sioux campaign
of 1876, I cannot find any good and sufficient reason for changing
aught that was stated in the article published in the _Journal of
the Military Service Institution_, in January, 1896. I do find,
however, that something could be added to the statement of the case
in reply to new matter which he has injected into it in his book.
These items are three in number, to wit:

1st. General Miles does not agree with the views therein expressed.

2d. New evidence in the form of an affidavit made by some
individual, name not given.

3rd. The writer of the book dissents from my view of the case.

We will take these items up severally:

First: “General Miles is strongly of the opinion that Custer was not
guilty of disobeying any orders.”

It is not a new experience to learn that the views of General Miles
and myself are at variance. Indeed, it seems that they are seldom in
accord. But, in this instance, my views are supported by the late
General P. H. Sheridan, who states as follows:

“General Terry, now pretty well informed of the locality of the
Indians, directed Lieutenant-Colonel George A. Custer to move with
the Seventh Cavalry up the Rosebud, until he struck the trail
discovered by Major Reno, with instructions _that he should not
follow it directly to the Little Big Horn, but that he should send
scouts over it and keep his main force farther south_.”[118]

General Gibbon, in a letter to General Terry, written after having
reached his post, Fort Shaw, Montana, and bearing date November 5th,
1876, writes as follows, speaking of the “Conference”:

“We both impressed upon him (Custer) that he should keep
constantly feeling to his left, and even should the trail turn
toward the Little Big Horn that he should continue his march
southward along the headwaters of the Tongue, and strike west
toward the Little Big Horn. So strong was the impression upon my
mind and great my fear that Custer’s zeal would carry him
forward too rapidly, that the last thing I said to him when
bidding him good-by, after his regiment had filed past you when
starting on the march, was, ‘Now, Custer, don’t be greedy, but
wait for us.’ Poor fellow! Knowing what we do now, and what an
effect a fresh Indian trail seemed to have on him, perhaps we
were expecting too much to anticipate a forbearance on his part
which would have rendered coöperation between the two columns
practicable.”

The foregoing clearly shows that no doubt existed in the minds of
the Division Commanders and the third party present at the
conference as to what the instructions required and that those
instructions were not complied with.

Second: Dr. Andrews states that there was a listener at the last
conversation between Terry and Custer at the mouth of the Rosebud,
just before Custer began his fatal ride, and that his affidavit sets
up that:

“Terry said: ‘Use your own judgment and do what you think best if
you strike the trail and, whatever you do, Custer, hold on to your
wounded.’”

It is quite evident that this is the same affidavit which General
Miles refers to in his book. My attention was called to that
reference in the winter of 1896, and in behalf of the family and
friends of General Terry I asked to see the affidavit, saying that I
might wish to make a copy of it. My request was refused by General
Miles, with the further information that it had been in his
possession for nineteen years, which carried the date back to a time
when Colonel Miles was commanding a post in General Terry’s
Department. The value of the document could have been very readily
determined at that time by General Terry himself, and I am thankful
to say its worthlessness is still capable of proof.

The quotations given by Dr. Andrews would alone be sufficient to
condemn the paper with any one familiar with General Terry and the
situation.

It will be noticed that he is represented as saying, “If you strike
the trail.” Terry was sending, with Custer, Reno and six troops of
cavalry, who had followed the trail for many weary miles only three
days before, and there was no “if” in the case.

The other quotation is equally incredible. General Terry had an
enviable reputation throughout the army for his exceptional courtesy
on all occasions and under all circumstances, to all those serving
in his command. To have made the remarks quoted, “Whatever you do,
hold on to your wounded,” would have been tantamount to saying to
one of his Lieutenant-Colonels, to whom he was confiding the finest
command in his department, that he considered it necessary to
caution him on the elementary principle of the position assigned
him. To an officer of General Custer’s experience and gallantry such
a caution would have been far from agreeable, and such action would
have been entirely foreign to the life-long conduct of General
Terry.

But, fortunately, we are not dependent upon deductive evidence in
this instance. There are still living a good many people who were
witnesses of that “march past” and parting of Generals Terry and
Custer. By personal observation I positively know that any one,
General Gibbon excepted, who makes affidavit to the effect that, at
the said parting at the Rosebud, there was a conversation between
Terry and Custer to which he was the only listener, is guilty of
perjury.

When the notice came that the command was ready to take up its march
I was sitting with Terry and Gibbon. General Terry invited General
Gibbon to go with him and see it. They walked off a few yards from
the bank of the stream and stood together when Custer joined them.
The three remained together until the command had filed past and the
final good-by was said. Custer mounted his horse and rode off, and
Terry and Gibbon came back to where I had remained. The last remark
made to Custer was by Gibbon. If any change was made at that time in
Custer’s orders it was perforce known to Gibbon, who was alongside
of Terry, and the only one who was with him and Custer. Now let us
see what Gibbon said in a letter written to General Terry
twenty-seven years ago, when he could not foresee for what purpose
his words would be quoted:

“Except so far as to draw profit from past experience it is,
perhaps, useless to speculate as to what would have been the
result had _your plan_ been carried out. But I cannot help
reflecting that, in that case, my column, supposing the Indian
camp to have remained where it was when Custer struck it, would
have been the first to reach it; that with our infantry and
Gatling guns we should have been able to take care of ourselves,
even though numbering only two-thirds of Custer’s force.”

The only person actually in the presence of Terry and Custer at that
final parting, happened to be the third member of the conference,
who knew the “plan,” and on the fifth of the November following he
writes as above, of what would have been the result had “your plan”
(Terry’s conference plan) been carried out.

It so happened that I went over this whole subject with General
Gibbon personally only a short time before his death. He certainly
knew nothing of any change in the “conference plan” at that time.
Any historian who makes use of the affidavit General Miles had some
years ago, would do well to look carefully into the facts.

Third: Andrews states: “He (Hughes) adduced many interesting
considerations, but seemed to the writer not at all to justify his
views.”

I am, by no means, sure that this dissent would have disturbed me if
I had depended on my own judgment alone in submitting the
article[119] for publication, but it so happened that I did not do
so. The tragedy discussed being of an exceedingly grave character,
and both the responsible heads having passed away, rendered it
unusually important that every possible precaution should be taken
against mistakes. For this reason, after the “many interesting
considerations” were prepared for publication, I submitted the
article to different _competent military men_ with the simple
question, “Is it conclusive?”

The final review was made by General Henry L. Abbott, U. S. Army,
who enjoys a world-wide reputation for military ability and
scholarly attainments. The gentlemen who revised the article were
unanimously of the opinion that the statement was _absolutely
conclusive_, and with the support of such men I have felt little
anxiety about the criticisms that have been made.

Very truly yours,
R. P. HUGHES.

Thereafter I wrote again to General Hughes about some matters repeated to me in conversation by General Carrington, who told me that Custer actually got down on his knees to Terry and begged him, for the sake of Custer’s honor and fame as a soldier, to get the orders detaining him at Fort Lincoln revoked, so that he might be spared the disgrace of seeing his regiment march to the front leaving him behind. Carrington’s recollection was that the scene took place in Terry’s bedroom.

Here is General Hughes’ letter on that point:

New Haven, Conn.,
27th Nov., 1903.

My Dear Sir:

Yours of the 27th at hand. Carrington is all right except as to
location—the incident occurred in General Terry’s office in St.
Paul, corner Fourth and Wabashaw Streets. It drew from Terry a
request to the President to permit Custer to go with him, the answer
being through Sherman, “If Terry wishes Custer let him take him
along.” Just after notifying Custer of the reply and telling him he
would take him along, Custer met Ludlow on the street and made the
“swing clear” remark which is spoken of in Andrews’ history and is
referred to in my article in the journal. I shall have to apply for
a copy of the Secretary of War’s report for 1876, which has the
reports of Sheridan, Crook, Terry, Gibbon, Reno, etc., pages
439–487.[120]

Yours very truly,
R. P. HUGHES.

III.

Meanwhile I had communicated with Colonel Godfrey, who had already furnished me with much data in addition to that contained in his valuable and interesting paper, calling particular attention to some of the statements made by General Hughes in his article in the _Journal_ _of the Military Service Institution_. From Colonel Godfrey I received the following paper:

MEMORANDA FOR REV. C. T. BRADY

A semi-official account entitled “Record of Engagements with Hostile
Indians in the Division of the Missouri, from 1868 to 1882,” was
published by the Division of the Missouri. This paper is now being
reprinted in the _United States Cavalry Journal_, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. The part relating to the Little Big Horn, is in the October,
1903, number. This account reads:

“About two o’clock in the morning of July 25th, the column halted
for about three hours, made coffee, and then resumed the march,
crossed the divide, and by _eight o’clock_ were in the valley of one
of the branches of the Little Big Horn.”

This is misleading and not altogether true. We halted about two
A.M., till eight A.M., then marched till ten A.M., halted, and it
was not until nearly noon that we crossed the divide. We were in a
narrow valley. The march is correctly described in my article. The
inference is that Custer was so very eager that he crossed the
divide into the valley of the Little Big Horn and put himself where
he could be discovered. General Hughes’ article is a _special plea_
to clear General Terry from the odium that he and his family seemed
to think was heaped upon him for failure to push forward with the
information they had on June 25th and 26th, and that General
Custer’s family and friends were supposed to hold him (Terry)
responsible for the disaster in a measure. I do not remember a
charge of disobedience as having been made at any time during this
campaign; nor, on the other hand, do I recall that much was said
that Terry and Gibbon did not do as they thought best on June 25th
and 26th.

The marching distance from the Yellowstone, where Gibbon’s command
was crossed, to the Little Big Horn, was about forty-six miles. East
of the Big Horn, the country over which Gibbon’s forces marched, was
rough—bad lands. The Second Cavalry on its march June 25th, saw the
“big smoke” (from the fire in the bottom at the time of Reno’s
attack) and at once sent word to General Gibbon (and Terry) that
they thought a fight was going on, or something to that effect. I
don’t know when they saw this “big smoke,” but my recollection is
that it corresponded or tallied very well with the time of Reno’s
attack. The Second Cavalry got to the Little Big Horn, four or five
miles above the mouth, about nine-thirty, June 26th. They were then
distant from the battlefield about eight or ten miles—an infantry
officer says six miles. They arrived in the vicinity of our position
about eleven A.M., June 27th, nearly two days after the “signs,” the
“big smoke” of the fight, had been communicated.

That the country between the Yellowstone and the Little Big Horn was
rough; that the 25th of June was hot; that the water was scarce, we
all know; but we thought it strange that, after they learned from
the Crow scouts—say at ten-thirty, June 26th, on the Little Big
Horn—that a disaster had occurred, it took them so long to get a
move. Yet none of us blamed them for being cautious at that time.

General Terry was not an Indian fighter and would never have made a
success of getting Indians on the plains. The idea is
preposterous[121] that a force can march through the open country (a
great big country like we had) pass by the Indians fifty or sixty
miles south, then turn round and find them in the same place, and
crush them between that force and another from the opposite
direction. They don’t linger that way. Our march from eleven P.M.,
June 24th, was in a close country and not exposed—was in a close
valley, a branch of the Rosebud. The Indians who discovered us and
sent word to the village would have discovered our trail and
consequently informed them of our movements.

General Custer did not intend to attack until June 26th, the date
Terry was to be at the Little Big Horn.[122] Herandeen was the scout
that was to take the information through to Terry, but developments
made it necessary, in General Custer’s opinion, if we were to strike
the Indians at all, that we should do it at once. Even then he
expected only a running fight. Their stand and concentration were
unexpected, because the chance of “surprise” was gone, and he
probably did not send Herandeen, as was intended, to communicate
with Terry for the reason that he did not think he could get
through.

Now, suppose the Indians had been located on the headwaters of the
Rosebud or Tongue, or Powder, and not on the Little Big Horn, and we
had bumped up behind them on the north, should Custer have backed
away, sent a scout through to Terry, made a detour so as to get to
the south side? Terry’s instructions had fairly located the Indians,
but it was a mere _guess_.[123] On the 17th they had fought Crook to
a retreat, then they concentrated upon the Little Big Horn.

In my opinion, if our attack had been delayed even a few hours we
would not have found the Indians all in the village. When we got to
the divide their pony herds were still out grazing; when the attack
was made all herds had been driven into the village; they did not
have time to strike their tepees and steal away. I don’t believe
they had a long warning of our advance. The Indian runners had the
same, or a greater, distance to get back than we had to advance. It
was their evident purpose to drop out of sight of our scouts who
were in position for observation before daylight, and did not see
them returning down the valley on the trail. Therefore, they must
have made a wide detour.

Again, when they discovered us we were probably in bivouac and, at
all events, an ordinary day’s march distant from the village. The
time of warning, I think, could be safely conjectured as the time of
arrival of the few warriors that came out to meet the advance and
attack Reno. All those warriors that had their ponies handy, I
believe, were assembled at once to come out and meet the troops. The
rapid advance didn’t give the Indians a chance to collect their
belongings and mature any plans to escape; otherwise I believe the
expected “scattering” would have taken place. And in just so much
was the attack a “surprise.”

That General Custer deliberately disobeyed Terry’s orders I do not
believe. Custer was intensely in earnest and fully determined to
find the Indians and, when found, to attack them, even if it took
him back to the agencies. Suppose Custer had asked Terry “If I find
these Indians shall I attack, or wait for you?” Undoubtedly Terry
would have replied “Attack!” He was too good a soldier not to
appreciate opportunity, but he was not enough of a cavalryman or
Indian fighter to appreciate the flash-like opportunities for
hitting the Indians on the broad prairies.

Custer was what in these modern days is styled a “strenuous” man.
Terry was not. He was the personification of gentleness and
deliberateness. And besides, Terry’s instructions _gave the
necessary latitude_. He told Custer what he thought should be done
but, after all, left it to Custer’s judgment and discretion when so
nearly in contact with the enemy.[124] If Custer had passed on south
and the Indians had escaped, or had gone forth and attacked him, as
they had Crook, and defeated him, would these instructions have
shielded him? Not much. He would have been damned as cordially for
the failure of the expedition as he is now, by those same men, for
courting disaster. I have no doubt in my mind, that if Custer had
passed south even one more day, the Indians would have attacked us
as they had General Crook, and upon almost the same ground, just one
week before.[125]

Terry says, in his instructions, “He will indicate to you his own
views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should
conform to them unless _you should see sufficient reason for
departing from them_.”[126] Custer was an experienced war soldier, a
thorough cavalryman, and an experienced Indian campaigner. So why
not give him the benefit of “sufficient reason”? Were Terry’s
instructions “definite and explicit”? Terry himself says in his
order that “definite instructions” were “impossible.”

There was not an officer or soldier of the Seventh Cavalry but that
expected a fight when we were preparing to leave the mouth of the
Rosebud. Where the fight would take place we knew not, but I venture
to say that never was there a thought that the Indians would take a
position and wait there for us to go through a lot of manœuvers.
Reno’s scout had not brought any _definite_ information. I find my
notes (June 20th) say that it was generally thought the trail, when
they left it, was about _three weeks old_ and the indications showed
perhaps three hundred and fifty lodges. I don’t think General Terry
had any later information than Reno’s scout on which to guess the
location of the Indians on the Little Big Horn. General Custer’s
statement that he would follow the trail until he found the Indians,
even if it took us to the agencies on the Missouri or in Nebraska,
does not indicate that he expected them to wait in position on the
Little Big Horn or elsewhere. This statement was made after it had
been decided that we should go over the trail, June 21st, but
probably before the general instructions had been made out.

As it turned out I think Custer did make a mistake in going in with
a divided force, not that the division of itself would have been
fatal, but because Reno failed to hold a leg even if he couldn’t
skin.

If Custer had followed Reno the latter, in my opinion, would never
have dared to halt, or even hesitate, in his attack. If Reno had
even held to the bottom, the overwhelming forces would have been
divided. There was nothing in Reno’s past career that would indicate
confidence should not be placed in his courage. Custer could not
have anticipated a faint-hearted attack or that Reno would get
stampeded.

I believe that Reno was dismayed when he saw the showing in front of
him, and when he failed to see the “support” promised, I think he
lost his nerve, and then when his Ree scouts stampeded and he found
his force being surrounded in the bottom, I believe he abandoned
himself to his fears, then stampeded to the hills and lost his
reason, throwing away his ivory handled pistols. If Reno had held to
the bottom, Custer’s left flank (Keogh and Calhoun) would not have
been so quickly overwhelmed (for the Indians leaving Reno made that
envelopment), and it is reasonable to suppose Custer would have had
a better show to withdraw and rejoin other forces.

If Custer had followed up Reno he would have taken matters in his
own hands, held and concentrated his men in such manner as to
control the situation until Benteen and the packs came up. The
Indians, as a rule, will not stand punishment unless cornered. I
went over the ground in the bottom where Reno was when he concluded
to go to the hills, and I believe he could have held the position. I
talked the matter over with General Gibbon and he practically agreed
with me. I know many others think otherwise, including some who were
in that part of the fight.

I have doubts about the saving of Custer if Reno had advanced after
the packs joined us, for I think the fight was practically over
then. To have advanced before then might possibly have done
something in favor of Custer, but probably not. I am of the opinion
that part of the fight was settled quickly. Custer’s battalion had
practically no shelter and no time to make any. While a good many
horses were killed, I fear that most of those getting away carried
their reserve ammunition, and it didn’t take long to get away with
fifty rounds in a fight. With a different commander than Reno we
might have created a diversion by advancing as soon as the
ammunition packs came up, which was some little time before
McDougall arrived with all the packs. Reno was apparently too busy
waiting for further orders from Custer to take any initiative. Weir
asked permission to take his troop to reconnoiter in the direction
of the firing on Custer, and Reno would not give it. Weir started on
his own hook, and Edgerly (Weir’s Lieutenant) supposing permission
had been given for the troop, followed Weir with the troop. I think
Reno subsequently tried to make it appear that this advance of Weir
was by authority. I don’t think Reno was drunk, for I don’t believe
there was enough whiskey in the command to make a “drunk.”[127]

At the Reno Court of Inquiry I was asked if I thought Reno had done
all he could as a commanding officer, and I replied “No.” That was
about the effect of the question and answer. The testimony and
proceedings were reported in full in the Chicago _Times_. The New
York _Herald_ had an able correspondent, Mr. Kelly, that joined our
forces on the Yellowstone in July or August, and wrote, giving all
the information he could gather from all sources that pervaded the
command, that he could _get at_. There were a “whole lot” of
correspondents in the field after the fight, but Mr. Kelly was
considered one of the ablest. Being in the field till September
26th, we saw but few newspapers from the east.

E. S. GODFREY.

On the receipt of this memoranda I sent Colonel Godfrey all the papers printed above, and asked him further to discuss these papers. They were returned to me with the following letter, accompanied by these additional notes:

Headquarters, Ninth United States Cavalry,
Fort Walla Walla, Washington,
February 12th, 1904.

My Dear Doctor:

I return to-day the letters sent to me by registered mail. I am very
sorry to have kept them so long from you, but I have been suffering
from a sprained knee which has laid me up, and have been otherwise
under the weather.

I feel that I have not in my memoranda done justice to the subject.
It is largely one of sentiment, and the best rule is to put yourself
in his place and act under the lights then exposed to view. That
Custer may have been actuated by other motives I do not doubt. The
main question to me was whether he was justified from a military
point, in a campaign against Indians, in his conduct of the march
and battle.

If we could have foreseen as we now look back and see!

Sincerely yours,
E. S. GODFREY.

ADDITIONAL NOTES BY COLONEL GODFREY.

The statement of General Sheridan, quoted by Hughes, was made in his annual report for 1876, and of course from data furnished by General Terry. It is but natural that he should reflect more or less the views of Terry. He could have had only the newspaper and other unofficial accounts. Of course I recognize that “unofficial accounts” very often give more _inside_ information than the official report.

A word as to that affidavit. I don’t know anything about it and am ready to take Hughes’ say-so as to what _officers_ were present, but I suggest a possible solution: When Custer dismounted he had his orderly and generally his flags with him; naturally the orderly would be somewhat retired, and when Custer went to mount his horse, Terry may have gone aside to accompany him and spoken the caution to him in a subdued voice so that Gibbon would not have heard him, but the orderly might have heard.[128]

In going over a lot of letters relating to the campaign, etc., I find one from General J. S. Brisbin (now dead), then Major, commanding Second Cavalry Battalion. It is dated January 1st, 1892, just two weeks before his death. In it he is very bitter against Custer. He says that Custer disobeyed:

“If not in letter, then in spirit, and I think and have ever thought, in letter as well as spirit. Terry intended, if he intended anything, that we should be in the battle with you. I was on the boat, steamer Far West, Captain Grant Marsh, the night of the 21st, when the conference took place between Gibbon, Custer and Terry, to which you refer, and I heard what passed. Terry had a map and Custer’s line of march up the Rosebud was blocked out on it by pins stuck in the table through the paper. Terry showed Custer his line of march and, being somewhat near-sighted as you know, Terry asked me to mark the line, and I did so with a blue pencil. Custer turned off that line of march from the Rosebud, just twenty miles _short_ of the end of the pins and blue line.”

Just how much dependence can be placed on Brisbin’s statements I don’t know. He may have been present at this conference, but Hughes makes no mention of him; in fact, entirely ignores him and may have forgotten him. I will make another quotation from Brisbin:

“I read the order you print as being the one given by Terry to Custer for this march. If that is the order Custer got it is not the order copied in Terry’s books at Department Headquarters. You will remember that after Custer fell Terry appointed me chief of cavalry. I looked over all the papers affecting the march and battle of Little Big Horn and took a copy of the order sending you up the Rosebud. The order now lies before me and it says ‘you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads (Terry had already referred to the trail Reno followed). Should it be found, as it appears almost certain that it should be found, to turn toward the Little Big Horn, he thinks (that is, the Department Commander thinks) that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue River, and _then_ (‘then’ underscored in order) turn _toward Little_ Big Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. It is desired that you conform as nearly as possible to those instructions and that you do not depart from them unless you shall see absolute necessity for doing so.’”

That part of the quotation from “It is desired” to “necessity for doing so,” is omitted in the order as printed in the report of General Terry. Not having seen the original order I cannot vouch for either being the true copy, but the omission looks peculiar to say the least, if omission there was.[129]

I do not know that I can add very much to what I have already sent to you on the question of disobedience. Here is a commander who has had experience in war, civilized and Indian, sent in command of his regiment against an unnumbered foe, located we know not where (although well conjectured in the instructions, as it turned out); given instructions to _preclude their_ escape; to coöperate with another column separated from fifty to one hundred miles, having infantry and artillery, marching over a rough, untried country. Now if that commander thought that to go on farther south before he had located the foe (when he was on the trail) was to leave an opening and an almost certainty of their escape, if they wanted to do so, is it reasonable to expect him to leave the trail and go on “in the air”? The commander who gives him his instructions cannot be communicated with. Is this isolated commander not allowed to act on his own responsibility, if he thinks he cannot _preclude_ the escape by leaving the very trail that will locate the enemy?

Hughes in his article, and the official reports, make it appear that we were at or near the “Crow’s Nest” at daylight and crossed the divide at eight A.M. The scouts were at the “Crow’s Nest,” but at eight A.M. we took up the march to near the divide and “Crow’s Nest,” arriving at ten o’clock, A.M.; that is, we were in the Rosebud Valley, one mile from the divide. We did not cross the divide till nearly noon. Hughes seems to pooh-pooh the idea that we were not to attack till the morning of the 26th. We had Custer’s own statement as to that. He said so himself when he called the officers together on the night of June 24th and again reiterated the statement before crossing the divide.

During the second or third day (23rd or 24th) up the Rosebud, several times we thought we (I mean some of us) saw smoke in the direction of the Tullock, and finally we spoke of it to the General (Custer) at one of the halts. He said it could not be, that he had scouts over on that side and they most certainly would have seen any such “signs” and report to him, and he reiterated that there were scouts out looking toward Tullock’s Valley. After this assurance we made it a point to watch this “smoke business” and we discovered the illusion was due to fleecy clouds on the horizon and the mirage, or heated air, rising from the hills on that side. The air was full of dust from our marching columns, which helped the illusion.

With reference to my slip that “about eighteen hundred had gone _from one agency_ alone.” I took that from my diary, as I had been informed by some one who got the information from Department Headquarters. I had never seen the despatch and put down the item as it came to me. It was a matter of common report in the camp.

Another point occurs to me: “For Custer to be in coöperating distance on the only line of retreat if the Indians should run away.” (Hughes’ magazine article, page 36.) Hughes intimates that there was only one line of retreat, presumably up the valley of the Little Big Horn. The Indians certainly could have retreated over their traveled route, or could have cut across the headwaters of the Tullock for the Yellowstone had Custer gone south. Hughes seems to forget that an almost impassably rough country—the Wolf Mountains—would lie between Custer and those lines of retreat. Yet he would insist that it was good generalship to leave these routes open to close up one other. The Indians were in light marching order and could travel faster than Gibbon over the Tullock Divide, and there would have been a long-distance, “tail-end” pursuit for Custer when he descended the Little Big Horn (by following the “plan”) and found the enemy had escaped over the very trail he had left behind him, or had struck for the Yellowstone, passing Gibbon’s left.

It has been the criticism almost ever since Indian fighting began that commanders were too prone to follow some strategic theory and fail to bring the Indians to battle—give them a chance to escape. It was Custer’s practice to take the trail and follow it, locate the enemy and then strike home by a surprise attack. Custer knew the ridicule and contempt heaped on commanders who had failed to strike when near the enemy; or who had given the enemy opportunity to escape when nearly in contact with them. Whatever may be the academic discussions as to his disobedience, I hold that he was justified by sound military judgment in making his line of march on the trail.[130]

IV.

General Hughes and Colonel Godfrey may be considered fairly enough as representatives of the opposing views on the question. I thought it would be well to have the papers discussed by an officer who might be considered as taking an impartial view of the matter. I therefore sent them to Brigadier-General Charles A. Woodruff, U. S. A. (retired), and his review of the whole question is as follows:

103 Market Street,
San Francisco, May 3, 1904.

My Dear Dr. Brady:

I have read with a great deal of pleasure, your three articles on
“War with the Sioux,” and I have taken the liberty of making various
marginal notes and corrections on the manuscript. I have also read
the letters from General Miles, Professor Andrews, General Hughes,
and Colonel Godfrey.

General Miles, in his letter of November 20, 1903, dismisses the
matter very curtly. He says “Custer did not disobey orders,” and he
states as military dictum that, in sending General Custer
seventy-five or one hundred miles away, Terry could not indicate
what Custer should do, and that, practically, Custer was not under
any obligations to execute Terry’s orders, even when he found
conditions as Terry had expected and indicated.[131]

The order states explicitly “Should it—the trail up the Rosebud—be
found (as it appears almost certain it will be found) to turn toward
the Little Big Horn, then you should still proceed southward.” Now,
when he found that it turned toward the Little Big Horn, instead of
going south or stopping where he was and scouting south or southwest
and west and try to locate the village, or examining Tullock Creek,
or sending scouts to Gibbon, he made that fatal night march with the
deliberate intention of trying to locate and strike the village
before Gibbon could possibly get up.

Gibbon says (page 473, Vol. I., Report of the Secretary of War for
1876), “The Department Commander (Terry) strongly impressed upon him
(Custer) the propriety of not pressing his march too rapidly.”
Whether Custer’s written instructions were based upon a “guess” of
the actual condition, as Colonel Godfrey suggests, or had no
“military merit,” as General Miles states, the facts remain: First:
That they were based upon a “foresight” as good as the present
“hindsight,” which is often not the case. Second: That Custer
accepted them without demur. Third: No further information was
gained to suggest a modification, or, to use the words of the
letter: “unless you see sufficient reason for departing from them.”
On the contrary, the supposed turn of the trail was found to be an
actual fact.