Chapter III: Political Future of Cuba

The political future of Cuba is a matter of much speculation and interest. Considerable will hereafter be said in this volume on the economic and industrial future of this wonderfully productive Island, and little doubt can be entertained that with an honest effort and stable government the commercial future of Cuba will be full of promise. What of the political future? The industrial independence of the Island attained, what, if any, steps are likely to be taken for the political independence? At the present moment, it is difficult to discern any nucleus around which is likely to crystallise sentiment strong enough to form, with any degree of unanimity, a cohesive, independent government. The strongest and uppermost sentiment in the Island, as I have found it since the close of the war, is for peace and reconstruction under the guidance of the United States. Those who have made the greatest sacrifice for independence are apparently willing to rest for a while and enjoy the glorious results of industrial and commercial independence and a release for ever from Spanish misrule. Let the future shape its own political policy, is the desire of all intelligent Cubans. In commercial and business circles (and it must be remembered that the author has, in the course of his inquiries, been very largely thrown in contact with business people), the desire for ultimate absorption or annexation by the United States is almost unanimous. Those who have property, those engaged in industrial pursuits, those carrying on commerce, those interested in affairs, regardless of nationality, see the greatest future for Cuba in ultimate annexation to the United States, and openly advocate that policy. There are others who advocate annexation on grounds of sentiment, and who take the stand that the degree of real freedom enjoyed by a State of the Republic is greater, and the advantages far in excess of those likely to accrue to the mixed population of Cuba by the establishment of any sort of independent government. This is not a matter for surprise when it is recalled that a large proportion of the most enlightened Cubans have been educated in the United States, while no inconsiderable number of the most active participants in the war for Cuban freedom carried individually, alike into battle and into conference, the grandest badge of freedom so far vouchsafed to mankind--United States citizenship.

These ideas are admirably set forth in a pamphlet just written by Fran Figueras, who makes an eloquent plea for the annexation of Cuba to the United States. The title of the little book--for it is more than a pamphlet--suggests the line of argument: _Cuba Libre--Independence or Annexation_. Exactly! Cuba is free to-day! Liberty came when Spanish sovereignty ended. Adapting the lines of Kipling, the Cubans may truthfully say:

"If blood be the price of liberty,
Lord God, we ha' bought it fair."

Liberty, therefore, has been won and paid for. By the very nature of things there can be no forcible annexation to the nation representing the absolute liberties of the people. If Cuba becomes part of the United States, it will be because the Cubans, having won their liberty, shall so decree. Intelligent Cubans understand this perfectly well and none better than the author referred to above.

After reviewing the state of public opinion in Spain late in 1896 and the sentiments predominating in Cuba among the native population in regard to the mutual relations with the mother country, Mr. Figueras analyses the present situation, and considers that public opinion in Cuba is divided into three classes. Those wanting:

1. Immediate and absolute independence.
2. Independence under American protectorate.
3. Annexation, more or less immediate.

He allows independence to be the ideal of all peoples, but considers Cuban independence to be still in embryo, and compares the sudden liberation of the island from Spanish dominion to a premature birth, brought on by American intervention and subject to the dangers attending its early advent at an unexpected time. The author contends that to form a nation it is important that the inhabitants shall have some common interests, usually apparent in countries where one element predominates. He finds that in Cuba there are three races equally strong: the autochthonic or white Cuban (pure white), the Cuban with unmistakable and acknowledged signs of black descent, and the white Spaniard; the first of which by its number, the second by its greater acclimation, and the third by its wealth preserve the balance. The fact that these people do not live in different provinces but in the same places makes this adjustment all the more noticeable. Sometimes in one house you will see a patriarchal Spanish father with conservative ideas in the same room with his son of high-flown, Robespierre-like ideas, convinced that a country progresses more in a year of revolution than in a century of peaceful campaigning; while in a dark corner the negro servant, a slave only yesterday, to-day free and taking an interest by no means meagre in the revolutionary legend, curses his colour but does not fail to realise how better fitted he is for rough work than his white neighbours.

"And in the present situation which, pray, of these elements," the
author asks, "is victorious? Which has conquered and is ready to
take under its protecting ægis the other two? Is it perchance the
revolutionary party that has had its work crowned with success and
that can therefore force its criterion of independence on all the
inhabitants? Facts answer this question negatively and it would be
sheer madness to constitute one nation out of such heterogeneous
elements."

The author establishes comparisons with the other southern republics, contends that Cuba will be in a chronic state of revolution if left to herself, calls attention to the handicap to Cuban sugar, tobacco, and coffee industries by the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and asks if it is to be expected that the United States understands that her interest in Cuba's welfare is to justify damaging that of the new colonies for Cuba's exclusive benefit.

Arguing against a protectorate, the author calls attention to the fact that Cuba has nothing to fear from foreign nations. Her dangers are at home; it is _pronunciamentos_ and the like that threaten, and a protectorate will not avoid this; it is only absolute annexation that will.

"If before 1895," continues the author of _Cuba Libre_, "all Cubans were satisfied with a Canadian autonomy system given by Spain, why should the United States be refused a trust given to a nation like Spain, which has treated Cuba with injustice, bad government, and extortion, against the tested 'cash' good faith of the other?"

Refuting arguments upon the offensiveness of annexation to Cuban dignity, the author calls attention to the fact that dignity does not always accompany independence, as, for example, it is often seen how an English, German, or Italian schoolship silences the dignity of some independent states by firing a few shots.

In conclusion he says:

"We Cubans have been tyrannised by an unscrupulous mother country
and the proceeding has dishonoured the nation which did so, and we
victims have withstood the humiliation with dignity. We stood with
dignity when we were burdened with a system of colonial servitude,
it was with dignity that we rebelled, staining the chains that
bound us with our own and foreign blood; we have kept our dignity
whilst the Americans have cut them for us; when to-morrow comes,
and we ask for annexation to the United States, we shall do so with
the same dignity."

There is sentiment, force, and good hard business sense in this attitude. A flag, after all, is nothing in itself, but all in what it represents. The Stars and Stripes have for a century or more represented human liberty and have taken into their folds millions of the people of the old world. The historic flags of all nations have been fully and freely and joyously repudiated by them, in search of broader liberties, for that fascinating emblem of the people's rights; and under it scarred and impoverished Cuba may in truth rest with dignity and content.

Adolfo Muñoz, one of the ablest and most thoughtful Cubans it has been my pleasure to meet, gave utterance to similar views in relation to the future of Cuba, though he approached the subject more from a commercial than a sentimental point of view.

"A new community," said Mr. Muñoz to the author, "particularly a
small one, after a long and destructive war, is always surrounded
by many dangers, both internal and external; and the only safety
Cuba may find against them is a close connection with the United
States which will afford the immediate protection of the American
Government. Cuba left alone could not enjoy a high credit, either
public or private; neither could she build a respectable navy,
which her geographical position renders necessary. In these, and in
many other respects, Cuba has to depend exclusively on the United
States. The political connection between both countries becomes
consequently a matter of extreme importance, which cannot be
discussed, and much less decided upon, in haste."

Continuing, Mr. Muñoz said:

"The liberty which, by the aid of the United States, Cuba has now
conquered, will enable her to frame an entirely new tariff. This
work, which must be done in accordance with other financial laws,
will prove to be a rather easy task, because the commercial
relations between Cuba and the United States are naturally
beneficial to both countries. Perhaps the best arrangement, both on
commercial and political grounds, would be to convert these
relations into a coastwise trade, so that the productions of
either country should be admitted free of duty in the other;
provided that the question of the United States sugar industry
could be settled by means of some compensation or otherwise. Cuba
expects to be placed, in what respects custom duties, on the same
footing as Puerto Rico; as it is necessary to save her sugar
industry from its present depression and ruin."

Here is annexation clearly marked out though not actually advocated. A country without credit cannot start up the machinery of government. To make the trade coastwise for Cuba, as we have already done in the case of Puerto Rico, means ultimate annexation. If, therefore, as Mr. Muñoz says, Cuba "expects to be placed on the same footing as Puerto Rico," she expects annexation--nothing more, nothing less.

Attention is next directed to another, though not less interesting view of the future of Cuba. When in Cienfuegos the author had the honour and pleasure of meeting the Marquis de Apezteguia, President of the Conservative party, and, although a Cuban born, a strong sympathiser with Spain. There are few abler men in Cuba than the Marquis de Apezteguia. Educated in London, Paris, and Madrid, and at home in the best circles of New York, the Marquis is, in a sense, a cosmopolitan. His interests, however, are all bound up in Cuba. If Cuba once more flourishes the Marquis will become rich again; if it does not his large fortune will have gone, and he himself have been reduced to penury. Asked to give his opinion of the present and future condition of the Island of Cuba, the Marquis de Apezteguia did so without hesitation, clothing his thoughts in English so pointed and vigorous that it would be an injustice to the reader to abridge or change it, and it is therefore made part of this chapter.

"In regard to the disposition of Cuba," said the Marquis de
Apezteguia to the author, "you have first of all to consider the
population of the Island, then you have its geographical position,
which makes it of importance to the United States; nay, if there is
anything in geographical position, which makes it dependent upon
the United States. Key West is not an offensive position, it is
simply a defensive position for the United States, because it
commands the defence of the American coasts. The defence of your
coast, with the Island of Cuba, is trebled with the same number of
vessels, as its 750 miles practically makes the Gulf an inland sea,
outside of the possibility of incursions from foreigners. Up to
Cape Hatteras, Cuba defends your eastern coast. Therefore, to you
as a military nation and as a naval power, Cuba is a necessity;
without Cuba, you have simply Key West, and Cuba is an excellent
substitute for Key West. Having this naval defence, which makes the
United States non-attackable from Cape Hatteras to the Rio Grande,
with how much more efficacy, and without danger, you can move your
armies! Cuba is of immense value to the United States, and
therefore from that point of view we will develop the others. Under
the naval and military aspect in regard to the concentration of the
army, we command the Gulf of Mexico as an inland sea of the United
States, and we are the principal factor in the trans-oceanic
traffic.

"The Cuban question is not a difficult one, because there is an
imposed issue. In commercial development, to all evidence, you have
been a long time a borrowing country, but to-day you have great
banking centres: New York, Philadelphia, and Boston constituting an
eastern centre; Chicago, St. Louis, and Cincinnati constituting
another; with a smaller one at New Orleans, and a western one at
San Francisco. Certain centres, such as the New York one, which has
an excess of capital, will act in this annexation of Cuba as a
multiple in the matter of capital. The capital will in preference
come to Cuba, instead of going west.

"In the political problem, the condition of the population of Cuba
must be considered. It is not a new country, but four hundred years
old,--a totally different nation, with different habits, ways, and
languages. Then how can you profitably absorb that population as a
State? You cannot afford to sacrifice the United States for Cuba,
but must lend Cuba both moral and material riches without
forgetting yourself. Is it profitable for the United States to
absorb Cuba as a State? If I were an American, I would oppose it. I
do not think the Cuban people have sufficient adaptation; in fact
they will not Americanise for quite a while, and therefore you must
create an empire and a public right that is not within the federal
bounds. Your territorial laws pursue colonisation towards the end
of absorption, and have placed in your Constitution a limit of
population, which we initially possess. Were I an American, I would
not be for annexation of Cuba as one of the units of the Union. I
think there is a condition of injustice which would be felt by both
parties, if you held Cuba in an inferior political state so close
to Florida. I say that this is inevitably American, from the
material defence which it procures to the United States, and it is
a military necessity. It cannot, however, be absorbed and governed
rapidly, and for a time you will have to create a new political
right, for it is inevitable. You cannot absorb it without creating
a different political right.

"Now I have said that, in my belief, the issue is imposed and
inevitable; Cuba has to be American territory, and cannot be
anything else, with restringent or lax ties uniting it; but in the
exterior life it will have to be American. You have no laws so far
that can be established here; the new political right will have to
be created because of the way in which you acquired the Island. You
cannot govern it until you give it those things which have been
assured it. You have acquired responsibilities which you are not at
liberty to throw away and go back on; that is your position towards
Cuba and towards the world, and therefore towards yourself. The
American people must not feel that they are making of Cuba a
business, but a necessity, to be maintained by force if necessary
until evolution can be accomplished.

"Since we see the problem is one with an imposed ultimate solution,
the easiest way is to continue the same action that brought the
Island. You need, as a guaranty to yourself, and to the Cubans not
in arms (which are the majority), a material force here that cannot
be disputed with any chance of success. After Spain has abandoned
her sovereignty here you are under the responsibility of keeping a
force here which will make it a crazy enterprise to dispute. This
is a moral duty which you are obliged to fulfil; you cannot have
the excuse of want of power that Spain had. The first element of
success is the destruction beforehand of all insurgent or
insurrection element. All minor things should be put aside and the
American mind have a national policy toward the colonisation and
final prosperity of Cuba. You do not want the Cuban question to
become one of those burning questions of American politics; but it
will, unless you have strength to determine it in the way it should
go. If it is disputed now in the transient state, you will convert
it into an interior American question, which would make things
worse than if you had never come into the thing at all. It is the
duty of your Administration to mark out these lines and tell the
American people that it is a duty outside of small political lines.

"What is the duty of the Cuban people? Your trouble comes from
having to handle an unknown land. The business of the President is,
not to show business people how they can make money, but to show
the people their duty, and leave the rest to American ingenuity.
The Cubans are a good people. The population is divided about
equally between whites and blacks, and has decreased about one
third during the war. I do not wish to discuss the inferiority of
the black race, but, so far as I can see in this country from
whatever cause, they do not meet worry. The act of force is the
determining one with them, and in it they are of great value. In
all other social determinations they count very little indeed. From
this you derive two lines of conduct: you must try to satisfy the
whites as far as possible, and you must content the black so that
he will not lend his brutal force to the discontent of the white.
The insurrection caused a great fraternity, that is to say, the
distinction of race which existed before the war does not exist
now. This is not, however, one of the elements that is going to
cause trouble, if you do not let them conflict. The insurgents have
fought many years for independence, making great sacrifices for the
sake of it, and therefore they will not be satisfied with anything
short of independence. If you leave them in the future to their own
inferior force, I do not think there will be a strong fight towards
acquiring total independence in the exterior world, because they
recognise the fact that their country is comparatively small and
the United States is large, but if these people see that this
independence at any moment is not given to them, they will rise in
arms--to what extent I do not know. A man who has lost family,
suffered sickness, and has no interest now in the home where he was
born, is a very reduced moral being. He has not the energies of a
total being. The Island of Cuba has been debased by a war of
extermination, brought about by its own manner of warfare, and by
the Spanish warfare. The Island of Cuba is now totally inert and
totally incapable of any governing faculties, not only because of
the dead, but by making the rich poor, by making the poor indigent,
and the indigent dying. You have in the Island of Cuba a reduced
specimen both of material and moral wealth, and these individuals
are not capable of determinations of value and worth towards the
natural end of civilisation. You then see how much you can depend
on the help of the individual. If you attempt to govern by
carpet-bag legislation, you will bring on an insurrection. If you
help the indigent, and bring them to a condition like they were
before the war, you will do them no good. Therefore, you must have
a force to establish an indisputable power, and then you must have
a policy in which each one finds a solution to his own interest and
welfare, under the idea that the Cuban people are unable to take
care of themselves to-day, and that none of them have definite
ideas or definite plans for their welfare. These plans must come
through a strange guidance and not from the Cubans. I have on the
Constancia in my care about five thousand people to-day, whom I
have helped all I could. I shall have to employ means of coercion
to throw these people outside of my house, so little is the sense
of dignity in them to-day, and shall have to give them lands, and
help them, in order to get them to find their own way in life. This
is the real condition of things. The more energetic element is the
one in the insurrection, but these on my estate are such as
constitute the element which took no sides but suffered the
distress of both.

"The size of property was one of the causes of the war, together
with the total neglect of the lower orders of population.

"Of the element in arms, you have to distinguish between those who
made the war and those who are wittily called the 'Veterans of
1898'--about one half are Veterans of 1898. These people have
energy, and these people have accustomed themselves to that life of
civil warfare, but their condition is very bad to-day, and because
of this they would like to come into order, although they have
great inclination to continue. This is about the only energy left
here, but it will be of no use to you except by getting these
people out of the way. They have gone to war and acquired honours
and salary to the extent of probably $10,000,000. The only way you
can do is to offer them the security of what they have acquired so
far as material welfare is concerned,--that is, their salaries. It
would be an error not to give it all to them. If you give them work
in the face of that inert mass I have shown you, and let them see
their superiority, giving them certain annuities or monthly
payments, you can bridge over the troublesome part of this
population, but you cannot do it through their moral nature. You
will have to bridge over several months by a strong occupation, by
destroying the insurgent energy, by helping the other people, and
by drawing general lines which all parties in the United States
will accept. You must outline a distinct American policy which must
be followed by both parties, and which no party can differ from.
With these conditions you will have no trouble in the Island of
Cuba.

"If you name your high officials Cubans, this will run off into
Cuban solution, and not American. If the occupation is made by
sufficient force, and you name only a few high officials who have
the confidence of the Administration and have a general plan to
carry through, and these appoint lower officials, taking the best
class of Cubans and insurgents, the problem is solved. As a
Spaniard born in Cuba and wishing this country all the good I can,
I think it would be absurd to hope for the peace of the Island
without a strong military force. The place must be occupied on
strategic lines and not as Spain occupied it, and with good means
of communication. This is the solution of the question. If this is
not done, guerrilla warfare will have the advantage and it will be
the same as when the Island was occupied by the Spanish forces;
there were no enemies and no battles and it was like making a
cavalry charge on a cloud or a mist."

The above is a vigorous statement of the situation from the standpoint of one who has lost his all, not in fighting for independence, but in a contest for what he believed was a strong government. The Marquis wastes no sentiment. He tells some hard truths which all who know Cuba will recognise as such. Few foreigners know the United States better than the Marquis de Apezteguia and few have his ability of touching the weak spots in our armour. He tells us we cannot absorb Cuba, and as an American he would oppose annexation. These observations, as well as some others, will delight Mr. Andrew Carnegie, Mr. Edward Atkinson, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, and other opponents of annexation. The talk of strategic necessity, the exertion of power, and the material force necessary to make Cuba American territory will give these gentlemen who have raised the anti-Imperialist cry sentences which will greatly increase their stock of phrases, but in no way solve the question of what shall be done with our new possessions. Indeed, the Marquis, consoling the so-called anti-Imperialists with his well turned sentences, offers them medicine more stringent and a remedy more drastic than annexation. The word "Empire" has no terror for this Cuban-born Spaniard. You must create an Imperialistic policy, or right, not granted in the Federal Constitution, you must maintain American ascendency at any cost, and do your duty toward the people of Cuba and the people of the world. Cuba must, for all time to come, be American territory. It is only by a policy of this sort the Marquis thinks we shall succeed. In carrying out this plan, we are warned not to allow the Cuban question to become a burning question of American policy, but we are enjoined to hold up President McKinley's hands in establishing a stable government in Cuba. It must not be made into a business, but a necessity. Carpet-bag legislation, he thinks, would bring on an insurrection. In this the Marquis is undoubtedly right. Lastly, he offers the good advice that something must be done and done quickly for the insurgents in arms, whose deplorable condition he vividly portrays. That these soldiers should be speedily paid off there can be no doubt, for until that is done, the rural districts of Cuba can never become productive.

Presumptuous as it may be to pass judgment on the utterances of a man of such wide range of experience in Cuba as the Marquis de Apezteguia, I believe the President of the late Conservative party of Cuba underestimates the Cuban capacity, both for self-government and for annexation to the United States. The work of final absorption may take a generation, but it will surely come. Once annexed, Cuba would become an English-speaking country, and the alert Cuban mind would grasp those great principles of fundamental liberty with far greater alacrity than the Spanish. Let the word go forth to teach English in every schoolhouse in Cuba, and the work of amalgamation would be half done. The more the Cubans know of the United States and of our institutions, the better they will like us. As confidence takes the place of distrust in the minds of the population of Cuba,--native or foreign-born, black or white,--the sooner all will reach the conclusion that the most promising future for Cuba can only be attained by complete union with the greater Republic.

In support of this opinion as to the political future of Cuba it is only necessary to quote the utterance of one whose opportunity for making such a forecast has been exceptional. Major-General Matthew C. Butler, of South Carolina, combines in his make-up and experience both soldier and statesman. The Confederate cause can point to no more brave and capable officer than General Butler. For sixteen years he represented his State in the United States Senate, and during that period grappled with all the important questions of the day. No man on the Cuban Evacuation Commission was so well equipped to study the political and economic side of the Cuban question as General Butler; and no man took so much pains to ascertain the facts in relation to the condition and sentiment of the people of Cuba. For a month last autumn the author was daily and closely associated with General Butler at the Vedado, near Havana, where the Military Commission had its headquarters. Between acquaintances of many years, in Washington, it is not strange that conversation during those long evenings at the Hotel Trotcha turned on the future of Cuba and that the exchange of thought was both free and frank. Summed up, the opinion of General Butler on the future of Cuba is as follows:

"You ask an expression of my opinion before leaving Cuba as to the
character of the people of the Island and their future prospects.
If they will be patient, following the dictates of prudence, and
trust the Government of the United States, a very prosperous and
happy future awaits them. The process of rehabilitation may be
slow, but by cordial co-operation of all classes it will be more
certain and permanent.

"The army of the United States is here to guarantee public order
and enforce obedience to law. Its use will be controlled very
largely by the conduct of the people themselves. If they uphold the
law and insure public tranquillity, if each will respect the rights
and persons of the other, there will be no occasion for
interference by American troops. And you may take my word for it
they will not interfere with the people in their peaceful
vocations, if the conditions I have suggested prevail.

"The officers and soldiers on duty in the Island of Cuba are
American citizens as well as American soldiers, accustomed to
rendering loyal obedience to law; and they will not abandon on this
Island their devotion to the principles of American liberty
regulated by law. I therefore repeat that the people of Cuba may
safely trust the officers and soldiers of the United States to
establish and maintain the principles of government as set forth in
our Constitution and laws, which mean freedom, not licentiousness,
and equality before the law for all.

"We have no such thing as 'one man power' in the United States, and
cannot so far depart from our devotion to popular liberty as to
tolerate it here. So I say, if the people of Cuba (I include in the
word 'people' all classes and conditions) will await with patience
and resolution the establishment of good government, honestly and
impartially administered, a brilliant future is in store for them.
If, on the contrary, bickerings among themselves, unreasonable
complaints, and demands in disregard of the rights of persons and
property should lead to bloodshed and breaches of the peace and the
disturbance of public order and tranquillity, as they most surely
will, the day of their deliverance will be indefinitely deferred.

"You ask me whether I think the people of the Island of Cuba
capable of self-government. This is a very difficult question to
answer. I may, however, say that I have no sympathy with the harsh
and unjust judgments of those who condemn them without a hearing
and settle in advance a problem which requires time for solution.

"Officially I have no opinion to express as to the status of such a
commonwealth, for that is a question to be settled by the people
themselves in their aggregate capacity, but personally I should
like to see Cuba a State in the American Union, enjoying all the
rights of local autonomy and self-government on terms of equality
with the other commonwealths of the United States. She would then
have liberty, regulated by a written constitution, where the
military is subordinate to the civil power, and where each of the
three great co-ordinate branches of the government, legislative,
executive, and judicial, execute the will of the people."

The above statement, which, with General Butler's consent, is made part of this chapter, was prepared with great precision and care and only after long deliberation. Moreover, it was submitted to some of his colleagues, and the subject-matter fully discussed with the author, who is in full and hearty accord with the views expressed. Officially the author has no opinion to express as to the status of such a commonwealth, for the work committed to him was purely of an economic and fiscal and not of a political character. Personally, however, the author, with General Butler, looks forward to the day when Cuba will be a State of the Union, in the enjoyment of that full degree of liberty and self-government which is accorded the other commonwealths of the United States.