Chapter VII: Longstreet’s Honeymoon (2)

During the night a Federal strayed beyond his line, was taken up by Longstreet’s troops, and on his person was found a memorandum of General Burnside’s arrangements and an order for the renewal of the battle next day. Upon receiving this information General Lee gave immediate orders for a line of rifle-pits on the top of Marye’s Hill for General Ransom, who had been held somewhat in reserve, and for other guns to be placed on Taylor’s Hill. The Confederates were up before daylight on the morrow, anxious to receive General Burnside again. The Federal troops, however, had left the field. It was at first thought that the memorandum was intended as a ruse of war, but it was afterwards learned that General Burnside expected to resume attack, but gave it up when he became fully aware of the fate of his soldiers at the foot of Marye’s Hill.

CHICKAMAUGA

This battle marked the only great Confederate victory won in the West, and was one of the bloodiest battles of the war. Indeed, the contest for the bloodiest day in this great war is, I believe, between Antietam and Chickamauga. Official reports show that on both sides the casualties embrace the enormous proportion of thirty-three per cent. of the troops actually engaged. On the Union side there were over a score of regiments in which the losses in this single fight exceeded 49.4 per cent. The “Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava,” immortalized by Tennyson, did not suffer by ten per cent. as much as did thirty of the Union regiments at Chickamauga; and a number of Confederate regiments suffered even more than their Federal opponents.

Longstreet’s command in less than two hours lost nearly forty-four per cent. of its strength. Of the troops that received their splendid assaults, Steedman’s and Brannan’s commands lost respectively forty-nine and thirty-eight per cent. in less than four hours. The loss of single regiments showed a much heavier percentage. For instance, the Tenth Tennessee Regiment lost sixty-eight per cent.; the Fifth Georgia, 61.1; the Second Tennessee, 60.2; the Sixteenth Alabama, 58.6; a great number of them more than fifty per cent.

The total Confederate losses were about 18,000 men; the total Federal losses, about 17,000. Viewed from the stand-point of both sides, Chickamauga was the fifth greatest battle of the war, being exceeded only by Gettysburg, Spottsylvania, the Wilderness, and Chancellorsville. But each of these battles were of a much longer time. The total Confederates engaged in the battle were 59,242; the total Federals, 60,867. The battle was fought on the 20th of September, 1863.

The movements of both sides were too complex to be followed here. During a very hot part of the battle, General Hood, on the Confederate side, was fearfully wounded; General Benning, of his “Rock Brigade,” lost his own horse, and thought that General Hood was killed and that everything was gone to smash. He cut a horse loose from a captured gun, grabbed a rope trace as a riding whip, mounted, and rode to meet General Longstreet and report. He had lost his hat in the mêlée, and everything was in terrible shape. He reported,--

“General Hood killed, my horse killed, my brigade torn to pieces,
and I haven’t a single man left.”

General Longstreet smiled, and quietly asked him if he did not think he could find _one_ man. Quieted by the tone of the question, he began to look for his men, found quite a number of them, and quickly joined the fighting forces at the front, where he discovered that the Confederates had carried the first line, that Johnson’s division was in the breach and pushing on, with Hindman spreading battle to the enemy’s limits, Stuart’s division holding bravely on, and the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys coming along to help restore the battle to good organization.

About one o’clock in the day lunch was ordered spread for a number of the officers. General Longstreet meanwhile rode with General Buckner and the staffs to view the changed conditions of the battle. He could see but little of the enemy’s line, and only knew it by the occasional exchange of fire between the skirmishers. Suddenly the party discovered that they had passed the Confederate line and were within the fire of the Federal sharp-shooters, who were concealed behind the trees and under the brush. They came back in more than double-quick. General Longstreet ordered General Buckner to establish a twelve-gun battery on the right and enfilade the Federal works. Then he rode away to enjoy a sumptuous spread of Nassau bacon and Georgia sweet potatoes. They were not accustomed to potatoes of any kind in Virginia, and the Georgia variety was a peculiar luxury. While the lunch was in its first stages a fragment of shell came tearing through the woods, passed through a book in the hands of a courier who sat his horse hard by reading, and struck down the chief of ordnance, Colonel T. P. Manning. Friends sprang forward to look for the wound and give relief. Manning had just taken an unusually large bite of sweet potato, and was about suffocating thereby. He was supposed to be gasping for his last breath when General Longstreet suggested that he be relieved of the potato and given a chance to breathe. This done, he soon revived, and was ready to be taken to the hospital, and in a few days he was again ready for either a Federal shell or a Georgia potato.

The vicissitudes of the battle were many and varied, but finally the Federal forces quit the field and the different wings of the Confederate army came together and greeted each other with loud huzzas. The Army of the Tennessee was ready to celebrate its first grand victory, in spite of the great losses sustained. The twilight dews hung heavy over the trees, as if to hush the voice of victory in the presence of death, but nevertheless, the two lines, which neared as they advanced, united their shouts in increasing volume, not as the cannon’s violent noise, but as one great burst of harmony that seemed almost to lift from their rooted depths the great forest trees. Before greetings and congratulations upon the success had passed it was night, and the mild beams of the quartering moon were more suggestive of Venus than of Mars, as Longstreet rested in the white light of the one great triumph of Confederate arms in the West.

IN EAST TENNESSEE

About the 1st of November, 1863, it was determined at Confederate head-quarters that Longstreet should be ordered into East Tennessee against General Burnside’s army.

On the 22d of October General Grant joined the army, and it was known that General Sherman was marching to join him.

On the 20th of October General Burnside reported by letter to General Grant an army of twenty-two thousand three hundred men, with ninety-odd guns, but his returns for November gave a force of twenty-five thousand two hundred and ninety, and over one hundred guns. Eight thousand of his men were on service north of Knoxville and about Cumberland Gap.

To march, capture, and disperse this formidable force, fortified at points, Longstreet had about fifteen thousand men, after deducting camp guards and foraging parties. Marching and fighting had been his almost daily occupation from the middle of January, 1863, when he left Fredericksburg to move down to Suffolk, Virginia, until the 16th of December, when he found bleak winter again breaking upon him, away from friends, and dependent upon his own efforts for food and clothing for his ragged and hungry Confederates.

It is not in the purview of this paper to more than briefly refer to Longstreet’s work in East Tennessee in the bitter winter of 1863-64. He has said that Washington’s men at Valley Forge did not suffer more than his command on the hard campaigns of that severe winter. Much of the time half-clad and shoeless, the snow-covered ground bore the bloody imprint of their naked feet. They were compelled to dig holes in the frozen ground, which were thawed out by fires to furnish their usual couch. They had nothing to eat but parched corn. But the brave fellows never lost heart. They undertook to make a joke of their dire straits. As General Longstreet rode out among them, they would call cheerily to know if they might not have a little fodder to eat with their corn.

It is now generally conceded that no more valorous service was rendered the Confederate cause during the four years’ fighting than Longstreet’s work in East Tennessee, cut off from supplies, improperly supported by his government, and sent with an inadequate force to attack Burnside in his stronghold.

Mrs. Grant, a few years before her death, in discussing the events of those campaigns, said to me that General Grant had come to Nashville to spend Christmas with her. She had scarcely given him greeting when a hurried message came from Knoxville,--“Longstreet is coming!” He was much perturbed at having to forego his Christmas with his family and return immediately to his works about Knoxville. In parting she said to him, “Now, Ulysses, you know that you are not going to hurt Longstreet.” Grant quickly replied, “I will if I can get him; he is in bad company.”

To “get” Longstreet or to drive him out of Tennessee came to be the chief concern of Grant and his government. General Halleck was much concerned about the Confederate army in East Tennessee, the only strategic field then held by Southern troops. It was inconveniently near Kentucky and the Ohio River. President Lincoln and his War Secretary added their anxiety to Halleck’s on account of its politico-strategic bearing. General Halleck urged his views upon General Grant, and despatched General Foster that it was of first importance to “drive Longstreet out of Tennessee and keep him out.” General Grant ordered: “Drive Longstreet to the farthest point east that you can.” It was easier to issue that order than to execute it. And Grant reported to the authorities:

“If Longstreet is not driven out of the valley entirely, and the road destroyed east of Abingdon, I do not think it unlikely that the last great battle of the war will be fought in East Tennessee. Reports of deserters and citizens show the army of Bragg to be too much demoralized and reduced by desertions to do anything this winter. I will get everything in order here in a few days and go to Nashville and Louisville, and, if there is still a chance of doing anything against Longstreet, to the scene of operations there. I am deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond Saltville this winter, so as to be able to select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having the enemy dictate it to me.”

About the middle of December orders were given the Confederate army, which was on the west bank of the Holston River, to cross and march for the railroad, only a few miles away.

The transfer of the army to the east bank of the river was executed by diligent work and the use of such flatboats and other means of crossing as could be collected and constructed. They were over by the 20th, and before Christmas were in camps along the railroad near Morristown. Blankets and clothes were scarce, shoes more so. But to the hungry Confederates the beautiful country in which they found themselves seemed a land of milk and honey. The French Broad River and the Holston are confluent at Knoxville. The country between and beyond them contains as fine farming-lands and has as delightful climate as can be found. Stock and grain were on all farms. Wheat and oats had been thoughtfully hidden away by the Federals, but the fields were full of maize, still standing. The country around the French Broad had hardly been touched by the foragers. The Confederate wagons immediately on entering the fields were loaded to overflowing. Pumpkins were on the ground in places like apples under a tree. Cattle, sheep, and swine, poultry, vegetables, maple sugar, and honey were all abundant for immediate wants of the troops.

When the Federals found that the Confederates had moved to the east bank, their cavalry followed to that side. They were almost as much in want of the beautiful foraging lands as the Confederates, but there was little left for them. With the plenitude of provisions for the time, and many things which seemed luxuries, the Confederates were not altogether happy. Tattered garments, blankets, and shoes (the latter going, many gone) opened ways, on all sides, for piercing winter blasts. There were some hand-looms in the country, from which there was occasionally picked up a piece of cloth, and here and there other comforts were received, some from kind and some from unwilling hands, which nevertheless could spare them. For shoes the men were compelled to resort to the raw hides of beef cattle as temporary protection from the frozen ground. Then soldiers were discovered who could tan the hides of beeves, some who could make shoes, some who could make shoe-pegs, some who could make shoe-lasts; so it came about, through the varied industries of Longstreet’s men, that the hides passed rapidly from the beeves to the feet of the soldiers. Thus the soldier’s life was made, for a time, passably pleasant in the infantry and artillery. Meanwhile, the Confederate cavalry were looking at the Federals, and the Federals were looking at them, both frequently burning powder between their lines.

General Sturgis had been assigned to the cavalry of the other side, to relieve General Shackelford, and he seemed to think that the dead of winter was the time for cavalry work; and the Confederate General Martin’s orders were to have the enemy under his eye at all hours. Both were vigilant, active, and persevering.

About December 20 a raid was made by General Averill from West Virginia upon a supply depot of General Sam Jones’s department, at Salem, which was partially successful, when General Grant, under the impression that the stores were for East Tennessee, wired General Foster, “This will give you great advantage.” And General Foster despatched General Parke, commanding his troops in the field, December 26, “Longstreet will feel a little timid now, and will bear a little pushing.”

General Grant made a visit to Knoxville about New Year’s, and remained until the 7th. He found General Foster in the condition of the Confederates,--not properly supplied with clothing, especially in want of shoes. So he authorized a wait for clothing, then in transit and looked for in a week; and that little delay was a great lift for the Confederates.

Before leaving General Foster, General Grant ordered him, on receipt of clothing, to advance and “drive Longstreet at least beyond Bull’s Gap and Red Bridge.” And to prepare for that advance, he ordered the Ninth and Twenty-third Corps to Mossy Creek, the Fourth Corps to Strawberry Plains, and the cavalry to Dandridge.

The Union army--equipped--marched on the 14th and 15th of January. The bitter freeze of two weeks had made the rough angles of mud as firm and sharp as so many freshly quarried rocks, and the bare feet of the Confederates on this march left bloody marks along the roads.

General Sturgis rode in advance of the army, and occupied Dandridge by Elliott’s, Wolford’s, and Garrard’s divisions of cavalry and Mott’s brigade of infantry. The Fourth and Twenty-ninth Corps followed the cavalry, leaving the Ninth Corps to guard at Strawberry Plains.

General Martin gave prompt notice that the march was at Dandridge and in full force. Dandridge is on the right bank of the French Broad River, about thirty miles from Knoxville. Its topographical features are bold and inviting of military work. Its other striking characteristic was the interesting character of its citizens. The Confederates--a unit in heart and spirit--were prepared to do their share towards making an effective battle, and the plans were so laid.

At the time ordered for his advance General Foster was suffering from an old wound, and General Parke became commander of the troops in the field. The latter delayed at Strawberry Plains in arranging that part of his command, and General Sheridan, marching with the advance, became commander, until superseded by the corps commander, General Gordon Granger.

The Confederate plans were laid before the army was all up. Their skirmish line was made stronger, and relieved the cavalry of their dismounted service. A narrow, unused road, practicable for artillery, was found that opened a way for the Confederates to reach the enemy’s rearward line of march. Sharp-shooters were organized and ordered forward by it, to be followed by our infantry columns. It was thought better to move the infantry alone, as the ringing of the iron axles of the guns might give notice of the Confederate purpose; the artillery to be called as the Confederate sharp-shooters approached the junction of the roads. The head of the turning force encountered a picket-guard, some of whom escaped without firing. General Granger decided to retire, and was in time to leave the crossroads behind him, his rear guard passing the point of intersection before the Confederate advance party reached it about midnight.

The weather moderated before night, and after dark a mild, gentle rain began to fall.

When Longstreet rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morning the ground was thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of his horse. When the cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. The mud and want of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit by the heavy Confederate columns useless. The cavalry was ordered on, and the troops at Morristown, on the Strawberry Plains road, were ordered to try that route, but the latter proved to be too heavy for progress with artillery.

While General Longstreet rode through the streets of Dandridge, giving directions for such pursuit of the fleeing Federals as could be made, a lady came out upon the sidewalk and invited him into her parlors. When the orders for pursuit were completed, he dismounted, and with some members of his staff walked in. After the compliments of the season were passed, the Confederates were asked to be seated, and the lady told, with evident great enjoyment, of General Granger during the night before. She had never heard a person swear about another as General Granger did about General Longstreet. Some of the officers proposed to stop and make a battle, but General Granger swore, and said, “It’s no use to stop and fight Longstreet. You can’t whip him. It don’t make any difference whether he has one man or a hundred thousand.” Presently she brought out a flask that General Granger had forgotten, and presented it to General Longstreet. It had about two horizontal fingers left in it. Though not left with compliments, it was accepted. Although the weather had moderated, it was very wet and nasty, and as General Longstreet had taken his coffee at three o’clock, it was resolved to call it noon and divide the spoils. Colonel Fairfax, who knew how to enjoy good things, thought the occasion called for a sentiment, and offered, “General Granger--may his shadow never grow less.”

The cavalry found the road and its side-ways so cut up that the pursuit was reduced to a labored walk. The previous hard service and exposure had so reduced the animals that they were not in trim for real effective cavalry service. They found some crippled battery forges and a little of other plunder, but the enemy passed the Holston and broke his bridges behind him, and Longstreet’s men returned to their huts and winter homes.

To seek some of the fruits of his advantage at Dandridge, the roads being a little firmer, General Longstreet ordered his leading division, under General Jenkins, on the 21st, to proceed to march towards Strawberry Plains, and the Richmond authorities were asked to send a pontoon bridge, tools of construction, and to hurry forward such shoes as they could send.

On the 24th, as the official records show, General Grant sent word to General Halleck of Longstreet’s return towards Knoxville; that he had ordered General Foster to give battle, if necessary, and that he would send General Thomas with additional troops to insure that Longstreet would be driven from the State. He also directed General Thomas to go in person and take command, and said, “I want Longstreet routed and pursued beyond the limits of Tennessee.” And he ordered General Foster to put his cavalry on a raid from Cumberland Gap to cut in upon Longstreet’s rear.

On the 6th of February General Grant reported from Nashville,--

“MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
“General-in-Chief:

“I am making every effort to get supplies from Knoxville for the
support of a large force--large enough to drive Longstreet out.

“U. S. GRANT,
“_Major-General Commanding_.”

* * * * *

“MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS:

“Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed
most of his force from our front, two divisions going to
Longstreet. Longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the
east. This makes it evident the enemy intends to secure East
Tennessee if they can, and I intend to drive them out or get
whipped this month. For this purpose you will have to detach at
least ten thousand men besides Stanley’s division (more will be
better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chattanooga by troops
from Logan’s command. It will not be necessary to take artillery
or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery horses
should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to each two
hundred men should be taken, if you have them to spare. Let me
know how soon you can start.

“GRANT,
_Major-General_.”

On the 9th Major-General J. M. Schofield arrived at Knoxville, and assumed command of the Army of the Ohio.

General Grant reported on the 11th,--

“MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
“General-in-Chief:

“I expect to get off from Chattanooga by Monday next a force to
drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee. It has been impossible
heretofore to subsist the troops necessary for this work.

“U. S. GRANT,
“_Major-General_.”

* * * * *

“MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD,
“Knoxville, Tennessee:

“I deem it of the utmost importance to drive Longstreet out
immediately, so as to furlough the balance of our veterans, and
to prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, instead of
permitting the enemy to dictate it for us. Thomas is ordered to
start ten thousand men, besides the remainder of Granger’s corps,
at once. He will take no artillery, but will take his artillery
horses, and three mules to one hundred men. He will probably
start next Monday.

“U. S. GRANT,
“_Major-General_.”

How General Grant abandoned the move against Longstreet, while Longstreet kept Schofield bottled up all through that trying winter in his works about Knoxville, is old history.

The Confederate government finally abandoned the plan of occupying East Tennessee, and on the 7th of April Longstreet was ordered, with the part of his command that had originally served with the Army of Northern Virginia, to join General Lee on the Rapidan.

I have gone thus far into the East Tennessee campaigns for the pleasure it gives me to reproduce the following resolutions passed by the Confederate Congress during General Longstreet’s arduous work in the winter of 1863-64:

“No. 42. Joint Resolutions of Thanks to Lieutenant-General
Longstreet and the officers and men of his command.

“_Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America_,
That the thanks of the Congress are due, and hereby cordially
tendered, to Lieutenant-General James Longstreet and the
officers and men of his command, for their patriotic services
and brilliant achievements in the present war, sharing as they
have the arduous fatigues and privations of many campaigns in
Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Tennessee, and
participating in nearly every great battle fought in those
States, the commanding general ever displaying great ability,
skill, and prudence in command, and the officers and men the most
heroic bravery, fortitude, and energy, in every duty they have
been called upon to perform.

“_Resolved_, That the President be requested to transmit a copy
of the foregoing resolutions to Lieutenant-General Longstreet for
publication to his command.

“Approved February 17, 1864.”

THE WILDERNESS

The Wilderness is a forest land about fifteen miles square, lying between and equidistant from Orange Court-House and Fredericksburg. It is broken occasionally by small farms and abandoned clearings, and two roads,--the Orange Plank Road and the turnpike, which are cut at right angles by the Germania road,--in general course nearly parallel, open ways through it between Fredericksburg and the Court-House. The Germania Ford road joins the Brock road, the strategic line of the military zone, and crosses the turnpike at Wilderness Tavern and the plank road about two miles south of that point.

General Grant was making his head-quarters near the Army of the Potomac, in Culpeper County, Virginia, commanded by Major-General George G. Meade. The aggregate of the Federal command was about one hundred and thirty thousand men.

The Army of Northern Virginia was on the west side of the Rapidan River. Its total number at the beginning of the campaign was then put by Colonel Taylor, chief of staff, at about sixty-four thousand.

However, the numerical strength of the armies did not decide the merits of the campaign. The commanders on both sides had chosen their ground after mature deliberation. They knew of each other’s numbers and resources, and made their plans accordingly. A number of their respective leaders had known each other personally for more than twenty years. They had the undivided support and confidence of their governments and their armies. General Lee was as always the trusted leader of the Confederates; General Grant by his three years’ service in the West had become known as an all-round soldier seldom if ever surpassed. General Longstreet, who thought most highly of General Grant from every stand-point, always said that the biggest part of him was his heart.

In this case General Grant had no fixed plan of campaign except to avoid the strong defensive line occupied by General Lee, and to draw him out to open battle.

General Lee’s orders were against a general engagement until the Federal forces should attack, but in the midst of varied manœuvrings the battle was begun in half a dozen quarters before either commanding general had expected it. Hancock advanced before sunrise ready for battle, just as Longstreet’s command, which had come up from Mechanicsville, reported to General Lee. Longstreet’s line was formed along the right and left of the plank road, Kershaw on the right, Field on the left. Hancock’s musketry was doing considerable damage to the forces in front, and as Longstreet’s lines were forming the men broke files to give free passage for their comrades to the rear. The advancing fire was getting brisk, but not a shot was fired in return by Longstreet’s troops until the divisions were ready. Three of Field’s brigades were formed in the line of the left, and three of Kershaw’s on the right. The advance of the six brigades was ordered, and Hancock’s lines, thinned by their previous fighting and weaker than the fresh men now coming against them, were checked and pushed back to their intrenched lines. Then the fighting became steady and firm.

Finally Hancock’s line began to break. As they retreated and the Confederates advanced, a fire was started in the dry leaves and began to spread. The Confederate forces, in spite of the fire, moved on. As the battle waged, General Wadsworth, who was gallantly leading a division of the Federal forces, fell mortally wounded, and there was then a general break in the Union line. Jenkins’s brigade was conspicuous among the Confederates in pursuit. Jenkins exclaimed to those around him, “I am happy; I have felt despair of the cause for some months, but am relieved, and feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the Rapidan before night.” A few minutes later he fell mortally wounded. In the general mêlée Longstreet was leading in advance of his troops, and in the midst of close firing was shot by his own men. This caused the Confederate lines to slow up in their advance. Orders were given General Field by Longstreet to push on before the enemy could have time to rally, but in the midst of the general confusion, General Lee ordered the broken lines to be reformed, and the advantage already gained was not followed up.

General Field, in his subsequent account of the day, said,--

“I was at Longstreet’s side in a moment, and in answer to my
anxious inquiry as to his condition, he replied that he would be
looked after by others, and directed me to take command of the
corps and push on. Though at this moment he could not have known
the extent or character of his wounds (that they were severe was
apparent), he seemed to forget himself in the absorbing interest
of the movement he was making.

“Had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, I have
always believed that Grant would have been driven across the
Rapidan before night; but General Lee was present, and ordered
that our line, which was nearly a right angle, should first
be straightened out. The difficulty of manœuvring through the
brush made this a tedious operation, so that when we did advance
with large reinforcements from Ewell’s Corps placed under my
orders, the enemy was found awaiting us behind new breastworks,
thoroughly prepared.”

In a letter touching this subject to General Longstreet, Colonel Fairfax said,--

“On reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse and
propped against a tree. You blew the bloody foam from your mouth
and said, ‘Tell General Field to take command, and move forward
with the whole force and gain the Brock road,’ but meantime hours
were lost.”

A Northern historian[H] said, on the same point,--

“It seemed indeed that irretrievable disaster was upon us; but in
the very torrent and tempest of the attack it suddenly ceased and
all was still. What could cause this surcease of effort at the
very height of success was then wholly unknown to us.”

Some years after, General Hancock said to General Longstreet,--

“You rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours
before I could reorganize the battle.”

THE CURTAIN FALLS AT APPOMATTOX

In discussing the war, General Longstreet always dwelt with peculiar tenderness on the last days that culminated with the surrender at Appomattox. His mental belief for two years before the surrender was that from the very nature of the situation the Union forces would in all probability finally triumph, but his brave heart never knew how to give up the fight, and the surrender was at last agreed upon while he was still protesting against it.

The incident is well known of a number of the leading Confederate generals, who, having decided that further resistance was useless, went to General Lee and suggested surrender upon the best terms that could be had as the wisest thing to do. General Longstreet declined to join with them. General Pendleton was spokesman for the party. His account of the conference is thus related by General A. L. Long in his Memoirs of Lee:

“General Lee was lying on the ground. No others heard the
conversation between him and myself. He received my communication
with the reply, ‘Oh, no; I trust that it has not come to that,’
and added, ‘General, we have yet too many bold men to think of
laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with spirit, while
our boys do. Besides, if I were to say a word to the Federal
commander, he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as
to make it the condition of demanding an unconditional surrender,
a proposal to which I will never listen.... I have never believed
we could, against the gigantic combination for our subjugation,
make good, in the long run, our independence, unless some foreign
power should, directly or indirectly, assist us.... But such
considerations really make with me no difference. We had, I am
satisfied, sacred principles to maintain, and rights to defend,
for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if we
perished in the endeavor.’

“Such were, as nearly as I can recall them, the exact words of
General Lee on that most pitiful occasion. You see in them the
soul of the man. Where his conscience dictated and his judgment
decided, there his heart was.”

No words of eulogy show up so clearly the characters of Lee and likewise of Grant as their own direct words and deeds. On the evening of April 7, 1865, General Grant wrote General Lee as follows:

“The results of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender
of that portion of the Confederate army known as the Army of
Northern Virginia.”

General Longstreet was with General Lee when he received this note. It was handed to General Longstreet without a word. After reading it General Longstreet handed it back, saying, “Not yet.” General Lee replied to General Grant that same evening:

“I have received your note of this day. Though not entertaining
the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance
on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your
desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on
condition of its surrender.”

While this correspondence was pending, both armies, under the respective directions of Grant and of Lee, continued their preparations for battle as if there was no thought of cessation. The next day, April 8, General Grant wrote General Lee as follows:

“Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date
asking the conditions on which I will accept surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say
that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I
would insist upon,--namely, that the men and officers surrendered
shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the United
States government until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or
will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for
the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose
of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia will be received.”

To this General Lee replied, under the same date:

“I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of
yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition.
To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for
the surrender of this army, but as the restoration to peace
should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your
proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you
with a view to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia;
but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States
forces under my command and tend to the restoration of peace,
I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the
old stage road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two
armies.”

That night General Lee spread his couch about a hundred feet from the saddle and blanket that were General Longstreet’s pillow for the night, and it is not probable that either had a more comfortable bed than the other. Of the early hours of the next day, the last day of active existence of the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel Venable, of General Lee’s staff, has written a touching account, which is published in General Long’s “Memoirs of General Lee.” When further resistance seemed useless, he quoted General Lee as saying,--

“Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant,
and I would rather die a thousand deaths.”

Many were the wild words of passionate grief spoken by the officers around him. Said one, “Oh, General, what would history say of the surrender of the army in the field?” According to Colonel Venable, General Lee replied, “Yes, I know they will say hard things of us; they will not understand how we are overwhelmed with numbers. But that is not the question; the question is, Is it right to surrender this army? If it is right, then I will take all the responsibility.”

Presently General Lee called General Longstreet to ride forward with him. He said that the advance columns stood against a very formidable force which he could not break through, while General Meade was at Longstreet’s rear ready to call for all the work that the rear guard could do. He added that it did not seem possible for him to make further successful resistance. General Longstreet asked if the sacrifice of his army could benefit the cause in other quarters. He thought not. Then, said Longstreet, “The situation speaks for itself.” Several other leading generals were consulted, and all of them held the same view.

Meanwhile, the Federal forces appeared plainly to be preparing for attack. The Confederates continued work on their lines of defence. General Longstreet ordered parts of the rear guard forward to support the advance forces, and directed General E. P. Alexander to establish them with part of his batteries in the best position for support or rallying line in case the front lines were forced back.

Thus the last line of battle formed in the Army of Northern Virginia was by the invincible First Corps, twice conqueror of empire!

In talking over the delicate situation, General Lee told General Longstreet that he feared his refusal to meet General Grant’s proposition might cause him to demand harsh terms. General Longstreet assured him that he knew General Grant well enough to be certain that the best terms possible would be given--even such terms as he himself would be willing to give a gallant foe under similar circumstances. How true this estimate proved all the world now knows.