Chapter XXX: Appendix (1)

MR. LINCOLN’S SPEECHES IN CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE, PROCLAMATIONS,
LETTERS, ETC., NOT INCLUDED IN THE BODY OF THE WORK.

SPEECH ON THE MEXICAN WAR.

(_In Committee of the Whole House, January 12, 1848._)

Mr. Lincoln addressed the Committee as follows:

“MR. CHAIRMAN:--Some, if not all, of the gentlemen on the other
side of the House, who have addressed the Committee within the
last two days, have spoken rather complainingly, if I have
rightly understood them, of the vote given a week or ten days
ago, declaring that the war with Mexico was unnecessarily and
unconstitutionally commenced by the President. I admit that such
a vote should not be given in mere party wantonness, and that the
one given is justly censurable, if it have no other or better
foundation. I am one of those who joined in that vote; and did
so under my best impression of the _truth_ of the case. How I
got this impression, and how it may possibly be removed, I will
now try to show. When the war began, it was my opinion that all
those who, because of knowing too _little_, or because of knowing
too _much_, could not conscientiously approve the conduct of the
President (in the beginning of it), should, nevertheless, as good
citizens and patriots, remain silent on that point, at least
till the war should be ended. Some leading Democrats, including
ex-President Van Buren, have taken this same view, as I understand
them; and I adhered to it, and acted upon it, until since I
took my seat here; and I think I should still adhere to it, were
it not that the President and his friends will not allow it to
be so. Besides, the continual effort of the President to argue
every silent vote given for supplies into an indorsement of the
justice and wisdom of his conduct; besides that singularly candid
paragraph in his late message, in which he tells us that Congress,
with great unanimity (only two in the Senate and fourteen in the
House dissenting) had declared that ‘by the act of the Republic
of Mexico a state of war exists between that Government and the
United States;’ when the same journals that informed him of this,
also informed him that, when that declaration stood disconnected
from the question of supplies, sixty-seven in the House, and not
fourteen, merely, voted against it; besides this open attempt to
prove by telling the _truth_, what he could not prove by telling
the _whole truth_, demanding of all who will not submit to be
misrepresented, in justice to themselves, to speak out; besides all
this, one of my colleagues [Mr. Richardson], at a very early day in
the session, brought in a set of resolutions, expressly indorsing
the original justice of the war on the part of the President.
Upon these resolutions, when they shall be put on their passage,
I shall be _compelled_ to vote; so that I can not be silent if I
would. Seeing this, I went about preparing myself to give the vote
understandingly, when it should come. I carefully examined the
President’s messages, to ascertain what he himself had said and
proved upon the point. The result of this examination was to make
the impression, that, taking for true all the President states as
facts, he falls far short of proving his justification; and that
the President would have gone further with his proof, if it had not
been for the small matter that the _truth_ would not permit him.
Under the impression thus made I gave the vote before mentioned. I
propose now to give, concisely, the process of the examination I
made, and how I reached the conclusion I did.

“The President, in his first message of May, 1846, declares that
the soil was _ours_ on which hostilities were commenced by Mexico;
and he repeats that declaration, almost in the same language, in
each successive annual message--thus showing that he esteems that
point a highly essential one. In the importance of that point I
entirely agree with the President. To my judgment, it is the _very
point_ upon which he should be justified or condemned. In his
message of December, 1846, it seems to have occurred to him, as is
certainly true, that title, ownership to soil, or any thing else,
is not a simple fact, but is a conclusion following one or more
simple facts; and that it was incumbent upon him to present the
facts from which he concluded the soil was ours on which the first
blood of the war was shed.

“Accordingly, a little below the middle of page twelve, in the
message last referred to, he enters upon that task; forming an
issue and introducing testimony, extending the whole to a little
below the middle of page fourteen. Now, I propose to try to show
that the whole of this--issue and evidence--is, from beginning to
end, the sheerest deception. The issue, as he presents it, is in
these words: ‘But there are those who, conceding all this to be
true, assume the ground that the true western boundary of Texas
is the Nueces, instead of the Rio Grande; and that, therefore, in
marching our army to the east bank of the latter river, we passed
the Texan line, and invaded the territory of Mexico.’ Now, this
issue is made up of two affirmatives and no negative. The main
deception of it is, that it assumes as true that _one_ river or the
_other_ is necessarily the boundary, and cheats the superficial
thinker entirely out of the idea that _possibly_ the boundary is
somewhere _between_ the two, and not actually at either. A further
deception is, that it will let in _evidence_ which a true issue
would exclude. A true issue made by the President would be about as
follows: ‘I say the soil _was ours_ on which the first blood was
shed; there are those who say it was not.’

“I now proceed to examine the President’s evidence, as applicable
to such an issue. When that evidence is analyzed it is all included
in the following propositions:

“1. That the Rio Grande was the western boundary of Louisiana, as
we purchased it of France in 1803.

“2. That the Republic of Texas always _claimed_ the Rio Grande as
her western boundary.

“3. That, by various acts, she had claimed it _on paper_.

“4. That Santa Anna, in his treaty with Texas, recognized the Rio
Grande as her boundary.

“5. That Texas _before_, and the United States _after_ annexation,
had _exercised_ jurisdiction _beyond_ the Nueces, _between_ the two
rivers.

“6. That our Congress _understood_ the boundary of Texas to extend
beyond the Nueces.

“Now for each of these in its turn:

“His first item is, that the Rio Grande was the western boundary
of Louisiana, as we purchased it of France in 1803; and, seeming
to expect this to be disputed, he argues over the amount of nearly
a page to prove it true; at the end of which he lets us know that,
by the treaty of 1819, we sold to Spain the whole country, from
the Rio Grande eastward to the Sabine. Now, admitting for the
present, that the Rio Grande was the boundary of Louisiana, what,
under heaven, had that to do with the _present_ boundary between
us and Mexico? How, Mr. Chairman, the line that once divided your
land from mine can _still_ be the boundary between us _after_ I
have sold my land to you, is, to me, beyond all comprehension. And
how any man, with an honest purpose only of proving the truth,
could ever have _thought_ of introducing such a fact to prove such
an issue, is equally incomprehensible. The outrage upon common
_right_, of seizing as our own what we have once sold, merely
because it _was_ ours _before_ we sold it, is only equaled by the
outrage on common _sense_ of any attempt to justify it.

“The President’s next piece of evidence is, that ‘The Republic
of Texas always _claimed_ this river (Rio Grande) as her western
boundary.’ That is not true, in fact. Texas _has_ claimed it,
but she has not _always_ claimed it. There is, at least, one
distinguished exception. Her State Constitution--the public’s
most solemn and well-considered act; that which may, without
impropriety, be called her last will and testament, revoking all
others--makes no such claim. But suppose she had always claimed it.
Has not Mexico always claimed the contrary? So that there is but
_claim_ against _claim_, leaving nothing proved until we get back
of the claims, and find which has the better _foundation_.

“Though not in the order in which the President presents his
evidence, I now consider that class of his statements, which are,
in substance, nothing more than that Texas has by various acts
of her Convention and Congress, claimed the Rio Grande as her
boundary--_on paper_. I mean here what he says about the fixing
of the Rio Grande as her boundary, in her old Constitution (not
her State Constitution), about forming congressional districts,
counties, etc. Now, all this is but naked _claim_; and what I have
already said about claims is strictly applicable to this. If I
should claim your land by word of mouth, that certainly would not
make it mine; and if I were to claim it by a deed which I had made
myself, and with which you had nothing to do, the claim would be
quite the same in substance, or rather in utter nothingness.

“I next consider the President’s statement that Santa Anna, in
his _treaty_ with Texas, recognized the Rio Grande as the western
boundary of Texas. Besides the position so often taken that Santa
Anna, while a prisoner of war--a captive--_could_ not bind Mexico
by a treaty, which I deem conclusive; besides this, I wish to say
something in relation to this treaty so called by the President,
with Santa Anna. If any man would like to be amused by a sight at
that _little_ thing, which the President calls by that _big_ name,
he can have it by turning to Niles’ Register, volume 50, page 386.
And if any one should suppose that Niles’ Register is a curious
repository of so mighty a document as a solemn treaty between
nations, I can only say that I learned, to a tolerable degree of
certainty, by inquiry at the State Department, that the President
himself never saw it anywhere else. By the way, I believe I should
not err if I were to declare, that during the first ten years of
the existence of that document, it was never by anybody _called_
a treaty; that it was never so called till the President, in his
extremity, attempted, by so calling it, to wring something from it
in justification of himself in connection with the Mexican war. It
has none of the distinguishing features of a treaty. It does not
call itself a treaty. Santa Anna does not therein assume to bind
Mexico; he assumes only to act as President, Commander-in-chief
of the Mexican army and navy; stipulates that the then present
hostilities should cease, and that he would not _himself_ take up
arms, nor _influence_ the Mexican people to take up arms, against
Texas, during the existence of the war of independence. He did
not recognize the independence of Texas; he did not assume to put
an end to the war, but clearly indicated his expectation of its
continuance; he did not say one word about boundary, and most
probably never thought of it. It _is_ stipulated therein that the
Mexican forces should evacuate the territory of Texas, _passing
to the other side of the Rio Grande_; and in another article it
is stipulated, that to prevent collisions between the armies, the
Texan army should not approach nearer than five leagues--of _what_
is not said--but clearly, from the object stated, it is of the Rio
Grande. Now, if this is a treaty recognizing the Rio Grande as a
boundary of Texas, it contains the singular feature of stipulating
that Texas shall not go within five leagues of _her own_ boundary.

“Next comes the evidence that Texas before annexation, and the
United States afterward, exercising jurisdiction beyond the
Nueces, and _between_ the two rivers. This actual _exercise_ of
jurisdiction is the very class or quality of evidence we want.
It is excellent so far as it goes; but does it go far enough?
He tells us it went _beyond_ the Nueces, but he does not tell
us it went _to_ the Rio Grande. He tells us jurisdiction was
exercised _between_ the two rivers, but he does not tell us
it was exercised over _all_ the territory between them. Some
simple-minded people think it possible to cross one river and go
beyond it, without going all the way to the next; that jurisdiction
may be exercised _between_ two rivers without covering _all_
the country between them. I know a man, not very unlike myself,
who exercises jurisdiction over a piece of land between the
Wabash and the Mississippi; and yet so far is this from being
_all_ there is between those rivers, that it is just one hundred
and fifty-two feet long by fifty wide, and no part of it much
within a hundred miles of either. He has a neighbor between him
and the Mississippi--that is, just across the street, in that
direction--whom, I am sure, he could neither _persuade_ nor _force_
to give up his habitation; but which, nevertheless he could
certainly annex, if it were to be done, by merely standing on his
own side of the street and claiming it, or even sitting down and
writing a deed for it.

“But next, the President tells us, the Congress of the United
States _understood_ the State of Texas they admitted into the
Union to extend _beyond_ the Nueces. Well, I suppose they did--I
certainly so understand it--but how _far_ beyond? That Congress
did _not_ understand it to extend clear to the Rio Grande, is
quite certain by the fact of their joint resolutions for admission
expressly leaving all questions of boundary to future adjustment.
And, it may be added, that Texas herself is proved to have had the
same understanding of it that our Congress had, by the fact of the
exact conformity of her new Constitution to those resolutions.

“I am now through the whole of the President’s evidence; and it
is a singular fact, that if any one should declare the President
sent the army into the midst of a settlement of Mexican people,
who had never submitted, by consent or by force to the authority
of Texas or of the United States, and that _there_, and _thereby_,
the first blood of the war was shed, there is not one word in
all the President has said which would either admit or deny
the declaration. In this strange omission chiefly consists the
deception of the President’s evidence--an omission which, it does
seem to me, could scarcely have occurred but by design. My way
of living leads me to be about the courts of justice; and there
I have sometimes seen a good lawyer, struggling for his client’s
neck, in a desperate case, employing every artifice to work round,
befog, and cover up with many words some position pressed upon him
by the prosecution, which he _dared_ not admit, and yet _could_
not deny. Party bias may help to make it appear so; but, with all
the allowance I can make for such bias, it still does appear to me
that just such and from just such necessity, are the President’s
struggles in this case.

“Some time after my colleague (Mr. Richardson) introduced the
resolutions I have mentioned, I introduced a preamble, resolution,
and interrogatories, intended to draw the President out, if
possible, on this hitherto untrodden ground. To show their
relevancy, I propose to state my understanding of the true rule
for ascertaining the boundary between Texas and Mexico. It is,
that _wherever_ Texas was _exercising_ jurisdiction was hers; and
wherever Mexico was exercising jurisdiction was hers: and that
whatever separated the actual exercise of jurisdiction of the one
from that of the other, was the true boundary between them. If,
as is probably true, Texas was exercising jurisdiction along the
western bank of the Nueces, and Mexico was exercising it along
the eastern bank of the Rio Grande, then _neither_ river was
the boundary, but the uninhabited country between the two was.
The extent of our territory in that region depended not on any
_treaty-fixed_ boundary (for no treaty had attempted it), but on
revolution. Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the
power, have the _right_ to rise up and shake off the existing
government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a
most valuable, a most sacred right--a right which, we hope and
believe, is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to
cases in which the whole people of an existing government may
choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people that _can_ may
revolutionize, and make their _own_ of so much of their territory
as they inhabit. More than this, a _majority_ of any portion
of such people may revolutionize, putting down a _minority_,
intermingled with, or near about them, who may oppose their
movements. Such minority was precisely the case of the Tories of
our own Revolution. It is a quality of revolutions not to go by old
lines, or old laws; but to break up both and make new ones. As to
the country now in question, we bought it of France in 1803, and
sold it to Spain in 1819, according to the President’s statement.
After this, all Mexico, including Texas, revolutionized against
Spain; and still later, Texas revolutionized against Mexico. In my
view, just so far as she carried her revolution, by obtaining the
_actual_, willing or unwilling submission of the people, so _far_
the country was hers, and no further.

“Now, sir, for the purpose of obtaining the very best evidence
as to whether Texas had actually carried her revolution to the
place where the hostilities of the present war commenced, let
the President answer the interrogatories I proposed, as before
mentioned, or some other similar ones. Let him answer fully, fairly
and candidly. Let him answer with _facts_, and not with arguments.
Let him remember he sits where Washington sat; and, so remembering,
let him answer as Washington would answer. As a nation _should_
not, and the Almighty _will_ not, be evaded, so let him attempt no
evasion, no equivocation. And if, so answering, he can show that
the soil was ours where the first blood of the war was shed--that
it was not within an inhabited country, or, if within such, that
the inhabitants had submitted themselves to the civil authority of
Texas, or of the United States, and that the same is true of the
site of Fort Brown--then I am with him for his justification. In
that case, I shall be most happy to reverse the vote I gave the
other day. I have a selfish motive for desiring that the President
may do this; I expect to give some votes, in connection with the
war, which, without his so doing, will be of doubtful propriety,
in my own judgment, but which will be free from the doubt if he
does so. But if he _can not or will not_ do this,--if, on any
pretence, or no pretence, he shall refuse or omit it,--then I shall
be fully convinced, of what I more than suspect already, that he
is deeply conscious of being in the wrong; that he feels the blood
of this war, like the blood of Abel, is crying to heaven against
him; that he ordered General Taylor into the midst of a peaceful
Mexican settlement, purposely to bring on a war; that originally
having some strong motive--what I will not stop now to give my
opinion concerning--to involve the two countries in a war, and
trusting to escape scrutiny by fixing the public gaze upon the
exceeding brightness of military glory--that attractive rainbow
that rises in showers of blood--that serpent’s eye that charms to
destroy--he plunged into it, and has swept _on_ and _on_, till,
disappointed in his calculation of the ease with which Mexico might
be subdued, he now finds himself he knows not where. How like the
half insane mumbling of a fever dream is the whole war part of
the late message! At one time telling us that Mexico has nothing
whatever that we can get but territory; at another, showing us how
we can support the war by levying contributions on Mexico. At one
time urging the national honor, the security of the future, the
prevention of foreign interference, and even the good of Mexico
herself, as among the objects of the war; at another, telling
us that, ‘to reject indemnity by refusing to accept a cession of
territory, would be to abandon all our just demands, and to wage
the war, bearing all its expenses, _without a purpose or definite
object_.’ So, then, the national honor, security of the future, and
everything but territorial indemnity, may be considered the _no
purposes_ and _indefinite_ objects of the war! But having it now
settled that territorial indemnity is the only object, we are urged
to seize, by legislation here, all that he was content to take a
few months ago, and the whole province of Lower California to boot,
and to still carry on the war--to take _all_ we are fighting for,
and _still_ fight on. Again, the President is resolved, under all
circumstances, to have full territorial indemnity for the expenses
of the war; but he forgets to tell us how we are to get the
_excess_ after those expenses shall have surpassed the value of the
_whole_ of the Mexican territory. So, again, he insists that the
separate national existence of Mexico shall be maintained; but he
does not tell us _how_ this can be done after we shall have taken
_all_ her territory. Lest the question I here suggest be considered
speculative merely, let me be indulged a moment in trying to show
they are not.

“The war has gone on some twenty months; for the expenses of which,
together with an inconsiderable old score, the President now claims
about one-half of the Mexican territory, and that by far the better
half, so far as concerns our ability to make any thing out of it.
It is comparatively uninhabited; so that we could establish land
offices in it, and raise some money in that way. But the other half
is already inhabited, as I understand it, tolerably densely for the
nature of the country; and all its lands, or all that are valuable,
already appropriated as private property. How, then, are we to make
any thing out of these lands with this incumbrance on them, or how
remove the incumbrance? I suppose no one will say that we shall
kill the people, or drive them out, or make slaves of them, or
even confiscate their property? How, then, can we make much out of
this part of the territory? If the prosecution of the war has, in
expenses, already equalled the _better_ half of the country, how
long its future prosecution will be in equalling the less valuable
half is not a _speculative_ but a _practical_ question, pressing
closely upon us; and yet it is a question which the President seems
never to have thought of.

“As to the mode of terminating the war and securing peace, the
President is equally wandering and indefinite. First, it is to be
done by a more vigorous prosecution of the war in the vital parts
of the enemy’s country; and, after apparently talking himself tired
on this point, the President drops down into a half despairing
tone, and tells us, that ‘with a people distracted and divided by
contending factions, and a government subject to constant changes,
by successive revolutions, _the continued success of our arms
may fail to obtain a satisfactory peace_.’ Then he suggests the
propriety of wheedling the Mexican people to desert the counsels
of their own leaders, and, trusting in our protection, to set
up a government from which we can secure a satisfactory peace,
telling us that ‘_this may become the only mode of obtaining such a
peace_.’ But soon he falls into doubt of this too, and then drops
back on to the already half abandoned ground of ‘more vigorous
prosecution.’ All this shows that the President is in no wise
satisfied with his own positions. First, he takes up one, and, in
attempting to argue us into it, he argues himself _out_ of it;
then seizes another, and goes through the same process; and then,
confused at being able to think of nothing new, he snatches up the
old one again, which he has some time before cast off. His mind,
tasked beyond its power, is running hither and thither, like some
tortured creature on a burning surface, finding no such position on
which it can settle down and be at ease.

“Again, it is a singular omission in this message, that it nowhere
intimates _when_ the President expects the war to terminate. At
its beginning, General Scott was, by this same President driven
into disfavor, if not disgrace, for intimating that peace could
not be conquered in less than three or four months. But now at the
end of about twenty months, during which time our arms have given
us the most splendid successes--every department, and every part,
land and water, officers and privates, regulars and volunteers,
doing all that men could do, and hundreds of things which it had
ever before been thought that men could _not_ do; after all this,
this same President gives us a long message without showing us that
_as to the end_, he has himself even an imaginary conception. As
I have before said, he knows not where he is. He is a bewildered,
confounded, and miserably-perplexed man. God grant he may be able
to show that there is not something about his conscience more
painful than all his mental perplexity.”

* * * * *

SPEECH ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.

(_In Committee of the Whole House, June 20, 1848._)

Mr. Lincoln said:

“MR. CHAIRMAN:--I wish at all times in no way to practice any fraud
upon the House or the Committee, and I also desire to do nothing
which may be very disagreeable to any of the members. I therefore
state, in advance, that my object in taking the floor is to make a
speech on the general subject of internal improvements; and if I
am out of order in doing so I give the Chair an opportunity of so
deciding, and I will take my seat.”

The Chair.--“I will not undertake to anticipate what the gentleman
may say on the subject of internal improvements. He will,
therefore, proceed in his remarks, and if any question of order
shall be made, the Chair will then decide it.”

Mr. Lincoln.--“At an early day of this session the President sent
to us what may properly be termed an internal improvement veto
message. The late Democratic Convention which sat at Baltimore, and
which nominated General Cass for the Presidency, adopted a set of
resolutions, now called the Democratic platform, among which is one
in these words:

“‘That the Constitution does not confer upon the General Government
the power to commence and carry on a general system of internal
improvements.’

“General Cass, in his letter accepting the nomination, holds this
language:

“‘I have carefully read the resolutions of the Democratic National
Convention, laying down the platform of our political faith, and I
adhere to them as firmly as I approve them cordially.’

“These things, taken together, show that the question of internal
improvements is now more distinctly made--has become more intense,
than at any former period. It can no longer be avoided. The
veto message and the Baltimore resolution I understand to be,
in substance, the same thing; the latter being the more general
statement, of which the former is the amplification--the bill of
particulars. While I know there are many Democrats, on this floor
and elsewhere, who disapprove that message, I understand that all
who shall vote for General Cass will thereafter be considered
as having approved it, as having indorsed all its doctrines. I
suppose all, or nearly all, the Democrats will vote for him. Many
of them will do so, not because they like his position on this
question, but because they prefer him, being wrong in this, to
another, whom they consider further wrong on other questions. In
this way the internal improvement Democrats are to be, by a sort
of forced consent, carried over, and arrayed against themselves
on this measure of policy. General Cass, once elected, will not
trouble himself to make a Constitutional argument, or, perhaps,
any argument at all, when he shall veto a river or harbor bill. He
will consider it a sufficient answer to all Democratic murmurs, to
point to Mr. Polk’s message, and to the “Democratic platform.” This
being the case, the question of improvements is verging to a final
crisis; and the friends of the policy must now battle, and battle
manfully, or surrender all. In this view, humble as I am, I wish to
review, and contest as well as I may, the general positions of this
veto message. When I say _general_ positions, I mean to exclude
from consideration so much as relates to the present embarrassed
state of the Treasury, in consequence of the Mexican war.

“Those general positions are: That internal improvements ought not
to be made by the General Government:

“1. Because they would overwhelm the treasury;

“2. Because, while their _burdens_ would be general, their
_benefits_ would be _local_ and _partial_, involving an obnoxious
inequality;

“3. Because they would be unconstitutional;

“4. Because the States may do enough by the levy and collection of
tonnage duties; or, if not,

“5. That the Constitution may be amended.

“‘Do nothing at all, lest you do something wrong,’ is the sum
of these positions--is the sum of this message; and this, with
the exception of what is said about Constitutionality, applying
as forcibly to making improvements by State authority as by the
national authority. So that we must abandon the improvements of the
country altogether, by any and every authority, or we must resist
and repudiate the doctrines of this message. Let us attempt the
latter.

“The first position is, that a system of internal improvement would
overwhelm the treasury.

“That, in such a system, there is a _tendency_ to undue expansion,
is not to be denied. Such tendency is founded in the nature of the
subject. A member of Congress will prefer voting for a bill which
contains an appropriation for his district, to voting for one which
does not; and when a bill shall be expanded till every district
shall be provided for, that it will be too greatly expanded is
obvious. But is this any more true in Congress than in a State
Legislature? If a member of Congress must have an appropriation
for his district, so a member of a Legislature must have one for
his county; and if one will overwhelm the national treasury, so
the other will overwhelm the State treasury. Go where we will,
the difficulty is the same. Allow it to drive us from the halls
of Congress, and it will just as easily drive us from the State
Legislatures. Let us, then, grapple with it, and test its strength.
Let us, judging of the future by the past, ascertain whether there
may not be, in the discretion of Congress, a sufficient power to
limit and restrain this expansive tendency within reasonable and
proper bounds. The President himself values the evidence of the
past. He tells us that at a certain point of our history, more
than two hundred millions of dollars had been _applied for_, to
make improvements, and this he does to prove that the treasury
would be overwhelmed by such a system. Why did he not tell us how
much was _granted_? Would not that have been better evidence?
Let us turn to it, and see what it proves. In the message, the
President tells us that ‘during the four succeeding years, embraced
by the administration of President Adams, the power not only
to appropriate money, but to apply it, under the direction and
authority of the General Government, as well to the construction
of roads as to the improvement of harbors and rivers, was fully
asserted and exercised.’

“This, then, was the period of greatest enormity. These, if any,
must have been the days of the two hundred millions. And how much
do you suppose was really expended for improvements during those
four years? Two hundred millions? One hundred? Fifty? Ten? Five?
No, sir, less than two millions. As shown by authentic documents,
the expenditures on improvements during 1825, 1826, 1827 and 1828,
amounted to $1,879,627 01. These four years were the period of Mr.
Adams’ administration, nearly, and substantially. This fact shows
that when the power to make improvements was ‘fully asserted and
exercised,’ the Congress _did_ keep within reasonable limits; and
what _has_ been done it seems to me, _can_ be done again.

“Now for the second position of the message, namely, that the
burdens of improvements would be _general_, while their _benefits_
would be _local_ and _partial_, involving an obnoxious inequality.
That there is some degree of truth in this position I shall not
deny. No commercial object of Government patronage can be so
exclusively _general_, as not to be of some peculiar _local_
advantage; but on the other hand, nothing is so _local_ as not to
be of some general advantage. The navy, as I understand it, was
established, and is maintained, at a great annual expense, partly
to be ready for war, when war shall come, but partly also, and
perhaps chiefly, for the protection of our commerce on the high
seas. This latter object is, for all I can see, in principle, the
same as internal improvements. The driving a pirate from the track
of commerce on the broad ocean, and the removing a snag from its
more narrow path in the Mississippi river, can not, I think, be
distinguished in principle. Each is done to save life and property,
and for nothing else. The navy, then, is the most general in its
benefits of all this class of objects; and yet even the navy is of
some peculiar advantage to Charleston, Baltimore, Philadelphia,
New York and Boston, beyond what it is to the interior towns of
Illinois. The next most general object I can think of, would be
improvements on the Mississippi river and its tributaries. They
touch thirteen of our States--Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Iowa. Now, I suppose it will not be
denied, that these thirteen States are a little more interested in
improvements on that great river than are the remaining seventeen.
These instances of the navy, and the Mississippi river show clearly
that there is something of local advantage in the most general
objects. But the converse is also true. Nothing is so _local_
as not to be of some _general_ benefit. Take, for instance, the
Illinois and Michigan canal. Considered apart from its effects,
it is perfectly local. Every inch of it is within the State of
Illinois. That canal was first opened for business last April. In a
very few days we were all gratified to learn, among other things,
that sugar had been carried from New Orleans, through the canal,
to Buffalo, in New York. This sugar took this route, doubtless,
because it was cheaper than the old route. Supposing the benefit in
the reduction of the cost of carriage to be shared between seller
and buyer, the result is, that the New Orleans merchant sold his
sugar a little _dearer_, and the people of Buffalo sweetened their
coffee a little _cheaper_ than before; a benefit resulting _from_
the canal, not to Illinois, where the canal _is_, but to Louisiana
and New York, where the canal is _not_. In other transactions
Illinois will, of course, have her share, and perhaps the larger
share too, in the benefits of the canal; but the instance of the
sugar clearly shows that the _benefits_ of an improvement are by no
means confined to the particular locality of the improvement itself.

“The just conclusion from all this is, that if the nation refuse to
make improvements of the more general kind, because their benefits
may be somewhat local, a State may for the same reason, refuse to
make an improvement of a local kind, because its benefits may be
somewhat general. A State may well say to the Nation: ‘If you will
do nothing for me, I will do nothing for you.’ Thus it is seen,
that if this argument of ‘inequality’ is sufficient anywhere, it is
sufficient everywhere, and puts an end to improvements altogether.
I hope and believe, that if both the Nation and the States would,
in faith, in their respective spheres, do what they could in the
way of improvements, what of inequality might be produced in one
place might be compensated in another and that the sum of the
whole might not be very unequal. But suppose, after all, there
should be some degree of inequality: inequality is certainly never
to be embraced for its own sake; but is every good thing to be
discarded which may be inseparably connected with some degree of
it? If so, we must discard all government. This Capitol is built
at the public expense, for the public benefit; but does any one
doubt that it is of some peculiar local advantage to the property
holders and business people of Washington? Shall we remove it for
this reason? And if so, where shall we set it down, and be free
from the difficulty? To make sure of our object shall we locate
it nowhere, and leave Congress hereafter to hold its sessions as
the loafer lodged, ‘in spots about?’ I make no special allusion
to the present President when I say, there are few stronger cases
in this world of ‘burden to the many, and benefit to the few’--of
‘inequality’--than the Presidency itself is by some thought to be.
An honest laborer digs coal at about seventy cents a day, while the
President digs abstractions at about seventy dollars a day. The
_coal_ is clearly worth more than the _abstractions_, and yet what
a monstrous inequality in the prices! Does the President, for this
reason, propose to abolish the Presidency? He _does_ not, and he
_ought_ not. The true rule, in determining to embrace or reject any
thing, is not whether it have _any_ evil in it, but whether it have
more of evil than of good. There are few things _wholly_ evil or
_wholly_ good; almost every thing, especially of government policy,
is an inseparable compound of the two; so that our best judgment
of the preponderance between them is continually demanded. On this
principle the President, his friends, and the world generally, act
on most subjects. Why not apply it, then, upon this question? Why,
as to improvements, magnify the _evil_, and stoutly refuse to see
any good in them?

“Mr. Chairman, on the third position of the message (the
Constitutional question) I have not much to say. Being the man
I am, and speaking when I do, I feel that in any attempt at an
original, Constitutional argument, I should not be, and ought
not to be, listened to patiently. The ablest and the best of men
have gone over the whole ground long ago. I shall attempt but
little more than a brief notice of what some of them have said.
In relation to Mr. Jefferson’s views, I read from Mr. Polk’s veto
message:

“‘President Jefferson, in his message to Congress in 1806,
recommended an amendment of the Constitution, with a view to apply
an anticipated surplus in the treasury ‘to the great purposes of
the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects
of public improvements as it may be thought proper to add to the
Constitutional enumeration of the Federal powers.’ And he adds: ‘I
suppose an amendment to the Constitution, by consent of the States,
necessary because the objects now recommended are not among those
enumerated in the Constitution, and to which it permits the public
moneys to be applied.’ In 1825, he repeated, in his published
letters, the opinion that no such power had been conferred upon
Congress.’

“I introduce this, not to controvert, just now, the Constitutional
opinion, but to show, that on the question of _expediency_, Mr.
Jefferson’s opinion was against the present President--that this
opinion of Mr. Jefferson, in one branch at least, is, in the hands
of Mr. Polk, like McFingal’s gun:

“‘Bears wide and kicks the owner over.’

“But, to the Constitutional question. In 1826, Chancellor Kent
first published his Commentaries on American Law. He devoted a
portion of one of the lectures to the question of the authority of
Congress to appropriate public moneys for internal improvements.
He mentions that the question had never been brought under judicial
consideration, and proceeds to give a brief summary of the
discussions it had undergone between the legislative and executive
branches of the Government. He shows that the legislative branch
had usually been _for_, and the executive _against_, the power,
till the period of Mr. J. Q. Adams’ administration; at which point
he considers the executive influence as withdrawn from opposition,
and added to the support of the power. In 1844, the Chancelor
published a new edition of his Commentaries, in which he adds some
notes of what had transpired on the question since 1826. I have not
time to read the original text, or the notes, but the whole may
be found on page 267, and the two or three following pages of the
first volume of the edition of 1844. As what Chancellor Kent seems
to consider the sum of the whole, I read from one of the notes:

“‘Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States, vol. 2, page 429-440, and again, page 519-538,
has stated at large the arguments for and against the proposition
that Congress have a Constitutional authority to lay taxes, and
to apply the power to regulate commerce, as a means directly to
encourage and protect domestic manufactures; and, without giving
any opinion of his own on the contested doctrine, he has left the
reader to draw his own conclusion. I should think, however, from
the arguments as stated, that every mind which has taken no part
in the discussions, and felt no prejudice or territorial bias on
either side of the question, would deem the arguments in favor of
the Congressional power vastly superior.’

“It will be seen, that in this extract, the power to make
improvements is not directly mentioned; but by examining the
context, both of Kent and of Story, it will appear that the power
mentioned in the extract and the power to make improvements, are
regarded as identical. It is not to be denied that many great and
good men have been _against_ the power; but it is insisted that
quite as many, as great, and as good, have been _for_ it; and
it is shown that, on a full survey of the whole, Chancelor Kent
was of opinion that the arguments of the latter were _vastly_
superior. This is but the opinion of a man; but who was that man?
He was one of the ablest and most learned lawyers of his age, or
of any other age. It is no disparagement to Mr. Polk, nor, indeed,
to any one who devotes much time to politics, to be placed far
behind Chancelor Kent as a lawyer. His attitude was most favorable
to correct conclusions. He wrote coolly and in retirement. He
was struggling to rear a durable monument of fame; and he well
knew that _truth_ and thoroughly sound reasoning were the only
sure foundations. Can the party opinion of a party President, on
a law question, as this purely is, be at all compared or set in
opposition to that of such a man, in such an attitude as Chancelor
Kent?

“This Constitutional question will probably never be better settled
than it is, until it shall pass under judicial consideration; but
I do think that no man who is clear on this question of expediency
need feel his conscience much pricked upon this.

“Mr. Chairman, the President seems to think that enough may be
done in the way of improvements, by means of tonnage duties, under
State authority, with the consent of the General Government. Now,
I suppose this matter of tonnage duties is well enough in its own
sphere. I suppose it may be efficient, and perhaps _sufficient_,
to make slight improvements and repairs in harbors already in use,
and not much out of repair. But if I have any correct general idea
of it, it must be wholly inefficient for any generally beneficent
purposes of improvement. I know very little, or rather nothing at
all, of the practical matter of levying and collecting tonnage
duties; but I suppose one of its principles must be, to lay a duty,
for the improvement of any particular harbor, _upon the tonnage
coming into that harbor_. To do otherwise--to collect money in
_one_ harbor to be expended in improvements in _another_--would be
an extremely aggravated form of that inequality which the President
so much deprecates. If I be right in this, how could we make any
entirely new improvements by means of tonnage duties? How make a
road, a canal, or clear a greatly obstructed river? The idea that
we could, involves the same absurdity of the Irish bull about the
new boots: ‘I shall never git ‘em on,’ says Patrick, ’till I wear
’em a day or two, and stretch ’em a little.’ We shall never make
a canal by tonnage duties, until it shall already have been made
awhile, so the tonnage can get into it.

“After all, the President concludes that possibly there may be some
great objects of improvements which can not be effected by tonnage
duties, and which, therefore, may be expedient for the General
Government to take in hand. Accordingly, he suggests, in case any
such be discovered, the propriety of amending the Constitution.
Amend it for what? If, like Mr. Jefferson, the President thought
improvements _expedient_ but not Constitutional, it would be
natural enough for him to recommend such an amendment; but hear
what he says in this very message:

“‘In view of these portentous consequences, I can not but think
that this course of legislation should be arrested, even were there
nothing to forbid it in the fundamental laws of our Union.’

“For what, then, would _he_ have the Constitution amended? With
_him_ it is a proposition to remove _one_ impediment, merely to
be met by _others_, which, in his opinion, can not be removed--to
enable Congress to do what, in his opinion, they ought not to do if
they could.”

[Here Mr. Meade, of Virginia, inquired if Mr. L. understood the
President to be opposed, on grounds of expediency, to any and every
improvement?]

To which Mr. Lincoln answered: “In the very part of his message
of which I am now speaking, I understand him as giving some vague
expressions in favor of some possible objects of improvement; but,
in doing so, I understand him to be directly in the teeth of his
own arguments in other parts of it. Neither the President, nor
any one, can possibly specify an improvement, which shall not be
clearly liable to one or another of the objections he has urged on
the score of expediency; I have shown, and might show again, that
no work--no object--can be so general, as to dispense its benefits
with precise equality; and this inequality is chief among the
‘portentous consequences’ for which he declares that improvements
should be arrested. No, sir; when the President intimates that
something in the way of improvements may properly be done by the
General Government, he is shrinking from the conclusions to which
his own arguments would force him. He feels that the improvements
of this broad and goodly land are a mighty interest; and he is
unwilling to confess to the people, or perhaps to himself, that
he has built an argument which, when pressed to its conclusion,
entirely annihilates this interest.

“I have already said that no one who is satisfied of the expediency
of making improvements need be much uneasy in his conscience about
its Constitutionality. I wish now to submit a few remarks on the
general proposition of amending the Constitution. As a General
rule, I think we would do much better to let it alone. No slight
occasion should tempt us to touch it. Better not take the first
step, which may lead to a habit of altering it. Better rather
habituate ourselves to think of it as unalterable. It can scarcely
be made better than it is. New provisions would introduce new
difficulties, and thus create and increase appetite for further
change. No, sir; let it stand as it is. New hands have never
touched it. The men who made it have done their work, and have
passed away. Who shall improve on what _they_ did?

“Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of reviewing this message in the
least possible time, as well as for the sake of distinctness, I
have analyzed its arguments as well as I could, and reduced them
to the propositions I have stated. I have now examined them in
detail. I wish to detain the committee only a little while longer,
with some general remarks on the subject of improvements. That the
subject is a difficult one, can not be denied. Still, it is no
more difficult in Congress than in the State legislatures, in the
counties or in the smallest municipal districts which everywhere
exist. All can recur to instances of this difficulty in the case of
county roads, bridges, and the like. One man is offended because a
road passes over his land; and another is offended because it does
_not_ pass over his; one is dissatisfied because the bridge, for
which he is taxed, crosses the river on a different road from that
which leads from his house to town; another can not bear that the
county should get in debt for these same roads and bridges; while
not a few struggle hard to have roads located over their lands, and
then stoutly refuse to let them be opened, until they are first
paid the damages. Even between the different wards and streets
of towns and cities, we find this same wrangling and difficulty.
Now, these are no other than the very difficulties against which,
and out of which, the President constructs his objections of
‘inequality,’ ‘speculation,’ and ‘crushing the Treasury.’ There is
but a single alternative about them--they are _sufficient_, or they
are _not_. If sufficient, they are sufficient _out_ of Congress
as well as _in_ it, and there is the end. We must reject them as
insufficient, or lie down and do nothing by any authority. Then,
difficulty though there be, let us meet and overcome it.

‘Attempt the end, and never stand to doubt;
Nothing so hard, but search will find it out.’

“Determine that the thing can and shall be done, and then we shall
find the way. The tendency to undue expansion is unquestionably
the chief difficulty. How to do _something_, and still not to do
_too much_, is the desideratum. Let each contribute his mite in
the way of suggestion. The late Silas Wright, in a letter to the
Chicago Convention, contributed his, which was worth something; and
I now contribute mine, which may be worth nothing. At all events,
it will mislead nobody, and therefore will do no harm. I would
not borrow money. I am against an overwhelming, crushing system.
Suppose that at each session, Congress shall first determine _how
much_ money can, for that year, be spared for improvements; then
apportion that sum to the most _important_ objects. So far all is
easy; but how shall we determine which _are_ the most important?
On this question comes the collision of interests. _I_ shall be
slow to acknowledge that _your_ harbor or _your_ river is more
important than _mine_, and _vice versa_. To clear this difficulty,
let us have that same statistical information which the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. Vinton] suggested at the beginning of this session.
In that information we shall have a stern, unbending basis of
_facts_--a basis in nowise subject to whim, caprice, or local
interest. The pre-limited amount of means will save us from doing
_too much_, and the statistics will save us from doing what we do
in _wrong places_. Adopt and adhere to this course, and, it seems
to me, the difficulty is cleared.