Chapter XII: The Surrender of Vereeniging (2)

With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the morning of the 29th the delegates assembled in the tent provided by the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting President of the South African Republic, then announced that the meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses should be taken--to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting, and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of accepting the British terms, each of them was anxious, individually, to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute--for every man was preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement." Then a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6 votes.

[Footnote 341: The minutes of the final meetings of the
commando representatives--as also those of the earlier
meetings of May 15th to 17th--have been published by General
Christian de Wet in _The Three Years' War_.]

After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution constituting a committee[342] to collect funds for the destitute Boers was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.

[Footnote 342: Three of the members of this committee,
Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to
proceed to Europe for the purposes of this appeal.]

Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here, at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10 o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender Agreement was signed.[343]

[Footnote 343: The actual surrender of the arms in the
possession of the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out
with admirable promptitude. Three weeks after the agreement
had been signed Lord Kitchener was able, in a final despatch
from Capetown on June 23rd, to record his "high appreciation
of the unflagging energy and unfailing tact" with which
Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet had
facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed
to receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in
the Cape Colony less expeditious in surrendering to General
French. In all 21,226 burghers and colonial rebels, of whom
11,166 were in the Transvaal, 6,455 in the Orange River
Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down their arms. Lord
Kitchener's last words (despatches of June 21st and 23rd),
addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the
Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic
utterances. His message to the former was:

"I find it difficult in the short space at my disposal
to acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South
Africa to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, Cape Colony, and Natal. I will only say here
that no request of mine was ever refused by any of these
Governments, and that their consideration and generosity
were only equalled by the character and quality of the
troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that
country."

And of the troops, which under his command had successfully
accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he
wrote:

"The protracted struggle which has for so long caused
suffering to South Africa has at length terminated, and
I should fail to do justice to my own feelings if at
this moment I neglected to bear testimony to the
patience, tenacity, and heroism which has been displayed
by all ranks of His Majesty's forces, Imperial and
Colonial, during the whole course of the war. Nothing
but the qualities of bravery and endurance in our troops
could have overcome the difficulties of this campaign,
or have finally enabled the empire to reap the fruits of
all its sacrifices."]

[Sidenote: Admissions of the Boer leaders.]

The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of aggression forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the enemies of England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the enemy. Very different is the account of the origin of the war, which Acting President Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow countrymen in this day of truth-telling.

"Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he
said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon.
We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we
under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon
our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the
possibility of defeat."

And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war; I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this "although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts, State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, since in the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies himself would have found no occasion for departing from the truth.

[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.]

No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war, said:

"I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That
is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I
think also we might meet the emergency in this way--a part of the
men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the
women, and then they could take the women with them to the
English in the towns."

But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any longer carrying this plan into effect.

"When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of
provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot
without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then
well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too
thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English
protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our
greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man
answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to
the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women
now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how
can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to
give up liberty for their sakes?"

And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said:

"If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision
for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every
kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has
caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get
them into the townships, but later on this became impossible,
because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the
idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending
the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable,
because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and
the men still on commando were not so closely related to these
families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them."

Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected areas.

[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.]

"A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We
could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the
enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different
aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by
day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos."

And again--

"There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have
managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have
been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the
British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But
things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after
district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory.
In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its
forces upon us."

To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony.

"Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season
of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed.
How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that
they can only go _op-een-stap_?"[344]

[Footnote 344: An onomatopoeic expression for the step of a
tired horse.]

Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers, and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May 30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of the English Government "may not be very advantageous to us, but nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position." And Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it. What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,[345] he writes:

[Footnote 345: _The Three Years' War._]

"There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes
or No. It was an ultimatum--this proposal of England. What were
we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination."

[Sidenote: Boer claim to independence.]

Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History may well ask, On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical standard,[346] the Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the administrative autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged by the laws of war,[347] they had been saved from the alternatives of physical annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic generosity of the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant population. From a constitutional point of view, the presence of Article IV.[348] in the London Convention was in itself sufficient to refute the claim of the republic to be a "sovereign international state."

[Footnote 346: [The Transvaal Government]--"or rather the
President and his advisers--committed the fatal mistake of
trying to maintain a government which was at the same time
undemocratic and incompetent.... An exclusive government may
be pardoned if it is efficient; an inefficient government, if
it rests upon the people. But a government which is both
inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under
which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of
government which the Transvaal attempted to maintain. They
ought, therefore, to have either extended their franchise or
reformed their administration" (Bryce, _Impressions of South
Africa_, 2nd Ed., 1900). Mr. Bryce is not likely to have been
unduly severe. "The political sin of the Transvaal against
the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of detail--of
less or more--but was fundamental in its denial of elementary
political right." And again: In the Transvaal "an armed
minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the
taxes, denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the
money extorted" (Captain Mahan, _The Merits of the Transvaal
Dispute_, 1900 [included in _The Problem of Asia_]). To
these, perhaps, I may be permitted to add the following words
spoken by myself in 1894--more than a year before the
Raid--and published in 1895 (_South Africa: a Study,
etc._):--"The Boer has still to justify his possession of
these ample pastures, these rich and fertile valleys, and
these stores of gold and of coal. If he can enlarge his mind,
if he can reform existing abuses, if he can expand an archaic
system of government and render it sufficiently elastic to
meet the requirements of an enlarged population and important
and increasing industries--well and good. If not, let the
Boer beware; for he will place himself in conflict with the
intelligence and the progress of South Africa. _Then_ the
Boer system will be condemned by a higher authority than the
Colonial Office or the opinion of England; and from the high
court of Nature--a court from which no appeal lies--the
inexorable decree will go forth: 'Cut it down; why cumbereth
it the ground?'"]

[Footnote 347: See admissions of the Boer Generals quoted
_supra_.]

[Footnote 348: "The South African Republic will conclude no
treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the
Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward
or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved
by Her Majesty the Queen." Captain Mahan writes: "In refusing
the Transvaal that independence in foreign relations which
would enable other states to hold it directly accountable,
Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that
foreigners should be so treated as to give no just cause for
reclamations.... Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate
control of foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose
not to permit interference in the Transvaal by a foreign
Power, was responsible for conditions of wrong to foreign
citizens within its borders. She had surrendered the right to
interfere, as suzerain, with internal affairs; but she had
not relieved herself, as by a grant of full independence and
sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility for
injury due to internal maladministration, any more than the
United States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy [in
the case of the Italian citizens lynched at New Orleans] by
the state sovereignty of Louisiana" (_Ibid._). And, says the
same writer, _a fortiori_ was Great Britain justified in
interfering on behalf of her own subjects.]

[Sidenote: Effect of surrender terms.]

Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which, as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement of the country, and left it to them to decide at what time, and by what stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies. The two respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police. At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system--a system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition of arms by the natives in South Africa--the number of rifles possessed by the Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government; while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to British rule would form an additional safeguard.

In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free trade in language"--that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond, the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full self-government would not be granted to either of the new colonies until a British or loyalist majority was assured.

[Sidenote: Free initiative secured.]

But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task--at once more congenial and more especially his own--was discharged is a matter that must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close.

INDEX

"Acting Chief-Commandant" of the Orange Free State, The, his report
of De Wet's success in Cape Colony, 431, 432.
Administrative reconstruction, 397, 458, 489, 523 _et seq._
Africa. _See_ South Africa.
Afrikander Bond, The, 46;
programme of, 50 _et seq._;
its sphere of action, 55;
its power in Cape Colony, 55;
its origin, 56;
its purpose, 56 to 58, 106;
its first congress, 59;
its "programme of principles," 59;
its change of policy, 60;
members returned to it by the Cape Parliament, 60, 483;
meets at Bloemfontein, 63;
adopts the Hofmeyr programme, 64;
its manner of reuniting European communities in S. Africa, 65;
its first openly avowed aim, 66;
falls back on the policy of 1881, 69;
its influence in the Cape Legislature, 70, 93, 121, 122, 141;
its attempts to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, 94, 95;
the parliamentary chief and the real leader of, 97;
Lord Milner's remonstrance to the Dutch of Cape Colony, 84, 91, 92, 98;
the sum and substance of its policy, 106, 107, 119;
address to Lord Milner from the Graaf Reinet branch, 108;
Lord Milner's reply, 109 to 113;
Sir Gordon Sprigg's defiance of, 116;
the funds of, 118;
its domination, 150;
nature of its "mediation" with Pres. Krueger, 162, 169, 195, 274, 276;
demonstrations organised by, 215;
the completeness with which it had undermined British power, 223;
its view of the Salisbury Cabinet, 274;
its activity, 348;
its attitude at the end of January, 1900, 373;
annual congress at Somerset East, 374;
its policy after the occupation of the Republics, 429;
its attitude in February, 1901, 430;
the qualities of its leaders, 435;
its leaders decline to associate themselves with the efforts of the
Burgher Peace Committee, 474;
its identification with the Boer invaders, 475;
the character of the men it sent to Parliament, 483.
"Afrikanderdom," the doctrine of, 197.
Afrikander nationalists, The, 48 (note), 267;
the creed of, 48 _et seq._, 119;
their plan of a united S. Africa, 70;
Mr. Chamberlain's hope of winning their support, 73;
strength of their forces, 74, 96, 104;
their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
uneasiness of, 113;
dominate S. Africa, 126;
their motives with regard to the Bloemfontein Conference, 157;
their direct appeal to the Queen, 294;
unmasked, 300;
their speech and action during the war, 343;
they co-operate with the two Republics with a view to pressing their
"peace overtures" on the British Government, 360, 361;
their "conciliation" meetings, 361, 382;
renewal of their alliance with the Liberal Opposition, 369;
their objects, 382, 383;
their opposition to the Treason Bill, 395;
their references to Boer successes, 396;
they slander the British troops, 398;
their hatred of England, 429;
assistance rendered by them to the guerilla leaders, 478;
their commission to Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 495.
"Afrikander party" The, the friends of in England, 375, 379.
Agricultural Department, The, formation of in Orange River Colony, 525.
Agriculture, The development of in new colonies, 536.
"Albany" settlers, The, 15, 271.
Albert, 346.
_Albert Times, The_, 120.
Aliens Expulsion and Immigration Laws, The, Mr. Chamberlain's demand for
the repeal of, 81;
repeal and amendment of, 82, 88, 94.
Aliwal North, 346, 411, 455.
Amershof, Mr. Justice, 103.
Amery, Mr., 291, 300.
Amphitheatre Meeting, The, 131.
Anti-British Press, The, 68, 166, 205 to 207, 225, 272, 349, 374, 380,
391, 403, 409, 477.
Ardagh, Sir John, 319 (note).
Arms, The surrender of, 573;
the possession of, 581.
Army Corps, The, the order to mobilise, 244, 317, 318;
arrival of, 305, 321, 331.
Arnold-Forster, H. O., 516.
Asquith, H. H., his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 92, 99;
his utterances, 416.
Attorney-General, The (Cape), notice issued by as to acts of treason,
480.

Baden-Powell, Colonel, afterwards General, 191 (note), 329 (note), 397,
530.
Balfour, A. J., 203 (note), 228, 302, 307.
_Balfourian Parliament, The_, 319 (note).
Balliol Scholars, 76 (note).
Bantu, The, 11, 12, 25.
Barberton, 452.
Barkly East, 346.
Barkly, Sir Henry, 275.
Bastards, The, 281.
Basuto incident, The, 496 (note).
Basutoland, 83;
British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298;
construction of the railway to from Bloemfontein, 532 (note).
Beaconsfield, Lord, 24.
Bechuanaland Expedition, The, 350 (note).
Bechuanaland, 83;
the administration of the European population of, 35;
the Transvaal's attempt to secure, 64, 74, 93;
the Dutch community in, 346.
Bechuanas, the employment of as indentured labourers, 117.
Beechranger Hottentots, The, 2, 4.
Belgrave, Lord (now Duke of Westminster), 167.
Berry, Dr. (now Sir) Wm., 124 (note).
Bethulie Bridge, 411, 455;
alleged movement of British troops to, 236.
Bezuidenhout, the Boer, 11.
Blignaut, J. N., letter from, 258.
Blockhouse system, The, area inclosed by, 458;
effect produced by, 456, 457;
efficiency of, 576;
extension of, 455;
its help to the railways, 533.
Bloemfontein, Meeting of the Afrikander Bond at, 63;
opening of the railway at, 67;
seizure of correspondence at, 156, 162, 206, 376;
the occupation of, 328, 363, 384;
visit of Lord Milner to, 397;
the effective occupation of the district round, 453;
discussion at of the question of peace between Lords Milner and
Kitchener, 471;
civil administration in, 524;
construction of the railway to Basutoland, 532 (note).
Bloemfontein Conference, The, 268;
proposed, 140;
agreed to by President Krueger, 153;
negotiations leading up to, 151 to 165;
meeting of, 167, 168;
the discussion at a closing of, 168, 172;
the result of, 172;
the four months which followed, 174.
Bloemfontein Convention, The, 17, 87 (note);
Sir G. Grey's criticism of, 19.
_Bloemfontein Express, The_, 50, 54, 63, 67.
Blood, Sir Bindon, 425.
Bodley, J. E. C., statement by, 76 (note).
Boer Administration, The, depraved character of, 212.
Boer Army, The, 336, 337, 340 (note).
Boer aspirations, The, 302.
Boer children, Teaching of during the war, 519 to 523.
Boer Peace commissioners, The, their tortuous diplomacy, 526;
the "Terms of Surrender" communicated to them, 563;
their departure from Pretoria, 569.
Boer deputation in Europe, The, 555.
Boer emigrants, The, 19.
Boer leaders, The, their decision to continue the struggle, 414, 417,
418, 424 _et seq._;
their disingenuousness, 557;
penalties to which they were liable, 564;
they treat for peace, 552, 555 _et seq._
Boer raiders, The, 438.
Boer revolt of 1880-81, The, 31.
Boer Republics, The (_see also_ Orange Free State and Transvaal),
creation of, 17, 19;
scheme for their union with the British colonies, 24.
Boer spies, 337.
Boer, vernacular, The, 547.
Boers, The, the (3rd) Duke of Portland's despatch relating to their
treatment, 9;
their dealings with the natives, 11;
the grant of self-government to, 29;
their resistance to British arms 48;
their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
their military forces, 181, 340 (note),
without uniform, 336;
personal dealings with, 194, 195;
their friends in England, 232, 414, 424, 573;
breaches of faith by, 399;
their losses up to November, 1901, 458;
final surrender of, 573 (note).
Bond, The. _See_ Afrikander Bond.
Bond Press, The, 209.
Booy the Hottentot, 11.
Borckenhagen the German, 49, 50, 66.
Botha, Louis, 564;
dispersal of his army, 322;
defeat of at Diamond Hill, 329;
defeat of at Dalmanutha, 329;
in Johannesburg, 337;
urges his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms, 414, 424;
his determination to fight on, 421;
circular issued by him, 425 (note);
his responsibility for the suffering of the Boers during the guerilla
war, 427;
failure of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener, 434;
stimulates his followers, 457;
treats for peace, 471, 552, 554;
meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556;
letter to him from Mr. Chamberlain as to the re-opening of the
discussion after the surrender of Vereeniging, 562;
advocates submission, 571, 577;
Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact and energy after signing the
treaty of peace, 573 (note);
his views on the position of the Boer women and children during the
later stages of the war, 575;
his testimony to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's blockhouse system,
576;
his admission as to the impossibility of again raising a revolt in Cape
Colony, 577.
"Botha" terms, The, 471, 554.
Bower, Sir Graham, 41.
Brand, President, 28, 275;
discourages the Afrikander Bond, 55;
the role played by him in 1881, 153.
Brebner J., 564.
Breed's Nek, 455.
British Administration, the failure of in S. Africa, 1, 22;
distrust of by the British in S. Africa, 37;
the Bond and, 65;
its impotency, 69;
efficiency of impaired by English party politics, 254.
British and Dutch factions, The, bitterness of, 244.
British Army, The, in Cape Colony and Natal, 189, 325;
disadvantage in which it was placed, 253;
its performance in S. Africa, 323;
the number of effectives available, 323;
its difficulties, 330 _et seq._;
the slander of, 398, 499.
British colonists, the settlement of on the land, 538.
British Government, representatives of at the Cape, 7;
its treatment of the natives and Dutch in S. Africa, 8.
British Navy, The, the offer of an annual contribution to the cost of,
95;
holds the seas, 311.
British party, A, the creation of, 150.
British policy in S. Africa, 9 _et seq._;
up to 1897, 69.
British population in Cape Colony, The, 107, 115, 127;
effect of the Redistribution Bill on, 125;
their approval of Lord Milner's policy, 216;
their dismay at the Imperial Government's reception of the seven years'
franchise law, 222;
their support of Lord Milner, 270;
numbers which took part in the war, 324.
British settlers in the country, 61.
Britstown, 354.
_Brunt of The War, The_, 462 (note).
Bryce, James, The Rt. Hon. M.P., attitude and public utterances of, 259,
314, 360, 415, 496;
misstatement by, 263;
the "settlement" advocated by him, 370;
his view of the Transvaal Government, 579 (note).
Buller, General Sir Redvers, 191;
defeat of, 306;
his responsibility for the early disasters, 318, 319;
his misconception of the state of affairs, 319, 320;
at Maritzburg, 321;
forces at his disposal, 321;
false report of surrender to the Boers, 380.
Bundy, Thomas Dashwood, 212 (note).
Bunu, the affair of, 89 (note).
Burger, Schalk, 89, 101, 159, 564;
denounced by Krueger, 100;
attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
his determination to fight on, 421;
his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers in the guerilla war,
427;
his official notice of June 20th, 1901, 434;
his complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps, 463 (note);
announces to Lord Kitchener that he is prepared to treat for peace,
552;
granted a safe-conduct through the British lines to consult Mr. Steyn,
552;
meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552;
appointed a peace commissioner, 556;
calls upon the meeting to decide upon continuing the war or not, 570;
his account of the origin of the war, 574;
his reasons for treating for peace, 578.
Burgher Camps, deportation of Boer non-combatants to, 459;
high rate of mortality in, 460 to 463;
Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the
camps, 463 (note);
condition of, 503, 505, 513;
establishment of schools in, 519 to 523;
views of the Boers on, 575.
Burgher meetings, The, the minutes of, 560 _et seq._
Burgher Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423;
its efforts, 427, 429;
treatment of its agents, 427 to 429;
Bond leaders hold aloof from, 474.
Burghersdorp, The theological seminary of, 120.
Burns, John, 315, 496.
Burt, Thomas, 498 (note).
Butler, General Sir William, refuses to transmit a petition for
protection from the British residents in the Transvaal, 131, 176;
his sympathy with the views of Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 174, 184;
his views of a war, 174, 175, 179;
his view of the Uitlander grievances, 175;
the friction between him and Lord Milner, 175, 176;
his view of the attitude of the British inhabitants of S. Africa, 177;
his action during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of war,
180;
requested to furnish a scheme of defence, 180, 181;
his scheme, 181 to 183;
his evidence before the War Commission, 175 (note), 181 to 183;
his failure to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate
reinforcements, 183, 319;
his withdrawal from the command at the Cape, 184, 247, 269, 289;
his only point of agreement with Lord Milner, 185;
his estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces, 185;
is informed of the Cabinet's decision as to reinforcements, 190.

Caledon, Lord, one of the first measures as Governor of the Cape, 10.
Cambridge, The Duke of, 494 (note).
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, his public utterances on the war, 192,
252, 256, 259, 314, 367, 368, 399, 416, 418, 574;
his treatment of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal as to preparations for war,
265, 266;
his attitude in Committee of Supply, 371 (note);
his remarks in the debate on the S. African Settlement, 393;
his charges of inhumanity against the Government and Lord Kitchener,
460, 464 (note);
his reply to the charge brought against him by Sir M. Hicks-Beach, 466,
467;
his speech at Stirling on October 25th, 1901, 467;
his declaration at Plymouth, 499.
"Canadian Precedent," The, 385.
Cape Colony, The, an incident in the settlement of the Dutch E. India Co.
at, 2;
isolation of at the end of the 18th century, 6;
the task of governing, 6;
the old European population in, 7;
representatives of the British Government at, 7;
the temporary British occupation of in 1795-1803, 8;
population of at the time of the permanent British occupation, 10;
Franco-Dutch population in, 11;
the "Albany Settlers" in, 15;
the emancipation of slaves in, 15;
disintegrating influences at work in, 28;
transfer to the British Government, 51;
the sphere of action of the Afrikander Bond, 55;
conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Transvaal, 64;
speech of Cecil Rhodes on March 12th, 1898, 67;
anti-British sentiment of the Dutch leaders in, 91;
the political situation at the time of Lord Milner's arrival, 93;
division of parties in, 97;
aspirations of the Dutch in, 105;
the leaders of Dutch opinion in, 106;
public meetings in, 131;
nationalists of, 142, 195;
the vote for responsible government in, 147;
creation of a British party in, 151;
the garrison in, 191;
demonstrations in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, 215;
petition from to the Queen, 216;
the British forces in, 243;
the Boer aspiration to annex, 258, 259;
organisation of the defences of, 269, 278;
the British population of, 271;
only in name a British colony, 273;
alarming rumours from, 305;
rebellion of the Dutch in, 341 to 372;
proclamation of martial law, 345, 411;
Lord Milner's despatch dealing with the rebellion, 346;
disclosure of a new centre of rebellion, 354, 355;
the second invasion of, 383, 430;
racial relations in, 383;
clearing it of the republican invaders, 384;
the situation in November, 1900, 398;
De Wet enters, 430;
is chased out, 432;
the area to be protected, 445;
response of the British population to arms, 446;
numbers of Boers in the field in, 454;
screened off by blockhouses, 458;
the course of events in, 473;
collapse of the system of responsible government in, 478 to 480;
the Government stipulates for certain conditions as to the procedure
of military courts, 481;
number of troops placed by the Government of in the field, 485, 486;
treatment of rebels in, 563, 567.
_Cape Argus, The_, 243 (note).
Cape Boys, The, the ill-treatment of, 89 (note).
Cape Civil Service, The, disaffection of, 272.
Cape Distriks-bestuur, The, 349.
Cape electoral system, The, 115, 116.
Cape garrison, The, 191, 204, 278.
Cape local forces, The, 281 (note).
Cape Ministry, The (_see also_ Schreiner Cabinet and Sprigg), its views
as to its duties and powers in case of a war, 164;
and the Bond, 193;
attitude of, 198;
"moral support of," 217;
its views upon the settlement of the new colonies, 546.
Cape nationalists, The, 167, 268.
Cape Parliament, The, Afrikander Bond influence in, 60, 70, 393;
Progressive majority in, 393;
prorogation of, 478, 482.
Cape Parliamentary Reports, 395.
_Cape Times, The_, 48 (note), 220, 379 (note);
report of J. X. Merriman's speech in, 62;
its reported interview with Cecil Rhodes, 114;
its views on the Redistribution Bill, 117.
Capetown, mass meeting at, 204, 250;
alleged plot to seize, 350.
_Carisbrook Castle, The S.S._, 132 (note).
Carnarvon, 354.
Carnarvon, Lord, his scheme of federal union, 27.
"Carnival of Mendacity," The, 477.
Cartwright, Albert, 380, 381, 477.
_Cecil Rhodes_, Vindex's, 68 (note).
_Century of Wrong, A_, Mr. Reitz's, 356.
Cetewayo, destruction of a British regiment by one of his _impis_ 17;
his organisation of the Zulus, 25.
Chaka, 25.
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, 40, 41, 45, 72;
his inquiry of Lord Rosmead as to the Jameson raid, 42;
his active sympathy with the Uitlanders, 47;
his policy, 72, 73, 125;
his choice of Lord Milner as High Commissioner, 75, 77;
his despatch of March 6th 1897, 81;
accusation against, 82;
asserts Great Britain's suzerainty over the Transvaal, 126 (note);
his intimation to the Pretoria Executive as to the dynamite contract,
130;
accepts the suggestion of a conference at Bloemfontein, and decides
to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the
Uitlanders, 140;
a question put by him to Mr. Philip Schreiner, 146;
authorises Lord Milner to attend the Bloemfontein Conference, 155;
his despatch of May 10th, 1899, 155, 194;
agrees with the line proposed to be taken by Lord Milner at the
Bloemfontein Conference, 157;
his alleged determination to force a war on the Transvaal, 184;
his declaration in the House of Commons on the failure of the
Bloemfontein Conference, 188;
his desire to avoid war, 196;
the support given by him to Lord Milner, 200;
his speech of June 26th, 1899, at Birmingham, 202, 204;
urges delay in passing the limited Franchise Bill, 210;
believes the crisis to be at an end, 221;
prepared to accept Krueger's illusory Franchise Law, 222;
statement by him in the House of Commons on the new franchise law, 227;
proposes to the Transvaal a joint commission, 229;
his action after the repudiation by the Pretoria Executive of the
arrangement made between Mr. Smuts and Sir Wm. Greene, 238, 239;
he repudiates the claim made by the S. African Republic to be a
sovereign international state, 240;
his despatch of September 8th, 1899, 240, 241;
his speech at Highbury on August 27th, 249;
his proposal to Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman as to preparations for war,
265, 266;
repudiates the charges of bad faith brought against Sir Wm. Greene,
290;
his anxiety for a peaceful settlement, 293;
his statement at Birmingham, on May 11th, 1900, as to the number of the
forces in S. Africa, 325;
his statement at Birmingham of the nature of the settlement the
Government had determined on, 367;
sends a despatch to Lord Milner on the subjects of compensation of
loyalists and punishment of rebels, 384;
his reply to the views of the Schreiner Cabinet on the questions, 386;
his views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels, 389;
replies to the arguments of the Schreiner Ministry
in favour of a general amnesty, 395;
his speech containing the chief points in the proposed proclamation to
the fighting burghers, 420;
abandons the proposal, 421;
sanctions the issue of Governor's warrants at the Cape, 479;
refuses an appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479;
assents to Lord Milner's application for leave, 488;
importance attached by him to the views of the Cape and Natal
Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies,
489, 490;
receives Lord Milner, 490, 491;
report presented to him by the Land Settlement Commission, 516;
agrees to a tax on the mining industry, 542;
his reply to Lord Milner's telegram on the financial position, 543;
concurs in Lord Milner's proposals for land settlement, 544;
approves Lord Milner's suggestion as to the enlargement of the
Legislative Councils, 545;
declines to re-open the discussion after the signature of the
Vereeniging surrender, 562.
Channing, M.P., Mr., 489 (note).
Chartered Company, The, 36, 66, 83.
Churchill, Winston, Mr., his statement on the use of the word "natives"
in the "Terms of Surrender," 568 (note).
Civil Administration, the establishment of, in the new colonies, 397,
519;
its progress, 489, 524.
Claremont, speech of Sir J. Rose Innes at, 361, 362.
Cloete, Judge, his opinion of Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's
frontier policy, 14.
"Closer Union," the policy of, 49, 70.
"Coercive measures," Boer, 425.
Colenso, 306, 321;
a result of the defeat at, 8;
the Free State Boers moving on, 305.
Colesberg, 346, 348.
Colonial Conference, The, of 1897, 95.
Colonial Office, The, the administration of, 23;
a leakage from, 153.
Colonial questions, the study of, 24;
necessity of, 254.
Colonial rebels, The, penalties to be inflicted on, 563, 567;
surrenders of, 573 (note).
Colonies, The, offers of military aid from, 251, 324.
Commando Nek, 455.
_Commissie Van Toezicht, The_, 349.
Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, The, the report of, 97.
Concentration Camps. _See_ Burgher Camps.
Concessions Commission, The, 376, 377 (note).
"Conciliation," movement, The, 343, 359, 361, 373 to 412;
Lord Milner's record of the origin of the movement, 373;
injurious influence of the movement on the Colony, 381;
the Englishmen who took part in, 383;
the initiation of, 375, 415.
Conciliation Committee, The, in England, 415.
Conservative Governments, 255.
Conventions, The, Sir George Grey on, 19;
Lord Milner on, 86, 87 (note), 358, 360.
_Cornhill Magazine, The_, 263 (note).
_Coronation of King Edward VII._, J. E. C. Bodley's, 76 (note).
Courtney, Leonard (now Lord), his public utterances on the war, 232,
251, 257 to 259, 360, 363, 496, 497;
advocates the autonomy of the Republics, 370, 415;
letter to him from President Krueger, 372.
Cronje, surrenders at Paardeberg, 328.
Cronwright-Schreiner, Mrs., 146.
Crown Colony Government, formal initiation of, 490, 501, 544.
Customs Union, The, 36.

_Daily Chronicle, The_, a statement in as to the crisis in S. Africa,
154.
Dalmanutha, defeat of Louis Botha at, 329, 414.
Davies, "Karri," Major W. D., 88.
De Aar, 305, 354, 455.
De Jong, Mr., 402 (note), 477.
De Kock, Meyer, shot, 427.
Delagoa Bay, The proposed railway line to, 29;
its purchase recommended by Sir Bartle Frere, 29;
appearance of a British squadron at, 82;
consignment of ammunition to, 236;
railway communication with Pretoria re-opened, 329.
De la Rey, J. H., 434, 552, 556, 562 (note), 564;
Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note).
_De Patriot_, 48, 50 (note), 56, 57, 63.
_De Rand Post_, 213.
Derby, Lord, publication of his telegram of Feb. 27th, 1884, 262.
_De Transvaalse Oorlog_, 54, 57 (note), 58.
De Villiers, A. B., 382, 404, 406.
De Villiers, Melius, 160, 232;
advocates a cessation of hostilities, 401.
De Villiers, Sir Henry, 28, 95 (note), 102;
his letter of May 21st, 1899, to Pres. Steyn, 159;
his visit to Pretoria in 1899, 159, 160;
his complaint of the obscurity of the new franchise law, 218, 219;
his letter to Mr. Fischer urging Pres. Krueger's acceptance of the joint
inquiry, 232, 311;
his appeal to Pres. Steyn not to declare war, 292.
"Development Loan," The, 540.
Devonshire, The Duke of, comment on Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's attitude
in Committee of Supply, 371 (note).
De Wet, Christian, 420, 434, 562 (note), 564, 575;
his blow at Sannah's Post, 363;
his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers during the guerilla
war, 427, 428;
his laager near Lindley, 427;
enters Cape Colony, 430, 577;
chased out of it, 432;
his _Three Years' War_, 433 (note);
the pursuit of, 471;
his report to L. Botha on the rising in the Cape, 475;
meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556;
signs the Vereeniging Agreement, 567 (note);
advocates a continuance of the war, 571, 578;
Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note).
De Wet, Piet, protests against the treatment of the agents of the Peace
Committee, 427;
desires the Afrikander leaders to associate themselves with the Burgher
Peace Committee, 474.
De Wet, Sir Jacobus, 82.
Diamond Hill, defeat of the Boers at, 329.
Diamond Jubilee, The, celebration of on the Rand, 86, 90.
Diamond Mines, The, earnings of, 23;
Mr. Merriman's association with, 149.
Diamonds, The discovery of, 23.
Disarmament, The operation of, 413 to 469;
views of the Natal Ministry on, 549.
Dodd, Mr., arrest of, 131.
Doornkop, The surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at, 68 (note).
Dordrecht affair, The, 496 (note).
Downing Street, The impossibility of governing S. Africa from, 1, 22,
34, 35;
Mr. Chamberlain and, 47.
Doyle, Sir A. Conan, his _War in South Africa_, 469 (note).
Duncan, Mr., 515, 527.
Du Plessis, H. A., his protest against the treatment of the Boers who
were in favour of peace, 428.
Durban, 271.
D'Urban, Sir Benjamin, the reversal of his frontier policy, 12 to 15.
Durham, Lord, his report on Canada, 480.
Dutch, The, their first conflict with the natives of S. Africa, 3.
Dutch, The Cape, rebellion of, 341 to 372;
the aggravation and use of their disaffection, 373;
disarmament of, 413 to 469;
their sympathy with the Boer raiders, 432, 433;
their restlessness and embitterment, 443;
their general attitude, 444.
Dutch East India Company, The, an incident in their settlement at the
Cape, 2;
a century and a half of their government, 5;
the corner stone of their policy, 5;
their instructions to Van Riebeck, 5, 9.
Dutch language, The, the use of, 565, 581.
Dutch party, The, interests of, 273.
Dutch Press, The, the nationalist propaganda of, 69, 106, 107, 119.
Dutch Reformed Church, The, 120, 215, 410, 411, 428.
Dutch Republic, A, The establishment of, 255, 356, 357.
Dutch South African, The, the original stock from which they are
descended, 5;
their essential unity, 24;
Lord Milner's anxiety to see their best side, 90;
anti-British sentiment of, 91, 104;
their moral conquest of Cape Colony, 107.
Dutch, The republican, 17, 19, 28, 36;
conditions under which they were incorporated into the system of
British S. Africa, 545.
Dutch vote, The, 150.
Du Toit, Rev. S. J., 50 (note), 54;
his articles in _De Patriot_, 56;
rejected by the Bond, 58;
reference to him in J. N. Blignaut's letter, 258.
Duxbury, Mr., 212 (note).
Dynamite Contract, The, 130.

Ebden, Mr. Alfred, 173.
Edgar, Tom Jackson, 130, 131 (note), 132, 175.
Educational reconstruction, The work of, 519 to 523.
Eerste Fabriken, 456.
Eighty Club, The, an address to by Mr. Morley, 371 (note).
Eliot, Mr., 306.
Ellis, M.P., John, 498 (note).
Emigrant Farmers, The, 15 to 17.
England, The military unpreparedness of, 185;
ignorance of the situation in S. Africa, 251, 253, 283, 316, 323, 331;
hatred of, 312.
_England in Egypt_, 76.
English language, The, war against, 58.
English State Church, The, Afrikander view of, 53.
"Equal rights for all white men," The policy of, 1, 32.
Esau, brutal murder of, 427 (note).

Farelly, Mr., 126 (note), 214.
Farmer, Canon, 259.
"Farmers' Protection Association, The," 59, 60.
Farrer, Lord, 498 (note).
Faure, Pieter (now Sir), 93, 105.
Fiddes, G. V., 167, 515;
his report on the work of the departments of education, public works,
and district administration, 526.
Fischer, Abraham, 126 (note), 161, 203, 204, 210, 239 (note);
acts as interpreter at the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
his advice to Krueger, 217;
in constant communication with Mr. Schreiner, 217 (note);
dissociates himself from the "mediation" policy of the Cape
nationalists, 234;
works at the completion of the military preparations of the Republics,
234;
revises the Boer reply to the British despatch of Sept. 8th, 1899, 242;
recasts the ultimatum, 291;
attempt to influence him to terminate the war, 495.
Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, The, 203 to 210, 236, 275, 555.
Fish River, The, grants of land beyond, 13.
FitzPatrick, Sir Percy, 264, 273.
_Five Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers_, 16 (note).
Forestier-Walker, Lieut.-General, appointed to the Cape command, 184,
247, 269;
military measures of, 288.
Fouche, 432.
Fowler, Sir Henry, 416.
Franchise for the Uitlanders, The five years', 37, 156, 157, 170, 172,
238;
conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238.
Franchise Law, The, 209 _et seq._;
the Volksraad discussion on, 213;
demonstrations upon, 215;
Krueger recommends a further modification of, 217;
the new law passed, 218;
obscurity of its provisions, 218 to 220;
flagrant insincerity of, 234;
Mr. Smuts offers a simplified seven years', subsequently a five years'
franchise in lieu of the proposed joint inquiry, 237, 238;
conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238;
the Home Government kept inactive by, 288.
France, The attitude of, 311.
Franco-Dutch population at the Cape, The, 11;
secession of part of, 17.
Fraser, Edmund, difficult position of, 175.
Fraser, J. G., his opposition to the policy of "closer union," 49;
beaten for the Presidential election, 70.
Free State Dutch, The, 18.
Frederickstad, 455.
French, General, his advance on Colesberg, 348;
libel on, 477;
surrenders of rebels to, 573 (note).
French, Mr., 306.
Frere, (the late) Sir Bartle, 24, 25, 261;
his diagnosis of the S. African situation, 26;
his difference with the Beaconsfield Cabinet, 26;
his recall, 27;
the vindication of his statesmanship, 27;
his knowledge of S. African conditions, 28;
drafts a scheme of administrative reform, 28;
his private memo, written from the Cape in 1879, 29;
events following his recall, 34, 255;
letter from to Sir Gordon Sprigg, 263.
Frere, Sir Bartle, and Mr. John Morley, 261.
_Friend, The_ (Bloemfontein), 235.
Froneman, Commandant, 428.