Chapter II: Account of the Ship's Journey Across the Atlantic, the Messages She (2)

But in other cases of damage in ships constructed like the _Titanic_, it is probable that the efficiency of the closing arrangement of the water-tight doors may exert a vital influence on the safety of the ship. It has been represented that in future consideration should be given to the question--

as to how far bulkhead should be solid bulkheads, and how far there
should be water-tight doors, and, if there should be water-tight
doors, how far they may or may not be automatically operated.

This again is a question on which it is not necessary here to express any general opinion, for there are conflicting considerations which vary in individual cases. The matter, however, should come under the effective supervision of the board of trade much more than it seems to come at present, and should be referred to the bulkhead committee for their consideration with a view to their suggesting in detail where doors should or should not be allowed, and the type of door which should be adopted in the different parts of ships.

NOTE.--The vertical letters signify the different decks. The
horizontal letters signify the water-tight bulkheads. The heavy
line shows the top of the water-tight bulkheads. The crosshatched
compartments are those opened to the sea at the time of the
collision with the iceberg.]

IV.--ACCOUNT OF THE SAVING AND RESCUE OF THOSE WHO SURVIVED.

THE BOATS.

The _Titanic_ was provided with 20 boats. They were all on the boat deck. Fourteen were life boats. These were hung inboard in davits, 7 on the starboard side and 7 on the port side, and were designed to carry 65 persons each. Two were emergency boats. These were also in davits, but were hung outboard, one on the starboard side and one on the port side, and were designed to carry 40 persons each. The remaining 4 boats were Engelhardt or collapsible boats. Two of these were stowed on the boat deck and 2 on the roof of the officers' quarters, and were designed to carry 47 persons each. Thus the total boat accommodation was for 1,178 persons. The boats in davits were numbered, the odd numbers being on the starboard side and the even numbers on the port side. The numbering began with the emergency boats, which were forward, and ran aft. Thus the boats on the starboard side were numbered 1 (an emergency boat), 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 (lifeboats), and those on the port side 2 (an emergency boat), 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 (lifeboats). The collapsible boats were lettered, A and B being on the roof of the officers' quarters and C and D being on the boat deck; C was abreast of No. 1 (emergency boat) and D abreast of No. 2 (emergency boat). Further particulars as to the boats will be found on page 18.

In ordinary circumstances all these boats (with the exception of 1 and 2) were kept covered up, and contained only a portion of their equipment, such as oars, masts, and sails, and water; some of the remaining portion, such as lamps, compasses, and biscuits being stowed in the ship in some convenient place, ready for use when required. Much examination was directed at the hearing to showing that some boats left the ship without a lamp and others without a compass, and so on, but in the circumstances of confusion and excitement which existed at the time of the disaster this seems to me to be excusable.

Each member of the crew had a boat assigned to him in printed lists, which were posted up in convenient places for the men to see; but it appeared that in some cases the men had not looked at these lists and did not know their respective boats.

There had been no proper boat drill nor a boat muster. It was explained that great difficulty frequently exists in getting firemen to take part in a boat drill. They regard it as no part of their work. There seem to be no statutory requirements as to boat drills or musters, although there is a provision (sec. 9 of the merchant shipping act of 1906) that when a boat drill does take place the master of the vessel is, under a penalty, to record the fact in his log. I think it is desirable that the board of trade should make rules requiring boat drills and boat musters to be held of such a kind and at such times as may be suitable to the ship and to the voyage on which she is engaged. Boat drill, regulated according to the opportunities of the service, should always be held.

It is perhaps worth recording that there was an inspection of the boats themselves at Southampton by Mr. Clarke, the emigration officer, and that, as a result, Mr. Clarke gave his certificate that the boats were satisfactory. For the purpose of this inspection two of the boats were lowered to the water and crews exercised in them.

The collision took place at 11.40 p. m. (ship's time). About midnight it was realized that the vessel could not live, and at about 12.05 the order was given to uncover the 14 boats under davits. The work began on both sides of the ship under the superintendence of five officers. It did not proceed quickly at first; the crew arrived on the boat deck only gradually, and there was an average of not more than three deck hands to each boat. At 12.20 the order was given to swing out the boats, and this work was at once commenced. There were a few passengers on the deck at this time. Mr. Lightoller, who was one of the officers directing operations, says that the noise of the steam blowing off was so great that his voice could not be heard, and that he had to give directions with his hands.

Before this work had been begun, the stewards were rousing the passengers in their different quarters, helping them to put on life-belts and getting them up to the boat deck. At about 12.30 the order was given to place women and children in the boats. This was proceeded with at once and at about 12.45 Mr. Murdoch gave the order to lower No. 7 boat (on the starboard side) to the water. The work of uncovering, filling, and lowering the boats was done under the following supervision: Mr. Lowe, the fifth officer, saw to Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7; Mr. Murdoch (lost) saw also to 1 and 7 and to A and C. Mr. Moody (lost) looked after Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15. Mr. Murdoch also saw to 9 and 11. Mr. Lightoller saw to Nos. 4, 6, 8, B, and D. Mr. Wilde (lost) also saw to 8 and D. Mr. Lightoller and Mr. Moody saw to 10 and 16 and Mr. Lowe to 12 and 14. Mr. Wilde also assisted at No. 14, Mr. Boxall helping generally.

The evidence satisfies me that the officers did their work very well and without any thought of themselves. Capt. Smith, the master, Mr. Wilde, the chief officer, Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all went down with the ship while performing their duties. The others, with the exception of Mr. Lightoller, took charge of boats and thus were saved. Mr. Lightoller was swept off the deck as the vessel went down and was subsequently picked up.

So far as can be ascertained the boats left the ship at the following times, but I think it is necessary to say that these, and, indeed, all the times subsequent to the collision which are mentioned by the witnesses, are unreliable.

---------------------------------------
| No. | Starboard | No. | Port side.|
| | Side. | | |
-------------------|------------------|
| | _a. m._ | | _a. m._ |
| 7 | 12.46 | 6 | 12.55 |
| 5 | 12.55 | 8 | 1.10 |
| 3 | 1.0 | 10 | 1.20 |
| 1 | 1.10 | 12 | 1.25 |
| 9 | 1.20 | 14 | 1.30 |
| 11 | 1.25 | 16 | 1.35 |
| 13 | 1.35 | 2 | 1.45 |
| 15 | 1.35 | 4 | 1.56 |
| C | 1.40 | D | 2.05 |
|[1]A | |[3]B | |
---------------------------------------

As regards the collapsible boats, C and D were properly lowered; as to A and B, which were on the roof of the officers' house, they were left until the last. There was difficulty in getting these boats down to the deck, and the ship had at this time a list. Very few of the deck hands were left in the ship, as they had nearly all gone to man the lifeboats, and the stewards and firemen were unaccustomed to work the collapsible boats. Work appears to have been going on in connection with these two boats at the time that the ship sank. The boats seem to have floated from the deck and to have served in the water as rafts.

The following table shows the numbers of the male crew, male passengers, and women and children who, according to the evidence, left the ship in each boat. In three or four instances the numbers of women and children are only arrived at by subtracting the numbers of crew and male passengers from the total said to be in the boat (these are in italics). In each case the lowest figures given are taken:

Key
A: Starboard side boat. No.
B: Men of crew.
C: Men passengers.
D: Women and children.
E: Total.
F: Port side boat No.
G: Men of crew.
H: Men passengers.
I: Women and children.
J: Total

+------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+
| A | B | C | D | E || F | G | H | I | J |
+------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+
| 7 | 3 | 4 | _20_ | 27 || 6 | 2 | 2 | _24_ | 28 |
| 5 | 5 | 6 | 30 | 41 || 8 | 4 | | 35 | 39 |
| 3 | 15 | 10 | _25_ | 50 || 10 | 5 | | 50 | 55 |
| 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 12 || 2 | 4 | 1 | 21 | 26 |
| 9 | 8 | 6 | 42 | 56 || 12 | 2 | | 40 | 42 |
| 11 | 9 | 1 | 60 | 70 || 14 | 8 | | 53 | 63 |
| 13 | 5 | | 59 | 64 || 16 | 6 | | 50 | 56 |
| 15 | 13 | 4 | _53_ | 70 || 4 | 4 | | 36 | 40 |
| C | 5 | 2 | 64 | 71 || D | 2 | 2 | 40 | 44 |
| A[1] | | | | || B[1] | | | | |
+------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+
|Total | 70 | 36 | 355 |461 || |37 | 7 | 349 |393 |
+------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+

General total:
Men of crew 107
Men passengers 43
Women and children 704

This shows in all 107 men of the crew, 43 male passengers, and 704 women and children, or a total of 854 in 18 boats. In addition, about 60 persons, two of whom were women, were said to have been transferred, subsequently, from A and B collapsible boats to other boats, or rescued from the water, making a total of 914 who escaped with their lives. It is obvious that these figures are quite unreliable, for only 712 were in fact saved by the _Carpathia_, the steamer which came to the rescue at about 4 a. m., and all the boats were accounted for. Another remarkable discrepancy is that, of the 712 saved, 189 were in fact men of the crew, 129 were male passengers, and 394 were women and children. In other words, the real proportion of women to men saved was much less than the proportion appearing in the evidence from the boats. Allowing for those subsequently picked up, of the 712 persons saved only 652 could have left the _Titanic_ in boats, or an average of about 36 per boat. There was a tendency in the evidence to exaggerate the numbers in each boat, to exaggerate the proportion of women to men, and to diminish the number of crew. I do not attribute this to any wish on the part of the witnesses to mislead the court, but to a natural desire to make the best case for themselves and their ship. The seamen who gave evidence were too frequently encouraged when under examination in the witness box to understate the number of crew in the boats. The number of crew actually saved was 189, giving an average of 10 per boat, and if from this figure the 58 men of the 60 persons above mentioned be deducted the average number of crew leaving the ship in the boats must still have been at least 7. The probability, however, is that many of the 60 picked up were passengers.

The discipline both among passengers and crew during the lowering of the boats was good, but the organization should have been better, and if it had been it is possible that more lives would have been saved.

The real difficulty in dealing with the question of the boats is to find the explanation of so many of them leaving the ship with comparatively few persons in them. No. 1 certainly left with only 12; this was an emergency boat with a carrying capacity of 40. No. 7 left with only 27, and No. 6 with only 28; these were lifeboats with a carrying capacity of 65 each; and several of the others, according to the evidence, and certainly according to the truth, must have left only partly filled. Many explanations are forthcoming, one being that the passengers were unwilling to leave the ship. When the earlier boats left, and before the _Titanic_ had begun materially to settle down, there was a drop of 65 feet from the boat deck to the water, and the women feared to get into the boats. Many people thought that the risk in the ship was less than the risk in the boats. This explanation is supported by the evidence of Capt. Rostron, of the _Carpathia_. He says that after those who were saved got on board his ship he was told by some of them that when the boats first left the _Titanic_ the people "really would not be put in the boats; they did not want to go in." There was a large body of evidence from the _Titanic_ to the same effect, and I have no doubt that many people, particularly women, refused to leave the deck for the boats. At one time the master appears to have had the intention of putting the people into the boats from the gangway doors in the side of the ship. This was possibly with a view to allay the fears of the passengers, for from these doors the water could be reached by means of ladders, and the lowering of some of the earlier boats when only partly filled may be accounted for in this way. There is no doubt that the master did order some of the partly filled boats to row to a position under one of the doors with the object of taking in passengers at that point. It appears, however, that these doors were never opened. Another explanation is that some women refused to leave their husbands. It is said further that the officers engaged in putting the people into the boats feared that the boats might buckle if they were filled; but this proved to be an unfounded apprehension, for one or more boats were completely filled and then successfully lowered to the water.

At 12.35 the message from the _Carpathia_ was received announcing that she was making for the _Titanic_. This probably became known and may have tended to make the passengers still more unwilling to leave the ship, and the lights of a ship (the _Californian_) which were seen by many people may have encouraged the passengers to hope that assistance was at hand. These explanations are perhaps sufficient to account for so many of the lifeboats leaving without a full boat load; but I think, nevertheless, that if the boats had been kept a little longer before being lowered, or if the after gangway doors had been opened, more passengers might have been induced to enter the boats. And if women could not be induced to enter the boats, the boats ought then to have been filled up with men. It is difficult to account for so many of the lifeboats being sent from the sinking ship, in a smooth sea, far from full. These boats left behind them many hundreds of lives to perish. I do not, however, desire these observations to be read as casting any reflection on the officers of the ship or on the crew who were working on the boat deck. They all worked admirably, but I think that if there had been better organization the results would have been more satisfactory.

I heard much evidence as to the conduct of the boats after the _Titanic_ sank and when there must have been many struggling people in the water, and I regret to say that in my opinion some, at all events, of the boats failed to attempt to save lives when they might have done so, and might have done so successfully. This was particularly the case with boat No. 1. It may reasonably have been thought that the risk of making the attempt was too great; but it seems to me that if the attempt had been made by some of these boats it might have been the means of saving a few more lives. Subject to these few adverse comments, I have nothing but praise for both passengers and crew. All the witnesses speak well of their behavior. It is to be remembered that the night was dark, the noise of the escaping steam was terrifying, the peril, though perhaps not generally recognized, was imminent and great, and many passengers who were unable to speak or to understand English were being collected together and hurried into the boats.

CONDUCT OF SIR C. DUFF GORDON AND MR. ISMAY.

An attack was made in the course of the inquiry on the moral conduct of two of the passengers, namely, Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon and Mr. Bruce Ismay. It is no part of the business of the court to inquire into such matters, and I should pass them by in silence if I did not fear that my silence might be misunderstood. The very gross charge against Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon that, having got into No. 1 boat, he bribed the men in it to row away from drowning people is unfounded. I have said that the members of the crew in that boat might have made some attempt to save the people in the water, and that such an attempt would probably have been successful; but I do not believe that the men were deterred from making the attempt by any act of Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon's. At the same time I think that if he had encouraged the men to return to the position where the _Titanic_ had foundered they would probably have made an effort to do so and could have saved some lives.

As to the attack on Mr. Bruce Ismay, it resolved itself into the suggestion that, occupying the position of managing director of the steamship company, some moral duty was imposed upon him to wait on board until the vessel foundered. I do not agree. Mr. Ismay, after rendering assistance to many passengers, found C collapsible, the last boat on the starboard side, actually being lowered. No other people were there at the time. There was room for him and he jumped in. Had he not jumped in he would merely have added one more life, namely, his own, to the number of those lost.

THE THIRD-CLASS PASSENGERS.

It had been suggested before the inquiry that the third-class passengers had been unfairly treated; that their access to the boat deck had been impeded, and that when at last they reached that deck the first and second class passengers were given precedence in getting places in the boats. There appears to have been no truth in these suggestions. It is no doubt true that the proportion of third-class passengers saved falls far short of the proportion of the first and second class, but this is accounted for by the greater reluctance of the third-class passengers to leave the ship, by their unwillingness to part with their baggage, by the difficulty of getting them up from their quarters, which were at the extreme ends of the ship, and by other similar causes. The interests of the relatives of some of the third-class passengers who had perished were in the hands of Mr. Harbinson, who attended the inquiry on their behalf. He said at the end of his address to the court:

I wish to say distinctly that no evidence has been given in the
course of this case which would substantiate a charge that any
attempt was made to keep back the third-class passengers. * * * I
desire further to say that there is no evidence that when they did
reach the boat deck there was any discrimination practiced either
by the officers or the sailors in putting them into the boats.

I am satisfied that the explanation of the excessive proportion of third-class passengers lost is not to be found in the suggestion that the third-class passengers were in any way unfairly treated. They were not unfairly treated.

MEANS TAKEN TO PROCURE ASSISTANCE.

As soon as the dangerous condition of the ship was realized, messages were sent by the master's orders to all steamers within reach. At 12.15 a. m. the distress signal CQD was sent. This was heard by several steamships and by Cape Race. By 12.25 Mr. Boxall, the fourth officer, had worked out the correct position of the _Titanic_, and then another message was sent: "Come at once, we have struck a berg." This was heard by the Cunard steamer _Carpathia_, which was at this time bound from New York to Liverpool and 58 miles away. The _Carpathia_ answered, saying that she was coming to the assistance of the _Titanic_. This was reported to Capt. Smith on the boat deck. At 12.26 a message was sent out, "Sinking; can not hear for noise of steam." Many other messages were also sent, but as they were only heard by steamers which were too far away to render help, it is not necessary to refer to them. At 1.45 a message was heard by the _Carpathia_, "Engine-room full up to boilers." The last message sent out was "CQ" which was faintly heard by the steamer _Virginian_. This message was sent at 2.17. It thus appears that the Marconi apparatus was at work until within a few minutes of the foundering of the _Titanic_.

Meanwhile Mr. Boxall was sending up distress signals from the deck. These signals (rockets) were sent off at intervals from a socket by No. 1 emergency boat on the boat deck. They were the ordinary distress signals, exploding in the air and throwing off white stars. The firing of these signals began about the time that No. 7 boat was lowered (12.45 a. m.), and it continued until Mr. Boxall left the ship at about 1.45.

Mr. Boxall was also using a Morse light from the bridge in the direction of a ship whose lights he saw about half a point on the port bow of the _Titanic_ at a distance, as he thought, of about 5 or 6 miles. He got no answer. In all, Mr. Boxall fired about eight rockets. There appears to be no doubt that the vessel whose lights he saw was the _Californian_. The evidence from the _Californian_ speaks of eight rockets having been seen between 12.30 and 1.40. The _Californian_ heard none of the _Titanic's_ messages; she had only one Marconi operator on board and he was asleep.

THE RESCUE BY THE STEAMSHIP "CARPATHIA."

On the 15th of April the steamship _Carpathia_, 13,600 tons gross, of the Cunard Line, Mr. Arthur Henry Rostron, master, was on her passage to Liverpool from New York. She carried some 740 passengers and 325 crew.

On receipt of the _Titanic_'s first distress message the captain immediately ordered the ship to be turned around and driven at her highest speed (17-1/2 knots) in the direction of the _Titanic_. He also informed the _Titanic_ by wireless that he was coming to her assistance, and he subsequently received various messages from her. At about 2.40 a. m. he saw a green flare which, as the evidence shows, was being sent up by Mr. Boxall in No. 2 boat. From this time until 4 a. m. Capt. Rostron was altering his course continually in order to avoid icebergs. He fired rockets in answer to the signals he saw from Boxall's boat. At 4 o'clock he considered he was practically up to the position given and he stopped his ship at 4.05. He sighted the first boat (No. 2) and picked her up at 4.10. There was then a large number of icebergs around him, and it was just daylight. Eventually he picked up in all 13 lifeboats, two emergency boats, and two collapsible boats, all of which were taken on board the _Carpathia_, the other boats being abandoned as damaged or useless. From these boats he took on board 712 persons, one of whom died shortly afterwards. The boats were scattered over an area of 4 or 5 miles, and it was 8 a. m. before they had all been picked up. He saw very little wreckage when he got near to the scene of the disaster, only a few deck chairs, cork life belts, etc., and only one body. The position was then 41° 46´ N., 50° 14´ W.

The _Carpathia_ subsequently returned to New York with the passengers and crew she had rescued.

The court desires to record its great admiration of Capt. Rostron's conduct. He did the very best that could be done.

NUMBERS SAVED.

The following were the numbers saved:

First class:
Adult males 57 out of 175, or 32.57 per cent.
Adult females 140 out of 144, or 97.22 per cent.
Male children (all saved) 5
Female children (all saved) 1
-----
203 out of 325, or 62.46 per cent.

Second class:
Adult males 14 out of 168, or 8.33 per cent.
Adult females 80 out of 93, or 86.02 per cent.
Male children (all saved) 11
Female children (all saved) 13
-----
118 out of 285, or 41.40 per cent.

Third class:
Adult males 75 out of 462, or 16.23 per cent.
Adult females 76 out of 165, or 46.06 per cent.
Male children 13 out of 48, or 27.08 per cent.
Female children 14 out of 31, or 45.16 per cent.
-----
178 out of 706, or 25.21 per cent.

Total 499 out of 1,316, or 37.94 per cent.

Crew saved:
Deck department 43 out of 66, or 65.15 per cent.
Engine-room department 72 out of 325, or 22.15 per cent.
Victualing department
(including 20 women out of 23) 97 out of 494, or 19.63 per cent.
----
Total 212 out of 885, or 23.95 per cent.

Total on board saved 711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent.

Passengers and crew:
Adult males 338 out of 1,667, or 20.27 per cent.
Adult females 316 out of 425, or 74.35 per cent.
Children 57 out of 109, or 52.29 per cent.
----
Total 711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent.

V.--THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE STEAMSHIP "CALIFORNIAN."

It is here necessary to consider the circumstances relating to the steamship _Californian_.

On the 14th of April the steamship _Californian_, of the Leyland Line, Mr. Stanley Lord, master, was on her passage from London, which port she left on April 5, to Boston, United States, where she subsequently arrived on April 19. She was a vessel of 6,223 tons gross and 4,038 net. Her full speed was 12-1/2 to 13 knots. She had a passenger certificate, but was not carrying any passengers at the time. She belonged to the International Mercantile Marine Co., the owners of the _Titanic_.

At 7.30 p.m., ship's time, on April 14, a wireless message was sent from this ship to the _Antillian_:

* * * * *

To CAPTAIN, _Antillian_:

Six thirty p.m., apparent ship's time, latitude 42° 3´ N., longitude 49° 9´ W. Three large bergs, 5 miles to southward of us. Regards.

LORD.

* * * * *

The message was intercepted by the _Titanic_, and when the Marconi operator (Evans) of the _Californian_ offered this ice report to the Marconi operator of the _Titanic_, shortly after 7.30 p. m., the latter replied:

It is all right. I heard you sending it to the _Antillian_, and I
have got it.

The _Californian_ proceeded on her course S. 89° W. true until 10.20 p. m., ship's time, when she was obliged to stop and reverse engines because she was running into field ice, which stretched as far as could then be seen to the northward and southward.

The master told the court that he made her position at that time to be 42° 5´ N., 57° 7´ W. This position is recorded in the log book, which was written up from the scrap log book by the chief officer. The scrap log is destroyed. It is a position about 19 miles N. by E. of the position of the _Titanic_ when she foundered, and is said to have been fixed by dead reckoning and verified by observations. I am satisfied that this position is not accurate. The master "twisted her head" to E. N. E. by the compass and she remained approximately stationary until 5.15 a. m. on the following morning. The ship was slowly swinging around to starboard during the night.

At about 11 p. m. a steamer's light was seen approaching from the eastward. The master went to Evans's room and asked what ships he had. The latter replied: "I think the _Titanic_ is near us. I have got her." The master said: "You had better advise the _Titanic_ we are stopped and surrounded with ice." This Evans did, calling up the _Titanic_ and sending: "We are stopped and surrounded by ice." The _Titanic_ replied: "Keep out." The _Titanic_ was in communication with Cape Race, which station was then sending messages to her. The reason why the _Titanic_ answered "keep out" was that her Marconi operator could not hear what Cape Race was saying, as from her proximity the message from the _Californian_ was much stronger than any message being taken in by the _Titanic_ from Cape Race, which was much farther off. Evans heard the _Titanic_ continuing to communicate with Cape Race up to the time he turned in at 11.30 p. m.

The master of the _Californian_ states that when observing the approaching steamer as she got nearer he saw more lights, a few deck lights, and also her green side light. He considered that at 11 o'clock she was approximately 6 or 7 miles away, and at some time between 11 and 11.30 he first saw her green light; she was then about 5 miles off. He noticed that about 11.30 she stopped. In his opinion this steamer was of about the same size as the _Californian_--a medium-sized steamer, "something like ourselves."

From the evidence of Mr. Groves, third officer of the _Californian_, who was the officer of the first watch, it would appear that the master was not actually on the bridge when the steamer was sighted.

Mr. Groves made out two masthead lights; the steamer was changing her bearing slowly as she got closer, and as she approached he went to the chart room and reported this to the master; he added, "She is evidently a passenger steamer." In fact, Mr. Groves never appears to have had any doubt on this subject. In answer to a question during his examination, "Had she much light?" he said, "Yes, a lot of light. There was absolutely no doubt of her being a passenger steamer, at least in my mind."

Gill, the assistant donkey man of the _Californian_, who was on deck at midnight, said, referring to this steamer: "It could not have been anything but a passenger boat, she was too large."

By the evidence of Mr. Groves, the master, in reply to his report, said: "Call her up on the Morse lamp, and see if you can get any answer." This he proceeded to do. The master came up and joined him on the bridge and remarked: "That does not look like a passenger steamer." Mr. Groves replied: "It is, sir. When she stopped her lights seemed to go out, and I suppose they have been put out for the night." Mr. Groves states that these lights went out at 11.40, and remembers that time because "one bell was struck to call the middle watch." The master did not join him on the bridge until shortly afterwards, and consequently after the steamer had stopped.

In his examination Mr. Groves admitted that if this steamer's head was turning to port after she stopped, it might account for the diminution of lights, by many of them being shut out. Her steaming lights were still visible and also her port side light.

The captain only remained upon the bridge for a few minutes. In his evidence he stated that Mr. Groves had made no observations to him about the steamer's deck lights going out. Mr. Groves's Morse signaling appears to have been ineffectual (although at one moment he thought he was being answered), and he gave it up. He remained on the bridge until relieved by Mr. Stone, the second officer, just after midnight. In turning the _Californian_ over to him, he pointed out the steamer and said: "she has been stopped since 11.40; she is a passenger steamer. At about the moment she stopped she put her lights out." When Mr. Groves was in the witness box the following questions were put to him by me:

Speaking as an experienced seaman and knowing what you do know now,
do you think that steamer that you know was throwing up rockets,
and that you say was a passenger steamer, was the _Titanic_?--Do I
think it? Yes. From what I have heard subsequently? Yes. Most
decidedly I do, but I do not put myself as being an experienced
man. But that is your opinion as far as your experience goes?--Yes,
it is, my lord.

Mr. Stone states that the master, who was also up (but apparently not on the bridge), pointed out the steamer to him with instructions to tell him if her bearings altered or if she got any closer; he also stated that Mr. Groves had called her up on the Morse lamp and had received no reply.

Mr. Stone had with him during the middle watch an apprentice named Gibson, whose attention was first drawn to the steamer's lights at about 12.20 a. m. He could see a masthead light, her red light (with glasses), and a "glare of white lights on her afterdeck." He first thought her masthead light was flickering and next thought it was a Morse light, "calling us up." He replied, but could not get into communication, and finally came to the conclusion that it was, as he had first supposed, the masthead light flickering. Sometime after 12.30 a. m., Gill, the donkey man, states that he saw two rockets fired from the ship which he had been observing, and about 1.10 a. m., Mr. Stone reported to the captain by voice pipe, that he had seen five white rockets from the direction of the steamer. He states that the master answered, "Are they company's signals?" and that he replied, "I do not know, but they appear to me to be white rockets." The master told him to "go on Morsing," and, when he received any information, to send the apprentice down to him with it. Gibson states that Mr. Stone informed him that he had reported to the master, and that the master had said the steamer was to be called up by Morse light. This witness thinks the time was 12.55; he at once proceeded again to call the steamer up by Morse. He got no reply, but the vessel fired three more white rockets; these rockets were also seen by Mr. Stone.

Both Mr. Stone and the apprentice kept the steamer under observation, looking at her from time to time with their glasses. Between 1 o'clock and 1.40 some conversation passed between them. Mr. Stone remarked to Gibson: "Look at her now, she looks very queer out of water, her lights look queer." He also is said by Gibson to have remarked, "A ship is not going to fire rockets at sea for nothing;" and admits himself that he may possibly have used that expression.

Mr. Stone states that he saw the last of the rockets fired at about 1.40, and after watching the steamer for some 20 minutes more he sent Gibson down to the master.

I told Gibson to go down to the master, and be sure and wake him,
and tell him that altogether we had seen eight of these white
lights like white rockets in the direction of this other steamer;
that this steamer was disappearing in the southwest, that we had
called her up repeatedly on the Morse lamp and received no
information whatsoever.

Gibson states that he went down to the chart room and told the master; that the master asked him if all the rockets were white, and also asked him the time. Gibson stated that at this time the master was awake. It was five minutes past two, and Gibson returned to the bridge to Mr. Stone and reported. They both continued to keep the ship under observation until she disappeared. Mr. Stone describes this as "A gradual disappearing of all her lights, which would be perfectly natural with a ship steaming away from us."

At about 2.40 a. m. Mr. Stone again called up the master by voice pipe and told him that the ship from which he had seen the rockets come had disappeared bearing SW. 1/2 W., the last he had seen of the light; and the master again asked him if he was certain there was no color in the lights. "I again assured him they were all white, just white rockets." There is considerable discrepancy between the evidence of Mr. Stone and that of the master. The latter states that he went to the voice pipe at about 1.15, but was told then of a white rocket (not five white rockets). Moreover, between 1.30 and 4.30, when he was called by the chief officer (Mr. Stewart), he had no recollection of anything being reported to him at all, although he remembered Gibson opening and closing the chart-room door.

Mr. Stewart relieved Mr. Stone at 4 a. m. The latter told him he had seen a ship 4 or 5 miles off when he went on deck at 12 o'clock, and at 1 o'clock he had seen some white rockets, and that the moment the ship started firing them she started to steam away. Just at this time (about 4 a. m.) a steamer came in sight with two white masthead lights and a few lights amidships. He asked Mr. Stone whether he thought this was the steamer which had fired rockets, and Mr. Stone said he did not think it was. At 4.30 he called the master and informed him that Mr. Stone had told him he had seen rockets in the middle watch. The master said, "Yes, I know; he has been telling me." The master came at once on to the bridge, and apparently took the fresh steamer for the one which had fired rockets, and said, "She looks all right; she is not making any signals now." This mistake was not corrected. He, however, had the wireless operator called.

At about 6 a. m. Capt. Lord heard from the _Virginian_ that the "_Titanic_ had struck a berg, passengers in boats, ship sinking;" and he at once started through the field ice at full speed for the position given.

Capt. Lord stated that about 7.30 a. m. he passed the _Mount Temple_, stopped, and that she was in the vicinity of the position given him as where the _Titanic_ had collided (lat. 41° 46´ N.; long. 50° 14´ W.). He saw no wreckage there, but did later on near the _Carpathia_, which ship he closed soon afterwards, and he stated that the position where he subsequently left this wreckage was 41° 33´ N.; 50° 1´ W. It is said in the evidence of Mr. Stewart that the position of the _Californian_ was verified by stellar observations at 7.30 p. m. on the Sunday evening, and that he verified the captain's position given when the ship stopped (42° 5´ N.; 50° 7´ W.) as accurate on the next day. The position in which the wreckage was said to have been seen on the Monday morning was verified by sights taken on that morning.

All the officers are stated to have taken sights, and Mr. Stewart in his evidence remarks that they all agreed. If it is admitted that these positions were correct, then it follows that the _Titanic_'s position as given by that ship when making the CQD. signal was approximately S. 16° W. (true), 19 miles from the _Californian_; and further that the position in which the _Californian_ was stopped during the night, was 30 miles away from where the wreckage was seen by her in the morning, or that the wreckage had drifted 11 miles in a little more than five hours.

There are contradictions and inconsistencies in the story as told by the different witnesses. But the truth of the matter is plain. The _Titanic_ collided with the berg at 11.40. The vessel seen by the _Californian_ stopped at this time. The rockets sent up from the _Titanic_ were distress signals. The _Californian_ saw distress signals. The number sent up by the _Titanic_ was about eight. The _Californian_ saw eight. The time over which the rockets from the _Titanic_ were sent up was from about 12.45 to 1.45 o'clock. It was about this time that the _Californian_ saw the rockets. At 2.40 Mr. Stone called to the master that the ship from which he had seen the rockets had disappeared. At 2.20 a. m. the _Titanic_ had foundered. It was suggested that the rockets seen by the _Californian_ were from some other ship, not the _Titanic_. But no other ship to fit this theory has ever been heard of.

These circumstances convince me that the ship seen by the _Californian_ was the _Titanic_, and if so, according to Capt. Lord, the two vessels were about 5 miles apart at the time of the disaster. The evidence from the _Titanic_ corroborates this estimate, but I am advised that the distance was probably greater, though not more than 8 to 10 miles. The ice by which the _Californian_ was surrounded was loose ice extending for a distance of not more than 2 or 3 miles in the direction of the _Titanic_. The night was clear and the sea was smooth. When she first saw the rockets, the _Californian_ could have pushed through the ice to the open water without any serious risk and so have come to the assistance of the _Titanic_. Had she done so she might have saved many if not all of the lives that were lost.

VI.--THE BOARD OF TRADE'S ADMINISTRATION.

The court was invited by the board of trade--

"to report upon the rules and regulations made under the merchant
shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of those acts, and
of such rules and regulations so far as the consideration thereof
is material to this casualty" (No. 26 of the questions submitted to
the court by the board of trade).

Charges were made against the board of trade during the progress of the inquiry of a twofold kind. First, it was said that the board had been negligent in that they had failed to keep up to date their rules and regulations relating generally to the provision of life-saving appliances at sea, and, secondly, it was said that their officials had in the particular instance of the _Titanic_ failed to exercise due care in the supervision of the vessel's plans and the inspection of the work done upon her.

With reference to the first of these charges, it was reduced in the course of the inquiry to a charge of neglect to keep the board's scale for the provision of lifeboat accommodation up to date. The circumstances are these: In March, 1886, the board appointed a departmental committee, consisting of three of their principal officers, to inquire into the question of boats, rafts, and life-saving apparatus carried by sea-going merchant ships. In their report this committee pointed out that, as regards boats for ocean-going steamers carrying large numbers of passengers, the boats would be of little use in saving life (although they might for a time prolong its existence) unless succor were at hand from other ships or from proximity to shore; and speaking with special reference to passenger steam vessels carrying emigrants across the Atlantic to ports on the east coast of North America, they said as follows:

Considering the number of vessels employed in this trade, and the
large number of passengers they carry, and also taking into
consideration the stormy character of the ocean they have to cross,
and the thick and foggy weather encountered, we think this class is
the most important of any, and we can not pass over the fact that
of late years this traffic has been carried on with remarkable
immunity from loss of life.

The boat accommodation these vessels are forced to carry when
sailing with emigrants is regulated by the scale in the passengers
act, 1855, which provides for boat accommodation for 216 people as
a maximum, so that, supposing a vessel leaves with 1,000 passengers
and 200 crew under the present statutory requirements, she need
only carry sufficient boat accommodation for 216 of these people.
Thus it will be seen that the boats carried by this class of
vessels are also quite inadequate as an effectual means of saving
life should a disaster happen to a ship with her full complement of
passengers on board. We are glad to be able to say that there are
many liberal and careful shipowners who do all in their power to
provide for the safety of their passengers by equipping their
vessels with boats far in excess of the number required by statute.
But, at the same time, there are others carrying large numbers of
emigrants who do no more than they are required to do by law.

We have gone into this question with reference to this class of
vessels very fully, and have visited many of them, and we think
that the boats required by act should be increased 100 per cent.,
and in addition to them that the owners should be induced to carry
sufficient collapsible boats and approved rafts, so that each ship
shall have sufficient life-saving gear for all on board at any one
time, provided, as said before, that no ship need carry more boat
accommodation than is sufficient for all on board at that time.

In 1887 a select committee of the House of Commons, of which Lord Charles Beresford was the chairman, was appointed to report on saving life at sea, and they found in their report--

That many passenger ships could not, without great inconvenience,
carry so many of the ordinary wooden boats as would suffice to
carry the whole of the passengers and crew with safety in bad
weather. Under such circumstances the crew would not be sufficient
to man so many boats; nor could they all be got into the water in
sufficient time in the event of very rapid foundering. Having
regard, however, to the fact that accidents occur probably as often
in moderate weather as in bad, and having regard also to the fact
that the very cause of the accident frequently incapacitates many
of the boats, and to the further fact that an insufficiency of
boats undoubtedly tends to cause panic, we are of opinion that all
sea-going passenger ships should be compelled by law to carry such
boats, and other life-saving apparatus, as would in the aggregate
best provide for the safety of all on board in moderate weather.

As a result of these reports, the merchant shipping (life-saving appliances) act, 1888, appears to have been passed, under which rules were made by the board of trade at different dates. The merchant shipping act, 1894, repealed the act of 1888, and substituted therefor sections 427 to 431 and the seventeenth schedule of the new act. Under this act (1894) a table showing the minimum number of boats to be placed under davits and their minimum cubic contents was issued by the board. It was dated March 9, 1894, and came into operation on June 1 of that year. This table was based on the gross tonnage of the vessels to which it was to apply, and not upon the numbers carried, and it provided that the number of boats and their capacity should increase as the tonnage increased. The table, however, stopped short at the point where the gross tonnage of the vessels reached "10,000 and upwards." As to all such vessels, whatever their size might be, the minimum number of boats under davits was fixed by the table at 16, with a total minimum capacity of 5,500 cubic feet.

But as regarded emigrant steamships there was a rule which provided that if the boats under davits required by the table did not furnish sufficient accommodation for all on board, then additional boats of approved description (whether under davits or not) or approved life rafts should be carried, and that these additional boats or rafts should be of at least such carrying capacity that they and the boats required by the table should provide together in vessels of 5,000 tons and upwards three-fourths more than the minimum cubic contents required by the table, so that in the case of an emigrant ship such as the _Titanic_ the requirements under the rules and table together exacted a provision of 9,625 cubic feet of lifeboat and raft accommodation (5,500 feet in boats under davits with three-fourths, namely, 4,125, added). Taken at 10 cubic feet per person, this would be equivalent to a provision for 962 persons. No doubt at the time these rules were made and this table was drawn up it was thought that, having regard to the size of vessels then built and building, it was unnecessary to carry the table further. The largest emigrant steamer then afloat was the _Lucania_, of 12,952 tons.

In the report of the select committee of the House of Commons a reference to water-tight bulkheads had been made, which was in the following terms:

Though the question of construction was clearly not included in the
reference to the committee, still they think it only right to
state, after having heard the evidence, that the proper placing of
bulkheads, so as to enable a ship to keep afloat for some length of
time after an accident has occurred, is most important for saving
life at sea, and a thing upon which the full efficiency of
life-saving appliances largely depends.

This passage probably explains the insertion in the board of trade's rules for life-saving appliances of rule No. 12, which is as follows:

_Water-tight compartments._--When ships of any class are divided
into efficient water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the
board of trade, they shall only be required to carry additional
boats, rafts and buoyant apparatus of one-half of the capacity
required by these rules, but the exemption shall not extend to life
jackets or similar approved articles of equal buoyancy suitable to
be worn on the person.

If this rule had become applicable to the _Titanic_, then the total cubical lifeboat or raft accommodation which she would have been required to carry would not have been more than 7,562 (equivalent to accommodation for 756 persons). It did not, however, become applicable for the owners never required the board of trade to express any opinion under the rule as to the efficiency of the water-tight compartments. The _Titanic_, in fact, carried boat accommodation for 1,178 persons, a number far in excess of the requirements of the table and rules, and therefore no concession under rule 12 was needed. Speaking generally, recourse to this rule (12) by shipowners has been so insignificant that the rule itself may be regarded as of no practical account.

The foregoing rules with the table were laid before Parliament in the usual way, and so received the required statutory sanction.