Chapter IX: Some Conclusions (1)

The question naturally arises, what is the peculiarity about American society which fosters and tolerates lynching? Why is lynching a peculiarly American institution? It has been suggested that the explanation lies along racial lines. Some have said that the Scotch-Irish are responsible for the introduction into this country of the practice of illegally punishing public offenders. Others say that it is race prejudice, a result of the coming together of many races in one country, and particularly that it is the racial antagonism between the white race and the negro race, which explains the matter. Looking at the history of the practice in the United States from colonial times down to the present day, one can scarcely regard such an explanation as either adequate or conclusive. The real explanation lies along a somewhat different line, and it can be pointed out best by drawing some contrasts between the administration of the law in the United States and its administration in the older countries of Europe.

The American people are not any more disposed toward lawlessness—they are not less law-abiding—than European peoples; it is rather that they maintain a wholly different attitude toward the law. Social and political conditions are different, and the law, instead of being something in itself to reverence and respect, is little more than a device for securing freedom. The value of laws as rules of conduct is not minimized but there is no sense of sanctity pertaining to them. To outwit, avoid, defy, or forget the laws is not a serious offense so long as an appeal can be made to the individual sense of justice in support of such courses of action.

In Europe, where the statutes have grown up from tradition and ancient custom, the law is regarded as a more sacred institution; in a very real sense it is the product of a superior authority. Law in its institutional sense is as much a predetermined factor in daily affairs as is one of the laws of nature. Social and political conditions are fixed. Politics do not enter into the enforcement of law. Civilization is distributed in a more nearly equal measure and the law is enforced with equal vigor over the whole country.[341] The judicial and administrative officers are persons socially and politically distinct from the masses, and their individuality is so completely subordinated to their representative capacity that the law thus comes to have a majesty and dignity which can be given it in no other way.

In the United States, on the contrary, the body of the law lacks the support of long tradition and ancient practice. The early immigrants brought with them the European conception of law, but in the midst of new conditions, with no strong government to enforce it with an impartial and an iron hand, along with the growth of the democratic spirit, a new _esprit des lois_, as Montesquieu would call it, has been developed. Where the people, either directly or through their representatives, make the laws and then elect the officers who are to enforce them, it is inevitable that the legal machinery will prove powerless to control popular excitements. Politics also enter very largely into the whole question. In remote districts, too, the people seldom have occasion to meet any other officers of the law than their own neighbors and friends whom they have elected to minor civil offices. It is for this reason that the execution of the law varies so greatly in different parts of the United States, being either vigorous or lax, in accordance with the moral sentiment of the community.

In a monarchy or a highly centralized form of government, the law is made for the people and enforced against them by officials who are in no sense responsible to them.

In a democracy with a republican form of government, like the United States, such is not the case. The people consider themselves a law unto themselves. They make the laws; therefore they can unmake them. Since they say what a judge can do, they entertain the idea that they may do this thing themselves. To execute a criminal deserving of death is to act merely in their sovereign capacity, temporarily dispensing with their agents, the legal administrators of the law. While not always expressed in language so unmistakable in meaning, yet this is the spirit exhibited, the vague and perhaps unconscious attitude toward the law, which seems particularly to pervade the United States.

The tendency toward public disorder has existed in this country from its earliest settlement, and as the line of the frontier has slowly moved westward there has always been a region on the border where the forces of law were unorganized. There has thus been a constant opportunity for a plea of necessity in certain cases for resorting to the popular execution of justice. In recent years the customary explanations of lynchings attribute them to mob rule, emotional insanity of the crowd, race prejudice, contempt for the “niggers,” intense community feeling, vivid hatred of crime, _lex talionis_ and the like. It is often asserted that lynchings occur because the courts are slow, uncertain, and unduly sympathetic with the rights of the accused, because corrupt jurymen, shrewd lawyers, the technicalities of the law or the undue sympathies of the pardoning powers frequently prolong and save a guilty person’s life. While it is true on psychological grounds that punishment to be effective must be prompt and certain, and while such explanations have validity in particular cases, the fundamental explanation lies deeper. It is to be found in the peculiar and distinctively American attitude toward those institutions connoted by the term “the law.”[342] There is a readiness on the part of the people in the United States to take the law into their own hands which is not found in other countries, and the consequent immunity from punishment which is generally accorded to lynchers renders an American mob exceedingly open to the suggestion of lynching.

It is on such grounds that the existence of lynching as a peculiarly American institution is to be explained. Such are the conditions and such has been the conception of the law which has fostered a public sentiment in the United States excusing and apologizing for lynchings. The writer of a book published in London in 1837 was not far wrong when he wrote: “The Lynch law, is not, properly speaking, an opposition to the established laws of the country, or, is at least, not contemplated as such by its adherents; but rather as a supplement to them,—a species of _common_ law, which is as old as the country.”[343]

To the same effect is this “Scotch View of Lynch law” which was occasioned by the lynching of the Italians at New Orleans in 1891. After reviewing the facts and circumstances connected with that lynching, the following comments were made: “This is crude and it is primitive. It is to be deplored and condemned. But it is not without a foundation of reason and justice. The people have committed the administration of justice to a certain machinery; so long as that machinery works without flagrant injustice, it will be left to do the work; but when it utterly breaks down, or goes in the teeth of what is right according to the rough-and-ready ideas of the Americans, the people will resume the function of dealing out punishment direct. The ultimate sanction is brought in. That is the American method. The Briton, when he thinks the ordinary tribunals have failed, writes to the _Times_, or gets up a monster petition to the Home Secretary, or asks a question of the Houses of Parliament.”[344]

In certain sections of the United States this readiness on the part of the people to take the law into their own hands receives constant support and encouragement from the racial antipathy which exists between the whites and the negroes. It cannot be said that the lynching of negroes is due to “race prejudice” alone, but it is true that the antagonistic feeling between the two races aggravates the tendency to lynch, when offenses are committed against white persons by negroes. Other racial contrasts in the population have likewise promoted the adoption of extra-legal methods of punishment. From colonial times down to the present day the contemptuous attitude of the whites toward the Indians has undoubtedly been a potent factor in the not infrequent failure to observe due process of law in the treatment of Indians. In the summary treatment of Italians, Mexicans, Chinese, and other aliens, differences in racial characteristics have also played an important part. In very many cases of lynching a racial antipathy has acted as the most prominent contributory cause, and it is this fact that has induced many writers to find in “race prejudice” the ultimate explanation of lynching as an American institution.

The lynching of negroes is now so distinctively an American practice largely because of the racial contrast in the population which is peculiar to this country. Nowhere else in the temperate zone does a colored race of tropical origin come into contact in such numbers with a highly civilized race of European stock. The “native question” of tropical regions has here been transplanted, as it were, to the temperate zone.[345] Furthermore, the difficulties arising from ethnic contact within the tropics have been intensified rather than lessened by this change of environment. There are the same fundamental differences in racial characteristics and in racial heredity, but these become accentuated and seem even more adverse in a climate where the struggle for existence is of necessity much more vigorous and exacting. In addition, there has developed between the white race and the colored race in the United States an intolerant, inconsiderate spirit directly promoted by an unwise and short-sighted political policy. A great many years will doubtless be required for the effacement of the unfortunate results of past errors, involving as it does a very general understanding and recognition of the ethnic and “societal” factors which enter vitally into the “race question.” Only in so far as this comes about, however, will it be possible to establish a new order of society with an appropriate legal system in the place of that which formerly existed on the basis of the institution of slavery.

The assumption made by many writers that more negroes are lynched for the crime of rape against white women than for any other crime is without foundation in fact. Statistics show that not more than thirty-four per cent of the negroes summarily put to death during the last twenty-two years have been lynched for that crime, either alleged, attempted, or actually committed. Lynching for that crime, however, leads to lynching for other crimes and also furnishes a ground for an appeal to public sentiment to condone the practice of lynching.

Since the negroes were made free American citizens a large class of the younger generation has become utterly shiftless and worthless, many of them being vicious and dangerous individuals in a community. Professor DuBois, than whom there is probably no man better qualified to make a careful and conservative estimate, says that at least nine per cent of the county black population in the Black Belt are thoroughly lewd and vicious.[346] Lynching has been resorted to by the whites not merely to wreak vengeance, but to terrorize and restrain this lawless element in the negro population. Among the Southern people the conviction is general that terror is the only restraining influence that can be brought to bear upon vicious negroes. The negroes fear nothing so much as force, and should they once get the notion that there is a reasonable hope of escape from punishment, the whites in many parts of the South would be at their mercy.[347] There is no evidence, however, to show that the punishment of negroes by mob violence tends to decrease lawlessness among the negroes, or even tends to restrain the vicious element from committing offenses against the whites. On the contrary, lawlessness seems to beget lawlessness and the publicity given to revolting crimes by lynching the perpetrators of them seems really to incite others to commit similar crimes, or at least suggests to others like crimes when opportunity offers.

The frightful tortures and the burnings which have taken place in the last few years in connection with the lynching of negroes is partly to be accounted for by the fact that lynchings are now carried on by a lower class of whites than formerly.[348] The power of suggestion as an incentive to crime is also evident in this barbarous conduct of lynching mobs. The publicity given in the newspapers, particularly the sensational ones, to the details of such tragic scenes has undoubtedly been largely responsible for the frequency of their recurrence.[349] The relations between the younger generations of the two races are, besides, much less cordial and amicable than were those which existed between the generations immediately preceding; there is less of a mutual understanding. The relation of master and slave has been destroyed and no new relation has yet been firmly established in its place. In the process of adjustment to a new order of things there has been constant friction between the two races, and when an offense has been committed upon a white person by a negro, particularly if an assault has been made upon the person of a white woman or child, the exasperation of the whites has known scarcely any bounds.

While the decrease in the number of lynchings per year since the early nineties affords some hope for the future with reference to the suppression of lynchings, still the number of burnings and the number of cases in which the victims are subjected to extreme torture indicate that too much reliance cannot be placed upon any apparent decline in the tendency to lynch. The fact also that lynchings frequently occur in communities where such summary and illegal procedure had not previously been permitted forebodes more lynchings in the future. The seriousness of the situation with reference to the practice of lynching in the United States is not yet fully realized. There is no little ground for apprehension in the fact that it is becoming common for cries of “Lynch him,” “Hang him,” “Get a rope and string him up,” &c., to be heard, even on the streets of New York City, whenever a crowd gathers in response to a feeling of popular excitement and indignation over the perpetration of some atrocious crime.

In the course of this investigation into the history of lynching it has become evident that there is usually more or less public approval, or supposed favorable public sentiment, behind a lynching. Indeed, it is not too much to say that popular justification is the _sine qua non_ of lynching. It is this fact that distinguishes lynching, on the one hand, from assassination and murder, and, on the other hand, from insurrection and open warfare. A lynching may be defined as an illegal and summary execution at the hands of a mob, or a number of persons, who have in some degree the public opinion of the community behind them. When the term first came into use it meant the infliction of corporal punishment, particularly whipping. The term is now used exclusively to signify the infliction of the death penalty in a summary fashion, usually by hanging. But whatever the penalty imposed or the manner of its imposition, the sentiment frequently expressed in a community where a lynching has occurred is to the effect that the victim or victims got no more than was deserved.

It further appears from this investigation that no one cause or crime can be assigned for lynching. Lynchings take place for various causes. At one time there may be a lack of ordinary tribunals of justice, at another time there may be doubt as to the efficiency of the legal machinery. Lynchings may take place because the offense is outside the law but is deemed serious enough to merit severe punishment. They may occur because of the barbarity and fiendish nature of the crime committed. They may occur for one reason or for another; the only factor that is always present is a disorganized state of society or a condition of popular excitement and resentment when reliance on ordinary legal procedure is at a minimum.

Of the legal remedies for lynching which have been proposed, few have been enacted into laws, and where such measures have been placed upon the statute-books they have not as yet been so effectively administered as to inspire confidence in them as an ultimate means of suppressing the practice. The problem of finding a remedy for lynching is really a problem of increasing and maintaining a popular reliance on the formulation and the administration of the law. Every measure which will in any way promote such a reliance, either by invalidating the excuses offered in justification of the practice or by developing a strong public sentiment against it, deserves serious consideration, and every such measure, unless likely to be productive of other evils possibly greater, should be immediately adopted and put into operation.

The existence of the practice of lynching in the United States is a national disgrace and should be so considered by every citizen no matter in what part of the country his home may be. This, however, does not justify citizens of the Northern section in violently attacking citizens of the Southern section every time that a lynching occurs in that section, or _vice versa_. Each section and indeed each community must hold itself responsible for the prevention of lynchings. Neither European philanthropists nor the Northern press or pulpit can do very much toward preventing such occurrences in the South. It is a question with which the South alone can properly deal and it is a problem which the intelligent men of the South are best able to solve. The efforts of the Southern Education Board and the General Education Board to educate both the whites and the blacks and lift them to a higher plane of living will do much toward preventing lynchings. The work done by such schools as the Hampton Institute and the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute, and the principles advocated by such men as Booker T. Washington, also lead in the same direction.

It has been well suggested that the Northern papers and the Southern papers should exchange texts—the Northern press should preach against negro crime, the Southern press should preach against lawlessness and race prejudice. That this has been done in a few instances gives hope for the future.

To the extent that the colored race increases its industrial efficiency and becomes economically strong in the South will there be a decrease in negro lawlessness and viciousness, and likewise will it merit respect and confidence on the part of the white race. More than anything else the colored race needs wise and able leaders at the present time. The false notions and ideals of the Reconstruction Period have now been largely eradicated. The race is in a position to make substantial and material progress, if under able leadership, and such progress will tend to eliminate the conditions which foster lynching in the South.

If the United States had a monarchical form of government the most practicable means for the suppression of lynchings would consist merely in the publication of an edict by the monarch for the better enforcement of the law. Most lynching mobs could be easily dispersed were the officers of the law resolute and determined men intent upon protecting their prisoners and letting the law take its course; if they were responsible only to their superior officers and not more or less directly responsible to the people, and if they were not in sympathy with the mob to a greater or less degree. Our system of government, however, is in form representative and popular, and all our traditions are against a highly centralized form of government. In the United States it is therefore necessary to depend very largely upon public sentiment for a strict enforcement of the law. Lynch-law will not cease to exist in this country until there is a strong and uncompromising public sentiment against it in every community, a public sentiment which, with a full recognition of the ethnic and “societal” factors involved in the “race question,” and of the necessity for a legal system consistent with these factors instead of one based on abstract principles concerning the rights of all men, will invariably condemn lynchings because they are a crime against society, if for no other reason, and will under no circumstances countenance them because they may be the administration of deserved and well-merited punishments.

LIST OF PERIODICALS CITED

American Journal of Social Science. American Law Review. American Whig Review. Annals of the American Academy of Science. Annual Reports of the American Historical Association. Atlantic Monthly. Boston Chronicle. Boston Daily Advertiser. Boston Evening Post. Boston Evening Transcript. Boston Gazette. Boston News-Letter. British and Foreign Review. Brooklyn Standard Union. Chambers’ Journal. Chattanooga Times. Chicago Tribune. Congressional Record. Cyclopedic Review of Current History. Denver Republican. Essex Gazette. Fortnightly Review. Forum. Green Bag. Harper’s Magazine. Harvard Law Review. Houston Post. Howitt’s Journal. Independent. International Monthly. Johns Hopkins Historical Studies. Journal of Proceedings of American Social Science Association. Leisure Hour. Leslie’s Weekly. Liberator. Literary Digest. London Gazette. London Gazetteer. Massachusetts Spy. Modern Philology. Nation. New England Gazette. New England Magazine. New York Commercial Advertiser. New York Evening Post. New York Evening Sun. New York Evening Telegraph. New York Gazette. New York Times. New York Tribune. New York World. Niles’ Register. North American Review. Notes and Queries. Our Day. Outlook. Publications of the American Economic Association. Publications of the Southern Historical Association. Public Opinion. Raleigh News-Observer. Review of Reviews. Richmond Planet. Salem Gazette. Saturday Review. Southern Literary Messenger. Spectator. Washington Times. Yale Review.

Citations are made also to statutes, historical records, colonial archives, encyclopedias, dictionaries, etc. Full references are given in the foot-notes. For authors quoted see index.

INDEX

Abolitionism, 91, 107, 121.

Abolitionists, 105, 106, 113, 120, 122.

Act of indemnity, 29, 72, 73.

Agreement to take extra-legal measures, 49, 73, 83.

Alabama, burning alive, 108, 126;
lynch-law adopted, 151, 179, 183, 188;
responsibility of sheriffs, 244;
punishment of lynchers, 255, 263.

Alaska, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Aliens, lynching of, 171, 181.

Anti-slavery agitation, 198.

Arizona, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Arkansas, burning alive, 109, 126, 191;
lynch-law adopted, 179, 183, 188.

Arnold, S. G., 66.

Atkinson, Governor, 231.

Austria-Hungary, mob violence, 4.

Aycock, Governor, 256.

Bancroft, H. H., 132, 198.

Bassett, John S., 48, 211.

Beard, J. M., 139.

Birkbeck, Morris, 77.

Blanchard, Governor, 262.

Blane, W. N., 38, 78.

Boag, Rev. John, 10.

Bohemian lynched, 172, 181.

Boies, Henry M., 164.

Brackett, J. R., 212.

Brande, 5, 8.

Brewer, Justice, on right of appeal, 260–262.

Bristed, C. A., 16.

Brown, W. G., 140.

Brown, William Wells, 202.

Brown _v._ Orangeburg Co., 246 ff.

Bryce, James, 140.

Burning alive, 108, 109, 126, 127, 191, 274, 275;
as legal punishment, 212 ff.

Cabell, Julia Mayo, 23, 33, 75.

California, vigilance committee movement, 132 ff.;
lynch-law adopted, 151, 180, 184;
punishment of lynchers, 255.

Canada, practice of lynching does not exist, 3.

Carpet-baggers, 138.

Castration, form of punishment, 211.

Cattle thieves, 163 (see horse thieves).

Causes of lynchings, classification of, 166 ff.;
conclusion in regard to, 276.

Cazneau, Jane M., 197.

Channing, W. E., 194.

China, secret societies in, 4.

Chinese lynched, 172, 181.

Civil War, social disruption at close of, 137 ff.

Club law, 38.

Colonies, punishment of rape in, 208 ff.

Colorado, lynch-law adopted, 152, 163, 180, 184;
burning alive, 191.

Colored element in population, influence on lynching, 186 ff.

Commissioners _v._ Church, 248 ff.

Connecticut, tarring and feathering, 63;
perpetrators of outrage
fined, 115;
lynching of Charles Lockwood, 180, 181, 185.

Corporal punishment (see whipping, tar and feathers, riding on rail).

County liable for damages, 246 ff.

Cowper justice, 8.

Craig, John, 10.

Criminality among negroes, 274.

Crockett, David, 196.

Damages, suits for, 114, 115, 125.

Defensor, 105.

Delaware, burning alive, 180, 185, 191, 261.

Desjardins, Arthur, 24.

Desperadism, 166.

Desperadoes, 128 ff., 150.

Dewees, F. P., 150.

Douglass, Frederick, 223.

Doyle, A. Conan, 140.

Drake family of South Carolina, tradition in, 17 ff.

Draper, Lyman C., 26, 34, 73.

Drayton, John, 61, 69.

Drewry, W. S., 92 ff., 165.

DuBois, W. E. B., 274.

Durbin, Governor, 263.

England, practice of lynching does not exist, 3, 7, 9.

Emancipation proclamation, 137.

Fallows, Samuel, 10.

Farmer, John S., 10.

Faux, W., 38, 76.

Featherston, H. C., 15, 23, 30.

Featherstonhaugh, G. W., 36.

Federal anti-lynching law proposed, 257.

Fiske, John, 212.

Flogging (see whipping).

Florida, lynch-law adopted, 119, 179, 183, 188.

Ford, Paul Leicester, 60.

Foreign element in population, effect on lynching, 186 ff.

France, practice of lynching does not exist, 3.

Franchise given to negroes, effect of, 205 ff.

Frontier conditions, lynch-law under, 1, 78 ff., 129 ff., 150, 194 ff.

Gag law, 37.

Galway story, 13 ff.

Gamblers, lynch-law adopted against, 98, 99, 108.

Garner, J. W., 138.

Garrison, W. L., 91, 96.

Georgia, lynch-law adopted, 92, 168, 179, 183, 185;
burning alive, 191;
anti-lynching laws, 231 ff., 233;
punishment of lynchers, 256.

Germany, practice of lynching does not exist, 3.

Gregg, Alexander, 20, 51 ff.

Grose, 7.

Grund, F. J., 114, 271.

Guinea Coast, secret societies of, 4.

Hakluyt, 61.

Halifax law, 8.

Hall, Judge James, 39, 81.

Hanna, C. A., 42.

Hardiman, 15.

Hawkes, Arthur, 202.

Hening, 30, 32, 73, 76, 211.

Henry, William Wirt, 32.

Hershey, O. F., 270.

Heyward, Governor, 252.

Hittell, John S., 132.

Hoffman, F. L., 153.

Hogg, Governor, 230.

Holt, George C., 155, 265.

Hone, Philip, 117.

Horse thieves, 3, 122, 128, 134, 163.

Howe, Henry, 25, 26, 33.

Idaho, lynch-law adopted, 180,184.

Illinois, lynch-law adopted, 44, 45, 78, 180, 185, 188;
compact entered into by Regulators, 83;
mob violence, 110, 115;
burning alive, 191;
punishment of lynchers, 254.

Illiteracy, study of with reference to the distribution of lynchings,
186 ff.

Immigration, effect on practice of lynching, 186 ff.

Indemnities paid by United States, 259.

Indemnification of William Preston and others, 29;
William Campbell and others, 72;
Thomas Nelson, Jr., 73.

Indiana, lynch-law adopted, 38, 77, 152, 180, 185, 188;
anti-lynching laws, 241 ff.;
Maxwell _v._ Dudley, 250.

Indians lynched, 172. Cf. 41 ff., 44. 45.

Indian Territory, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Informers tarred and feathered, 62 ff.

Ingle, Edward, 75.

Ingraham, J. H., 101, 227.

Iowa, lynch-law adopted, 86 ff., 180, 184.

Italians lynched, 172, 181, 228.

Jacksonian period, 106 ff.

Jameson, R. G., 61.

Jamieson, John, 8.

Japanese lynched, 172, 181.

Jeddart justice, 8.

Jelks, Governor, 263.

Johnson, Joseph, 22, 56, 61.

Johnson, William, 26.

Judge Lynch, code of his honor, 82, 83, 102, 133.

Kansas, lynch-law adopted, 134, 152, 180, 184, 245;
burning alive, 191;
anti-lynching law, 245.

Keller, Albert G., 272.

Kemble, Fanny, 201.

Kentucky, lynch-law adopted, 38, 78, 88, 151, 179, 183, 188;
damages for slaves illegally executed, 125;
burning alive, 191, 264;
anti-lynching law, 238 ff.;
punishment of lynchers, 255, 264.

Ku-Klux Klan 6, 139 ff.

Lashing (see whipping).

Latrobe, C. J., 83.

Lawless, Judge, 109, 193.

LeBon, Gustave, 275.

Lee, Henry, 26.

Legal executions compared with lynchings, 163.

Legal remedies, efficacy of, 245, 251 ff, 277.

LeRoy, James A., 202.

Lester, J. C., 139.

Levell, W. H., 274.

Linch, 16.

Linch’s Law, 39, 81.

Lincoln, Abraham, on effects of mob law, 110 ff.

Linn, W. A., 103.

Lossing, Benson J., 24.

Louisiana, lynch-law adopted, 117, 151, 179, 183, 188;
slaves sentenced to death by planters, 126;
burning alive, 191, 228.

Lovejoy, Rev. E. P., 110, 115.

Loyal League, 146.

Lydford law, 7.

Lyell, Sir Charles, 119.

Lynch, dictionary definitions of, 9 ff.;
etymology of, 16 ff.;
use of word, 116.

Lynch, Charles, 11, 23 ff.

Lynch, John, 23, 35, 75.

Lynch, James Fitzstephen, 13.

Lynch, William, 73, 75.

Lynchers, punishment of, 114 ff., 152, 254 ff., 265.

Lynch’s Creek, South Carolina, 19 ff.

Lynch Creek, North Carolina, 17.

Lynching, practice peculiar to United States, 1 ff., 267 ff.;
social conditions affecting, 2, 5, 277;
similar to regulating, 46;
definition of, 11, 135, 136, 186, 241, 276;
manner of death by, 151, 152, 191;
how justified in South, 224–226, 272, 273.

Lynchings, reports of in newspapers, 159;
distribution of by States, 182;
distribution of by counties, 189.

Lynch-law, meaning of term, 9 ff., 40, 136;
frontier type, 82 ff., 85 ff., 89, 90, 129 ff., 150, 194 ff.;
type found in well settled communities, 2, 112 ff.

Lynch’s law, earliest use of expression, 36;
original signification of term, 39, 40;
used for first time in Liberator, 97;
used for first time in Niles’ Register, 98.

Malay lynched, 152.

Marryat, F., 114, 194 ff.

Martin, Colonel William, 34.

Martin, F. X., 20, 48.

Martineau, Harriet, 104, 114.

Maryland, lynch-law adopted, 152, 179, 183, 188.

Massachusetts, lynch-law adopted, 102, 103;
tarring and feathering, 61 ff., 64, 65, 67 ff.

Matthews, Albert, 19, 21, 32, 36, 59.

Maxwell _v._ Dudley, 250.

Mayo-Smith, Richmond, 170.

McConnel, J. L., 84, 85.

McCord, D. J., 213, 219, 221.

McCrady, Edward, 20, 61, 69.

Mexicans lynched, 172, 181.

Michigan, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 185;
anti-lynching law, 244.

Mississippi, lynch-law adopted, 99 ff., 117, 120, 168, 179, 183, 188;
suits for damages, 115;
burning alive, 191;
punishment of lynchers, 254.

Missouri, lynch-law adopted, 98, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 151, 179,
183, 188;
burning alive, 108, 109, 126;
punishment of lynchers, 255.

Mob law, 37.

Mobocracy, 101.

Mobs, 20, 69, 97, 101;
definition, 241.

Mob violence, 66, 68, 91, 103 ff., 110, 115, 259;
damages for, 66.

Molly Maguires, 150.

Montana, lynch-law adopted, 151, 163, 180, 184.

Montgomery, Cora, 197.

Moore, Frank, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71.

Moore, Nina, 64.

Mormons, 103.

Murray, C. A., 36, 198.

Murrell conspiracy, 100.

Nebraska, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 184.

Negroes, lynching of, previous to Civil War, 124, 126 ff.;
in recent years, 151, 152, 170 ff., 181;
how justified, 223 ff.

Nevada, lynch-law adopted, 151, 180, 184.

New Hampshire, lynch-law adopted, 44.

New Jersey, tarring and feathering, 70, 180, 185.

New Mexico, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

New York, tarring and feathering, 63, 70;
lynch-law adopted, 180, 185.

New Zealand, tarring and feathering, 61.

Noble, J., 212.

North Carolina, Regulators, 20 ff., 48;
lynch-law adopted, 91, 120, 179, 183, 188, 264;
burning alive, 191;
anti-lynching law, 232;
punishment of lynchers, 256, 257.

North Dakota, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Nuttall, 10.

O’Ferall, Governor, 229, 231, 262.

Ohio, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 185, 188, 248;
anti-lynching laws, 235 ff.;
Commissioners _v._ Church, 248 ff.

Olmsted, F. L., 128.

O’Neall, J. B., 20, 21, 53, 55.

Oregon, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Page, Thomas Nelson, 140, 207, 224.

Page, Thomas Walker, 23 ff.

Page, Walter H., 223.

Pell, Edward Leigh, 159, 231.

Pennsylvania, Rangers at Paxtang, 41;
tarring and feathering, 64;
lynch-law adopted, 22, 97, 98, 180, 185.

Perfectionists, 103.

Phillips, Edward, 7.

Popular tribunals, 133.

Public sentiment as remedy, 265 ff., 279.

Race prejudice, 168, 198 ff., 272.

Ramsay, David, 55.

Rangers, 41, 45, 82.

Rape, 126, 127, 166, 169, 170, 177, 207 ff., 213 ff., 273.

Ratzel, F., 4, 201.

Reconstruction period characterized, 153.

Regulate, earliest use in connection with extra-legal punishment, 48.

Regulating, 20, 38, 39, 46, 48, 51, 59, 80.

Regulators, 6, 20 ff., 33, 38, 42, 48 ff., 79 ff., 88, 121, 130, 143.

Remedies tried, 245, 251 ff.

Revolutionary War, social conditions during, 60.

Rhode Island, tarring and feathering, 63;
mob violence, 66.

Riding on rail, 92, 103, 113, 120 (see whipping, tar and feathers).

Riots, 38, 69, 91, 97.

Roads, Jr., S., 69.

Roberts, William, 3.

Royce, Josiah, 132.

Russia, lynch-law procedure, 3.

San Francisco vigilance committees, 132.

Schaper, Wm. A., 21.

Schenck, David, 36.

Schofilites, 22, 56.

Scotland, summary procedure, 7, 9.

Scotch-Irish blamed for introduction of lynch-law, 42, 43.

Sewall, Samuel, 201.

Shaler, N. S., 270.

Shepherd, Samuel, 211.

Sidis, Boris, 275.

Simms, W. G., 26.

Slick, use of word, 98, 120.

Sloane, W. M., 71.

Smith, W. H., 45.

Sons of Liberty, 59, 154.

South Carolina, Regulators, 19, 21, 51 ff.;
tarring and feathering, 69, 71;
lynch-law adopted, 151, 168, 179, 183, 188;
provision for trial of slaves, 218 ff.;
anti-lynching law, 233 ff.;
Brown _v._ Orangeburg Co., 246 ff.

South Dakota, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Squire Birch, 33, 81.

Stamp Act, 59.

Stearns, Charles, 139.

Stedman, C., 26.

Stone, Alfred Holt, 191.

Summers, L. P., 36.

Sumner, W. G., 60, 107.

Swiss lynched, 172, 181.

Tar and feathers, 60 ff., 92, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 120.

Tarleton, Banastre, 26.

Tea merchants, subjects for tar and feathers, 66.

Tennessee, lynch-law adopted, 35, 114, 115, 119, 151, 179, 183, 188;
Ku-Klux Klan, 139, 145, 148;
anti-lynching law, 237;
punishment of lynchers, 255, 256.

Texas, lynch-law adopted, 118, 121, 122, 128, 179, 183, 188;
burning alive, 191, 228;
anti-lynching law, 240, 241;
punishment of lynchers, 255.

Tillinghast, J. A., 200.

Tories, 24 ff., 60, 72.

Turner, Nat., 92 ff.

Union League, 146.

Upton, George P., 160.

Utah, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Vardaman, Governor, 263.

Vehmic courts, 5 ff.

Verdicts of coroner’s juries, 263.

Vicksburg gamblers, 99, 108, 194.

Vigilance organizations, 6, 122, 125, 128, 130 ff.

Virginia, lynch-law adopted, 23 ff., 32, 39, 76, 92, 119, 151, 179,
183, 188;
acts to indemnify, 29, 72, 73;
tarring and feathering, 71;
agreement of 1780, 73;
slave insurrection led by Nat Turner, 92 ff.

Washington, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

Washington, Booker T., 278.

Wells, Ida B., 229.

West Virginia, lynch-law adopted, 102, 179, 183, 188;
joint resolution condemning lynching, 244.

Westcott, 7.

Wheeler, John H., 17 ff., 50.

Whipping, 27, 28, 32, 35, 47, 76, 77, 92, 98, 99, 102, 113, 114, 115,
116, 120, 217–218.

White Caps, 154, 168.

Willcox, Walter F., 207.

Williams, George W., 199, 203.

Williamson, Hugh, 20, 48, 50.

Wilson, D. L., 139.

Wilson, Woodrow, 107.

Wirt, William, 26, 32, 71.

Wisconsin, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 185.

Wister, Owen, 197.

Women, lynching of, 172, 173.

Wright, Carroll D., 268.

Wyoming, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184;
punishment of lynchers, 255.

-----

Footnote 1:

Compare statement by William Roberts in _Fortnightly Review_, January,
1892 (57: 92).

Footnote 2:

The _Times_, Washington, D. C., Dec. 14, 1902.

Footnote 3:

The _Standard Union_, Brooklyn, N. Y., Nov. 14, 1902.

Footnote 4:

The _New York Evening Telegraph_, Oct. 8, 1902.

Footnote 5:

See F. Ratzel: “History of Mankind” (trans. by A. J. Butler), I, 125,
281, 282; II, 131; III, 507.

Footnote 6:

See “Fehmic courts,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th edition.

Footnote 7:

Edward Phillips: “The New World of Words, or a General English
Dictionary” (1678, 4th edition).

Footnote 8:

Grose’s “Provincial Glossary” (London, 1811), p. 163.

Footnote 9:

See “Lynch Law,” International Cyclopædia (1893).

Footnote 10:

See Century Dictionary under “Law.”

Footnote 11:

John Jamieson: “Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language”
(1879).

Footnote 12:

An American edition, bound under the title, “Brande’s Encyclopædia,”
was published in 1843.

Footnote 13:

The English Dictionary, edited by Rev. John Boag and published at
Glasgow in 1848, gives for the verb lynch, “To inflict punishment
without the forms of law, as by a mob.” The definitions given for the
words “lynched” and “lynching” are also very similar to the ones given
by Webster. It is fair to presume that Boag consulted Webster and
followed his authority, although he did not mark the term as an
American word. John Craig’s Dictionary of the English Language
(London, 1849) gives “lynch, _v. a._ To punish summarily without
judicial investigation, as by a mob.—An American word.” The London
edition of Nuttall’s Dictionary (published about 1863) gives “Lynch,
_v. a._ To inflict pain, or punish without the forms of law, as by an
American mob.” The dictionaries published in Great Britain previous to
1848 do not contain the verb lynch.

Footnote 14:

The edition of 1901 has the same. The Century Dictionary is the only
recent authoritative work that states unequivocally that lynch-law was
originally the kind of law administered by Charles Lynch of Virginia.

Footnote 15:

See Hardiman’s History of Galway (Dublin, 1820), p. 70. Also,
_Spectator_ (London), April 13, 1889 (62: 511). The story can be
traced back as far as the year 1674. See Miscellany of the Irish
Archæological Society (1846), I, 44–80. (M.)

Footnote 16:

The _Green Bag_, March, 1900 (12: 150).

Footnote 17:

See “lynch law,” The American Cyclopædia (edition of 1875). See also,
Notes & Queries, 2d Series, Oct. 23, 1858 (6: 338), where reference is
made to _London Gazette_, 6–9 February, 1687–8, No. 2319.

Footnote 18:

That he succeeded in making himself thoroughly unpopular with every
one is shown in the Calendars of State Papers, Colonial Series,
America & West Indies, 1685–1688, and 1688–1692. (M.)

Footnote 19:

See “lynch law,” Encyclopædia Britannica (9th edition); also, under
“to lynch,” Bartlett’s Dictionary of Americanisms (4th edition, 1877).

C. A. Bristed, in an essay on The English Language in America
(Cambridge Essays, 1855, p. 60) says: “_Linch_, in several of the
northern-county dialects, means to beat, or maltreat. Lynch Law, then,
would be simply equivalent to _club-law_; and the change of a letter
may be easily accounted for by the fact that the name of Lynch is as
common in some parts of America as in Ireland.”

Footnote 20:

No such verb as _linch_ or _linge_ is found in Bosworth’s Dictionary
of the Anglo-Saxon Language, or in Stratmann’s Middle-English
Dictionary. Murray’s Oxford Dictionary (1903) gives the verb _linch_
as a variant of _linge_, a word “of obscure origin.”

Footnote 21:

See “lynch,” Skeat’s Etymological Dictionary.

Footnote 22:

Although Bristed ingeniously traces lynch-law back to the verb
_linch_, he remarks, in passing, that “if there ever was a phrase
deemed particularly Trans-atlantic in origin, it is that of Lynch Law
for summary and informal justice.”

Footnote 23:

See p. 10, note 1.

Footnote 24:

“Reminiscences and Memoirs of North Carolina” (1884), p. 172.

Footnote 25:

“History of North Carolina” (1851), p. 274.

Footnote 26:

See article by Albert Matthews in the _Nation_, Dec. 4, 1902 (75:
439).

Footnote 27:

Alexander Gregg: “History of the Old Cheraws” (1867), p. 120. F. X.
Martin: “History of North Carolina” (1829), II, 228, 233. Hugh
Williamson: “History of North Carolina” (1812), II, 128, 131.

Footnote 28:

J. B. O’Neall: “Annals of Newberry” (1859), p. 76. It is not stated by
O’Neall at what time these gentlemen instituted this practice in South
Carolina. From the evidence that Gregg gives, it apparently took place
in the summer of 1767. See the following chapter, p. 53.

Footnote 29:

See article by Edward McCrady, in the _Nation_, Jan. 15, 1903 (76:
52). This article as originally written was published in full in the
_Sunday News_, Charleston, S. C., Jan. 11, 1903. In a letter published
in the _Nation_, March 19, 1903 (76: 225), Mr. George S. Wills cites
an example of the use of the word lynch in connection with this creek,
which is found in a journal kept by the Rev. William H. Wills, a
Methodist minister of North Carolina, who traveled in his sulky from
Tarboro, North Carolina, to Alabama, in the early summer of 1837.
After describing a narrow escape from drowning in an attempt to cross
Lynch’s Creek while it was swollen, the Rev. Mr. Wills writes in his
journal: “Probably I shall never forget Lynches Creek; for it had well
nigh Lynch^d me.”—See “Publications of the Southern Historical
Association,” November, 1902 (6:479). This example, however, shows no
original connection between the term lynch-law and Lynch’s Creek,
South Carolina. As will appear in the following pages, by the year
1837 the word lynch had come to be widely used to indicate summary
punishment. Evidently the writer in this case merely noticed the
similarity between the name of the creek and the word which had
recently come into use, and so made this play upon words, using the
word lynch in a somewhat figurative sense.

Footnote 30:

See article by Albert Matthews in the _Nation_, Jan. 29, 1903 (76:
91). In a monograph by William A. Schaper, on “Sectionalism and
Representation in South Carolina,” the statement is made, in reference
to the Regulators of 1768, that “the settlers agreed to rely on lynch
law, which received its name at this time.”—Annual Report of the
American Historical Association (1900), I, 337. The author of this
statement that lynch-law received its name at this time was, however,
unable to cite facts to support it. (M.)

Footnote 31:

“History of the Old Cheraws” (1867), p. 128.

Footnote 32:

J. B. O’Neall: “Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South
Carolina” (1859), I, p. x.

Footnote 33:

“Traditions and Reminiscences,” pp. 44–45.

Footnote 34:

Ibid., p. 544.

Footnote 35:

Vol. 48, p. 402.

Footnote 36:

One such story will be found in the following chapter on p. 73. For an
account of the Lynch family in Virginia, see Mrs. Julia Mayo Cabell:
“Sketches and Recollections of Lynchburg” (1858), pp. 9–23. The chief
available sources of information for the facts and events pertaining
to the life of Charles Lynch are an article by Thomas Walker Page in
the _Atlantic Monthly_, December, 1901 (88: 731), and one by Howell
Colton Featherston in the _Green Bag_, March, 1900 (12: 150). Both of
these articles have been largely drawn upon in the following pages.

Footnote 37:

A writer (“Claverhouse”) in the _New York Evening Post_ for June 2,
1864, says: “In America, the term ‘Lynch law’ was first used in
Piedmont, on the western frontier of Virginia. There was no court
within the district, and all controversies were referred to the
arbitrament of prominent citizens. Among these was a man by the name
of Lynch, whose decisions were so impartial that he was known as Judge
Lynch, and the system was called ‘Lynch law,’ and adopted in our
pioneer settlements as an inexpensive and speedy method of obtaining
justice.”

Footnote 38:

Edited by Benson J. Lossing, published in 1882.

Footnote 39:

See article by Arthur Desjardins, _Revue des Deux Mondes_, May, 1891.

Footnote 40:

Charles Lynch was born in 1736, at Chestnut Hill, his father’s estate,
upon a part of which the city of Lynchburg now stands. His father was
a “redemptioner” who came to Virginia from Ireland about 1725. The
young adventurer subsequently married the daughter of the planter to
whom the captain of the ship that brought him over had sold him, took
up a large tract of land lying between the James and the Staunton
rivers, and became a tobacco planter on a large scale. At his death
the home on the James fell to his eldest son, John, and Charles took
the part of the family lands that lay nearer the frontier. The mother,
Sarah Lynch, then a widow, had joined the sect of the Quakers at the
Cedar Creek meeting on April 16, 1750, and it is in the records of
this congregation of Quakers that the following item appears: “14 of
Dec., 1754. Charles Lynch and Anne Terrill published for the first
Time their Intentions of Marriage.” The young couple established their
home on the Staunton, in what is now the southwestern part of Campbell
County.

For years Charles followed his mother’s teachings and was an active
member of the Society of Friends; for some time he was “Clerk of the
monthly meetings.” Later, however, the exigencies of the times caused
him to forego some of his scruples and accept public office. In 1767
he became “unsatisfactory” to the peace-loving Quakers and he was
“disowned for taking solemn oaths, contrary to the order and
discipline of Friends.” It was in this year, 1767, that he was elected
to the Virginia House of Burgesses, where he held a seat till the
colony became an independent State. He was prominent in the earliest
organization of Bedford County, formed from Lunenburg County in 1753
(Henry Howe: “Historical Collections of Virginia” (1845), p. 188;
Hening’s Statutes at Large, VI, 381), and was a member of the Virginia
convention of 1776, which, by sending instructions to the delegates
from Virginia in the Continental Congress, exercised a decisive
influence on the movement for independence. He had been made a justice
of the peace under a commission from Governor Dunmore in 1774, and
when the county court was reorganized, according to the ordinance of
the Convention, passed on the 3d of July, 1776, he retained the
position.

At the beginning of the Revolutionary War his Quaker principles seemed
still to influence his actions to an extent sufficient to keep him out
of active military service. His loyalty was well known, however. Mr.
Page says: “He did not enlist in the army, partly because of his
Quaker principles, but chiefly because his presence was imperatively
necessary at home. He had to rouse the spirit of his constituents to
support the action he had advocated in the convention. He had to raise
and equip troops for the army. He had, as it were, to mobilize the
forces of his country, and attend to all the duties of a commissary
department. In addition, he had to make some provision in the event of
an attack from hostile Indians.” In 1778 the court of Bedford
recommended him to the Governor for the office of Colonel of Militia
in that county. He accepted the commission and organized a regiment,
but the call to the front did not come till two years later when the
war was shifted to the south and Lord Cornwallis was sent to
co-operate with General Philips and Benedict Arnold in the invasion of
Virginia.

The records of the court of Bedford County, the minutes of various
Quaker meetings, the journals of the Virginia House of Burgesses and
of the first Constitutional Convention, taken together with family
documents and traditions, show Charles Lynch to have been a thoroughly
capable and highly respected man, a leader among the men in his
community. Before the close of the war he made a record for himself as
an officer in the army. At the battle of Guilford Court House, March
15, 1781, a battalion of riflemen under his command behaved with much
gallantry and aided in bringing considerable credit to the Virginia
militia. [Henry Howe: “Historical Collections of Virginia” (1845), p.
212. W. G. Simms: “Life of Nathanael Greene” (1859), p. 186. Henry
Lee: “Memoirs of the War” (1812), I, 341, 345. William Johnson:
“Sketches of Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene” (1822), II,
3. Banastre Tarleton: “History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781”
(1787), p. 272. C. Stedman: “History of the American War” (1794), II,
338.]

He lived for a number of years after peace had been declared with
England, and voted for the new constitution. In the family
burying-ground on his homestead plantation a tombstone bears the
simple inscription:

“In memory of Colonel Charles Lynch, a zealous and active patriot.
Died, October 29, 1796; aged 60 years.”

Many anecdotes are still in circulation among the old inhabitants of
his neighborhood illustrative of his habits and character. The chorus
of a once popular patriotic song runs as follows:

“Hurrah for Colonel Lynch,
Captain Bob and Callaway!
They never turned a Tory loose
Until he shouted ‘Liberty’!”

Another version of this refrain runs this way:

“Hurrah for Captain Bob,
Colonels Lynch and Callaway!
Who never let a Tory off
Until he cried out ‘Liberty!’”

Footnote 41:

Mr. Page makes no mention of any trouble with desperadoes. Referring
to the Tories in Bedford County, he says: “Numerous records of the
county courts, taken together with other sources of information, show
that here, as in many other western counties, there was a strong and
influential party opposed to the struggle for independence. For the
most part they were quiet, thrifty men, far different from the
ruffians and desperadoes that prejudice has since represented them to
be.” That there were cliques of depredators and that much lawlessness
prevailed in Virginia and the Carolinas at about this time is
undoubtedly true, however. William Wirt, in his “Sketches of the Life
and Character of Patrick Henry” (p. 217), cites the case of Josiah
Philips who, at the head of a band of banditti, spread terror in the
counties of Norfolk and Princess Anne, and was made an outlaw by an
act of the legislature of Virginia, by which act it became lawful for
any person to kill him whenever opportunity offered. Lyman C. Draper
presents the record of a great deal of lawlessness and depredation in
his “King’s Mountain and its Heroes.” See pp. 241, 331, 332, 336, 340
note, 343 note, 384, 448–449.

Footnote 42:

It is to be understood that these statements are based on tradition
and not on contemporary evidence.

Footnote 43:

Mr. Page remarks that the fine was not so heavy as it seems, for in
that year the prices fixed by the court were: rum and brandy per
gallon, £40, corn and oats per gallon, £2 8s., dinner at an
“ordinary,” £4 10s., &c.

Footnote 44:

Hening’s Statutes at Large, XI, 134–135.

Footnote 45:

Quoted from the article by Mr. Page. No evidence is cited in support
of the statement that the proceedings in Bedford were imitated in
other parts of the State and came to be known by the name of Lynch’s
Law.

Footnote 46:

See article by Mr. Featherston. A drawing of this tree “from a sketch
from nature” may be found in the _Green Bag_, December, 1892 (4: 561).

Footnote 47:

Mr. Featherston states that Charles Lynch was often called “Judge
Lynch” by his neighbors. He seems to have been more commonly known as
“Colonel Lynch.”

Footnote 48:

“The infliction of capital punishment was extremely rare. There were
only three instances of it, and these for most heinous offenses,
between the organization of the county (Bedford) and the Revolution.
The first case was on May 24, 1756, when the court assembled ‘to hear
and determine all Treasons, Petit Treasons, Murders, and other
Offenses committed or done by Hampton and Sambo belonging to John
Payne of Goochland, Gent.’ ‘The said Hampton and Sambo were set to the
Bar under Custody of Charles Talbot (then sheriff) to whose Custody
they were before committed on Suspicion of their being Guilty of the
felonious Prepairing and Administering Poysonous Medicines to Ann
Payne, and being Arraigned of the Premises pleaded Not Guilty and for
their Trial put themselves upon the Court. Whereupon divers Witnesses
were charged and they heared in their Defence. On Consideration
thereof it is the Opinion of the Court that the said Hampton is guilty
in the Manner and Form as in the Indictment. Therefore it is
considered that the said Hampton be hanged by the Neck till he be
dead, and that he be afterwards cut in Quarters, and his Quarters hung
up at the Cross Roads. And it is the Opinion of the Court that the
said Sambo is guilty of a Misdemeanor. Therefore it is considered that
the said Sambo be burnt in the Hand, and that he also receive
thirty-one Lashes on his bare Back at the Whipping Post. Memo: That
the said Hampton is adjudged at forty-five Pound which is ordered to
be certified to the Assembly (that his owner may be remunerated
according to law).’ That it was a convincing proof of his guilt, and
not race prejudice, that led the court to impose this savage
punishment is evident from the fact that in the same year a negro was
tried for murder, another for poisoning, and a third for arson, and
all were cleared.”—Quoted from the article by Mr. Page.

Footnote 49:

This evidence has been presented by the present writer in a
communication to the _Nation_. See issue of May 21, 1903 (76: 415).

Footnote 50:

William Wirt: “Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry”
(1818), p. 372. Mr. Matthews, in his article in the _Nation_, Dec. 4,
1902 (75: 439), remarks that it is uncertain whether the note was
written by Roane or Wirt. In William Wirt Henry’s “Life of Patrick
Henry,” Vol. II, p. 482, the “MS. Letter of Judge Roane to Mr. Wirt”
is given, but the note is not included. The note was undoubtedly
written by Wirt.

Footnote 51:

An act for dividing the county of Bedford into two distinct counties,
the new county to be known by the name of Campbell, was passed by the
General Assembly in 1782.—Hening’s Statutes at Large, X, 447; Journal
of the House of Delegates, Jan. 5, 1782, p. 73. Howe says that
Campbell County was formed from Bedford in 1784, and named in honor of
General William Campbell, a distinguished officer of the American
Revolution.—“Historical Collections of Virginia.” p. 210.

Footnote 52:

Published at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1845. See p. 212 for the
quotation. See Mrs. Julia Mayo Cabell: “Sketches and Recollections of
Lynchburg” (1858), pp. 9–10, for a similar account of the connection
of Colonel Charles Lynch with the origin of “the celebrated code
called ‘Lynch Law.’” This account is taken from the _St. Louis
Republican_, but neither the author’s name nor the date of its
publication is given.

Footnote 53:

Henry Howe: “The Great West” (Cincinnati, 1852), p. 183.

Footnote 54:

The writer is indebted to Mr. Matthews for the suggestion that Howe’s
allusion to “Squire Birch” points to Judge James Hall’s “Letters from
the West” as one such source. See Chapter III. p. 81.

Footnote 55: