Chapter XXII: Baron Eichi Shibusawa 315 (10)

Things outside were completely shut off from their view. Along with this perplexity the advocates of the virtual authority of the Throne assailed the Shogunate. Baron Ii Naosuke was the person who had to face these great problems. Confident in the wisdom of his policy, he bravely opposed public opinion, and was hated even by his relations. The result was that he had to sacrifice his life for his perseverance in the policy that he followed. Yet this sad event not only saved our country from the misfortune that befell our neighbour, China, but opened the pathway of civilisation in our own land. The merit of this is attributable to no one but Baron Ii Naosuke.” This powerful championship of a nobleman to whom Japan owes much—further reference to the part which he took in connection with the foreign treaties and the manner of his death will be found in this volume in the chapter devoted to Prince Tokugawa Keiki—does justice to the memory of one whose fate it was to be much maligned during life, and also to Marshal Yamagata’s goodness of heart, and there must have been many of the former adherents of the _Tairo_ who read this eulogy of their murdered chieftain with genuine satisfaction.

It was on Yamagata’s return from France in 1871 that the reform and expansion of the military system were definitely taken in hand, the barons of Satsuma, Choshiu, and Tosa presenting their provincial armies to the Emperor, and it was then that four military centres were formed for the troops that likewise were drafted into the imperial service from the military establishments of the other feudal lords. In 1872 conscription became the law of the land. Six divisions of the army were formed, and regular drill and instruction were provided for. Several French officers were engaged to give tuition in military subjects. Yamagata himself occupied the post of Minister of War, and to the army he appointed as Commander-in-chief General Saigo Takamori. General Yamada ranked next, and other appointments to high command were those of Kirino, the close friend of Saigo in the events of 1877, General Tani, who in that year defended Kumamoto, and Generals Toriwo, Miura, Nodzu, Asa, Miyoshi, Nishi, Osawa, etc.: all capable men who in after years greatly distinguished themselves, some having taken part prominently in the war, now happily at an end, with Russia.

The first regulations promulgated remain in most of their essential features but little changed, notwithstanding the lapse of thirty-five years, and this is testimony in itself to the soundness of the system for which Marquis Yamagata was mainly responsible. All Japanese subjects on reaching the age of twenty were to be liable for three years’ active service in the army or the navy. The officers of the lower grades were to be chosen by the officers of the corps. Commissions were to be granted only after a course of instruction and rigid examination. After their three years’ term conscripts were to form a first reserve, assembling once a year for drill. On the expiration of two years in the first reserve they were to be placed in a second reserve, only liable to be called out in case of a levy _en masse_. The militia was to be formed of all males between the ages of seventeen and forty, who had been otherwise exempted from service, and these were to be formed into troops for district protection whenever a general levy might take place. The term in the first reserve has been extended far beyond that originally contemplated, but in practice the service in the first and second reserves is merely nominal, and in the militia or national army likewise, as the men are only called out once a year for manœuvres, save in case of war or emergency. The six provincial divisions, inclusive of the Imperial Guards, who were maintained at the capital, were stationed in the first place as under:—

Headquarters Brigade Headquarters Regiment Quarters

Provincial
Division I. Tokio I. Tokio I. Tokio
XV. Takasaki
II. Sakura II. Sakura
III. Tokio
Do. II. Sendai III. Sendai IV. Sendai
XVI. Shibata
IV. Aomori V. Aomori
XVII. Sendai
Do. III. Nagoya V. Nagoya VI. Nagoya
XVIII. Toyohashi
VI. Kanazawa VII. Kanazawa
XIX. Nagoya
Do. IV. Osaka VII. Osaka VIII. Osaka
IX. Otsu
VIII. Himeji X. Himeji
XX. Osaka
Do. V. Hiroshima IX. Hiroshima XI. Hiroshima
XXI. Hiroshima
X. Matsuyama XXII. Matsuyama
XII. Marugame
Do. VI. Kumamoto XI. Kumamoto XIII. Kumamoto
XXIII. Kumamoto
XII. Kokura XIV. Kokura
XXIV. Fukuoka

In addition to the six divisions detailed under the earlier scheme of military organisation—viz. those having their headquarters at Tokio, Sendai, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto—divisions were subsequently established at Asahigawa in the island of Yeso, at Hirosaki in Northern Hondo, at Kanasawa on the west coast, at Himeji, near Kobé, close to the Inland Sea, at Kokura, facing Shimonoseki across the Straits, and at Marugame in the island of Shikoku.

All the divisional headquarters are now served by public or State railways, and practically the same may be said of the various Brigade headquarters, numbering twelve more.

The establishment comprised 36 regiments including artillery, 22 battalions, 20 companies, 12 corps (inclusive of colonial troops in Yeso, and the gendarmerie), 228 General and Field officers, 2267 officers, 484 cadets, 5835 sub-officers, and 54,555 rank and file. Total 63,369.

These were the figures of the standing army at the end of 1893, and at that time the nominal strength of the reserve rank and file was 193,949 of all arms, made up of 107,222 infantry, 1923 cavalry, 10,182 artillery, 4373 engineers, 2035 commissariat, and 68,214 miscellaneous, including transport-soldiers, firemen, ambulance attendants, etc.: all these passing into the “landsturm” or national army on the expiration of their 12 years with the colours or in the reserves.

By the ordinance of July 1894, a divisional regiment consists of 3 battalions or 12 companies, each company comprising 136 officers and men. A Bodyguard regiment has only 8 companies. The cavalry battalion is of 3 companies, each of 159 officers and men. A Field artillery regiment includes 693 officers and men in a division, or 465 if of the Bodyguard.

In time past only the “Samurai” of Japan were entitled to bear arms, and as the sum-total of these “Samurai” families was comparatively small, it was evidently impossible in 1871 to create a large army of this class alone. Thus it became needful as a first step to throw open the ranks of Japan’s new military organisation to “heimin” as well as to the “ancient warrior caste,” if what was in reality the knighthood of the realm may properly be so designated. The “heimin” were complimented by such a direct recognition of their ability to wield weapons of war, and flocked to the standards; the nucleus of a huge fighting machine was speedily formed, and the necessary steps were taken to provide tuition for its officers and competent instruction for the rank and file. At first the intention was to take France as the model, as it had already been determined to copy Britain in all matters naval. But France having come somewhat badly out of the war of 1870 it was in the end decided to base the system chiefly on that of Germany. The Household Troops were at first an exception to this rule and held more or less for a time to the French system.

Yamagata’s ambition did not extend very far at first, for the army was to consist of only 20,000 men, all told. But it was intended that these should be well drilled, with additions to their ranks later on, and in gaining proficiency in military exercises they served to leaven the whole mass of the male population, and imbue it with a notion of the high standard of efficiency which defenders of the realm were expected to attain. Not until after the war with China, however, which will be referred to in detail in its proper place, was the Japanese army really formidable in point of numbers. But under the plan for which Marshal Yamagata was directly responsible, there grew up an enormous reserve, far in excess of anything for which the rest of the world was prepared to give Japan credit. Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that even down to the end of 1904 the tremendous strength which Japan is able to put forth had not, save in a very limited circle, been in the faintest degree appreciated, and least of all, perhaps, in Russia.

At the time of the outbreak of war in the island of Kiushiu in 1877 General Yamagata was at headquarters in Tokio, and it may well be comprehended that there was some anxiety in his mind concerning the behaviour of the new army when confronted by the redoubtable swordsmen of the great southern clan. The heimin of whom the imperial army was largely composed were comparatively unaccustomed to the use of weapons of warfare, and it remained to be seen how they would comport themselves in the face of a peculiarly strong and agile foe. The Satsuma onslaught was famed for its irresistible vigour and determination. It was at least open to question if the men who had only recently begun to handle the bayonet would with it be a match for swordsmen whose tactics were to come to close quarters on every occasion and to some extent despised musketry as an art unworthy of their knightly training. But the outcome of the struggle justified the sanguine anticipations which the military authorities at Tokio had formed regarding the value of the new force, and increased confidence was felt in its future development. It was not the first trial that it had undergone in actual warfare, for some regiments had been through a rather severe campaign,—not in respect of the fighting that they had to do, but in regard to the climate and the character of the country—in the island of Formosa three years before the contest with Satsuma occurred, yet the civil war in Kiushiu was a test of a far more rigorous nature, and one on which the fate of the Government’s scheme of reform in no small degree depended. Suffice it to say that the confidence Yamagata had placed in his military system was amply warranted by events, and as references are to be found elsewhere to the incidents of the campaign it would be superfluous to enter into detail concerning them here.

By 1883 the available strength of the imperial army had risen to some 105,110 men, of all arms, not counting non-combatants, and at the end of the year 1888 there were 150,000 drilled men, with 120 guns, and a cavalry force of 500 sabres, ready for service at short notice, and a serviceable army of 25,000 troops could have been sent away to Korea or China at any time, on three days’ notice being given to the War Department.

In December 1889 Marshal Yamagata, as he had now become,—having previously held the office of Nai-mu-kio or Home Minister, in the Cabinet, was called upon, owing to the resignation of Count Okuma, to form a Ministry, and he continued to fill the post of Minister-President of State until April 1891, when he gave way to Count Matsukata, who had held under him the portfolio of Finance.

The following year, the Marquis Ito having meanwhile become head of the Ministry, a very extensive scheme of army extension and reorganisation was brought forward, encountering no inconsiderable opposition from the Radical party in the House of Representatives, and the year ended with stormy debates in Parliament on questions of military and naval expenditure. Marshal Yamagata was of course mainly responsible for the project as far as it related in detail to the enlargement of the nation’s military resources, but that it had the entire approval and support of the Crown was clear from the imperial rescript which appeared in 1893, when matters had reached a deadlock in the Diet owing to the obstacles placed in the Cabinet’s path by the irreconcilable elements of the Opposition. In the course of his message to the Diet the Emperor declared that “the progressive force of various countries of the world becomes more apparent day by day: at this period if time is squandered in disputes and ultimately the great objects in view become neglected, so that the opportunities of promoting the nation’s welfare and extending its influence are lost, the desire that we cherish in view of meeting the spirits of our ancestors will be frustrated, and the way to reap the fair result of constitutional government will be missed. The items of expenditure referred to in the 67th Article of the Constitution are already guaranteed by the terms of those articles, and therefore must not be a matter of dispute now. As to the military defences of the State, a single day’s neglect may result in a hundred years’ regret. We shall Ourselves economise in the expenditure of Our household, and We call on Our officers to do the same....” His Majesty’s efforts brought about a temporary understanding, and in the meantime affairs in Korea were assuming so threatening a shape that all the energies of the War Office were directed into the channel of urgent and complete preparation for what it was feared could not long be averted, namely, a desperate struggle with China, whose policy had been growing more and more inimical to Japan’s interests in the adjacent peninsula.

The culmination was reached when news arrived in Japan that a large reinforcement of the Chinese army in Korea was on the eve of being sent from Tientsin, and that foreign vessels had been chartered to convey the troops across the Yellow Sea to points on the Korean littoral. The bargain had been that neither Japan nor China was to increase its strength in the peninsula without giving due notice to the other interested power, for Korea, under the existing agreement, was independent, though China still insisted on claiming a rather shadowy suzerainty. Japan ordered her fleet to intercept the Chinese vessels, and hostilities began when the _Naniwa Kan_, a cruiser at that time commanded by the now famous Admiral Togo, fired upon and sank a British-owned steamer which had been chartered for the express purpose of carrying Chinese soldiers to the vicinity of the Korean port of Chemulpo. Admiral Togo’s orders were to prevent a landing, and when he had taken on board the _Naniwa Kan_ all the foreign officers of the transport, the Chinese on board refused to surrender, in spite of fair warning, so he considered that he had no alternative but to put an effectual stop to the vessel’s career. Already large numbers of Chinese had been thrown into Korea, and a first collision between the rival forces took place at Asan, a port to the south of Chemulpo, in the Nam-yang or Empress Gulf. The decisive battle of the 15th September 1894, at Ping-Yang, north of Seoul, at which spot Hideyoshi had fought the Chinese at the end of the sixteenth century, settled the question of the supremacy on Korean soil, and the Chinese withdrew in haste beyond the river Yalu frontier. Marshal Yamagata at this stage arrived from Japan to take command in person of the Japanese army in Manchuria, in the campaign on which it was now about to enter, and a second army, under the command of Marshal Oyama, was called out for the invasion of the peninsula known as the “Regent’s Sword,” at the extremity of which lay Port Arthur, for until this fortress should be captured the Chinese fleet could not be said to have been rendered absolutely useless, whilst its possession would give Japan the control of the Gulf of Pechili and enable her to interrupt communications with the Chinese ports in those waters.

At the end of 1893 the strength of the Japanese army was as follows:—

Peace Establishment 70,892
First Reserve 92,252
Second Reserve 106,020
Yeso colonists 4,104
-------
273,268

The peace establishment and the First Reserve constitute the First Line on a war footing, so that the forces which Japan was able under Marshals Yamagata and Oyama to place in the field were 163,144 in all. Roughly the peace strength of a Japanese division is 9000, but in time of war its total rises to about 27,000 men, all told. In the Japan and China war, under the arrangements which Marshal Yamagata had made, each division was a complete unit in itself, and, comprised 2 infantry brigades, 1 artillery regiment, 1 engineer battalion, 1 cavalry battalion, 1 train battalion, a medical corps, and an intendant, accountant, veterinary and legal staff.

Each infantry brigade had 2 regiments, and each regiment 3 battalions,—(save in the Guards, which had 2 battalions to a regiment)—a battalion at war strength averaging 800 rifles. The weapon was the Murata rifle of the 1889 pattern (embodying the improvements effected in the original type which was the invention of Captain Murata, as he was then, of the Japanese army, in the early years of the Meiji era,—he is now General Murata) the rifle being a single-loading breech-loader of 8 millimetres calibre. Each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition, and there were 80 rounds per man in the battalion transport and ammunition column. A new magazine rifle—since brought to great perfection—had then just been issued to the Guards and to the Osaka (4th) division. An artillery regiment comprised 6 batteries of 6 guns each, and a cavalry battalion consisted of 2 squadrons of 100 sabres each. The engineer battalion had 2 field companies of about 200 combatants each, and also furnished the bridging and telegraph sections. The train battalion supplied the personnel, ponies, and so forth for all regimental and divisional transport, a pack pony being able to carry about 250 lbs., but during the campaign great use was made of hand-carts, each drawn by 3 coolies, and conveying about 350 lbs. Each division had 3 supply columns and 5 ammunition columns, and in all 8 days’ rations were carried. The medical corps formed 2 bearer companies and 6 field hospitals. The men of the First Reserve formed depots for each corps and augmented the units from peace to war strength, whereas the Second Reserve, on territorial mobilisation, formed additional units for garrison work, and for the preservation of the lines of communication for the army in the field.

It is needful to supply these details in order to show how Marshal Yamagata had taken cognisance, in his scheme, of the requirements of modern warfare, and that the confidence with which Japan entered on the contest with China was thoroughly well based. By Yamagata’s efforts the army of Japan had already been brought to a high standard of efficiency, and it more than fulfilled the expectations that he had been led to form of its capabilities in the field. Its discipline was from the first perfect. Had they been needed, there was a vast reserve of men in Japan who, given medical fitness, were liable to be called out, if between the ages of seventeen and forty, for service in the National Army, but up to that period no demand had ever been made on them, and they had not been organised into a fighting force.

The Japanese headquarter staff, at the beginning of the war, removed from Tokio to Hiroshima, in the south-west, and thence directed operations. The Emperor went likewise to Hiroshima and took up his residence in the barracks without the ancient castle of the former _daimio_ of Aki province, as Dai-Gen-Sui, or Supreme Commander-in-chief of Army and Navy. At his Majesty’s side were Prince Komatsu, Chief of Staff for the army, with General Kawakami, as his assistant, and Admiral Kabayama, as Chief of Staff for the Navy.

It was noted by military critics of the campaign that “the conduct of the war by the Japanese was marked by a very complete decentralisation.” The commanders of armies or detached forces were given definite objectives (one at a time), and then allowed a free hand in carrying out their work, the same system being followed within the armies or their divisions.

The telegraph, of which Japan had learned the value during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was turned to the best account in the war of 1894-5, for orders were sent by cable from Japan to Fusan, and thence by telegraph through Korea to Marshal Yamagata, and for the Second army they were sent by wire to Ping-Yang and thence by steamer to the Liao-Tung peninsula. After the end of December 1894 the line of telegraph was built around the coast to the vicinity of Port Arthur, so that Marshal Oyama was also in direct touch with the imperial headquarters at Hiroshima.

The approximate strength of the Chinese army when it took its stand at Kiu-lien-cheng, on the west bank of the Yalu, was 20,000, and there was a further contingent of 4500 men, who had come south from Tsi-tsi-har, posted ten miles upstream. The advanced guard of Marshal Yamagata’s army arrived at Wiju, on the south side of the river, on the 10th October, and the main body on the 23rd. Just above Kiu-lien-cheng the Yalu is joined by the Ai-ho, and in the angle formed by the two rivers stands a prominent hill called Hu-shan, or Tiger Mount. The Chinese held this as an advanced position in front of their left flank, their main position extending along the right bank of the Yalu as far south as An-Tung-hsien. In front of this main Chinese position the river was broad and deep, and the country on the opposite bank was flat and open, so Marshal Yamagata, realising the difficulty of making a direct attack, determined to capture Hushan first, and then by fording the tributary stream to turn the Chinese left. The attack was planned to take place at daylight on the 25th October. The main obstacle to the advance of the Japanese forces was the principal channel of the Yalu, which at that time of the year was 11 feet deep and about 200 yards wide. The bridge had to be constructed by night, the pontoon equipment at that time with the army was not sufficient, and the water was so ice-cold that the men could only work in very short reliefs. By dawn however, the principal work had been done, and, the attack was delivered, the Chinese abandoning their Hushan positions before 8 A.M., though the main position continued to give trouble. The Japanese bivouacked on the right bank of the Ai-ho above Kiu-lien-cheng, and next morning it was found that their foes had evacuated both that city and An-Tung during the dark hours, and had fallen back, part in the direction of Feng-hwang-cheng, and part towards Siu-Yen.

The maxim that history repeats itself was so accurately borne out in the events of a decade later at Kiu-lien-cheng that the temptation to allude briefly to them at this point becomes irresistible. In the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 the Japanese commander General Kuroki had to force the passage of the Yalu in a precisely similar fashion, the attack being commenced by the crossing of the twelfth division at dawn on the 30th of April, and the Russians vainly attempting to hold the heights facing Hushan against assault. General Sassulitch fell back on the 1st of May, on Feng-hwang-cheng, which the Japanese occupied five days afterwards. In 1894 the troops under Marshal Yamagata entered Feng-hwang-cheng on the 29th October, the fifth day after the commencement of the attack on Hushan, the Chinese having retreated to the Mo-tien pass, thirty-eight miles to the north-west. Two columns were sent by different roads towards Taku-shan, afterwards meeting at Siu-Yen, and General Nodzu executed a brilliant combined movement against Sai-ma-tsui and defeated the Chinese at Tsao-ho-kao, on the 30th of November. Meanwhile General Sung, taking with him Ma Yu-kun as his chief of staff, had gone south by way of Kai-ping to attack the Japanese Second Army, which was reported to be marching on Port Arthur. At this time the Chinese opposing Marshal Yamagata in Manchuria numbered approximately 22,000 men.

After the capture of Port Arthur by the Second Army on the 21st of November, Marshal Yamagata was directed to proceed to the taking of Hai-cheng, which the Chinese were then holding in considerable strength, but his health, which had never been good during his stay in that region, quite broke down, and he was invalided home, his place in the field being taken by General Nodzu. At this period the marshal was so feeble that he could only with difficulty mount his charger, but he held on until the Emperor’s own physician, who had been sent with him to Manchuria, made a resolute appeal to him to desist. Very reluctantly Yamagata returned to Japan, abandoning the hope of winning glory on the field of battle, almost at the moment when fame seemed to be within his grasp.

The end of the war came in April 1895, and Marshal Yamagata had recovered sufficiently to be able to resume his place at the War Office, and even to journey to Europe, to attend the coronation of the Tsar Nicholas II. at Moscow, as the delegate of the Japanese Emperor. He did not succeed in getting as far as London, for he was obliged by illness to return direct to Japan from Russia, after concluding the Treaty of 9th June 1896.

On resuming his duties some months later at Tokio a scheme of expansion of the military forces was elaborated under his supervision which promised to confer upon Japan by the year 1902 a military power just double that which she possessed in the summer of 1895, and providing for an army of not less than 500,000 men, at an annual cost of 26,000,000 _Yen_ (roughly £2,654,000).

In January 1898 the Emperor decreed the formation of a Supreme Military Advisory Council, consisting of four members—viz. Marquis Yamagata, holding the position at that time of Inspector-General of the Army,—Prince Komatsu, Chief of the Staff,—Marshal Oyama,—and Marquis Saigo (since deceased). On the failure of the attempt to form a Party Government, which ended in the resignation of the Cabinet in November 1898, Marquis Yamagata was once more commanded by the Emperor to form a Ministry, and he became Minister-president with Marquis Saigo as Home Minister, Count Katsura as Minister for War, Count Matsukata at the Finance Department, and Baron Aoki at the Foreign Office. The Cabinet so constituted remained in office until September 1900, when Marshal Yamagata made way for Marquis Ito, who, as the retiring Minister-president declared, was far more skilled than himself in matters concerning China, and Chinese questions were then becoming exceptionally prominent.

Marquis Yamagata held during 1904 and 1905 the position at headquarters of Chief of the General Army Staff, and politically he is one of the Gen-Ro, or Elder Statesmen, to whom Japan looks for counsel and guidance in the hour of trial. During the recent war with Russia he was ever at the helm at Tokio, silently arranging and directing everything pertaining to the conduct of the campaign in Manchuria, while his colleague Marshal Oyama was active in the field.

Ten years ago Marshal Yamagata realised to his intense mortification not only that the Government of St Petersburg wished to deprive Japan of the legitimate fruits of her successes in the war with China, but that Russia intended to appropriate Manchuria herself. From that time his thoughts were occupied with the development of his country’s military strength, that at least she might not again be subject to the indignity which she had to suffer in 1895. It has already been shown how he gradually and surely raised the total of Japan’s resources in men and material until she was in possession of an army that would enable her to challenge with success the further advance towards her own shores of a power whose progress southward had ever constituted,—and as Minister Okubo had declared thirty years before,—a grave peril for Japan.

The disposition of Western observers had always been to accept the published figures of the standing army as indicative of the Empire’s military power. Never, perhaps, were figures so altogether deceptive, for the nominal muster of the regular forces bears but little comparison with the real strength which the nation is capable of putting forth in time of war.

Japan’s army is based on conscription, and all male subjects of the Ten-shi become liable when full seventeen, and remain liable until full forty years of age. In actual practice they are never called on until they are twenty, but even then their term of service may extend over twenty years, only three of which it is compulsory that they shall spend with the colours. We have in the Japanese system, therefore, a short service with the colours, but followed by a prolonged liability to be called out in emergencies and annually for practice, and its effects in relation to the military power of a nation are conveniently to be studied in the history of Japan since about the year 1890 when its possibilities first began to be realised by the people at large. At the end of his third year the Japanese soldier of the first selection—which is of men of superior physique—passes into the First Reserve, to which he is attached for four years and four months. But as there is a superabundance of men who are physically fully qualified for the Active army, the conscripts have to draw lots for the three years’ service with the colours, and when one of them is unlucky enough to be debarred from the active service—(this is the view which, as is, of course, only natural, the Japanese youth’s patriotism induces him to take of the fact that he has drawn a blank)—he is commiserated by his friends, and passes to the depot, where he will serve seven years and four months, and thus equal in the duration of his term his more fortunate comrade on whom the lot fell for active service at the outset. At the expiration of their term of seven years and four months the men of both classes are passed into the territorial army for ten years, and thence to the territorial reserve until they reach the age of forty. Up to a certain point the same course is followed with those who were at first rejected as being of inferior physique,—they serve seven years and four months in depot, but they then pass to the Territorial Reserve direct until they are forty years old. One-year volunteers are accepted, as in Germany, provided they are youths of the prescribed educational attainments and undertake to maintain themselves (and to mount themselves in mounted branches of the service) during their term. They then pass for six years and four months into the Active Reserve Army, and next for ten years into the Territorial Army as usual, completing their term in the Territorial Reserve until forty. There is a special plan of service in force in the island of Tsu-shima owing to its strategical position, whereby all the male population may be mobilised, but with the changed circumstances resultant on the altered status of Korea it seems possible that Tsushima may eventually be brought under the operation of the ordinary regulations.

The general effect of the provisions for service was to equip Japan down to the end of 1904 with an army on a peace footing of 8000 officers and 152,000 men, which was capable of being raised on a war footing to 14,000 officers and 630,000 men, but that was before the law increasing the term of service in the Territorial Army to ten years, promulgated in September 1904, came into operation. The term had previously been five years only. The lengthening of the term will have had the result of vastly adding to the possibilities of the army in numbers on a war footing. The budget appropriation for this large army was for the fiscal year ending with March 1906 as nearly as possible £4,000,000.

It may be useful to insert here for the sake of comparison the cost of some other armies to their respective countries:—

Russia £38,330,000
Germany 31,674,000
Great Britain 28,600,000
France 27,000,000
Austro-Hungary 13,150,000
Italy 11,160,000

In Japan the service is universal and compulsory, with exemption only for physical disability. At a rough estimate 410,000 youths reach the prescribed age annually, but less than one-third of this number are selected for the maintenance of the standing army, as men of superior physique, a term which palpably is elastic enough to admit of the choice of precisely the number required from the vast assemblage of youths presenting themselves every year for enrolment.

To judge of Japan’s strength, then, by her standing army would be a huge mistake, or even to wholly estimate it from the figures given as that of her army on a war footing, as was proved by the last campaign, for there were vast numbers of men who had completed their twelve (now 17) years and four months’ service in the active army, the first reserve, and territorial army, who were still liable until they became full forty. Moreover, the territorial army and its reserves are composed of men who are as a rule in good marching condition, for they are in the majority of cases engaged in normal times in agriculture or other industries, and physically equal to any tasks they may be called on to undertake. Conscription has made of Japan the great military power that she may, with strict justice, claim to be, but owing to the light in which military service is there regarded it is never a burden on the population. On the contrary, the system is really a voluntary one, since it is every youth’s hope and ambition to be among those first chosen to enter the ranks of the active army and a source of grief to him when he is drafted into the depot corps.

It was, then, not simply with a nation possessing a powerful army but with veritably a nation in arms that Russia had to contend when the war was begun in February 1904, and no more definite, straightforward history of that mighty contest has been given to the world than the brief account of its origin, progress, and conclusion which, according to a journal published in the Far East, fell from Marshal Yamagata’s own lips not long ago. Referring to the events of the spring of 1904, he said:—

“Russian aggression in the Far East became so notorious, and
took on such serious dimensions after Russia obtained the
lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan that it was felt that a
conflict of the interests of Japan and Russia was imminent.
I considered most carefully measures to counteract this
aggression, and took counsel with all my colleagues and
friends. We came to the decision to forestall Russia in Korea,
as the historical and geographical relations of Korea with
our Empire demanded that we should have the peninsula in our
power, rather than it should fall into that of Russia. To
attain this object we decided to construct the Seoul-Fusan
railway, and did not neglect to elaborate any other necessary
measures, as circumstances required, to oppose Russia. In the
meantime Russia steadily augmented her naval strength in the
Far East, and by about March 1903 her naval force here was
almost equal to our own. Russia failed to fulfil her promise
to evacuate Manchuria, and by steadily reinforcing her army
and navy her designs came to be generally acknowledged. The
Japanese Government, therefore, decided to protest against
these designs, and entered upon negotiations in July 1903, with
a view to arriving at an arrangement diplomatically. These
negotiations proved very difficult, and towards the end of
November the situation became desperate. By this time we were
determined that Korea should under no circumstances be left
in the hands of Russia. Frankly I may say that we were not
confident of defeating Russia, for she was considered to be one
of the greatest powers of the world. We had some hope, however,
in our navy. The naval forces of the two countries were almost
equally balanced, but fortunately our navy had had experience
in fighting in the past ten years, while Russia had had none.
As to the strength of the army, there was great disparity, the
Russians having 4,000,000 men and Japan only 500,000. There was
certainly a limit in the strength of the army that could be
sent by Russia’s one line of railway, but the Russian equipment
in arms was in no way inferior, even if it was not superior, to
that of our army, and the education of the officers was almost
equal. We had, therefore, no advantage over the Russian army,
with the exception, as we thought, of the skill of our troops
in fighting in such hilly country as Korea and Manchuria.
Thus we had very little prospect of success in land fighting,
it having been altogether impossible to assure ourselves of
success in the way that the lay mind is apt to think. It was a
critical and anxious time when hostilities were commenced, but
the army was determined, we knew, to fight to a man in defence
of the Empire. On the campaign being opened, however, we were
able to obtain a success far beyond that which we had hoped
for. This was to be ascribed to the virtue of the Emperor and
to the valour of the officers and men, and the army and navy
are to be congratulated thereon.

From about the time of the great victory at Mukden a suggestion
was made in Europe and America that for the sake of humanity
peace should be restored, and shortly after the defeat of the
Russian fleet in the battle of the Sea of Japan, President
Roosevelt, acting from humanitarian motives, advised the two
belligerents to make peace, with the result already known.

Some of the people appear to be strongly opposed to the terms.
Each man has a right to his own opinion, and it is only natural
that opinion should be divided upon so momentous a question.
In deciding to conclude peace the Government carefully
investigated the present financial capacity of the Empire,—the
plans made for its future development,—the general political
situation of the world,—as well as the fact that Russia was
constantly aggressive and warlike. After full consideration
the Government then came to the conclusion that if hostilities
were continued any longer it would hardly be possible to obtain
compensation for the vast expenditure involved, and no better
result could be secured than was to be obtained by concluding
peace there and then. The continuation of the war, it was
thought, would require a further heavy sacrifice and the only
result would be to exhaust the funds required for the promotion
of works in Korea and Manchuria. Thereupon the members of the
Government agreed without a dissenting voice to conclude peace
without delay. There was no difference, as alleged, among the
members of the Government—no ‘strong party.’ If the peace be
condemned by some people, I am for my part quite willing to
accept the name of being a member of the ‘weak’ party, and all
the other Elder Statesmen and Cabinet Ministers will share my
view.”

Marshal Yamagata emphatically repudiated the allegation that he had advocated peace on the ground of the difficulty of further continuing the war because of the inadequacy of the country’s military strength. “The assertion,” he said, “reflects upon the prestige of the army and cannot be passed over unnoticed. The Government prosecuted the war with the greatest determination, and is still competent to carry it on. I have been in the military service over forty years, and have been through several wars. We have experienced greater difficulties in other wars than in the one with Russia, though the wars of the past were of less magnitude. We have always managed to overcome difficulties.”

It will be admitted that this speech was not conceived in any spirit of boastfulness, but that it was a plain unvarnished statement of fact. Japan was by no means exhausted by the struggle with Russia,—on the other hand, nothing was to be gained by prolonging it to exhaustion point.

The combination of soldier and politician is not so uncommon that it need occasion remark to find it exemplified in the case of Marshal Yamagata, whose abilities as a leader in the field have been almost equalled, though they could not be surpassed, by his talents as chief of a numerous and powerful party in the State. He is the acknowledged head of the Japanese Conservatives, and has served his country as Prime Minister with signal success. He always displayed a perfect genius for organisation, and in the Parliamentary arena he shone as brilliantly as in the “tented field.” But for all that it is not for one moment to be imagined that he is in the usually accepted meaning of the word a parliamentarian. He is not, strictly speaking, a politician or party man at all. When he was originally invited to form a Ministry he accepted the task, not from a desire to achieve political success, but in order that he might, if possible, be the means of removing from the arena of party conflict those great questions that were at the period alluded to becoming daily of real importance to the nation at large. He has ever set his face sternly against the subordination of national interests to the ambitions of a party. He is essentially a soldier, and his heart is with the army, on which he bases his hopes for the future eminence among the powers of that country which it was called into being to protect. And Marshal Yamagata has every right to be proud of that magnificent force the enrolment of which he so strenuously advocated from the very first, and to the complete organisation of which he has entirely devoted his energies for forty years. True it is that he received the utmost help in this great work,—one surely worthy of a life’s continuous effort,—from those military and other experts from the Occident whose services he had known how to secure, and that this loyally rendered assistance was at all times recognised by him. It was none the less a result of his personal and unflagging zeal that the course of training for the army, once entered on, was never suffered to deviate a hair’s-breadth from the plan on which it had been determined that the vast structure should in the main be raised.

Two maxims have always had weight with him, and he has steadfastly inculcated their observance by every individual in the army in which he takes such justifiable pride: they are:—

Gi wo mite, nasazaru wa, yu naki nari.

(Duty recognised, but unfulfilled, means lack of courage.)

Gi wo omonzuru koto tai-san no gotoku
Shi wo karonzuru koto, ko-bo no gotoshi.

(Duty should weigh (with us) as the mass of a lofty mountain:
Against it, our lives resemble in lightness the swan’s down.)

There are six kinds of decorations in Japan, that of the Golden Kite being the Japanese equivalent of the Victoria Cross. Its first grade carries an annuity of £150. The Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun and Paulownia is the Order of Merit, held by very few. Marshal Yamagata has both, and in February 1906, he was invested with the British Order of Merit, at the hands of Prince Arthur of Connaught, an honour which was universally appreciated in Japan. His heir is Mr Yamagata Isaburo, his adopted son, who took office as Minister of Communications in 1906.

XIV

COUNT OKUMA SHIGENOBU

Very few of those who have been prominent as Statesmen in Japan have wholly escaped the personal dangers which there appear to be inseparable from a political career, and though the attacks have not always been fatal they have been painfully frequent in the past forty or fifty years. Count Okuma was maimed by the explosion of a bomb hurled at his carriage as he drove past on his way to the Finance Department one morning in 1889, and has but one leg. The marvel was that he survived the attempt on his life at all, for the fanatic who was guilty of the crime unquestionably intended to murder him outright and did succeed in killing his coachman and groom. Count Okuma, who was raised to the peerage in 1887, is a native of Hizen, having been born in that province, at Saga, in February 1838. He is a big, broad-shouldered man, endowed with a bright, cheery disposition, possessed of most genial manners, and is brilliant and entertaining to a degree in his ordinary conversation. It is generally conceded that in the qualities which go to form a successful politician Count Okuma and Marquis Ito have much in common, for in respect of their prestige as party leaders, and the remarkable mental vigour and activity by which these renowned statesmen have ever been distinguished, there can be no doubt that they both take exceptionally high rank in the public esteem. Both have been the consistent advocates of progress, and both date their service to the Crown from the very beginning of the present reign. In one sense the Count’s success in politics was more noteworthy than that of his colleagues among the Elder Statesmen, since his clan took by no means the leading part in the course of events immediately antecedent to the Restoration of 1868 that fell to the share of Satsuma, for example, or of Choshiu. Hizen nevertheless was a progressive province and its feudal chieftain had set up an ironworks in his territory, and had commenced coal-mining upon a practical basis, long prior to the establishment of foreign industries in the Empire on a large scale. Thus it was that Okuma Shigenobu, who had studied at Nagasaki, came early to the front in connection with the dissemination of foreign ideas, and it was perhaps as much by his energy as that of Marquis Ito that arrangements were made for the construction of the first line of railway connecting Tokio with the port of Yokohama, immediately that the Central Government was removed to the new Capital.

The capital for that railway was found in England, and its Engineers were engaged partly there and partly in India. It seems difficult nowadays to imagine Japan paying 9 per cent. for a Loan, yet that was the rate at which she procured the means of developing the Scheme of Public Works on which the Government embarked, and it is matter of history that the short railway of eighteen miles by which the Japanese metropolis was joined to the chief treaty port in 1872 was phenomenally expensive. In recent times it has been feasible to build railways and execute other works of public utility in Japan on the most economical and satisfactory terms, but thirty-five years ago economy in construction was, owing to the novelty of the undertaking, practically out of the question.

Count Okuma is, in his native tongue, a fluent and effective speaker, and he has a most retentive memory. Early in his life he closely studied Finance, and was an able Minister of that department in the seventies, prior to the institution of the Cabinet, which dates from 1885. In 1881 there were serious differences of opinion between the Count and his colleagues in the Dai-jo-Kwan, and he resigned office, forming a united party named the Shim-po-to, by the amalgamation of several smaller ones, in opposition to the Government of the day. Latterly it has borne the title of Kai-shin-to (from _Kai_ = to alter or correct,—_shin_ = to advance,—_to_ = a party) in Chinese Kai-chin-tang,—and thus it is literally the progressive party in Japan, in contradistinction to the Sei-Yu-Kai or Constitutional party, now headed by Marquis Saionji, but formerly by Marquis Ito. In the Cabinet of Count Kuroda, of 1888, which was replaced by that of Marshal Yamagata within two years, Count Okuma acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it was during his tenure of this post that the Constitution was promulgated in 1889, and Okuma received the congratulations of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce on the auspicious event and on his personal endeavour to effect a satisfactory revision of the Treaties. He was succeeded at the Foreign Office in the late autumn by Viscount Aoki, and, having just become Minister of Finance, was attacked in the manner already described, for no other than the fancied reason that he was willing to give away too much in respect of concessions to foreigners.

Okuma’s return to ministerial life after seven years spent in retirement, between 1881 and 1888, was a source of general satisfaction to the nation, for the fusion brought about between the Government and the Kai-shin-to by his taking office was regarded as a valuable massing of strength at a critical time, when supreme efforts were being made to secure the abolition of the extra-territorial privileges thereunto enjoyed by the subjects of other nations. On this much-vexed question an undercurrent of discontent had agitated the nation for many years, the obnoxious clause in the proposed new treaty with which Count Inouye was identified in 1887, and which led to his resignation of the post of Foreign Minister which he then held, being one relating to the suggested establishment of mixed Courts, like those in Egypt, or that at Shanghai which has in recent times been the object of much hostile criticism on the part of the Chinese population of that port. Count Okuma in 1889 was anxious to remove this source of irritation from the path of his own countrymen, and sought to minimise the objections to the clause by restricting its application to the Supreme Court, whereas Count Inouye had been ready to admit foreign judges to the lower tribunals also. The misguided “patriot” who threw the bomb which shattered Count Okuma’s limb was not even well posted in regard to the circumstances of the case.