Chapter III (2)

The first great incident of the war was the Battle of Agnadello (May 14, 1509), in which the Venetians suffered defeat at the hands of the French. The Papal troops occupied Ravenna and the rest of the Romagna, while Ferdinand added the Apulian ports to his new dominions. For the first and last time Venice made Maximilian a really advantageous offer: all his lands should be restored, the Imperial suzerainty should be recognized, and a handsome yearly subsidy paid down. But the envoys of the Republic were not even allowed to approach him, and about midsummer the Emperor opened the campaign in person with 15,000 men. The Venetians had drawn off the mass of their troops to meet the French advance, and he was virtually unopposed. By the middle of July he had recovered all that he {60} had lost, and occupied in addition Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Bassano and Feltre. He had already fetched some heavy artillery over the Brenner to reduce Treviso, when the complexion of affairs was suddenly and completely reversed. The inhabitants of the invaded districts remained loyal to the Venetians, and so many of the Imperial troops were required to check their harassing movements that the towns were insufficiently garrisoned. The Pope and Ferdinand, their own objects once attained, grew indifferent to the progress of the League, and the Venetians bravely rallied and by a sudden movement regained possession of Padua. The Emperor, leaving Treviso, laid siege to Padua with some 22,000 men, and employed his heavy ordnance with considerable effect. But the numbers of the garrison prevented him from maintaining a complete blockade; and when two brilliant and determined assaults had failed to reduce the town, he raised the siege and returned to Tyrol (October). He himself explains his action by the great number of troops and artillery inside, by the wonderful strength of the defences, and by the lukewarm spirit of his own troops.[76] But the main reasons are to be found in the short period for which the troops were voted, and the entire lack of money to win them for further services. Even in August the Emperor was pawning "deux couliers d'or garniz de beaucop de bonnes et riches pierres," and a number of other valuable jewels.[77] The Venetians quickly recovered all places of any importance, with the solitary exception of Verona, which was defended by a mixed garrison of Germans, French and {61} Spaniards. Maximilian, at the end of his resources, threw himself unreservedly into the hands of Louis XII. The Diet of Augsburg, which met in January, 1510, would have acted wisely in strengthening his hands; for, now that there was a danger of both Italy and the Papacy becoming dependent upon France, it was more than ever to the interests of Germany to hold a strong position south of the Alps. In spite of his rash onsets without adequate preparation, Maximilian had a strong sense of the greatness of the Empire, and was pre-eminently fitted to rouse the patriotism of Germany in a struggle against the foreigner. The Diet did, it is true, vote 1,800 horse and 6,000 foot for six months, but it had taken four months to make up its mind to the sacrifice, and even then the troops never arrived. Meanwhile the League had broken up. Julius II., once in possession of the Romagnan cities, devoted himself to the problem of "the expulsion of the barbarian." With this end in view, he removed the ban from the Republic (February, 1510) and concluded a five years' league with the Swiss, who were to send 6,000 mercenaries to his aid. In July the Papal and Venetian armies assumed the offensive, and the latter were able to reoccupy Friuli. But Julius met with disaster on all sides; Maximilian and Louis won over the Swiss to inactivity, and Henry VIII., on whose aid the Pope had reckoned, made peace with France. Maximilian's attitude towards Venice was fiercer and more hostile than ever, and led him to encourage the Pasha of Bosnia to attack her Adriatic possessions. He himself declares that he hopes soon "to carry out some fine exploit and execution against our enemy; for it is not enough to put them to death by the {62} hundred: we must dispose of them by the thousand."[78] Julius was driven to modify or conceal his contemptuous opinion of the Emperor, whom he had treated to the nick-name of "a naked baby."[79] For it was mainly through the latter's influence that the Congress of Mantua was arranged, and attended by the envoys of France, Spain, England and the Pope (March 1511), the primary object being the restoration of the League against Venice. Earnest negotiations were also conducted at Bologna between the Pope and Matthew Lang, who loyally resisted the bribes of a cardinal's hat from Julius and of large subsidies from Venice. The disproportion between the demands of the Emperor and the Republic was too great to be overcome, and the Pope's hopes of winning Maximilian to his League were frustrated. Still powerless by himself, Maximilian was more than ever dependent on the French, and played a somewhat subordinate part in the operations of Louis against the Venetians. A despatch which he received from Trivulzio shows us in what scanty consideration he was held by the French commander. Referring to the capture of Mirandola by a German captain, he declares that "it has thrown me into a worse humour than I have been in during my life," and denounces the Imperialists in the most outspoken fashion.[80]

The sudden illness of Julius II. (August 1511), from which a fatal issue was generally expected, led to an episode, which, though trivial in itself and void of result, gives us a vivid impression of Maximilian's {63} visionary nature. He actually entertained the preposterous idea of himself succeeding Julius and uniting Empire and Papacy in one person. Lang, Bishop of Gurk, was to proceed at once to Rome, to persuade the Pope "to take us as coadjutor, so that on his death we may be assured of having the Papacy, and of becoming a priest, and afterwards a saint, so that after my death you will be constrained to adore me, whence I shall gain much glory."[81] If necessary, Lang was to spend 300,000 ducats in bribing the various Cardinals, and Maximilian counted upon the assistance of Ferdinand and the people of Rome. His confidential letter to Margaret bears the signature--"vostre bon père Maximilian, futur pape."

But these extravagant dreams were dissipated by the unexpected recovery of Julius II., who plunged more eagerly than ever into political life. On October 5, 1511, the Holy League was openly published in Rome. Its members--the Pope, Ferdinand and Venice--veiled their real design, the expulsion of the French, under the sanctimonious pretence of maintaining the integrity of the Papal States. Throughout the early stages of the war Maximilian remained virtually inactive, but steadily declined to desert his French allies. But none the less he permitted Ferdinand and the Pope to conclude in his name a ten months' truce with Venice. He was thus in the happy position of being in request with both sides, while himself free from all immediate danger. When the death of Gaston de Foix at Ravenna (April 11, {64} 1512) deprived the French of their most capable leader, and the tide began to turn against them, Maximilian inclined towards the side of the Pope. In allowing 18,000 Swiss to pass through Tyrol on their way to join the Venetians, and in issuing strict orders that all Germans serving with Louis should return home, he was certainly guilty of unfriendly conduct towards his ally. In the actual expulsion of the French from the Milanese he took no direct part, but from want of funds rather than disinclination,--the Diet of Trier turning a deaf ear to his most urgent entreaties. At length in November he took the decisive step. Though he had hoped to see Milan under his grandson Charles rather than Massimiliano Sforza, he consented to a league with Julius II., to whom the Imperial recognition of the Lateran Council was of vital importance. In return for this the Pope promised his support against Venice, with temporal as well as spiritual arms.

In February 1513, however, the situation was again changed by the death of Julius II., and by the reconciliation of France and Venice. The new Pope, Leo X., was vacillating and untrustworthy, though nominally well-disposed to the Emperor; and the latter began to turn elsewhere for an ally. On April 5, 1513, a treaty of alliance was concluded between Maximilian and Henry VIII., mainly through the efforts of Margaret, who had long urged on her father a break with France and a close union with Spain and England. At first we find him complaining that Henry "gives us only to understand what he wishes from us, while of what he ought to do for us there is no mention."[82] But the promise of 100,000 gold {65} crowns was magical in its effect; all his opposition ceased, and he indulged in the usual sanguine anticipations. Ferdinand, Henry and Maximilian would unite until France was completely crushed, and by a joint invasion would win back all the territories which had been wrested from their ancestors. The alliance was to be cemented at the earliest possible date by the marriage of Charles to Mary of England.

Notwithstanding such threatening signs, the French king pushed on his preparations for a new invasion of Italy. The rapid success of the expedition was suddenly effaced on the field of Novara (June 6, 1513), where the French sustained a severe defeat at the hands of the Swiss and were driven back across the Alps. Their return to France virtually coincided with the expedition of Henry VIII. At the end of June the English army landed at Calais, and marching in three divisions, appeared before Thérouenne on August 1. Eleven days later he was joined by Maximilian, who had already announced his intention of serving as the English king's chief captain. "His experienced eye at once detected a capital blunder in Henry's strategic position," but the lethargy and exhaustion of the French had saved the latter from any awkward consequences. The French armies had suffered terribly at Novara, and Louis XII. himself was too broken in health to infuse vigour into the operations. On August 16, Maximilian, at the head of the allied forces, won a brilliant little victory at Guinegate, the scene of his earlier triumph over the French in 1479. The enemy's headlong retreat won for the engagement the familiar name of the Battle of Spurs. This resulted in the surrender of Thérouenne, whose example was followed on {66} September 24 by the important town of Tournai. But, in spite of Maximilian's eager encouragement, Henry VIII. refused to make full use of his advantage. The lateness of the season, the difficulties of obtaining sufficient supplies, and still more the position of affairs in Scotland, made him anxious to return to England; and in November he re-embarked his army, leaving vague promises of a renewal of the campaign in the following spring. Maximilian's disappointment had been seriously augmented by the course of events on the Burgundian frontier. Towards the end of August an army of 30,000 Swiss and Germans, led by Ulric of Würtemberg, had penetrated into Burgundy, and on September 7 laid siege to Dijon. A determined assault upon the town came within an ace of success, and made it clear to La Trémouille, the commander of the garrison, that any prolonged resistance was impossible. Substantial bribes to the Swiss leaders won over the invaders to a treaty, by which Louis XII. was to make peace with the Pope, to evacuate Milan, Cremona and Asti in favour of the young Sforza, and to pay 400,000 crowns to the Swiss. On the strength of this agreement Burgundy was evacuated; but no sooner was all danger from that quarter at an end than Louis XII. repudiated the treaty, on the ground that La Trémouille had greatly exceeded his powers.

In spite of the failure of Maximilian's hopes, he and Henry seem to have parted on friendly terms. Indeed, the last event of the campaign had been the treaty of Lille (October 17, 1513), between the two sovereigns and Ferdinand, which stipulated for a triple attack on France in the summer. Maximilian was to maintain 10,000 troops on the French frontier in {67} return for a substantial subsidy from Henry VIII., and Charles's betrothal to Mary of England was formally renewed. But the unscrupulous Ferdinand only signed this treaty to infringe it. Ere six weeks had elapsed, he had formed a close alliance with Louis XII., which was to be cemented by the marriage of the Princess Renée to one of Ferdinand's grandsons. Milan and Genoa were to form her dowry, and were to be jointly occupied by the two sovereigns until the marriage was actually accomplished. Although the execution of this treaty could not but thwart one at least of Maximilian's projects--the marriage of Charles and Mary, and that of young Ferdinand and Anne of Bohemia---the Emperor was none the less won over by the wiles of the Catholic king to listen to French proposals of peace. The earnest dissuasions and sagacious advice of Margaret fell upon deaf ears. "It seems to me," she wrote, "that this is done only to amuse you ... in order to gain time, just as happened last year by reason of the truce.... Small wonder if Ferdinand is the most readily disposed of you three towards peace; for he has what he wants."[83] And again, "you know the great inveterate hatred which the French bear towards our House,"[84] and, "it is clear that now is the hour or never, when you will be able, with the aid of your allies, to get the mastery over our common enemies." Even her warnings that peace means that the Duchy of Burgundy will remain French[85] and that Henry VIII., "if he sees himself deserted by you, will win for himself better terms than you will know how to secure," seem to have been entirely {68} disregarded by the obstinate Maximilian. On March 13, 1514, the Emperor signed the treaty of Orleans with France, and so confident was he of Ferdinand's influence with his son-in-law Henry VIII., that he actually guaranteed the English king's adhesion. The natural result of such presumption was that Henry and Maximilian fell apart, and early in August the former made his own terms with Louis XII., fully justifying Margaret's prophecy that the French King would set more value upon a settlement with England than upon the less solid advantages to be gained from her father's goodwill.

Peace was followed in October by the marriage of the enfeebled Louis XII. and the vivacious Mary of England, the rupture of whose betrothal to Charles completed the estrangement of Henry and Maximilian. But the gaieties and entertainments which heralded the new Queen's arrival proved fatal to the bridegroom. The death of Louis XII. on New Year's Day 1515, and the accession of his cousin, the young and fiery Francis of Angoulême, produced a complete change in the political situation. The typical product of his age, the new sovereign personified only too well the France of the Renaissance and of the later Valois kings, combining all their exaggerated license and treachery with those debased ideals of chivalry which had replaced the ancient code of honour. His mind was fired by wild dreams of foreign conquest, and his accession was promptly followed by preparations for a fresh invasion of Italy. The treaties with England and Venice were renewed, and by the end of March the young Archduke Charles, who had assumed the Government in January, signed, at the instance of his tutor Chièvres, a treaty of peace and amity {69} with France. But the French monarch was not to remain unopposed. A new league was speedily formed against him between the Pope, the Emperor, Ferdinand, Milan and the Swiss, the latter resolutely rejecting all Francis's overtures for peace. Undeterred by the threatening attitude of the League, Francis led a magnificent army of 60,000 men across the Alps, and in the desperate battle of Marignano (September 13 and 14, 1515) drove back the Swiss army by sheer hard fighting. Full 20,000 men were left dead upon the field, and the Swiss, exhausted by so crushing a defeat, were compelled to abandon the Milanese to yet another conqueror. Leo X. promptly sued for peace, and the Spanish and Papal forces in North Italy were practically disbanded.

The strange inactivity and want of interest, which Maximilian would at first sight seem to have displayed, while such grave issues were at stake, must be attributed to an event of great importance in the history of his own dominions. This was no less than his reception, at Vienna, of the Kings of Hungary and Poland, which set a seal to the negotiations and labours of many years by a final understanding between the two dynasties.[86] Under the terms of the Treaty of Vienna (July 22), Prince Louis of Hungary was definitely betrothed to Mary of Austria, while his sister Anne was delivered over to the Emperor to be educated, in view of her marriage with the young Archduke Ferdinand. The flattery and congratulations which surrounded these proceedings included the adoption of Louis by Maximilian as his successor in the Empire. But this was merely a formal move in the diplomatic game, calculated to {70} win the support of the young Prince. The Emperor well knew that the Electors cared little for any wishes which he might express; otherwise we may be sure that Charles, not Louis, would have been designated.[87]

The completeness of Francis's success, and his efforts to rouse the Scots against England drove Henry VIII. into the arms of Ferdinand. (October 19.) English gold was liberally expended among the Confederates; and in February, 1516, 17,000 Swiss mercenaries moved on Verona, to join the Imperialists. Maximilian, whose forces were further swelled by levies of Tyrol and the Swabian League, was thus enabled to take the offensive in North Italy, with better prospects of success than on any previous occasion. In March he led a well-appointed army of 30,000 men across the Mincio, and forced the French and Venetians to raise the siege of Brescia and fall back upon their respective bases. Maximilian continued to advance rapidly beyond the Oglio and the Adda, until he was within nine miles of Milan itself. But now, when Bourbon was well-nigh incapable of any prolonged resistance, and when fortune, after so many rebuffs, seemed at length about to crown the Imperial arms with victory, Maximilian, for some inexplicable reason, hesitated to strike home, and withdrew his army once more behind the Adda. His motives for so extraordinary a step have never been discovered; and today we are as completely in the dark as were his own allies at the time. Pace, who, as English envoy in Maximilian's camp, had peculiar opportunities for clearing up the mystery, writes in {71} his report to Wolsey, "that no man could, ne can, conject what thing moved him to be so slack at that time, when every man did see the victory in his hands, and the expulsion of the Frenchmen out of Italy."[88] Maximilian's own version--that the difficulties of foraging, the enemy's superiority in cavalry, and the stoppage of English money necessitated a retreat--is, in the face of incontestable facts, most improbable; and the only plausible suggestion--that the Emperor's change of policy was produced by a liberal outlay of French gold--is pure conjecture, unsupported by proofs. If we may believe the testimony of Pace in a matter which concerned his own person (and there is no reason to suspect his honesty), the Emperor, in his straits for money, actually profited by the English envoy's helpless condition, to extort a large sum of money from him, declaring that in case of a refusal he would make terms with France and would inform Henry that Pace had been responsible for his defection.[89]

The universal indignation which Maximilian's withdrawal aroused among the troops is shown by the nicknames of "Strohkönig" and "Apfelkönig" which were levelled at him.[90] The army rapidly melted away, and, after struggling through the Val Camonica in deep snow, he reached Innsbruck with but a few hundred Tyrolese troops. On May 26 Brescia surrendered to the French and Venetians, and of all the Emperor's conquests Verona alone continued its resistance.

The sorry outcome of Maximilian's last Italian expedition seriously impaired his credit, alike within the {72} Empire and abroad. He now found it advisable to give heed to the counsellors of his grandson Charles, whose position had been materially altered by recent events. On January 23, 1516, the arch-intriguer Ferdinand had passed from the scene of his questionable triumphs; and the young Archduke was left master of the entire Spanish dominions, with all their boundless possibilities. In spite of Francis' intrigues in Gueldres and Navarre, and his scarcely veiled designs upon the throne of Naples, Charles persisted in a policy of friendship towards France. On August 13 he concluded the Treaty of Noyon, by which Francis was unquestionably the greater gainer. Charles' betrothal to the French king's infant daughter not only put in question his rights to Naples, but also condemned him to remain a bachelor for many years, until the bride should attain a marriageable age. He further undertook to win Maximilian's consent to the restoration of Verona to the Republic, for a sum of 200,000 ducats.

The Emperor at first repudiated an agreement which implied such a lowering of self-esteem, and again sought subsidies from Henry VIII. But the conclusion of the Perpetual Peace between Francis I. and the Swiss (November 29, 1516) left him entirely unsupported, and revealed to him the hopelessness of further resistance. By a treaty at Brussels, Maximilian agreed to surrender Verona and to conclude a six months' truce with the enemy. But wounded pride still kept him from consenting to a permanent peace with Venice, and it was not till July 1518 that he finally acknowledged his discomfiture. A five years' truce was concluded, under the terms of which Maximilian retained Roveredo and the district {73} known as "the four Vicariates."[91] But these small acquisitions were completely outbalanced by the extensive pledging of domains, tolls and other sources of revenues, which the long-drawn-out war had rendered necessary, and by the further accumulation of an enormous debt. The dream of restoring Imperial influence in Italy was thus finally and completely dissolved.[92] While the French ruled supreme in the North of Italy and the Spaniards in the South, Germany alone saw herself excluded from the scenes of her former predominance. The blame of this failure must rest largely with the Imperial Diet, which hardly once throughout Maximilian's reign allowed itself to be moved by considerations of patriotism, and which by a studied neglect of the demands of foreign policy clearly thwarted the true interests of Germany. Yet, while there were several occasions on which the effective assistance of the Estates would have crowned the Imperial arms with success, it cannot be denied that on the whole Maximilian displayed an incapacity and want of decision which forms a striking contrast to his earlier record. The plain truth is that Maximilian lacked the distinguishing features of a great general, combining, if we may use a modern comparison, the qualities of a drill-sergeant and a cavalry-colonel. Brave as a lion himself,[93] he was apt to forget the duties of a commander in the fierce {74} delights of the melée; and the dashing successes of his tactics were often neutralized by the want of a connected plan for the whole campaign. But we cannot review his military failings without bestowing the highest praise on his organizing and disciplinary talents. The landsknechts, who spread the fame of the German arms throughout Europe, were mainly his creation. His eager care for their welfare, and his readiness to share their fatigues and privations, won him the entire devotion, nay adoration of his soldiers; and a personal bond of union was thus established between them, which accounts for their willingness to submit to a continual discipline, such as was still contrary to the practice of the age. Among his many other accomplishments he possessed a practical knowledge of the founder's trade, which enabled him to invent several kinds of siege- and field-pieces, and to introduce various minor improvements in the art of war.

In the summer of 1518, while the settlement with Venice was still pending, Maximilian met the Estates of the Empire for the last time, at the Diet of Augsburg. His two main objects--the election of Charles as his successor, and a permanent military organization with a view to a crusade against the Turks,--met with little encouragement from the Estates, whose minds were filled with religious grievances and dreams of a national German Church. Hence they were scarcely likely to assist the Emperor, when they realized that his present policy involved entire dependence upon the Pope.[94] The endless {75} complaints and proposals which characterized the Diet, "showed clearly that the highest power in the Empire no longer fulfilled its office, but also that the possibility of doing so had been removed from its hands." But Maximilian's comparative lifelessness at this time admits of another explanation, apart from his pre-occupation with the Venetian Treaty. Throughout the year he had been in failing health, and the pathetic words in which he bade farewell to his beloved Augsburg suggest that he was conscious of his approaching end. "God's blessing rest with thee, dear Augsburg, and with all upright citizens of thine! Many a happy mood have we enjoyed within thy walls; now we shall never see thee more!" Possibly at the prompting of Cajetan, the Papal Legate, Maximilian gave a most pointed proof of his lack of sympathy with Luther, by leaving the city only two days before the monk arrived.

The closing months of his life were troubled by the uncertainty of the succession to the Empire. His efforts to secure Charles' election as King of the Romans had almost been crowned with success. The day before he left Augsburg, he induced four of the Electors to meet him and to give their consent to the scheme. But his hopes were dashed to the ground by the opposition of Frederick of Saxony and Richard von Greifenklau, Elector of Trier, who contended that no election for the crown of the Romans was possible, while Maximilian himself still remained uncrowned as Emperor, and that Charles, as King of Naples, was expressly debarred from the Imperial dignity. The cup of his disappointment was full, and the Emperor retired wearily to Innsbruck, hoping to end his days in peace beneath the shadow of his {76} beloved Alps. But one final indignity awaited him. The burghers of Innsbruck, who had suffered severely on former occasions from the Emperor's insolvency, resolutely closed their gates upon him; and he was obliged to retire to Lower Austria. On January 12, 1519, Maximilian's adventurous career closed at the little town of Wels, not far from Linz. The body was interred without pomp in the Church of St. George at Wiener Neustadt; but his heart was removed to Bruges and buried beside the remains of the consort, whose early loss had robbed him of life's brightest joy. Thus, amid disillusionment and humiliation, ends the career which had opened so full of rich promise. With Maximilian passed away the last Holy Roman Emperor, in the true mediaeval sense. The dominion of Charles V. was doubtless more universal than any which Europe had seen since the days of Charles the Great, but its universality was essentially modern rather than mediaeval--dynastic and personal, not founded on the old dreams of an united Christian commonwealth. "Henceforth the Holy Roman Empire is lost in the German, and after a few faint attempts to resuscitate old-fashioned claims nothing remains to indicate its origin save a sounding title and a precedence among the States of Europe."[95]

[30] _Maximilians I. Beziehungen zu Sigmund von Tyrol._--Victor v. Kraus.

[31] His mother was the daughter of Albert II., Emperor and King of Hungary and Bohemia (died 1439). Though Hungary was strictly an elective monarchy, the next heir was almost invariably elected.

[32] A small garrison held out in the citadel till the end of August.

[33] Huber, _Gesch. Oesterreichs_, iii. 298.

[34] "Time ever brings its reward or its revenge."

[35] Maximilian to S. P. (September 21). Debts growing ever larger: "darumb pit helfft und rath ains für als." He adds, "Der König v. Behaimb ... ist auch nicht viel erberer dann der ander gewest" (i.e. Matthias).--_Vertraulicher Briefwechsel_, p. 80.

[36] This attitude was due to jealousy. Frederick disliked the idea of Maximilian as King of Hungary, fearing that he would then usurp all his remaining power in the Empire.

[37] To the amount of 100,000 gulden.

[38] This marriage of his only daughter against his will (1487) was a very sore point with Frederick III., and the fact that Maximilian acquiesced in it increased his irritation against him.

[39] It had been seized by Albert in 1486. _See_ above.

[40] Which included the free towns of Strassburg and Basel and their bishops.

[41] V. Polheim and W. v. Waldenstein to Maximilian. Even if Frederick recovers, "werde er doch die fuesse nit mer mugen brauchen"; ... "hab in den zehen kain empfintlichait."--_Vertraulicher Briefwecksel_, p. 83.

[42] Sigismund was now a nonentity, living obscurely in his former dominions.

[43] For Maximilian's relations to internal reform, _see_ Appendix.

[44] Janssen, i. 586.

[45] Huber, iii. p. 338.

[46] Creighton's _Papacy_, i. p. 277.

[47] December 31, 1510. For a most beautiful and touching letter of condolence from Margaret to Maximilian, _see_ Le Glay, _Correspondance_, i. p. 481.

[48] Few people seem to have troubled themselves about Gian Galeazzo's infant son, who was now the lawful heir of the Sforza.

[49] For Maximilian's efforts towards war against the Turks, _see_ Ulmann, i. pp. 203-218.

[50] Cp. Chmel, _Urkunden_, _Briefen_, etc., page 56. Marquard Breisacher to Maximilian, about Charles VIII., in Rome--"Darauss ich sorge, der Kung v. Frankreich werd auff das mindest die Kirchen reformieren und damit jm selbs in aller cristenheyt lob eer und auffsechen machen, das doch E. Ko. Mt. von götlichem und weltlichem rechtem me zu gepürett denn jm."

[51] Ulmann, i. 272-6.

[52] The more correct name of Emperor elect has been sunk for convenience sake.

[53] Afterwards the famous, or notorious, Ulric.

[54] "Und wo in der Zeit kein Gelt herkumbt, wirdet die Speisung an dem end auch still sten"! Dated May 27, 1496.--_Vertr. Briefwecksel_, page 109.

[55] Ranke, _Latin and Teutonic Nations_, page 109.

[56] In South Germany.

[57] Chmel, _Urkunden_, _Briefen_, etc.--Letter 126, Stangha to Maximilian (Sept. 30, 1496).

[58] Chmel, _ibid_.--Letter 127, Maximilian to Stangha (Genoa Oct. 1, 1496).

[59] Chmel, _ibid_.--Letter 146, Bishop of Concordia to Maximilian (Lindau, Dec. 26).

[60] This was written in 1507.--_Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato_, ed. Alberi, Serie I. vol. vi. page 26 sqq.

[61] Janssen, i. 593. Cp. Trithemius' view of the Hapsburg characteristic;--"Seelenruhe und Gottvertrauen beim Missgeschick; viel Noth, viel Ehr."

[62] Pirkheimer, quoted by Ranke, _Latin and Teut. Nations_, p. 149.

[63] The more so, as the Confederacy was joined by the Imperial cities of Schaffhausen and Basel.

[64] If Louis XII. died without male issue, Brittany and Burgundy were likewise to fall to Charles.

[65] "Il y a longtemps que François ont tousiours fait le piz qu'ilz ont peu a ceste maison, et n'ay espoir qu'ilz doyent changier," writes Chièvres to Maximilian 1506.

[66] By violating the perpetual Landfriede.

[67] Kirchberg, Weissenhorn, Marstetten, Neuburg-am-Inn, etc.

[68] Catherine, paternal aunt of Maximilian, married Charles, M. of Baden, whose son James was.

[69] Afterwards Adrian VI.

[70] Yet the people, Maximilian is convinced, are always on his side, and a few of the Cantons; "mes en sumarum il sount meschans, villains, prest pour traïre France on Almaingnes" (dated August 18, Lindau).--Le Glay, _Correspondance_, vol. i., letter 3.

[71] March 1, 1508, quoted Huber, iii. pp. 369, 370.

[72] Le Glay, i. p. 68 (dated July 4).

[73] Le Glay, i. p. 77 (dated July 23).

[74] Bishop of Gurk.

[75] Le Glay, i. letter 90 (dated Cambrai, December).

[76] Le Glay, i.--letter 143 (dated October 7).

[77] Le Glay, i.--letter 134 (Bassano, August 7).

[78] Le Glay, i.--letter 192 (Augsburg, April 6, 1510).

[79] Sanuto, x. 79, quoted by Huber, iii. 387.

[80] Chmel's _Urkunden_, etc., p. 470 (May 31, 1511).

[81] Le Glay, ii. p. 38--autograph letter, dated September 18, no year or place given. But A. Jäger, in _Kaiser Maximilians I. Verhältniss zum Papstthum_, p. 75, shows that 1511 was almost certainly the year.

[82] Le Glay, ii. p. 84 (dated January 21, 1513).

[83] Le Glay, Correspondance, vol. ii.--letter 554, page 221.

[84] Le Glay, ii.--letter 555.

[85] Le Glay, ii.--letter 556.

[86] Kings of Hungary and Poland were brothers.

[87] It is possible, however, that he was actuated by pique against his grandson, who had recently asserted his independence of control. (January 1515.)

[88] Quoted in Brewer, _Reign of Henry VIII._, page 125.

[89] Brewer, i. page 133.

[90] Huber, iii. page 407.

[91] Ala, Avio, Mori, and Brentonica.

[92] The early years of Charles V.'s reign do not disprove this assertion. For, though it was an Imperialist army which was responsible for the Sack of Rome in 1527, this was entirely composed of mercenaries, and Charles's predominance in Italy was due to his position as King of Spain and the Sicilies, and was won by the pikes of his Spanish infantry.

[93] He was called "Coeur d'Acier," by Olivier de la Marche.

[94] He hoped to obtain from Leo X. full recognition of himself as crowned Emperor, and, further, the grant of a tithe on church property in Germany for his projected Crusade.

[95] Bryce, _Holy Roman Empire_, page 126 (1st edition).

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