Chapter IV: for the proper coördination of the work of the Psychological

Examiner with the work of other officers in a camp.)

_Explanation of letter ratings._—The rating a man earns furnishes a fairly reliable index of his _ability to learn_, _to think quickly and accurately_, _to analyze a situation_, _to maintain a state of mental alertness_, _and to comprehend and follow instructions_. The score is little influenced by schooling. Some of the highest records have been made by men who had never completed the eighth grade. The meaning of the letter ratings is as follows:

A. _Very Superior Intelligence._ This grade is earned by only four or five soldiers out of a hundred. The “A” group is composed of men of marked intellectuality. “A” men are of high officer type when they are also endowed with leadership and other necessary qualities.

B. _Superior Intelligence._ “B” intelligence is superior, but less exceptional than that represented by “A.” The rating “B” is obtained by eight to ten soldiers out of a hundred. The group contains a good many men of the commissioned officer type and a large amount of non-commissioned officer material.

C+. _High Average Intelligence._ This group includes about fifteen to eighteen per cent. of all soldiers and contains a large amount of non-commissioned officer material with occasionally a man whose leadership and power to command fit him for commissioned rank.

C. _Average Intelligence._ Includes about twenty-five per cent. of soldiers. Excellent private type with a certain amount of fair non-commissioned officer material.

C−. _Low Average Intelligence._ Includes about twenty per cent. While below average in intelligence, “C−” men are usually good privates and satisfactory in work of routine nature.

D. _Inferior Intelligence._ Includes about fifteen per cent. of soldiers. “D” men are likely to be fair soldiers, but are usually slow in learning and rarely go above the rank of private. They are short on initiative and so require more than the usual amount of supervision. Many of them are illiterate or foreign.

D− and E. _Very Inferior Intelligence._ This group is divided into two classes (1) “D−” men, who are very inferior in intelligence but are considered fit for regular service; and (2) “E” men, those whose mental inferiority justifies their recommendation for Development Battalion, Special Service Organization, rejection, or discharge. The majority of “D−” and “E” men are below ten years in “mental age.”

The immense contrast between “A” and “D−” intelligence is shown by the fact that men of “A” intelligence have the ability to make a superior record in college or university, while “D−” men are of such inferior mentality that they are rarely able to go beyond the third or fourth grade of the elementary school, however long they attend. In fact, most “D−” and “E” men are below the “mental age” of ten years and at best are on the border-line of mental deficiency. Most of them are of the “moron” grade of feeble-mindedness. “B” intelligence is capable of making an average record in college, “C+” intelligence cannot do so well, while mentality of the “C” grade is rarely equal to high school graduation.

_Evidence that the Tests Measure Military Value._—It has been thoroughly demonstrated that the intelligence ratings are very useful in indicating practical military value. The following investigations are typical:

1. Commanding officers of ten different organizations representing various arms in a camp were asked to designate:

(_a_) The most efficient men in the organization;

(_b_) Men of average value;

(_c_) Men so inferior that they were “barely able” to perform their duties.

The officers of these organizations had been with their men from six to twelve months and knew them exceptionally well. The total number of men rated was 965, about equally divided among “best,” “average,” and “poorest.” After the officers’ ratings had been made, the men were given the usual psychological test. Comparison of test results with officers’ ratings showed:

(_a_) That the average score of the “best” group was approximately
twice as high as the average score of the “poorest” group.

(_b_) That of men testing below “C−” 70 per cent. were classed as
“poorest” and only 4.4 per cent. as “best.”

(_c_) That of men testing above “C+,” 15 per cent. were classed as
“poorest” and 55.5 per cent. as “best.”

(_d_) That the man who tests above “C+” is about fourteen times as
likely to be classed “best” as the man who tests below “C−.”

(_e_) That the per cent. classed as “best” in the various letter groups
increased steadily from 0 per cent. in “D−” to 57.7 per cent.
in “A,” while the per cent. classed as “poorest” decreased
steadily from 80 per cent. in “D−” to 11.5 per cent. in “A.”
The following table shows the per cents. for each letter group:

══════════════════════╤══════╤══════╤══════╤══════╤══════╤══════╤══════ │ D− │ D │ C− │ C │ C+ │ B │ A Total number │ 29│ 60│ 121│ 231│ 229│ 191│ 104 Classed with “best” │ 0.0%│ 6.7%│ 19.0%│ 26.0%│ 39.3%│ 53.4%│ 57.7% Classed with “poorest”│ 79.3%│ 66.0%│ 57.9%│ 31.2%│ 24.9%│ 16.7%│ 11.5% ──────────────────────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────

Considering that low military value may be caused by many things besides inferior intelligence, the above findings are very significant.

2. In an infantry regiment of another camp were 765 men (Regulars) who had been with their officers for several months. The company commanders were asked to rate these men as 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 according to “practical soldier value,” “1” being highest, and “5” lowest. The men were then tested, with the following results:

(_a_) Of 76 men who earned the grade A or B, none was rated “5” and
only 9 were rated “3” or “4.”

(_b_) Of 238 “D” and “D−” men, only one received the rating “1” and
only 7 received a rating of “2.”

(_c_) Psychological ratings and ratings by company commanders were
identical in 49.5 per cent. of all cases. There was agreement
within one step in 88.4 per cent. of cases, and disagreement of
more than two steps in only 7/10 of 1 per cent. of cases.

3. In another camp the company officers of a regiment were asked to designate the ten “best” and ten “poorest” privates in each company. The officers had been with their men long enough to know them thoroughly. Comparison of the officers’ estimates with the results of intelligence tests brought out the following facts:

(_a_) Of 156 men classed with the ten “best” in their respective
companies, only 9 tested below C−.

(_b_) Of 133 men classed with the “poorest” ten in their respective
companies, only 4 tested above C+.

(_c_) Men above C+ are 7.3 times as likely as men below C− to be
classed with the ten “best.”

(_d_) Men below C− are 10.8 times as likely as men above C+ to be
classed with the ten “poorest.”

(_e_) An “A” man is 11.7 times as likely as a man below C− to be rated
“best”; but a man below C− is 13.5 times as likely as an “A” to
be rated “poorest.”

4. The same experiment was made in still another camp. Officers of 36 different companies picked the ten “best” and the ten “poorest” men in each company. Of the “poorest,” 62.22 per cent. tested below C− and only 3.06 per cent. above C+. Of the “best,” 38 per cent. tested above C+ and only 9.72 per cent. below C−. According to this investigation, a man below C− is 6.4 times as likely to be “poorest” as to be “best.” A man above C+ is 12.5 times as likely to be “best” as to be “poorest.” A man rating A is 62 times as likely to be “best” as to be “poorest.” A man rating D− is 29.3 times as likely to be “poorest” as to be “best.”

5. Where commissioned officers are selected on the basis of trying out and “survival of the fittest” it is ordinarily found that about 80 per cent. are of the A or B grade, and only about 5 per cent. below the C+ grade. Of non-commissioned officers chosen by this method, about 75 per cent. are found to grade A, B, or C+, and only 5 per cent. below C. Moreover, there is a gradual rise in average score as we go from privates up through the ranks of privates first class, corporals, sergeants first class, O. T. S. candidates, and commissioned officers. This is seen in the following table:

═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════════════════════════════ │ PER CENT. EARNING EACH LETTER RATING ───────────────────────┼─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬───── Various Groups (Whites)│D− or│ │ │ │ │ │ │A and │ E │ D │ C− │ C │ C+ │ B │ A │ B 8,819 Commissioned │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Officers │0.0 │ 0.01│ .25│ 2.92│13.8 │34.6 │48.4 │83. 9,240 O.T.S. Candidates│0.0 │ 0.14│ .98│ 6.16│19.5 │36.4 │36.8 │73.2 3,393 Sergeants │0.0 │ 1.05│ 4.05│14.2 │27.3 │32.5 │20.9 │53.4 4,023 Corporals │0.0 │ 1.33│ 7.33│20.33│31.3 │26. │13.7 │39.7 81,114 Literate │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Privates │0.22 │10.24│21.48│28.79│20.48│12.38│ 6.37│18.75 10,803 Illiterate │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Privates │7.8 │41.16│29.11│14.67│ 4.43│ 1.95│ .52│ 2.47 ───────────────────────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────

6. Experience shows that “D” candidates admitted to Officers’ Training Schools almost never make good, and that the per cent. of elimination among the “C−” and “C” students is several times as high as among “A” students. For example, in one of the Fourth Officers’ Training Schools 100 per cent. of the “D” men were eliminated as unsatisfactory, 55 per cent. of the “C−” men, 14.8 per cent. of the “B” men, but only 2.7 per cent. of the “A” men. In another Fourth Officers’ Training School 76.2 per cent. of the men rating below C were eliminated in the first six weeks, 51.5 per cent. of the “C” men, and none at all of the “A” or “B” men. These findings are typical.

The psychological ratings are valuable not so much because they make a better classification than would come about in the course of time through natural selection, but chiefly because they greatly abbreviate this process by indicating _immediately_ the groups in which suitable officer material will be found, and at the same time those men whose mental inferiority warrants their elimination from regular units in order to prevent the retardation of training. Speed counts in a war that costs fifty million dollars per day and requires the minimum period of training.

_Directions for the Use of Intelligence Ratings._—In using the intelligence ratings the following points should be borne in mind:

1. The mental tests are not intended to replace other methods of judging a man’s value to the service. It would be a mistake to assume that they tell us infallibly what kind of soldier a man will make. They merely _help_ to do this by measuring one important element in a soldier’s equipment, namely, intelligence. They do not measure loyalty, bravery, power to command, or the emotional traits that make a man “carry on.” However, in the long run these qualities are far more likely to be found in men of superior intelligence than in men who are intellectually inferior. Intelligence is perhaps the most important single factor in soldier efficiency apart from physical fitness.

2. Commissioned officer material is found chiefly in the A and B groups, although of course not all high-score men have the other qualifications necessary for officers. Men below C+ should not be accepted as students in Officers’ Training Schools unless the score on the Officers’ Rating Scale indicates exceptional power of leadership and ability to command.

3. Since more than one fourth of enlisted men rate as high as C+, there is rarely justification for going below this grade in choosing non-commissioned officers. This is especially the case in view of the likelihood of promotion from non-commissioned rank. Even apart from considerations of promotion, it is desirable to avoid the appointment of mentally inferior men (below C) as non-commissioned officers. Several careful studies have shown that “C−” and “D” sergeants and corporals are extremely likely to be found unsatisfactory. The fact that a few make good does not justify the risk taken in their appointment.

4. Men below C+ are rarely equal to complicated paper work.

5. In selecting men for tasks of special responsibility the preference should be given to those of highest intelligence rating _who also have the other necessary qualifications_. If they make good they should be kept on the work or promoted; if they fail they should be replaced by men next on the list.

To aid in selecting men for occupational assignment, extensive data have been gathered on the range of intelligence scores found in various occupations. This material has been placed in the hands of the Personnel Officers for use in making assignments. It is suggested that those men who have an intelligence rating above the average in an occupation should be the first to be assigned to meet requirements in that occupation, and after that men with lower ratings should be considered.

6. In making assignments from the Depot Brigade to permanent organizations it is important to give each unit its proportion of superior, average, and inferior men. If this matter is left to chance there will inevitably be “weak links” in the army chain.

Exceptions to this rule should be made in favour of certain arms of the service which require more than the ordinary number of mentally superior men; e. g., Signal Corps, Machine Gun, Field Artillery and Engineers. These organizations ordinarily have about twice the usual proportion of “A” and “B” men and very much less than the usual proportion of “D” and “D−” men.

The first two columns in the following table illustrate the distribution of intelligence grades typical of infantry regiments and also the extreme differences in the mental strength of organizations which are built up without regard to intelligence ratings. The last column to the right shows a balanced distribution of intellectual strength which might have been made to each of these two regiments.

═════════════╤══════════════╤═══════════════════════════╤═════════════ INTELLIGENCE │INTERPRETATION│ ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION │ BALANCED RATING │ │ │DISTRIBUTION ─────────────┼──────────────┼─────────────┬─────────────┼───────────── │ │1st Regiment │2nd Regiment │ ─────────────┼──────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────┼───────────── A │Very Superior │ 1.0% │ 6.0% │ 3.5% B │Superior │ 3.0 │12.0 │ 7.5 C+ │High Average │ 7.0 │20.0 │13.5 C │Average │15.0 │28.0 │21.5 C− │Low Average │25.0 │19.0 │22.0 D │Inferior │31.0 │13.0 │22.0 D− │Very Inferior │18.0 │ 2.0 │10.0 ─────────────┴──────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────

Unless intelligence is wisely distributed certain regiments and companies will take training much more slowly than others and thus delay the programme of the whole organization.

7. “D” and “D−” men are rarely suited for tasks which require special skill, resourcefulness, or sustained alertness. It is also unsafe to expect “D,” “D−” or “E” men to read or understand written directions.

8. Only high-score men should be selected for tasks that require quick learning or rapid adjustments.

9. It should not be supposed that men who receive the same mental rating are necessarily of equal military worth. _A man’s value to the service should not be judged by his intelligence alone._

10. The intelligence rating is one of the most important aids to the Personnel Office in the rapid sorting of the masses of men in the Depot Brigade. _In no previous war has so much depended on the prompt and complete utilization of the mental ability of the individual soldier._ It is expected, therefore, that the psychological ratings will be regularly used as an aid in the selection, assignment, and classification of men.