Chapter II: Part 2

The army of General Blake was beaten at Espinora de los Monteros on the 10th and 11th of November; and the battle of Tudela on the 28th put to rout the army of Castanos. Sir John Moore had a most difficult card to play. His army was not assembled, his cavalry and artillery had not formed their junction, and a considerable distance divided him from the corps of Sir David Baird. He resolved therefore to abandon offensive operations, and directing this last-mentioned corps to retreat to Vigo, and there embark for Lisbon, he himself prepared to retire into Portugal. The direction of the French army upon Madrid changed, however, Sir John Moore’s determination. He stopped the movement of Sir David Baird, and ordered him to advance his corps to Benavente; from whence it was his intention to combine an operation with the whole British force upon the rear of Buonaparte.

General Soult commanded a corps of the French army upon the Carrion; Sir John Moore determined to attack him, and moved forward with that intention with the whole force under his command, which he had assembled on the 20th of December at Mayorga, combined with the corps of Romana upon his left. The British force amounted to 29,360 effective men. After severe marches, Sir John Moore reached Sahagun on the 21st of December, and prepared on the 23d to force the position of General Soult. He received, however, information that Buonaparte was marching upon Salamanca, and was seeking to surround his army. Sir John Moore instantly gave up the offensive, and retired in the greatest haste upon Benavente. When he arrived there, he found the advanced guard of Buonaparte’s army at a short distance from the place; and on the 29th of December, the British rear guard of cavalry distinguished itself in an affair with the cavalry of the imperial guard.

The superiority of the British was manifest on this occasion; they had in several preceding actions given samples of their bravery and good conduct; Lieutenant General Lord Paget and Major General the Honourable C. Stewart had led them on to the most decisive successes, and in an affair at Sahagun, on the 21st of December, had almost annihilated a regiment of French cavalry.

The fall of Madrid, after an inconsiderable resistance, had made a deep impression upon the mind of Sir John Moore; he looked with despondency upon the affairs of the Peninsula, after its surrender; and considered the great cause of Spanish independence completely lost. He had made one effort to relieve the southern provinces of Spain from the irruption with which they were threatened; he succeeded in diverting it against himself; and from that time he conceived that his first duty was to withdraw from the country. With that view he commenced his retreat into Gallicia; he at first determined to embark his army at Vigo; he afterwards led it to Corunna. It had been expected that he would have defended the strong ground he was passing over, but he continued his retreat, and once only, on the 8th of January at Lugo, offered battle to his pursuers[2]. The enemy was neither strong enough nor mad enough to accept it; and after a retreat, the most disastrous for an unbeaten but brave and gallant army that history records, Sir John Moore arrived at Corunna on the 11th of January 1809. He took up a position in front of the town to await the arrival of the transports; fortunately they were not long delayed; they reached the harbour on the 14th; and Sir John Moore prepared to embark his troops. Happily for the honour of the British army, though we must lament the loss that ensued, the French were too proud of the reputation they had gained against other armies, to permit the embarkation to be unmolested. They attacked the British corps, reduced by fatigue, by loss upon the march, by sickness, and by the absence of its cannon, which was already on board the transports; they attacked it when mustering only 16,000 men, placed in a bad position, with its retreat cut off if beaten; yet they were completely repulsed, with very severe loss, and a part of the position which they occupied before the action, was carried at the point of the bayonet, and maintained. The loss on the side of the British was considerable; Sir John Moore fell in the arms of victory; he died a death worthy of the character he had maintained through a long life of service and renown; he fell by a cannon-shot while directing a charge against the enemy, and commanded the respect, the admiration, and regret of his brother soldiers and his countrymen. Sir David Baird was severely wounded, and obliged to quit the field, and the command-devolved upon Sir John Hope. This officer withdrew his troops from the position, and embarked them in the course of the night and succeeding day; the rear-guard was commanded by Major General Beresford, and the whole army was embarked without loss, and sailed on the 17th of January; Thus ended the second campaign in which the British troops had been engaged in the Peninsula. It would be a melancholy task to canvass it throughout; the last action was worthy of the men that have since delivered Spain from its merciless invaders; but the movements which preceded it were far from being generally approved. Great difficulties were indeed opposed to Sir John Moore; but it would appear that in his own mind they were too highly rated. He discharged his duty to his country, however, with his utmost zeal. He died fighting to maintain its glory, and his name will ever be ranked amongst its heroes.

Footnote 2:

One of the principal causes of the uninterrupted continuation of this
retreat was the total failure of the Commissariat in the establishment
of the Magazines which had been directed to be formed on the line of
march now pursued by the army.

During the period of Sir John Moore’s campaign in Spain, Sir John Craddock had been appointed to the command of the British troops in Portugal. Their number was small, and varied considerably during the winter; some detachments which had been sent to Sir John Moore returned without having effected their junction, and many stragglers and sick from that army found their way into Portugal, and were formed into battalions. The brigade under Major General R. Stewart was also incorporated with the army under the orders of Sir John Craddock.

Before the retreat of Sir John Moore was known in England, a corps, under the orders of Major General Mackenzie, had been sent to Cadiz, with the view of being admitted as the garrison of that place. The conduct of the Spaniards, in refusing to allow the British army to enter Ferrol, although pressed by a superior enemy, made it necessary for the Government of England to secure a point of safety for its fleet and armies, before it could consent to the further co-operation of any British force in Spain. It therefore required, as a condition to the employment of an army for the defence of the southern provinces of the Peninsula, that a British force should be admitted within the walls of Cadiz. Much negotiation took place upon this point, but the Spanish Government at last refused the permission, and thus put an end to the proposed assistance of a British army.

The corps under Major General Mackenzie sailed from Cadiz to Lisbon, and added to the force under Sir John Craddock.

After the evacuation of Corunna, by Lieutenant General Sir John Hope, the French had entered it with two corps, those of Marshals Ney and Soult; the latter was detached, about the beginning of February, to the attack of Portugal. He succeeded, with little opposition, in occupying the country to the north of the Douro. In Oporto, the Portuguese force was collected to a considerable amount; but having neither discipline nor regularity, it was unable to oppose more than a feeble resistance to the French. Marshal Soult, who was anxious to strike terror amongst the inhabitants of Portugal, permitted his soldiers, after storming the town, and destroying an immense number of people, to continue their cruelties during several days. The plunder of the place was accompanied with every description of outrage; but the measure only succeeded in increasing the detestation in which the enemy was held, without effecting the subjugation of the country.

After the success of Buonaparte in the centre of Spain, and the expulsion of the English army from Gallicia, General Victor had been detached against the Spanish corps of General Cuesta, which was quartered about Medellin. After some previous movements a general battle was fought, in which the Spanish army was completely routed; it retired to the mountains about Monasterio, where, with the assistance of the reinforcements which were sent to it, it made head against the French army. Victor at this time concerted with Marshal Soult, in Oporto, a combined attack upon the unconquered provinces of Portugal. Soult was to move through Coimbra, upon Lisbon; while Victor was to co-operate from the Spanish frontier, through Portalegre, or Alcantara, upon Abrantes, and from thence to march upon the capital. Sir John Craddock had collected the British force, which had now become respectable from the different reinforcements which had arrived, in positions in front of Santarem, and upon the road to Coimbra, so as to be prepared to move upon either of the two French corps, which threatened to advance upon him. But on the 22nd of April, Sir Arthur Wellesley (who had been selected for the command in Portugal) arrived with some reinforcements, and assumed the direction of the army.

He decided to proceed instantly against the corps under Marshal Soult, in Oporto. He left a division under Major General Mackenzie, with the brigade of heavy cavalry under Major General Fane, at Abrantes, to watch the corps of Marshal Victor: some Portuguese were placed to observe the bridge of Alcantara, and with the rest of the army he proceeded to the Douro. By the rapidity of his movement, Sir Arthur Wellesley disconcerted the plans of the French; he drove their advance guard, in three days, from the Vouga to Oporto, and arrived on the Douro, opposite to that town, upon the 11th of May.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had detached Marshal Beresford, (who had lately been appointed to the command of the Portuguese army,) to pass the Douro, near Lamego, and to occupy Amaranthe; he had also directed General Silviera with the troops under his command, to retain possession of Chaves. By these movements he had hoped to enclose the French corps, in the north of Portugal. On the morning of the 12th he determined to cross the Douro, in face of the enemy, and to attack the town of Oporto, although the bridge had been destroyed, and the boats (with the exception of two that conveyed over the first soldiers) had been removed to the opposite side of the river.

No operation could be more difficult, or require greater bravery in the troops to execute, or talent in the general to combine; but complete success attended it. Marshal Soult was surprised; the British army passed the river in spite of every obstacle, and of the superior numbers which were brought to overwhelm the first regiments that crossed; and the French army was driven, with the loss of its sick and wounded, of great part of its baggage, and of a considerable number of guns, from the town of Oporto. Sir Arthur Wellesley pursued the French on the following day; Marshal Beresford had driven them from Amaranthe; so that, being pressed on all sides, they were obliged to abandon the whole of their guns and baggage, and to fly the country by the mountain roads to Orense; their rear was several times attacked, but the main body could not be attained; and Sir Arthur Wellesley, unable any longer to pursue an enemy who had abandoned every thing which constitutes an army, and who fled without artillery, baggage, or equipment, halted on the 18th at Monte Alegre, and gave up the pursuit.

This short campaign, of only ten days, is perhaps the most brilliant that ever has been executed. Marshal Soult, represented as the best officer in the French army, had occupied the northern provinces of Portugal, for upwards of two months; he had contemplated the entire conquest of the country, and was employed in organizing the necessary means. To defend himself from any attack, he had the Vouga, and the Douro, both formidable rivers, and the advantage of the strongest country in the Peninsula; he had a force equal in amount to the British, or within very little of it, and in a state of superior military organization. He had a perfect knowledge of the country; he commanded its resources; and was in every way formidable from his talents and his means. Yet the genius of Sir Arthur Wellesley deprived him at once of the advantages of which he was possessed. In the space of four days he was driven from Coimbra to the Douro; and in six days after, not having had the time or opportunity of defending himself in a single position, he was chased from the frontiers of Portugal.

The movements of the Portuguese about Chaves had disappointed the expectations of Sir Arthur Wellesley, or his triumph would have been more complete. He had entertained the hope of surrounding the French army; but by the non-execution of a part of his plan the individuals who composed it escaped; but there never was a more disgraceful escape; or a retreat (if it deserve that name, and not a flight) more humiliating to the officer who conducted it.

Lieutenant General Paget, who had displayed the greatest talent and bravery in the attacks he conducted, with the advanced guard under his command, before his arrival upon the Douro, passed that river with the first company of the Buffs; and having most gallantly sustained the desperate attack of the enemy upon the few troops under his orders, which had as yet arrived upon the Oporto side of the river, was unfortunately wounded in the arm, and suffered amputation. Major Hervey also lost his arm, in a most gallant charge of the 14th light dragoons, which he had led.

Whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley had been engaged in the pursuit of Marshal Soult, Marshal Victor had made a movement upon the bridge of Alcantara, and had threatened to enter Portugal in that direction; the bridge was destroyed, and Marshal Victor made no further advance; but Sir Arthur Wellesley, after making the necessary dispositions for the security of the northern frontiers of Portugal, brought back his army to the Tagus. The state of the French in the Peninsula, at this moment, was as follows. Marshal Ney was at Corunna, Soult was retreating from Portugal, and Mortier was at Valladolid; these corps together amounted to about 60,000 effective men, and kept the provinces of Gallicia, Asturias, Biscay, and Castile, in tolerable subjection. There were other corps employed in those provinces, but the amount of force of which we have spoken, was to a certain degree disposable. In the centre of Spain, Victor was at Merida; Sebastiani in La Mancha; and Joseph, with Jourdan, at Madrid; their force amounted to 50,000 men; Suchet was at Saragossa, in occupation of Arragon, with a corps of 20,000 men. The French force in Catalonia was considerable, but, from the state of that province, it could not be disposable for any offensive operations.

The distribution of the Spanish force was, General Cuesta at Monasterio, with 40,000 men, mostly recruits; Vanegas, with 25,000 in the Carolina; Romana, with 25,000 in different parts of Gallicia; and General Blake, with 20,000 in Valencia. There were several other corps in different quarters, of small amount, but which could not be considered as efficient for the duties of a campaign. In Portugal, the army of Sir Arthur Wellesley consisted of about 22,000 effective infantry, and 2,500 cavalry. The Portuguese, under Marshal Beresford, were as yet backward in organization, but amounted to about 15,000 men, collected and ready to take the field; besides the troops in garrisons, depôts, &c. According to this estimate, the French had a force of 130,000 effective men, while that opposed to them was about 150,000.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, upon his arrival on the Tagus, determined, if possible, to liberate Madrid. To effect this object, he proposed to bring the greater part of his own force, with that under General Cuesta, and the corps under General Vanegas, amounting in the whole to near 90,000 men, to operate upon the forces of Joseph, Victor, and Sebastiani, estimated at 50,000. He proposed to leave Marshal Beresford, in conjunction with the Duke del Parque, to watch Soult, from the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and he hoped that the troops under Romana would give sufficient employment to Marshal Ney, in Gallicia.

During the month of June, Victor, (in consequence of the successful operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley against Soult, and his return upon the Tagus) withdrew his corps from the neighbourhood of Monasterio, crossed the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz, and took up a position at Talavera de la Reyna; General Cuesta followed him to that place, but finding him in position, retired to Almaraz, where he remained, with his advance corps, under the Duke of Albuquerque, at Arzobispo. Towards the end of the same month, Marshal Soult arrived with the corps under his command, at Puebla di Senabria, from whence he marched to Zamora and Salamanca.

In this state of things, Sir Arthur Wellesley (after having received the most distinct declarations from the supreme Government of Spain that his army should be supplied with provisions) advanced on the 25th and 26th of June, from Abrantes, towards Placencia. Marshal Beresford moved at the same time to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. Sir Arthur Wellesley went on the 12th to the head-quarters of General Cuesta, at Casas del Puerta, near the bridge of Almaraz, to concert with him the operations of the campaign. He proposed as the first object, to occupy in strength the positions of Baños and Bejar, which commanded the only road from Upper Castile into Estremadura, and the country about Coria, and Placencia. Sir Arthur Wellesley, (aware that his own army was the only one that was efficient for the operations of a campaign,) recommended that a corps of Spaniards should be destined for this service.

It has since been known, that amongst the numberless intriguers who at this moment sought to disunite the counsels of the allies, one of the most busy had awakened the jealousy of General Cuesta upon this point, and had represented to him, that the English general, with a view of weakening the Spanish force in the field, would recommend him to make a considerable detachment from his army. When the recommendation was given, therefore, General Cuesta was convinced that the information he had received was correct; and from the violence of his own nature, could not easily repress his resentment at a proposal, which he thought was intended to reduce his army, for the purpose of diminishing his share of glory in the expulsion of the French from Madrid; a result which he anticipated from the movements about to be carried into execution. General O’Donaju, the adjutant-general of the Spanish army, prevailed upon him, however, to agree to the arrangement, but General Cuesta never carried it fairly into effect. The small force he afterwards sent to Bejar was incompetent to any resistance, and was totally unprovided, even with ammunition.

The remainder of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was, that his army should join that of General Cuesta, and should advance in the first instance to the attack of Victor at Talavera. By a movement in co-operation, General Vanegas was ordered to break up from the position in La Mancha, about Madrilejos; to march upon Pembleque and Ocaña, and pass the Tagus at Fuente Dueñas; where he was to arrive on the same day, the 22d of July, that the armies under Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Cuesta, were to arrive at Talavera, and attack the corps of Victor. General Vanegas received this order, and agreed to its execution. Sir Arthur Wellesley removed his army from Placencia, according to the plan which had been arranged; passed the Tietar, and arrived at Oropesa on the 20th of July; where he effected his junction with the army under the orders of General Cuesta, amounting to 35,000 effective men. The next day, the Spanish army advanced towards Talavera; and on the 22d the British corps moved forward to the same place. While upon his march, Sir Arthur Wellesley received several messages from General Cuesta, stating that the enemy was disposed to attack him. Sir Arthur Wellesley pushed forward, but upon reaching the ground, found only two squadrons of French, who had come from Talavera to reconnoitre the position of the Spaniards.

The light troops of both armies advanced upon the rear-guard of the French, the Spanish cavalry attempted to charge it, but without effect, and the whole French army took up a position upon the heights, to the eastward of the Alberche. The British and Spanish armies occupied the ground about Talavera with their advance upon the right of the same river. Sir Arthur Wellesley had expected to hear from General Vanegas: according to the orders which had been sent to him, he should have been at Fuente Dueñas upon the 22d; but from every information which could be obtained, no movement appeared to have been made by him. The history of the defection of his corps deserves to be recorded. When General Vanegas received the orders from General Cuesta to move upon Madrid, he returned for answer, that he would do so; he despatched, however, at the same time, a courier to the supreme Junta, communicating to it the orders he had received. That body replied, that he was not to execute the movement, but to await its further commands in the positions which he occupied. These directions, (which were neither announced to Sir Arthur Wellesley nor to General Cuesta), arrived in time to stop General Vanegas. It was difficult to explain the motive of this conduct; but it was afterwards discovered that the supreme Junta, amongst other reasons, was not anxious that General Cuesta should enter Madrid. He was supposed to entertain sentiments hostile to many of those who composed it, and not friendly to the whole body; the Junta, therefore, feared, that if he reached Madrid, he would effect a counter-revolution, and place himself at the head of the government; or at least overturn the Junta’s power. This explanation of its motive gained considerable weight from the conduct of that body, when it received General Cuesta’s despatches, stating that he had formed his junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and was proceeding to Madrid. The Junta then, with as much alacrity as it had sent counter-orders before, directed General Vanegas to move forward, and constituted him Captain-General of the province of Madrid; so that, upon his arrival there, he would be superior to General Cuesta, under whose orders up to that moment he had been placed. Although by this conduct the general effect of the plan proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley was destroyed, yet he resolved to attack the corps of Marshal Victor, and on the morning of the 23d moved his columns for that purpose into a wood close to the Alberche, and stretching along the right of the French army.

The plan of the movement which he determined upon, was to cross the river, attack the right of Marshal Victor with the whole of the British infantry, move the whole cavalry upon the centre of the enemy, and engage their left with the Spanish infantry.

The corps of Marshal Victor was 22,000 men; the allied army was 50,000. The troops of which it was composed were not all of equally good materials; but the number of English only would almost have secured success if the attack had taken place. General Cuesta, however, refused to march till the following morning; and Sir Arthur Wellesley with considerable reluctance was constrained to yield to his determination. Some alterations were made in the course of the night in the disposition of the troops. General Bassecour, with a Spanish division, was ordered to the left of the British, and was to have passed the Alberche in the rear of the enemy. Sir R. Wilson, who commanded a corps of light troops, Spanish and Portuguese, was also ordered still further along the banks of the Alberche to Escalona.

Marshal Victor, however, got information of the intended attack, and retired from his position in the night. Nothing could have been more unfortunate for the allied army; infinitely superior in numbers, it was at the point of making a combined attack upon him, from which it would seem almost impossible he should have escaped without considerable loss; by his retreat unhurt, the nature of the campaign was changed, and the bright prospects of the allies destroyed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, since his arrival at Talavera, had complained of the total failure on the part of the Spaniards in the supply of his army with provisions. The necessities of the British troops made it impossible to advance; and after the retreat of the French army, Sir Arthur Wellesley was compelled to remain at Talavera till supplies should arrive to him: but recommended the Spaniards, who had not the same deficiencies, to move upon Cavalla, upon the road to Toledo, and endeavour to communicate with General Vanegas, who was still supposed to have made some movement in La Mancha. General Cuesta, however, without communicating with Sir Arthur Wellesley, took the road to Sta. Olalla, where he arrived with the whole Spanish army on the morning of the 25th. From this place he gave notice of the defection of the corps of Vanegas.

On the morning of the 26th General Cuesta’s advance was attacked by the advanced guard of the French army. It appeared that Joseph had called General Sebastiani from La Mancha to Toledo; that with all the force he could withdraw from Madrid, he had marched himself to join him; and that he had formed a junction with these two corps and the corps of General Victor, at or near Torrijos; that he had immediately advanced upon General Cuesta; and was in hopes of beating him before he should be joined by the British. General Cuesta, however, upon learning the force of the enemy, retired to Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley had endeavoured to find a situation in which to fight a battle in front of the Alberche; but not having succeeded, determined to take up a position, the right upon the town of Talavera, the left upon some heights, about a mile to the northward of it. The Spanish army retired during the 26th and 27th, and took up the ground marked out for it about the town of Talavera. On the morning of the 27th Sir Arthur Wellesley sent a brigade of cavalry and two brigades of infantry; the whole under the orders of Major General Mackenzie, to watch the enemy upon the left of the Alberche, and to protect the retreat of the Spaniards.

Towards two o’clock in the afternoon the French advance of cavalry began to skirmish with the British. Major General Mackenzie soon after retired, and about four o’clock passed the Alberche with the whole of his corps. He took up a position in a wood upon the right bank of it, from which he could observe the movements of the enemy.

Joseph had brought the whole of his army to the opposite side of the river; and believing (from the small number of troops that were to be seen upon the right bank,) that the allies were retreating, he determined to push in their advanced guard immediately, with the hope of falling upon their army on its march to the bridge of Almaraz; to which place alone, after abandoning the line of the Alberche, he thought it could be retiring. The French infantry passed the river; the brigade of Colonel Donkin, which was posted to defend it, was to a certain degree surprised. The river was fordable at all points, and the French advanced guard fell upon this brigade and caused it considerable loss. Sir Arthur Wellesley (who had just arrived upon the ground) ordered the whole of Major General Mackenzie’s division to retire from the wood, and to fall back upon the position in the rear, into which the army was at this time moving. The French, elated with their first, successes, pushed forward as rapidly as the passage of their troops would allow, and threw their right forward, with the view of turning the town of Talavera. The Duke of Albuquerque shewed, however, so good a front with the cavalry under his orders (which was in a plain upon the left of the British,) that this movement was considerably delayed. Sir Arthur Wellesley was tempted, (while a part only of the French army had passed the Alberche), to attack it with the whole of the allies; but upon considering the lateness of the hour, he continued his movement to the position he had fixed upon. The British advanced guard retired under cover of the cavalry, and took up the ground allotted to it. The French continued to press forward; and, at last, when it was nearly dark, brought a battery of six guns, supported by a considerable corps of infantry, to some high ground opposite the height upon which the left of the British was to rest. The troops destined for this point had not at that moment reached it. Colonel Donkin’s brigade, which was retiring near it, was ordered to form at the foot of the hill upon the left of the Germans under General Sherbrooke. But the French, supported by their guns, attacked these corps, drove them from the ground they occupied, and carried the height. Lieutenant General Hill’s and Major General R. Stewart’s brigades were at that moment ascending it from the other side; their advance found the French upon the top. The battalion of detachments under Colonel Bunbury wheeled into line, charged, and retook the hill. The French, however, returned to the attack, but were finally driven to the foot of it. The action upon this point was severe; Major General Hill was at one moment mixed with the French soldiers; several men of both armies were killed or wounded with the bayonet, but the gallantry of British soldiers, and the intrepidity of their officers, prevailed.

During this attack, the Spanish troops were alarmed by the fire of the French, who were following the British cavalry in its retreat through the centre of the allies; they immediately began a fire which was taken up by the whole of the first line. Several of the officers of the Guards who were standing in front of their men, and many of the light troops of the Germans who were posted in advance, were killed or wounded by this fire. The French, however, were checked by it, and remained without making any further attack during the night. It appeared afterwards that the French officers discovered that the whole army was in front of Talavera, only from the firing which has just been described; they were ignorant of any position about that town, and, therefore, till then, had given out to their soldiers that the allied army was retiring.

At day-break on the 28th the French recommenced their attack with 14,000 men, by assaulting the hill from which they had been driven the night before. Their troops had been collected during dark, and were formed at the bottom of the height; they moved at a signal given, and succeeded in ascending to a considerable distance before they were checked by the fire of the British. From the conical shape of this hill it was difficult to form any considerable number of men to defend it: but the regiments which were on it charged the French troops with an impetuosity they were unable to resist, and drove them, with considerable loss and in total confusion, beyond the ground from which they had moved to the attack.

The British cavalry had been ordered up to charge the French right as they were retiring, but unfortunately it was at too great a distance to effect this object.

After the failure of this attempt upon the hill, the French continued to cannonade the British line for a considerable time; but the fire ceased at length on both sides, and perfect tranquillity reigned throughout the opposing armies. During this interval, Sir Arthur Wellesley communicated with General Cuesta near a house in the centre of the lines, and afterwards slept, till some fresh movements in the enemy’s camp were reported to him.

Joseph, having been defeated in the several efforts he had made upon the British left, determined to try his fortune upon the centre of the allied army. The attack which followed was made under cover of a wood of olives, and fell principally upon the brigade commanded by Major General Alexander Campbell; this officer had taken advantage of some high banks which intersected the ground he occupied, and through the means of which he was enabled, with a very inferior force, to arrest the progress of the enemy’s principal column. Being at one time, however, driven from one of these banks, he rallied the regiment which was retiring, charged the column which was pursuing him, drove it from the ground of which it had taken possession, and took twelve pieces of artillery; at the same time some squadrons of the Spanish regiment of cavalry of the King, charged the head of a French column of infantry which was advancing through the wood (in pursuit of some Spanish infantry that had given way,) and cut up a considerable part of it. Thus terminated the second attack of the memorable 28th of July; the enemy was completely repulsed, with the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery upon different points, and a very considerable number of his best troops. His failures seemed decisive of the day; another pause ensued, considerable movements on the part of the enemy were observed, and for some time were construed by the allied army as indicative of a retreat; but the severest action was yet to come.

The whole état major of the French was observed to have collected in front of the left of the British; after some consultation amongst the officers who composed it, they appeared to have decided upon a new arrangement of their army. The aides-de-camp were despatched in different directions, and soon after the French divisions were observed to be moving to their new destinations. It now seemed to be the intention of the enemy to bring the great body of his force to act upon that part of the British line which was occupied by the Guards; and, at the same time, to move with three columns of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, along the valley which extended under the height which formed the left of the British line. These columns were supported by some light infantry, which the enemy had thrown upon the chain of hills which run westward beyond the valley, and which were destined to turn the British left and attack it upon the flank and rear.

To meet this movement Sir Arthur Wellesley directed the cavalry (which was concealed in the valley) to be prepared to charge the columns of infantry, as soon as they should have extended their formation, and exposed their flank. He also directed the guards to be prepared for the attack which was going to be made upon them, and upon no account to move from the ground they occupied.

The French columns of infantry which had moved into the valley, were more advanced than those destined for the attack upon the Guards; they had halted near a house within gun-shot of the British left, and appeared to be waiting for orders to advance. Major General Payne, who commanded the British cavalry, seized this opportunity to attack them; the enemy, observing the forward movement of the cavalry, formed himself against the side of this house in solid column; he had a deep ravine, or water-course, along his front, of which the British cavalry was not aware, and he was besides supported by sixteen guns. The charge of the cavalry was thrown into confusion by this ravine; many of the horses fell into it; and the portion which got over it was so divided and broken as a body, that the effect of the charge was completely done away. The bravery of the British soldier was not, however, to be daunted by this check. The Honourable Major Ponsonby led the men who were near him upon the bayonets of the enemy; but their valour could not compensate for the total confusion into which they had been thrown. The bravery of individuals could effect nothing against a solid body of infantry; the soldiers who were repulsed by the French columns galloped forward upon the regiment of cavalry which supported them, and in a short time the whole plain was covered with British dragoons dispersed in all directions, and totally without formation. In this state they were charged by some French regiments which were in reserve; many of them were taken, the remainder passed through the intervals in the French columns, and those that escaped their fire, (of whom Lord William Russel was one), retired within the British lines.

In this attack the 23d Light Dragoons lost two-thirds of its number; its charge was injudicious; the ground in front had not been reconnoitred, and the French infantry was too strongly posted to promise it success. The order for the cavalry was to charge when the French columns had extended and exposed their flank. They had done neither when the attack was made, but the bravery with which it was conducted, put an end to the movements which the enemy had intended on that side; and he never stirred afterwards from the ground upon which he was formed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley observed this hesitation, and profited by it, in detaching the 48th Regiment, (which he had called for the defence of the height when it was threatened with an attack), to support the movement which the guards had at this moment made upon the enemy. These troops, with a part of Major General Cameron’s brigade, had been attacked by the whole reserve of the French army; but they had received it with so tremendous a fire, that they forced it to give way; charged it with great impetuosity; and pursued it into a wood. They had not proceeded to any great distance, however, when the enemy brought so considerable a number of guns to bear upon their flank, that in a very few moments all their mounted officers were killed or wounded and near 500 of their men. In this situation the Guards were forced to fall back in considerable confusion: they passed through the intervals of the 48th Regiment, which had just arrived to support them, and which checked the advance of the enemy. The attack was most severe upon this regiment; it maintained its ground in the most gallant manner, till the guards had re-formed, and moved forward to its support. When the French perceived these troops advancing, they retired; the Guards instantly huzza’d; the cry was echoed along the whole line; the enemy continued their retreat; and thus ended the last achievement of the battle of Talavera. The enemy was soon perceived to be moving to the rear; he shewed a considerable force of cavalry, and maintained a heavy cannonade to cover the retreat; and at the close of the day he had already passed a portion of his troops across the Alberche.

There never was a more extraordinary battle than the one which has now been described: the French brought into the field a force of not less than 47,000 men, and the whole of their attacks, with the most trifling exception, were directed against the British army, not exceeding 18,000 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry. Yet the British general had nerve to maintain the contest, and ability to baffle the efforts of the enemy. The army displayed a courage and perseverance, which did justice to the confidence with which its commander had relied upon it; and proved to Spain and to the world, what the dauntless spirit of the British soldier is capable of effecting, when under the direction of such an officer.

The enemy did justice to the talent of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and to the unrivalled bravery of his troops; Marshal Victor admitted to an English officer who was taken prisoner, that much as he had heard of the gallantry of English soldiers, still he could not have believed that any men could have been led to attacks so desperate as some that he had witnessed in the battle of Talavera. The glory of the British arms shone forth in brighter colours on this memorable day than it had ever done amidst its countless triumphs of years preceding. The soldiers struggled against privations of every description; as well as against a force which seemed calculated to overwhelm them; their native valour spurred them on to conquest, and stifled every feeling which could arrest or make it doubtful.

On the morning of the 29th, the light division of 3,000 men, under Major General Crawford, joined the army from Oropesa; it was immediately ordered to form the advance, and take up a position in the front of the field of battle. The allies were employed in attending their wounded, and burying or burning the dead of both armies.

The British loss was 5,000 men in killed or wounded; the loss of the Spaniards was much inferior. The French loss was estimated by themselves at 14,000 men. Joseph retired in the course of the 29th with the greatest part of his army, to Sta. Olalla; a rear guard of 6,000 men was left at Casas Leguas, to cover his retreat, but it retired on the night of the 30th, and joined the corps to which it belonged, near Toledo.

The army of General Vanegas, which had advanced from Madrilejos, in obedience to the orders of the supreme Junta, had arrived upon the Tagus, near Aranjuez and Toledo on the 28th. The advance of his corps pushed on in the night to within a short distance of Madrid, and took some patroles which had been sent out from the garrison; but General Vanegas having heard that the French army was retreating towards the capital from the field of Talavera, recalled the parties that had crossed the Tagus, and abandoned any further offensive operations. Sir Arthur Wellesley (who was still unable to advance, from the total want of provisions in which the Spaniards kept him) recommended to General Cuesta to form a junction with General Vanegas; but while this movement was in contemplation, information was brought from Placencia, that the corps of Soult was moving upon that town, and that the troops at Bejar, hearing of its advance, had abandoned that position, and left the road open to its march. Sir Arthur Wellesley could hardly believe that the strong positions about Bejar had been so hastily given up; the corps of Marshal Beresford was ready to have assisted the troops in occupation of them, and a brigade of British, under the orders of Major General Catling Crawford, was within a few days’ march, and would have assisted in their defence. But the intelligence being soon after confirmed, Sir Arthur Wellesley decided to carry the British army to attack General Soult; and proposed to General Cuesta to remain in the position of Talavera, to cover the movement of the English upon Placencia. Sir Arthur Wellesley also proposed to leave his wounded in charge of General Cuesta, to whose kindness and generosity he intrusted them, with a solemn promise from him, that if any thing should oblige the Spanish army to retire, his first care should be, to move the British to a place of safety. General Cuesta was delighted with the plan which was proposed to him. He felt that his own army was unequal to any contest with the French in an open plain, and that it must be to the British only, that he could look for the expulsion of the enemy from his rear; he also expressed himself most particularly gratified by the confidence which Sir Arthur Wellesley reposed in him, intrusting the wounded to his care.

The necessary arrangements being made, and Major General Mackinnon placed in the command of the hospitals at Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley marched on the morning of the 3d of August for Oropesa. A short time after his arrival at that place, he learnt that the advanced guard of Soult’s army was arrived at Naval Moral, and that the Spaniards, who had retired from Bejar, had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and destroyed the bridge; he determined, however, to move upon the French, and was in hopes of finding them the following day. General Bassecour, with a Spanish division, was moving along the Tietar, and was destined to act upon the left and rear of the French. About four o’clock in the afternoon, however, a despatch arrived from General Cuesta, announcing to Sir Arthur Wellesley, that, from intelligence upon which he could rely, he was persuaded that the corps of Marshal Ney had evacuated Gallicia, and formed a junction with the corps of Marshal Mortier, from Valladolid; that the two were united with Marshal Soult; and that the amount of the collected force upon the rear of the allied army, could not be less than 55,000 men; that Marshal Victor was at no great distance from Talavera, upon the other side; that he (General Cuesta) apprehended an attack from him; and had in consequence determined to break up immediately from that town, and join Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa. This information was as disastrous as it was unexpected: the letter from General Cuesta further stated, that his movement was already begun, and that his army would form its junction with the British in the course of the night: there remained, therefore, no hope of preventing or delaying it, and the whole plan, upon which Sir Arthur Wellesley had undertaken his operation, was at once destroyed.

The bridge of Almaraz was no longer in existence; the bridge of Arzobispo was exposed, by the abandonment of Talavera, to the corps of Victor, and the whole allied army, if it advanced, might be cut off from any retreat across the Tagus, while its movement upon Portugal must depend upon the success of its attack upon the combined army of Ney, Soult, and Mortier. In this situation of affairs Sir Arthur Wellesley did not hesitate to give up offensive operations, and retire across the Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had every reason to complain of the conduct of General Cuesta; he had abandoned the position intrusted to him, without any ground for so doing; for it afterwards appeared that Victor was at some distance from Talavera, and not occupied in a movement upon the corps of General Cuesta; but, at any rate, the Spaniards evacuated the post intrusted to them, and abandoned the British wounded, with a precipitancy that nothing but the actual presence of an enemy could justify. If General Cuesta was actuated by a desire of bringing his army to the assistance of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was about to attack a force which he had reason to believe was superior to him, he ought to have waited a few hours, till he had communicated with him, and in the mean time, he should have given assistance to the removal of the British wounded. If he thought that the return of a messenger from Oropesa (a distance of only five leagues), would have exposed him by too much delay, he ought at least to have left a corps to check the enemy in his front, and to have protected the retreat of the hospitals. And, last of all, it was his duty, to which he had also pledged himself in the most solemn manner, to have given all the means in his power to facilitate the removal of the British wounded. He did, however, the direct reverse: he abandoned his position with his whole army, without communication with Sir Arthur Wellesley; (indeed, he precluded the possibility of any, by stating in his letter that his army was in march); and to the wounded, instead of every assistance he could command, he gave but _four carts_, for the whole 4,000 men. It is impossible to conceive, that the importance of the occupation of Talavera, to the movement of Sir Arthur Wellesley, should have escaped the observation of General Cuesta, the ground about that town afforded the only situation in which the advance of the French army upon the rear of the British, while moving upon Soult, could possibly be resisted; the rest of the country was plain, and offered no defensive position; so that in abandoning it, General Cuesta exposed the whole allied army to an attack, in front and rear. In short, it is very difficult to discover a sound or equitable reason for the precipitancy with which this movement was executed; but the total disregard which was shewn to the British wounded, the paltry number of four carts which was afforded them, by an army that was provided with them to excess, remains a stain upon the character of General Cuesta, that no time will ever efface.

Sir Arthur Wellesley moved his army, upon the morning of the 4th of August, to the bridge of Arzobispo; the nature of the campaign was changed; Gallicia was delivered from the French; and the corps of Romana was now in peaceable possession of it, with the opportunity of augmenting its own numbers, and improving its discipline; the whole province was in a situation to dispose of its military means, and to create, in a short time, a powerful diversion, upon the rear of the enemy assembled upon the Tagus. The north of Spain was almost entirely in the same situation as Gallicia. The French had abandoned it, with very few exceptions, to concentrate their force against the British army; and Sir Arthur Wellesley conceived, that although he had been foiled in his attempt to rescue Madrid, yet he had restored independence to Gallicia, and in great part to the provinces adjoining it; which might, in the end, prove most advantageous to the cause of Spain. This opinion has since been proved to be correct; Gallicia retained its freedom, and the other northern provinces were never afterwards but in partial subjection to the enemy.

As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley had crossed the Tagus at Arzobispo, he detached Major General Crawford, with the light division, to occupy, with as much rapidity as possible, the pass at Almaraz; where it was to be feared the enemy, whose advanced guard had seen the passage of the allies at Arzobispo, might push a force across the Tagus, and endeavour to intercept the British army on its march upon Deleytosa. Major General Crawford arrived, however, in time to prevent that operation; the movement of the army was undisturbed; General Cuesta remained at Arzobispo; and the British moved to Deleytosa. The Spaniards were, however, attacked a few days after by the French at Arzobispo; their advanced guard was driven from the bridge; and their whole army retired to Deleytosa, whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley moved to Jaraseco.