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Chapter XI (3)

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The subject is fully gone into in “Considerations on behalf of the
Officers of the Indian Artillery and Engineer Corps,” by
Lieutenant-Colonel James Young, of the artillery. Published in 1816.

Footnote 72:

During the most severe part of this affair, a circumstance occurred
truly creditable to the character of this officer, and fully
substantiated by the testimony of an eye-witness. An European horse
artilleryman fell deadly wounded, and on his comrades attempting to
carry him to the rear, he entreated them to desist, adding, “I know I
must die, and I only wish to shake Lieutenant Mathison by the hand
before I die.” His wish was immediately gratified, and he expired
uttering “God bless you.”

Footnote 73:

The artillery were in front, and the first gun that opened was a
Madras horse-artillery gun under Lieutenant Hunter, which killed the
enemy’s beenee-wala, or quarter-master-general, upon which they took
to flight. One of Captain Hunter’s two guns sticking on the stump of a
tree, Lieutenant Crawford moved on with the other, accompanying
Captain Rodber’s guns.

Footnote 74:

Lieutenant Crawford says, “After a five-mile gallop we pulled up,
having no troops near but about 80 of the 5th cavalry, and so dead
beat were we all with the long march and gallop, that the Peshwah and
those with him, being fresh, got off easily.”

Footnote 75:

The explosion of a shell we believe.

Footnote 76:

2 24-pounder guns
22 18-pounder guns
4 12-pounder guns
3 12-pounder guns brass
16 6-pounder guns
14 —— -pounder guns gallopers
4 10-inch mortars
8 8-inch mortars
9 5½-inch mortars
6 8-inch howitzers
7 5½-inch howitzers
4 4⅖-inch howitzers

Footnote 77:

The 6th independent company of golundaz, and 40th company of gun
lascars were reduced on their return from Ceylon in March, 1819.

Footnote 78:

Joined in December, 1824.

Footnote 79:

Maharajah Bulwunt Sing succeeded his father in 1824, and was dethroned
by his cousin, Durjun Sal in March, 1825.

Footnote 80:

16 24-pounders,
20 18-pounders,
4 12-pounders,
12 8-inch howitzers,
2 13-inch mortars,
12 10-inch mortars,
46 8-inch mortars.

Footnote 81:

─────────────┬─────────────
2nd company,│ 1st brigade
─────────────┼─────────────
1st company,│ 2nd brigade
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
1st company,│ 3rd brigade
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│1st battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
1st company│3rd battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│4th battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│6th battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
5th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
13th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
17th company,│ 〃
─────────────┴─────────────

Footnote 82:

The daily expenditure of ammunition and artillery details of this
siege will be found in the East-India United Service Journal for 1837.

Footnote 83:

R. A. P. R. A. P.

Lieut.-Colonel 1,032 4 0 752 14 0 per mensem.
Major 789 3 0 580 14 6 per mensem.
Captain 433 10 0 354 13 0 per mensem.
1st Lieutenant 265 12 0 209 14 0 per mensem.
2nd Lieutenant 213 5 0 167 10 6 per mensem.

Footnote 84:

R. A. P.

Lieutenant-Colonel per mensem 827 14 0
Major 580 14 6
Captain 392 5 0
1st Lieutenant 234 14 0
2nd Lieutenant 192 10 6

Footnote 85:

The effect is clearly shown in the brigading the late army of the
Sutlej, where the army, consisting of fifteen cavalry and thirty-seven
infantry regiments, formed into six divisions and sixteen brigades,
was thus commanded:—

Cavalry regiments 3 Queen’s, 12 Company’s
Infantry regiments 8 Queen’s, 29 Company’s
Division Commanders 4 Queen’s, 2 Company’s
Brigade regiments 7 Queen’s, 9 Company’s

Of the cavalry, although four-fifths were Company’s regiments, the
division and three of the brigade commands fell to H.M.’s service.

Footnote 86:

1st company, 3rd battalion, and field-battery.
Detail of golundaz, and 2 6-pounders.
Gwalior contingent battery.
6 18-pounders.
2 8-inch howitzers.
4 8-inch mortars.

Major Bell.
Captain Lane.
Lieut. Buckle, commissary of ordnance.
Lieut. Richardson.
Lieut. Kinleside.
Lieut. Abercrombie.
Lieut. Salmon, adjutant.
Lieut. J. H. Smyth, Gwalior contingent.

Footnote 87:

(No. 6 battery.)

Footnote 88:

Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Salter of the cavalry, and Lieutenant
Sturt of the engineers (since killed in action).

Footnote 89:

The highest point surmounted, the Irak pass, was 12,400 feet above the
sea.

Footnote 90:

A good practicable road across the mountains had, ere this, been made.

Footnote 91:

The 4th company 6th battalion, with Lieutenants A. Christie and
Robertson, formed part of this force. Captain Lawrence, as political
agent, accompanied it, and procured four guns from the Seiks, which,
however, were of little use, as their carriages broke down.

Footnote 92:

Captain Sotheby, Lieutenants Cornish and Brougham.

Footnote 93:

From the report of Brevet-Captain Reid, assistant
quartermaster-general. The latter portion of the extract is adopted
word for word by General Gray in his despatch.

Footnote 94:

This, and the following paragraphs distinguished by inverted commas,
are taken verbatim from a very valuable article on the “Bengal
Artillery” in the _Calcutta Review_, No. xviii.

Footnote 95:

The following extract from a minute by Sir Henry Hardinge, dated
January 20, 1845, relates to this important subject. “In reference to
the 4-horse field-batteries, it appears to me essential that
9-pounders should be drawn by eight horses instead of six; that a
battery of six pieces should therefore have, when ordered on field
service, a complement of 120 horses, instead of 98; and considering
the immediate result of a few weeks’ campaigning, the number ought to
be 130 horses. When not under orders for field service, the number may
remain at 98. On this matter, and every other relating to the
artillery, the Governor-General requests the Honourable Sir George
Pollock to make the arrangements which his experienced judgment may
decide, so as to secure the utmost efficiency; for in all these
matters, efficiency will be found to be true economy.” [The number of
horses would seem to have been raised in the first instance from 89 to
98.]

Footnote 96:

On the deaths of Captains Dashwood and Todd, Captain Mills (of the
political department) commanded the 1st troop 1st brigade at
Ferozeshuhur, and Lieutenant Mackinnon commanded the 2nd troop in the
same action; Captain Waller commanded the latter at Sobraon.

Footnote 97:

Two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade accompanied this troop
throughout the action.

Footnote 98:

During the night of the 18th and the morning of the 19th the
ammunition-boxes of the horse-artillery and light field-batteries were
replenished, as far as practicable, from the spare waggons attached to
each troop and battery. The two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade,
which had originally marched from Muttra merely on escort duty, being
unprovided with spare ammunition, borrowed a few rounds from other
guns, but not sufficient to complete.

Footnote 99:

Ferozeshuhur is a small village between Moodkee and Ferozepore, and
about five miles south of the high-road from the latter place to
Loodianah.

Footnote 100:

Sir Hugh Gough has stated in his despatch, that the ammunition of the
artillery had been completely exhausted in this protracted engagement.
And an able writer in the _Calcutta Review_ (No. XI.) has made a
similar assertion, which, however, is not quite correct as to the time
indicated, as all the troops of horse-artillery present were engaged
with Tej Singh. The author of the article on the “Sikh invasion of
British India” adds, “We believe the complement of a horse-artillery
gun on service is 300 rounds.” This is not quite accurate. Each
6-pounder gun carries with it 128 rounds of all sorts; and each
12-pounder howitzer has 80 rounds. The troops of horse-artillery from
Umballah and Loodianah had each two spare 6-pounder waggons, and one
howitzer waggon, making up the complement to 166⅖ rounds per gun, and
140 per howitzer. The Ferozepore troops brought out with them no extra
waggons, and the two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade had no spare
ammunition at all.

Footnote 101:

The order was given to the brigadier, without authority from the
Commander-in-Chief.

Footnote 102:

“The royal waggons carry 146 rounds a gun, the Indian waggons, I
believe, only contain 96 rounds. In the royal service, the (6-pounder)
gun and waggon carry 194 rounds a gun. The extra waggons in the royal
service have 29 rounds a gun, and in the Indian service only 19 rounds
a gun. The waggon in the Indian service is, I have no doubt, best
adapted to the country and the draught animals, but if a battery of
five guns had ten waggons (and the howitzer one waggon), the number of
rounds a gun would be about 220. The 9-pounder field batteries, I
understand, take into action 139 rounds a gun. The royal 9-pounder
takes 166.”—_Minute of Lord Hardinge, Feb. 2, 1847._

Footnote 103:

In a memorandum on this subject left by Captain Buckle, the author
says:—“At Sobraon, the heavy guns, which had been waited for nearly a
month, were placed on the plain about 1,300 yards from the
intrenchments, instead of in batteries prepared for them at half that
distance, and the facilities for which were great in the abundance of
men and material, and in the softness of the soil. They might easily
have been erected during the night of the 9-10th of February, had
previous arrangements been made; and had this been done, the enemy’s
intrenchments, instead of being nearly uninjured, would have been
swept away by the storm of shot poured upon them. As it was, the
effect of the fire was greater on the defenders of the works than upon
the works themselves; and quite as much as was expected by those
competent to form an opinion, considering the greatness of the
distance, and the shortness of time during which they fired. And for
the selection of the distance we are credibly informed that the
artillery are not responsible.”

Footnote 104:

“For the severe punishment inflicted on the Sikhs during their retreat
across the river, we are indebted to the singular forethought and cool
calculating judgment of the Governor-General. Owing to the paucity of
artillerymen, men had been taken from the horse-artillery to serve the
heavy guns in the field; and the troops—three if not four—to which
they belonged, were _left behind in camp_. The services of these
troops would have been lost to the army on the 10th February, had not
Sir Henry Hardinge, while the battle was yet raging, ascertained that
the ammunition of the heavy guns was nearly expended, and deduced,
from this misfortune, the more than _fortunate_ conclusion, that the
horse-artillerymen would soon be again available for their proper
duties. He accordingly sent back orders to the troops left in camp to
move down without delay to _Rhodawallah_; and they _were_ brought down
_by their drivers alone_, to that post, where they found their own
artillerymen waiting for them, and were galloped into action. The
anecdote is not generally known, but is worthy of record as highly
characteristic of a mind peculiarly happy in the arrangement of
_details, whose judicious combination alone produces military
success.”—Reviewer._ [Colonel Alexander’s, Major Campbell’s, and
Captain Turton’s troops were on the right; Colonel Lane, with Sir R.
Dick’s division. Major Grant, as before mentioned, had commenced the
action with his 24-pounder howitzers. The officers and men of the 2nd
troop 1st brigade, 3rd troop 1st brigade, 5th troop 1st brigade, and
1st troop 3rd brigade, were employed with the heavy batteries,
rockets, and reamers. The 1st troop 1st brigade had remained with
Wheeler near Loodhianah.]—_Editor._

Footnote 105:

MacGregor’s “History of the Sikhs.”

Footnote 106:

Colonel Lawrence had by this time proceeded to Europe for the recovery
of his health.

Footnote 107:

Thackwell marched without baggage or camp equipage.

Footnote 108:

A brigade had been sent across previously by pontoons a few miles up
the river, but too late to take part in the action of Sadoolapore.

Footnote 109:

With regard to Pennycuick’s brigade, the Commander-in-Chief says in
his official despatch: “In justice to this brigade, I must be allowed
to state that they behaved heroically, and but for their too hasty
and, consequently, disorderly advance, would have emulated the conduct
of the left brigade, which, left unsupported for a time, had to charge
to their front and right wherever an enemy appeared. The brigade of
horse-artillery on their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind,
judiciously and gallantly aiding, maintained an effective fire.”

Footnote 110:

This troop had been on the detachment system experimentally, but,
after Chillianwallah, when new guns were given, it reverted to the old
system.

Footnote 111:

The following remarks by Major Siddons on the artillery practice at
Mooltan, taken from his admirable report of the siege, will be read
with interest:—“The artillery practice was most excellent, and the
exertions of officers and men indefatigable. It is impossible to
over-rate the service rendered by the 8-inch and 10-inch howitzers.
The walls are mostly of mud, or brick and mud; and it so happened that
the part selected for the breach was very defective—a mere facing over
the old wall. In this the 24-pounder shot brought down large masses;
but where the wall was sound the shot buried themselves, whereas the
shells penetrated and then acted as small mines. Against a mud fort,
an howitzer must therefore be considered far preferable to a gun,
though of course the latter would be more effective against a
well-built stone wall. The inconvenience to howitzers is the
difficulty of preserving the cheeks of the embrasures. The iron
howitzer might, perhaps, with advantage be lengthened.”

Footnote 112:

As another opportunity is not likely to occur, it may be mentioned
here that General Whish was instrumental in introducing some important
improvements in the internal organization of the artillery. He was the
first, when in temporary command of the horse-artillery (April, 1821),
to establish regimental libraries for the use of the men. In 1836, he
so far reformed the horse-artillery system, as to render it
unnecessary that the guns should be accompanied into action by their
waggons,—a change, however, which was reversed in 1845. He was also,
in 1841, instrumental in the abolition of winkers, as a portion of the
harness of the horses.

Footnote 113:

“The batteries engaged in action by those attached to the 1st and
2nd divisions, advancing to within about six hundred yards; and
the heavy guns within eight hundred or one thousand yards of the
enemy’s artillery, on which they opened their fire about nine
o’clock A.M.”—_Brigadier-General Tennant’s Despatch to the
Commander-in-Chief._

Footnote 114:

Non-effective—1 pay serjeant, 1 drill serjeant, 1 major serjeant, 1
park serjeant, 1 drill corporal, 3 camp colour-men, a bullock
serjeant, and overseer of bildars in time of service.

The ordnance with each company appears to have consisted of six light
6-pounders and two howitzers; to assist in working these and the
field-pieces with sipahi battalions, a large body of lascars were
attached to each company.

Heavy guns and mortars were supplied from magazines at the
head-quarters of brigades to the extent available and required for any
particular service.

PRINTED BY COX (BROTHERS) AND WYMAN, GREAT QUEEN STREET.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transcriber’s note:

1. Several tables with more columns than rows were rotated 90° left so
they would fit portrait format.

2. All items in the ERRATA were corrected in the text.

3. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.

4. Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as
printed.

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