Chapter XXX: Appendix: K

"Madrid, 10th March 1797.

"The following account of the action with the British squadron, on the 14th day of February last, has been received by D. Juan de Langara, in a letter addressed to his Excellency by D. Joseph de Cordova, commander-in-chief of the Squadron, dated del Oceano, the 2nd of March, at the entrance of Cadiz Bay.

"From the instant of my proceeding to sea, after securing the gun-boat at Algeziras, I had the winds E.N.E. to S.E. that drove me to the latitude of Cape St. Vincent; however, on the morning of the 14th, it changing to the west, I steered to the E.S.E., and formed in three separate columns, in the order of sailing with convoy. Several vessels from the left, at nine o'clock in the morning, observing a strange sail, I ordered the Principe de Asturias to chase; shortly after, the St. Firmin and the Pearl frigate discovered the number to increase to eight sail, and although the foggy weather prevented their being seen from the Trinidad, I forced the whole squadron to a press of sail; but counting already at ten o'clock from fifteen to eighteen of the enemy's ships, besides several frigates, I ordered our squadron to form immediately the line of battle, in the best manner possible, on the larboard tack, to maintain the weather gage. In tacking, the ships Principe, Conde-de-Regla, and Oriente, fell so much to leeward, that they were unable to join in the line without the risk of being cut off by the enemy, that now, but at a short distance and under a press of sail, met us in the most regular order: in consequence, I ordered these vessels to tack that they might fall in the rear of the line, which, although done by the two first, could not be effected by the Oriente, and she ran to leeward of the enemy.

"At a quarter before eleven, from the position of the squadron, the enemy's headmost ship commenced the action with the nearest situated to her ahead of the Trinidad, running along the whole of our rear, and successively bearing up before the wind. The Trinidad happened to be the last of our line, and consequently the centre and van remained out of the action.

"The rear of the enemy sailed but slowly, and for this reason, as well as to benefit by some means the fire from our van, I made a signal at half-past eleven for all the ships ahead to tack, in order to come round the enemy and attack their rear. My ordering this manoeuvre appeared the most opportune for many weighty reasons; but, misunderstood by the ships to which it was directed, I now looked upon the loss of the Principe, Regla, and the whole of our rear, as unavoidable. The favourable moment for this movement being lost, I made a signal for the whole squadron to bear up at the same time, with a view to contract our distance with the enemy, and to bring into action several other ships in our centre and van. At the time of bearing up, the Trinidad was ahead in close action with the enemy, within musket-shot, and having been engaged by the whole English line, was very much damaged.

"So soon as their headmost ship had passed athwart our stern, she tacked, followed by five or six others passing our line to windward; the remaining ten ships, that were before on our larboard side, then bore up at the same time, and passed through our line in different positions, and consequently remained on the other tack fighting us in great order, with a heavy and well-directed fire: this manoeuvre decided the action in their favour. I did not fail to guard against this from the commencement, and anticipated it by ordering the ships ahead to tack and gain the enemy's rear to leeward; and if the commanders of the Principe, Regla, Oriente, and Firmin had availed themselves of the opportunity to join six or eight ships of the van, they would have placed the enemy between two fires, and terminated the action in a very different manner.

"Although the Principe and Regla were not able to fall into the rear of our line, they notwithstanding did their utmost from their situation, engaging the enemy at the time of passing our line, till they had obtained the weather gage. The attack of the enemy was now principally on the Trinidad, which, from the crippled situation of her mast and rigging, fell to leeward. By word of mouth, and by signals, the Salvador, San Josef, Soberano, and San Nicholas were ordered to shorten sail, and to form in our rear, which they executed with celerity, maintaining a severe action. The van continually remaining to windward, at two I made them a signal to shorten sail, and bear down for a general attack.

"The Mexicano formed upon our bow about three in the afternoon, and engaged the foremost ship of the enemy's line; they now for the remainder of the day fixed their whole attention against the San Josef, Mexicano, San Nicholas, and San Yisidro, which were the only ships that bore the principal and hottest part of the action against the whole enemy's squadron.

"In this situation it would have been highly expedient that our centre and van should have come to our support, but it was out of my power to intimate to them the necessity of this movement, the ships being in want of masts, rigging, and every necessary for making signals. I cannot refrain from giving due praise to the valour of the above-mentioned ships formed at my stern, and expressing the gallant manner in which they behaved during the engagement: but at length, being dismasted and destroyed, some struck, and others left the action. The Trinidad was attacked the whole afternoon by a three-decker, and three ships of 74 guns, that raked her fore and aft at pistol-shot; and notwithstanding her having upwards of two hundred men killed and wounded, she still continued the action for a full hour longer. Such was the dreadful situation of the Trinidad at six o'clock, after an uninterrupted engagement, when the San Pablo and Pelayo, that in the morning had been detached by my orders, and crowded every sail from the moment of observing the action, now reached the squadron.

"The reinforcement of these two ships happened at the opportune junction of the Conde-de-Regla; the Principe arrived shortly after, and the enemy, observing our van standing towards them, immediately retired together, covering the captured ships San Josef, Salvador, San Yisidro, and San Nicholas.

"No one will be surprised at the ultimate consequences of the action, when the series of misfortunes and unforeseen events from the moment of our seeing the enemy is considered; and further, that when cruising, they should sail in a readier condition to form the line of battle than could be performed by our squadron, in the order of sailing with convoy, with the wind on our quarter. For the above reason, scarcely were they discovered, than they formed in regular order of battle, and so near as to oblige my forming the line hastily, without attention to posts, or the consequences that might result from this bad position of the ships and commanders; to which must be added, that the Pelayo and San Pablo were ahead by order,--that the Firmin and Oriente remained to leeward of both lines,--that notwithstanding the exertions made by the Principe, Regla, and Firmin, they did not enter into the line till the afternoon, the latter wanting a foretop-mast. So that of all the ships of my squadron, only seventeen formed in the line of battle, the St. Domingo included in the number, loaded with quicksilver, and of very inconsiderable force. Of the seventeen above mentioned, some were in action only at intervals, and many did not fire a gun; resulting from the circumstance of the enemy's line being entirely engaged against six Spanish ships, and their defence is the more praiseworthy, as they were all in want of men. The Trinidad remaining entirely dismasted, without the power of making signals with flags or lights, I desired Lieutenant General D. Juan Joachim Moreno to reestablish the line of battle close on the larboard tack, and gave orders that jury-masts should be fixed on the Trinidad and the Moredes frigate, to protect her to Cadiz, profiting by the wind and the situation of the enemy at night-fall.

"I embarked in consequence, with my Major General and Adjutants, on board the Diana frigate, and ordered several frigates along the line, that they should observe the order given, and repair the damages with all haste in order to return again to action. The squadron remained the whole night on the larboard tack, with the wind at W. to W.N.W. till six o'clock A.M. of the 15th, when I formed on the other tack, close hauled to the wind.

"My next attention was to inquire by signal the situation of the ships for action,--and it proved that the Concepcion, Mexicano, and Soberano _were not in a state to renew the action_; and that the Regla, Oriente, San Pablo, Pelayo, and San Antonio _could enter into action_, without my being able to gain any information regarding the others. Nevertheless I continued my course towards the enemy, that to the number of twenty ships had been seen since eight o'clock at S.S.W. My opinion as to the state of the ships of the squadron remaining still indecisive, in the afternoon I desired to know _if it was advisable to attack the enemy_; the ships Concepcion, Mexicano, San Pablo, Soberano, San Domingo, San Ildefonso, Nepomuceno, Atlante, and Firmin replied in the negative; the Gloriose, Pablo, Regla, and Firmin, _that it was advisable to delay the attack_; and only the Principe, Conquistador, and Pelayo, positively asserted that _the attach was advisable_. From the diversity of opinion, and considering the reply of each commander as an indication of the true state of his respective ship, I did not think it proper to force a press of sail towards the enemy, having likewise been informed that the Mexicano, San Domingo, and Soberano were considerably damaged, and the Atlante in want of men, which was general in every ship.

"At three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy was still to the E.S.E. I directed our course S.E. and varied it at five, to S.E. 74 S. to double Cape St. Vincent; and that every exertion should be made by day and night to repair the ships that were not very considerably damaged, I ordered the line at half-past eleven to close on the starboard tack. On the 16th some of the enemy's cruisers were seen to the S.E. 74 S. which route I followed at seven o'clock in the evening, with light winds at S.W. with hopes to see them again the next day, supposing their destination for Gibraltar. But at ten o'clock in the morning the Concepcion made a signal that the enemy were at anchor on the left side of the coast, and informed me she had seen four large ships in Lagos Bay. Believing that all the enemy's squadron might be likewise there, I ordered the line to form close on the starboard tack, and then despatched the Brigida frigate to reconnoitre; she returned, acquainting me that she had counted the whole force of the enemy at anchor in the bay.

"The squadron remained, close in-shore the whole afternoon, and part of the night, when the wind changing to S.E. I left it under an easy sail.

"No regular account has been received of the killed and wounded, not having obtained the respective returns from the commanders at the time of writing: but it was known that in the Conde-de-Regla a cannon ball at the commencement of the action killed the Xefe de Esquadra, Conde d'Amblemont, and the splinters wounded the commander, Brigadier D. Geronime Bravo, and H.D. Cadlos Sellery.

Soberano Killed, Captain de Fragata D. Francisco Luis,
Lieutenant Bernardino Antillon, and another
officer, name unknown.

Mexicano Mortally wounded, and died on the 4th day, her
Commander, Brigadier D. Fernando Herravay
Crurat.

Trinidad Killed, second Lieutenant D. Herculas Guchi, and
a Midshipman; wounded, Captain of Fragata,
D. Franco Alvarez, two Lieutenants de Fragata,
the Master, and an inferior officer."

"By advices from Brigadier D. Pebra Poneda, late Commander of the San Josef, the following account is likewise received relating to the captured ships:--

San Josef Killed, second Lieutenant D. Miguel de Doblas.--Mortally
wounded, Xefe de Esquadra, D. Francisco
Wenthysen, who lost both legs ten minutes
after the action commenced, and died the
same night; the Master D. Santiago Campomar.
Slightly wounded, two second Lieutenants,
and 152 seamen killed and wounded.

Salvador Killed, the Commander, Brigadier Antonio de
Tepes, two Lieutenants, and two other officers.
Wounded, Captain de Fragata D. Manoel
Rinz, and an inferior officer; 200 seamen
killed and wounded.

San Nicholas (boarded by one of the enemy's ships that engaged
her.) Killed, the Commander, Brigadier
D. Tomas Geraldino, two second Lieutenants,
one Midshipman. Wounded, three Lieutenants
of Infantry; 120 seamen killed and
wounded.

San Yisidro Killed, one Lieutenant and an inferior officer.
Wounded, the Commander D. Teadoro Argunato;
his second, D. Telepe Tournelle, two
Lieutenants, and two second Lieutenants;
mortally, one first Lieutenant; 104 seamen
killed and wounded.