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Chapter IV: Part 4

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Whilst the misunderstandings in the new world were the subject of conversation, the religious war still continued in the kingdom. The King, who, in order to restore tranquility to the state, had done every thing that was desired of him, had the mortification to find that nothing was done that he desired. He was obliged to exile the Archbishop of Paris. I was witness of the affliction he was under, from the necessity of giving this order. He had endeavoured to bring this prelate back to his duty, by all the methods which his goodness, and his beneficent soul, could suggest to him; and it was not till after he had in vain essayed them, that he resolved upon sending him to Conflans.

The conduct of this Archbishop, who had openly disobeyed his Sovereign’s orders, irritated the courtiers to that degree, that the Monarch was advised by several of them to have him seized by the military power, and to keep him closely confined: but Lewis XV. was of too gentle a disposition to put such rigorous counsel into execution. I have often heard him say, that Kings should punish, but never think of revenge. He entrusted the letter de cachet to one of his ministers, with orders to signify it to the Archbishop as privately as possible.

The King found himself again obliged to banish the bishops of Orleans and Troyes, two prelates whose sentiments were too conformable to those of the Archbishop of Paris. These two might be considered as the fire-brands of the kingdom. They prepared the people’s minds for disobedience, in showing themselves rebels to their Prince’s orders. One of these, from the extremity of his exile, insulted the court and the state by a mandate, wherein he forbad all his diocesans to have recourse, in the case of administration, to any other priests than those whom he prescribed; and it was necessary that these priests should be vicars, or curates. This was constraining the extent of priesthood; but as soon as the episcopal authority is the least attacked, the Princes of the church are always ready to undertake any thing. Marshal Saxe said, “That if God were to limit the power of bishops in France, these bishops would, in turn, allot bounds to the power of God.”

The exile of the Archbishop of Paris silenced his most considerable partizans; but it did not finish the quarrel.

The minister of the marine laid before the King a list of his navy: it consisted of sixty-six ships of the line, and thirty frigates. A politician of the North said, that this was not sufficient to make head against the English; and he prophesied, at that time, that if we did not avoid going to war, the French navy would be totally destroyed when we made peace. I repeated these words to several of our ministers, who answered, that this politician was unacquainted with marine prophecies. France has long since been deprived of those statesmen whose penetrating genius could unravel the most distant events. We at present go mechanically and habitually to work, in the track we are compelled to follow. Marshal Saxe made use of a very singular expression, he said, _that our government daily performed their day’s work_.

The naval force was kept in readiness: seamen were enrolled; but able sea-officers were wanting. France has seldom had any good ones. Lewis XIV. formed some, but they expired with his reign.

The spirit of party and animosity was still kept up at court. The cabal who strove to destroy me, increased with my favour. Envy displayed all the latent springs that human wickedness could suggest. All who surrounded the Prince, endeavoured to deprive me of his confidence.

Amongst those who conspired against me, there were people who were indebted to me for their fortune, and for whom I constantly interested myself. I pointed them out to the King. Lewis XV. detests ingratitude; these dark proceedings produced a very contrary effect to what my enemies had proposed. The King paid me more attention than before, and despised those the more who would have deceived him. I shall not repeat here the low and scandalous artifices that courtiers, and even some ambitious women, put in practice to surprize the Monarch’s heart. A detail of these intrigues are unworthy of history, and I have no design of transmitting to posterity the artifices of cabals, which relate to no one but myself.

M. Moreau de Seychelles, comptroller-general of the finances, was of service to the state. He was very assiduous in regulating the finances. I made the King take notice of him, and immediately this Prince made him minister of state. He had his enemies at court: it was said that he had done nothing yet to deserve that post, and that fortune having so precipitately forced his elevation, he would never advance above half way to favour.

When he came to court, to return the King thanks, I said to him, “Sir, many people pretend to foretel the destiny of your administration, convince all France that they are false prophets.”

The Duke of Mirepoix, who had always assured the court, that the English had no thoughts of breaking the treaty of peace, was at length obliged to write that they prepared for war. France hastily put herself into a state of defence, without knowing precisely whether she was coming to blows. Orders were dispatched from the office of the marine to all the ports and harbours. The ships that were finished were launched, and the others kept ready to sail on the first notice.

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was, nevertheless, still negociating at Paris. This business was no longer transacted with Lord Albemarle; he was dead. The interests of Great Britain were in the hands of a secretary of embassy, who gave vague replies to the questions that were put to him, upon the preparations his court was making.

Some politicians have assured us, that if Lord Albemarle had lived, the war, which afterwards rent the two nations, would never have taken place. It has been said that minister, who had great weight with George the Second, was at that time connected with a woman of pleasure at Paris, whom he would not part with. This perhaps is only a surmise, destitute of foundation; but after all, this would not have been the first time that the amours of a courtezan have influenced the affairs of Europe.

Upon the arrival of the dispatches from London, a great council was held at Versailles, and the King expressed himself in the following manner to his ministers. “I am resolved I will not begin the war, and if the English break the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Europe, who shall be witness to my moderation, shall see that they are the aggressors.”

M. de Maillebois, the father, said publicly at court, that it were better to prevent them, than to give them an opportunity of doing it.

The King’s moderation met with no advocates but those whose interest it was to avoid sieges and battles; for every one was concerned in the event according to his particular views of interest. Military people wanted war, merchants and financiers wished for peace.

The court of London sent my Lord Hertford to Paris, to replace the Earl of Albemarle. This Ambassador was compared to a herald at arms: it was said that he was come to declare war against France. He spoke, in fact, in such a tone, as testified that every thing was ready in England to invade America. M. Rouille was so intimidated, that he said to the King: “Sire, Great Britain must have resolved to declare war, for her Ambassador talks in such a stile, as if the English were ready to open the campaign.”

Upon the first report of the preparations of an armament, the military men, who, since the last campaigns in Flanders, had deserted Versailles, came in shoals to make their court to me. All my apartments were lined with officers, who, in intreating my interest to recommend them to the Prince, set forth their talents in the military art.

The Bishops war, nevertheless, still continued. The Archbishop of Paris, banished to Conflans, was not thereby rendered more submissive. He, from the extremity of his exile, braved the court and the city. He was removed to _Lagny sur Maine_, a little town that had neither the grandeur nor magnificence of Conflans. This retreat, by diminishing his episcopal pomp, no way changed his character, which remained inflexible. The other rebellious bishops were treated with more severity: but these lettres de cachet had a very opposite effect to what was intended. They served only to make them more important in the eyes of their partizans, which increased their arrogance.

A courtier said to the King, that a seminary should be built at Rome, to which should be sent all the French bishops who rebelled against his orders, with an establishment of 100 Roman crowns per head, for supporting their grandeur.

It is certain that too much respect was paid to these people; and the very chastisements that were inflicted on them, when they swerved from their duty, were tempered with so much consideration, as to prevent their returning to it.

The bishops having nothing to do in their exile but to write, and being unable to employ any other arms than their pens, France was deluged with letters and mandates. These were so many manifestoes against the royal authority. The King was often advised to hang the Printers, who were instrumental in the circulation of these seditious papers; but Lewis XV. would never have recourse to these violent methods.

The English, at length, explained themselves with respect to their warlike preparations, the news of which Fame had trumpeted throughout Europe. They declared to the government, that the French in Canada had made incursions upon lands under the dominion of Great Britain, and that England was not inclined to suffer such usurpations. We have seen that the two crowns, when peace was concluded, left the decision of this affair to commissaries. Count de Argenson had foreseen, at first, that these commissaries would completely ruin the interests of the two courts. “Sir, said he, when two powers, with arms in hand, cannot agree upon certain differences, it is impossible for individuals to reconcile them.”

Nevertheless, the English council did not say that they should declare war, but only that they were discontented with the French in America.

This declaration afflicted the King, who did not desire war. The national debts were not yet paid, the same imposts still subsisted as before, the people were always oppressed; so that a new war must overwhelm them. Lewis XV. spoke to me of the misfortune that threatened France, in such a manner as persuaded me he was sensibly affected. I was a witness to his uneasiness upon this account; and it is but justice, which I owe this Prince, to say he was penetrated with grief upon the occasion. This was not the case with the ministers and military courtiers, who were in hopes to advance their fortune by means of this new revolution. The difficulty was not to undertake the war, but to find generals to carry it on.

Marshal Saxe, the terror of France’s enemies, and in whom the troops placed an implicit confidence, was dead. Of all the officers who had served under him, there was not any one who furnished the same hopes of his abilities. They had courage and experience: but these were not sufficient; for I have heard it said, that to form a hero, requires an assortment of qualities, which are seldom found in the same man.

Amongst the generals who had served in the late wars, Marshal Belleisle was the most desirous of commanding in chief; but besides his never having been a good general, his capacity was greatly impaired. He expressed himself in diffuse terms, and was very verbose. It was said of him at court, that of all the genius that had elevated him to the pinnacle of greatness, he retained nothing but loquacity.

The state was now threatened with three different wars, two of which were declared. That of the Bull, as it was called, which was upon the point of causing a revolution in the state: that of the Barbarians, who, notwithstanding the faith of treaties, interrupted the trade of the nation; and that of the English, who were ready to give us battle.

A man of wit, who was told that the English were going to be our foes, said, _God be praised, the bishops quarrel is now at an end, for these people are never at war but in time of peace_.

The Archbishop of Paris, who was still exiled, and still obstinate, wrote a letter to the King in a stile truly original, and without example since the foundation of the monarchy. He said to the King, in very formal terms, that “His power was superior to that of the Sovereign, in matters relative to the administration which God hath entrusted him with; that his duty was that of conducting his flock; that he acknowledged no other upon earth; finally, he would not, nor could not, retract from the first steps he had taken; that these were his last sentiments, which would continue always the same to the grave, &c. &c.”

This was a period distinguishable for disobedience. The clergy gloried in rebelling against the orders of the King. This obstinate disposition had made its way into the provinces. The deputy of Languedoc related to the King an event that happened at Montpellier, which pointed out to this Prince the necessity of stopping the progress of such abuses. This man said, that the wife of a counsellor of that city, who had refused to receive the Bull, and whose life was in danger, requested the curate of her parish to administer the sacraments to her. Upon her first request, the curate and four vicars fled. Application was made to the other parishes, but it was found that all the clergy who administered had deserted. The chief justice then ordered an independent priest, and who was not belonging to any church, to administer to the Lady. This ecclesiastic thought it was his duty to obey; but he had observed that the host had accompanied the priests in their retreat. He did not find a single wafer in the tabernacles of the different churches of the city. The curates and the secondaries had eat them all before their departure. He consecrated one: but this was not sufficient; it must be administered. A general insurrection was feared. The commander of the place was obliged to put the garrison under arms, and appoint guards for the conducting of the host in safety to the sick Lady’s house.

Such scencs as these, in a city full of Protestants, made the Romish religion become a subject of public derision. The King was greatly affected at it, though he would not yet resolve to use violent remedies.

I have said that the King did not desire war; to prevent which, if it were yet possible, he sent Bussy to Hanover, where George II. was expected. I was not for employing this man, thinking he had not sufficient capacity to succeed in a negociation of this importance; but Lewis XV. had been prejudiced in his favour.

Bussy’s partizans said he spoke with resolution, and an absolute tone; qualities that were looked upon as essential at a free court, where moderation and suppleness are always unsuccessful. But the contrary was the truth. Bussy negociated badly to prevent the war, and he failed some years after to restore peace; but I laid it down as a maxim, never to oppose the King’s sentiments.

Orders were dispatched to all the commanders in the American colonies, to fit out as many ships as they could, to oppose the designs of the English. I heard Marshal Noailles then say, that troops should have been sent, and not orders.

The death of Marshal Lowendahl, the pupil and companion of Count Saxe, that happened at this time, created sorrow, which in the present circumstances was the more sensibly felt. His military talents had made us conceive hopes that his death destroyed. The conquest of Bergen-op-zoom had acquired him a reputation, from which France might have derived advantages in the war with which she was threatened. I testified my chagrin, upon this occasion, to the King. “You have reason to lament the death of this officer, he replied to me; he was among the number of those who were most deserving of any confidence. It is in vain for me to seek amongst my subjects, I shall find no one capable of supplying his place.”

Lewis XV. who had honoured him during his life-time, was willing to bestow marks of distinction upon him after his death. He was at the expence of his funeral obsequies, and granted pensions to his children of both sexes; recompences that were due to his merit, and with which the King gratified his heirs. All those who were eclipsed by this general’s merit, rejoiced at his death; none but real patriots lamented it.

Whilst France was employed about the means of supplying the expences of the war, we learnt at Versailles that England found voluntary resources in her subjects for her’s. Private persons offered money to such sailors as enrolled themselves in the royal navy, and others engaged to support their families at their own expence during the war, had it continued six lustrums.

Certain communities offered free gifts to those who would bear arms against France. I said to Marshal Belleisle, who related these facts to me: “It appears to me, sir, that a people who act in this manner, has the advantage over those who give no money but what they are compelled to part with, for the expences of the war.” _That is true_, replied the old Courtier; _but this same English nation, who thus voluntarily part with their riches for a war, which they think useful to the state, often lose all their advantages at a peace. A Lord who wants to make his way to the administration by a system of pacification, intrigues with the king, gains his confidence, and has his creatures. These set forth, that sieges and battles ruin the state, that commerce is hurt by them, and that industry perishes. The cabal acquire strength, the candidate minister’s party increases, he gains the ascendent, and the peace is signed, at the expence of the nation’s blood and treasure._

M. de Mirepoix still continued his negociations at London: he conferred with Sir Thomas Robinson, who gave him hopes; but this was only to gain time: the war was resolved upon. Count D’Argenson often said to the King, that this Embassador should be recalled, as his residence in London only amused the state, and made the French nation ridiculous. The King and council were greatly perplexed; Lewis XV. was not willing that Europe should be able to reproach him with having committed the first hostilities.

Marshal Lowendahl, who before his death was witness to this embarrassment, said publickly at court, that _it was better to attack as a principal, than to be beat as a second_. This counsel was not followed, but we repented of it.

As for me, I was neuter in this great affair. It was reported that I wished for this war, to make myself more considerable at court. I had no occasion for either sieges or battles, things constantly destructive to a state, to support my credit with the King. Lewis XV. honoured me with his confidence: all those who had endeavoured to prejudice me had miscarried in their attempt; rank and grandeur had no longer any charms for me: the only ambition I had remaining was the settling of my daughter; but she was not arrived at an age to be married, and I did not doubt that the King would honour her with his protection.

Peace was still the subject of conversation at London and Paris; but we at length learned that the English had declared war against France in the new world; the court of Versailles received advice, that Admiral Boscawen had with his fleet taken the _Alcide_ man of war, upon the banks of Newfoundland. The manner in which he took this ship aggravated the offence. The _Alcide_ should not have been attacked, at the time it was attacked, for she had no fighting orders. It is a custom established amongst all civilized nations, when they declare war, to publish a manifesto, containing the grievances which induce them to have recourse to arms; and England had not published any such: therefore this step was considered as a real piracy. This was observed to the King, who immediately sent orders to the duke of Mirepoix and Bussy to return to France, without taking leave of the court of England. Henceforward all means of accommodation were suspended.

The King, who had been desirous of avoiding a war before it began, took his measures as soon as he was acquainted with this first act of hostility. His honour would let him no longer put up an affront offered to his flag. He said, upon retiring from the council, “Madam, war is declared; the English are my enemies.”

The operations of the war office took place; the armaments by land and sea, the augmentation of the troops, and the means of supporting the army, were taken into consideration.

From this time the King lived more retired, he did not hunt so often, and he debarred himself several diversions which he took before. He conferred regularly with his ministers. Count D’Argenson, with whom he was often locked up, gave him a circumstantial detail of his land forces, and the naval minister laid before him a similar account of his navy. Lewis XV. made several objections to them concerning the principal points of their administration, to which these chiefs in office were obliged to answer.

The count D’Argenson, whose administration was then the most important, as he was at the head of military affairs, told the King that his troops were in a good state, that military discipline was well enforced, that the French were fond of war, and that we might flatter ourselves with successful campaigns, provided the generals seconded the ardour of the troops, and were not themselves an obstacle to the grandeur of France.

The conferences with the minister of the finances were of a still more intricate nature; there were many ancient debts unpaid, the revenues of the crown were mortgaged, commerce and industry, which had just recovered some little vigour since the peace, were upon the point of returning to their inactive state.

The comptroller-general said to the King, “Sire, the state of things must not be disguised to your Majesty; great springs must be put in motion to maintain the burthen of the war. I have made a calculation from the state of your finances, and they will procure me resources for four years: if at the end of that time peace should not take place, the campaigns cannot be carried on without imposing very oppressive taxes upon your people.”

The King, who after this conference paid me a visit, said, _that he had just been conversing with a minister, who was the honestest man in all France; for such I must call him_, he added, _who has so much probity as to speak freely to his King_.

The minister of the war department required an augmentation of 40000 men, which was granted him, and orders were issued accordingly for raising recruits. M. Belleisle told me, that so many men were not necessary for the defence of a handful of barbarians, that this would increase the expences of the state, and only tend to weaken it. He did not forsee that these levies were nothing in comparison of those that were to be afterwards made.

France had been perfectly secured by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. Her ports were open and defenceless. Upon the commission of the first acts of hostility in America, it was resolved to restore the works at Dunkirk. The prince of Soubise was appointed by the King to see this operation take place: eight thousand troops were allotted him to favour the execution of this design.

Upon the first reports of the revolutions in Canada, two successive squadrons were dispatched, of which no news had yet been received. The uncertainty of the success of this small naval armament suspended the grand operations by land.

The council of state could not resolve upon any fixed plan of operations, the members being divided in their opinion. I was a witness to a great part of the diversity of sentiments which then disturbed the court, with respect to this grand affair.

A man of much good sense said, like Marshal Belleisle, “that great armies were useless; that land campaigns were not the object, but a sea war; that the colonies should be put in a state of security, which alone could be conquered; that the plan of the English was not to increase their power in Europe, but to extend their limits in America; that all their designs tended that way, and that we should direct ours to the same object; that France was guarantied in Europe by the general balance; but that there was no system whereby our settlements in the new world were guarantied; that the crown would lose its influence, when trade would be entirely in the power of the English; that the British navy was already superior to the navies of all Europe, but that after the loss of Canada and the other parts of the continent of America, it would be the only one in Europe; that this was the crisis for France, and that if the opportunity was neglected of protecting ourselves from this last attempt, it would never return; that all other plans of warlike operations should be given up, to pursue that of the colonies, as they interested the general republic; but that this personally and solely interested France; that America being once conquered, the whole body of Europe could not restore the equilibrium, because the power of the first states of the continent did not extend to the sea; that the English in the center of the christian world, were separated from Christendom; that they could not be attacked in their own islands; that nature had secured them from all invasions in Europe, _&c._”

The opposite party, on the contrary, said, “that great armies should be raised to oppose the allies of England, who would not fail to form designs in Germany; that here the capital strokes would be struck; that the war in America was only the pretext for that which was to be carried on in Europe; that some troops should be sent to Canada; but that numerous legions should be raised for Germany; that we were mistaken if we thought the English limited their enterprizes to America, as it was visible that their designs tended to excite a revolution in the north of Europe; that the general balance guarantied France no farther than she herself contributed to support a just equilibrium; that with respect to trade in general, there was no reason to apprehend that England could engross it, as there were not sufficient materials in that country to compass the design; that the English were compelled to have recourse to industrious nations, and where the price of labour was not so high; that universal trade consisted in exchanges, and that a people who should considerably diminish that of other states, would greatly cramp their own; that with respect to the navy, one could not be immediately formed to balance that of England; that the expences made upon this account would be endless, as the time was too short and the means too circumscribed; that the loss of Canada was not certain, the events of war being casual; that the savage nations loved the French and hated the English; that they would prefer being exterminated, rather than submit to the British yoke; lastly, that if Canada should be conquered in this war, it might be retaken in another; but that if the English, united with their allies, should avail themselves of favourable circumstances to gain advantages in Europe, it would be then too late to repair the damage, as the last victories would be guarantied by new treaties of peace; whereas in America the barbarous nations in alliance with France, who are unacquainted with the laws of nations, are always ready to create revolutions: in a word, that it was France’s interest to set on foot numerous armies to support her pretensions by land, and to yield for some time the dominion of the sea, _&c._ _&c._”

A third party maintained that both these objects should be attended to: “We should (said they) prevent the English making conquests in America, and hinder any taking place in Europe. France is sufficiently powerful for this; she need only manage well her forces; she will prevail every where, when those who govern the state unite in one common interest; that is to say, the glory of the nation, and the happiness of the people. If the northern powers of Europe are inclinable to avail themselves of the misunderstandings in America, we must keep our engagements, and send 24000 men into Germany. A more numerous army can only procure us a greater loss without any advantage. These moderate succours will enable us to send more considerable assistance to the new world, to protect our colonies; the revolution in Canada is not a maritime quarrel, it is a land war. The point is to defend the continent, and it is only necessary to land troops there; and this the English cannot prevent. They have taken no measures yet to block up the passages; but if we do not make haste, we shall be too late; for the English, who keep a steady eye upon our operations, will no sooner find that we do not make any great preparations by land, than they will begin to make very considerable ones by sea.”

There was also a numerous party inclined for peace: the reasons which they alledged, were founded upon our inability of carrying on the war; but the minds of the people were too much agitated to listen to plans of pacification; each had his schemes for pushing his fortune, and private interest always prevails over the common weal. Subaltern officers who wanted advancement, were desirous of sieges and battles. Those who endeavoured to obtain the command of armies, were desperate advocates for war; and such as would be employed in furnishing the necessaries for carrying it on, thought it indispensable: it is plain from these motives, how little the interest of the state was considered.

During this crisis the clergy of France were assembled; they deliberated very seriously, whether sick people should have the sacraments administered, or whether they should die without them. The bishops who had been brought over by the court and the parliament, were of opinion, that they could not be refused this assistance. Those who expected nothing of the King, and who hated the parliament, maintained on the contrary, that they should be refused them like heretics. At length, after many debates, they seemed inclinable to leave this great affair to the determination of the Pope.

I learnt this news with pleasure. Benedict XIV. then filled the papal chair. Many persons who had been at Rome, gave me a very favourable opinion of this pontiff. He despised his predecessors, refined policy of turning every thing to their own advantage; the first steps he took upon his obtaining the pontificate, made me conceive a real esteem for him. He had abolished at Rome those wretched equivocations, which in serving as food for superstition, dishonour the Christian religion. He knew that God sometimes wrought miracles, but that he does not daily alter the course of nature. This prince of the church preferred the title of an honest man to that of a holy one, and this quality raised him above all the Popes that ever existed upon earth. Benedict XIV. had so much understanding and so little prejudice, that his decision could not fail to restore tranquility to the Gallican church.

The administration of the sacraments was not the only disquisition which engaged the clergy; the grand affair for which they were convened, and in which the whole body were unanimous, was to deny the authority of the parliaments, or any other body of laymen whatever. Lewis XV. who could not begin the war without oppressing his people, was willing to set them an example of œconomy, by diminishing his household expences. He reduced his hunting equipages, and the number of his hunting horses in both stables. The expences of his little journies were regulated and diminished: it was resolved that there should be no diversions this year at court, and the works of the Louvre were suspended, _&c._

The Count D’Argenson said, “that these savings are so small an object, that they will scarce enrich a commissary of stores during the war.”

I was myself often inclined to have an eye to œconomy; but M. de Belleisle had told me that it was scarce possible to benefit the state by such frugality; he added, “if it were an evil, it was impossible to remedy it; but that all those who served the King would enrich themselves; that a reform would produce no advantage; that it was better to continue employing the old officers who were already opulent, than to replace them with new ones, who would endeavour to become so.”

Neither the council of state nor the warlike preparations deprived me of the King’s company, who visited me regularly, and communicated to me his designs and intentions. The resolution he had taken of being revenged of his enemies, gave him an air of satisfaction, which he had not before he had taken it; his only uneasiness was for his people: he was afraid that the continuance of the war would exhaust them too much.

It was thought necessary to review the troops, and there were three encampments. The prince of Soubise wanted the command of the camp of Hainault: I spoke to the King, and it was granted him. M. de Chevert, and the Marquis de Voyer, in whose favour I also interested myself, obtained the two others.

Though hostilities were begun in America, Lewis XV. would not continue them in Europe. A frigate of the Brest squadron having taken an English frigate, the King immediately ordered it to be released, as he said, _he would not make war in time of peace, and be the first to infringe the treaty of Aix la Chapelle in Europe_.

A general officer, who was in my apartment when the King told me he had just dispatched this order, could not refrain telling him, in my presence, “Permit me, Sire, to represent to your Majesty, that this moderation will noways alter the system of the court of London. The English have resolved to fall upon us, and to seize all such ships as they think they have the superiority over: reprisals are necessary, and we should seize all such vessels as are inferior in strength to our’s that meet with them.”

The Count de Argenson said, there was but one method of carrying on the war, “which was to drub the enemy well, and take a good deal from them.”

The sea-officers paid their court regularly to me; for the navy was to have the honour of this war. There was a promotion of officers, and I interested myself in behalf of some, in consequence of the characters that were given me of their capacity and courage.

I know that complaints have often been made in France of my choice of certain persons, as well in the army as in the administration: but those who condemned me were unacquainted with Versailles. Every courtier has a party who cry up their talents and genius. It is impossible to descry real merit through these extravagant elogiums. All those who are interested in a courtier’s advancement, either in the army or in the government, hide his faults, and display his good qualities; for every man has a favourable side.

The death of Madame, daughter to the Dauphin, created fresh affliction for the King. I have often heard the happiness of Kings extolled, when they are in reality more to be pitied than other men. A citizen has scarce any thing but domestic troubles to afflict him: a Monarch unites family misfortunes with those of the state.

Scarce had Lewis wiped away his tears, before he had news of a battle that was fought in America, near the Ohio, between his troops and those of England, in which General Braddock fell, and where the French gained a compleat victory. The blood that was spilt in this affair, a detail of which may be found in the annals of Europe, closed all avenues to an accommodation. The only measure to be taken in Europe was to be upon the defensive, and this was not taken. The English seized as many merchant-ships in Europe as they met with in both seas. The commanders of these ships had received orders to surrender without making any resistance. I desired the King to explain to me the motive of this policy, and he replied to me as before, _that he would not break treaties, and make war in time of peace_.

The English availed themselves of this moderation; they became absolute masters of the sea, and filled their island with French prisoners.

At the very time that the court of Versailles piqued themselves upon fulfilling their engagements, the court of London reproached us with breaking them. The restoration of the works at Dunkirk was construed into an infraction of these same treaties, for which France sacrificed what power she had remaining at sea. In this manner each government endeavoured to justify their designs; and thus was ambition disguised under every form to obtain its ends.

Marshal Noailles, who was not of opinion that France should let the remainder of her navigation and trade be crushed, to convince all Europe that the English made war like pirates, said, that this external moderation deceived none, that the court of Versailles alone was deceived.

Those who agreed in opinion with the King, pretended that all these captures made without a declaration of war would be restored; but real politicians thought otherwise, and experience has demonstrated, by the event, that these were not deceived.

Repeated orders were dispatched to all the sea-ports, and preparations were making for a land-war; but there was not a sufficient fund in the royal treasury to support the extraordinary expences. The Comptroller-general said to the King, “Sire, the farmers-general offer your Majesty money, it should be taken. They will lend the crown sixty-six millions at 4 per cent. the state in its present exigence cannot purchase money at a cheaper rate.”

It may, perhaps, be thought that the financiers, affected at the state of France, made this voluntary proposal from a spirit of patriotism; but posterity will know that the same sordid interest which constantly actuates them, incited them to display this generosity. One of the first conditions was, that the lease of the farms should be renewed. They afterwards insisted that there should be no under-farmers; that is to say, that the profits arising from the farms should be no longer divided, and that they should be sole masters of the finances. They also wanted to have the disposal of all the employments in the farms.

It was publicly said in Paris, that I had framed the scheme of this loan. It is true that four farmers-general applied to me, to make the proposal from their body, and that I mentioned it to the King. Lewis XV. had it examined in his council, who approved of it; this is all the share I had in the transaction. Those who imagine that a King of France can raise money by the act of his own private will, are unacquainted with the government. This sum was far from being sufficient to put in motion all the machines of war that were foreseen to be necessary. The King borrowed thirty millions upon the posts at 3 per cent. but even this additional sum was not enough. The King’s secretaries, as well of the upper as the inferior college, were taxed, and this impost, the least burthensome perhaps of any, because it fell upon such as purchased their employments through ostentation, produced a supply of forty-five millions.

With this fund, it was incumbent upon us to oppose the designs of the English at sea, and of such powers as were enemies to France by land.

I saw the King as usual. He supped almost every night with me, and communicated to me all his plans and designs. Difficulties did not astonish him. Lewis XV. is slow at resolving, but when he is determined, his resolution is firm. He appeared more gay than usual: perhaps the internal tranquility of the state greatly contributed towards it; for the broils with the court of England had produced so good an effect at home, that schisms were no longer the subject of conversation. The curates administered to the sick, and thus the clergy and parliament were reconciled.

We learnt at Versailles that George II. who had made a voyage to his Electoral dominions, was returned to London. His presence was there necessary to expedite the military operations. We were at the same time informed, that several councils had been held at Kensington, in which it was resolved to make war. It had already been pursued for some time; and these councils were held only to deliberate upon the means. The English had by this time taken from the French 250 merchantmen, and made upwards of 4000 sailors prisoners of war.

The two nations mutually upbraided each other with the injustice of their proceedings. The English reproached the French with having infringed upon the treaty of peace, and the French openly declared, that the English made war like pirates; and added, that the parliament of England might be compared to the Divan of Constantinople, and George II. to the Dey of Algiers.

The Duke of Belleisle said, that these reproaches were carried too far; that there were sufficient grounds for the two nations fighting for five hundred years without declaring war.

Count de Argenson asked a foreign minister, in my presence, _Which of the two parties was the most equitable?_ “They are both unjust, said the foreigner. France is in the wrong for having made incursions upon the British dominions in America, and for having fortified Dunkirk; and England has done amiss by seizing the ships of this nation, and for having made prisoners of war in time of peace.”

I related this discourse to the King, who said, that most of the foreign ministers were unacquainted with the origin of the dispute, and that they judged of things only by appearances, or according to the ideas they entertained of their own country.

These private discourses no way altered the general operations. The armaments by sea and land continued going on, and we prepared ourselves for war. The Pope offered his mediation; this was Benedict XIV. The matter might have been referred to him, had it been possible for him to have negotiated the affair in person; but it must have been entrusted to nuncios, who are usually men as ambitious as they are ignorant, and who are acquainted with no other politics than those of the Vatican.

The King of Portugal also offered his service: but as he was incapable of throwing any weight in the scale, he occasioned no alteration in the designs that were formed for pursuing the war.

The duke of Noailles said, he was surprised that petty princes without power, should think of being the arbiters of the power of the first states in Europe.

I shall not conceal to posterity that pacific proposals were made between the two courts; but they were so distant from their respective views, that it may be presumed they were offered only to make the torch of war blaze the more, though the pretext was to extinguish it.

France’s demands were great, and the English required too much. This was the method of succeeding in the design that was formed of not agreeing.

In order to increase the troops, and render the armies more numerous, recourse was had to an expedient which was of very little consequence. The invalids, who, by their services and their wounds, had obtained admission into the hospital, were ordered to bear arms and fight the enemies of the state.

A wit said upon this occasion, that “this was having recourse to the dead to wage war against the living.”

In proportion as the quarrel between France and England increased, Lewis XV. gave me more power. It was imagined in the world, that I was the arbitress of this new revolution: it is true, the King asked my opinion upon many things; but I took care not to be answerable for such events as might give a new biass to affairs in general: I referred them to the council of state, leaving them to share all the blame, if any was incurred.

The ministers saw me more regularly, and the general officers who were desirous of commanding the armies, paid their court to me with remarkable assiduity.

Whilst agreeable news was received from the new world, the court was very uneasy about two squadrons which had set sail for America; but advice came of their being returned to Brest. The King came himself to acquaint me with the news, at which he testified much joy. It was natural to think that the ships which composed these squadrons would fall into the hands of the English, who had sent very considerable fleets to America.

The first advantage the French gained in Canada, produced a second. The Iroquois nation offered to enter into alliance with the French.

The count D’Argenson shewed me the discourse which the deputies of this savage people addressed to M. Vaudreuil, who commanded the King’s troops.

“May the Great Spirit preserve the captain of the French and his valiant warriors! May the extent of their courage be measured by the number of their wounds! We, whose nations are as ancient as the stars, and the most courageous upon earth, come to offer thee the right arm of our warriors. The black gowns who are amongst us, have taken care to make us acquainted with thy nation, which is the most valiant of any after our own, because they have seen that these warriors might learn from ours what they did not know before. Our nation, who reckon more than ten thousand moons, come then to unite their forces to assist thee, in order to regale our wives and children with the dead bodies of the enemies of the captain of the French. Receive the calumet of peace, and as a mark of joy, give three shouts to the sun, which is risen to enlighten our nations.”

This letter being made public at Versailles, a courtier, who had read it, said to the King: “Sire, we must make an alliance with the Iroquois, for they will eat as many Englishmen as they can find. Those people are so famished with glory, that they devour their conquests.”

A few days after the return of the Brest fleets, the King said to me: “The English parliament desire peace, the people of England want war. I shall take no steps to procure the last; but if it is proposed to me upon honourable terms, I will accept of it.”

M. de Belleisle told me, that no terms would be proposed, and that all the reports that were spread in England, were only designed to amuse France, and surprise the government.

“Marshal, said I to him, we may possibly be surprised, for it is above a year since we were told that we ought to be so.”

Whilst warlike preparations were making on every side, the ministers often received memorials from individuals, pointing out the object of our first attack.

The French have for some time been greatly addicted to politics. It is pretended that we caught the infection from the English, and that it was communicated to France by the way of Calais. A man of great wit said to me one day upon this head, that since this contagion had spread, an infinite number of people, whose labour and industry might have been very beneficial to the state, became idle spectators. In England this rage is not so dangerous; the citizens engage themselves as well with their own private affairs, as with the administration in general. But in France, when a man gives himself up to politics, he passes his life systematically.

The Count D’Argenson shewed me a memorial, which he had received from an unknown hand, bearing this title, _Important advice to the government_.

“We should not wage war, said the anonymous author, either in Germany or in America; the English navy is superior to ours: the English will in the end have the advantage over us. In opposing ourselves to their forces, we shall only compleatly ruin our own.

“We should take the field with a bold stroke. It should seem for some time past, as if our ministers were paid by the English government, to go into all the snares that were laid for them. It is only necessary that the court of London chalk out a plan, for that of Versailles to follow them. This bold stroke is to enter into alliance with Spain, and invade Portugal provisionally. The Portuguese are allies of the English, and this is a sufficient plea to conquer them: I say this is sufficient, for princes have long since thought they had no occasion for a pretext to make war: it was only necessary that an invasion favoured their designs.

“That kingdom is easy to invade; Portugal has neither armies nor officers, for we should not consider as soldiers, a few natives badly disciplined, who never saw fire, and commanders that never served. Some months must elapse before the English can send them troops and generals. Lisbon will be taken before the English fleet can set sail to defend it.

“Portugal being once in the hands of the French, the English will attempt nothing; or else at the peace, they will give up every thing.

“To form a judgment of the importance of this invasion, the advantages which Great Britain derives from Portugal should be considered.

“All Europe knows that this kingdom has no manufactures, and that the English furnish the Portuguese not only with every thing which promotes their luxury, but even their physical wants. Forty thousand artizans, in every kind of trade, are constantly at work for them. Portugal maintains forty thousand of King George’s subjects. These contribute to the support of an equal number of other citizens; and as this primitive industry is the source of infinite subordinate species of it, the interruption given to these manufactures would occasion a diminution in the general circulation.

“Eight thousand merchantmen sail every year from the river Thames to enter the Tagus; twenty thousand English sailors are therefore supported by this single branch of commerce.

“The mines of Brazil produce annually fresh riches for England, which are the more advantageous, as they furnish that nation with the means of purchasing alliances, and paying subsidies. It is partly with the gold of Portugal that Great Britain maintains her fleets, and raises armies.

“It is true that the riches of Portugal are in America, and that the English fleets might possess themselves of the mines; but the English would not derive great advantage from this conquest.

“The extraction of gold is a manufacture that must be rendered profitable, to draw advantages from it: and this capacity is not the lot of every one. The Portuguese, naturally sober, and who have but few wants, can alone derive these advantages from it; the English, with whom labour is much dearer, would be losers by it. Great Britain, instead of being enriched, would be impoverished by the mines.

“It is a general rule, that mines always ruin their proprietors, as Spain and Portugal evince, which are continually impoverished in proportion as their mines become fruitful. The only nations that are thereby enriched, are those who barter their industry for the produce.

“The invasion of Portugal would make a change in all the systems of Europe. It would cause a general revolution in cabinets. The face of affairs in Germany would be entirely altered. The King of Prussia would change his plans. The Belligerant powers, who are preparing for a certain war, would be obliged to carry on another, which would greatly distress many powers.

“France by this first cast would save great armies, and still greater sums. Portugal would be no sooner taken, than the English would set about re-taking it: this war, which would at once entirely occupy them, would divert them from any other.

“The English ministry are prepared for every thing, except the invasion of Portugal. They have planned all their operations for the German war, and that in America; but no steps are taken for the defence of Portugal.

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Memoirs of the Marchioness of Pompadour (vol. 2 of 2)Chapter IV: Part 4

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