Chapter IX: Front Matter (9)

Our commissioners arrived at the English head-quarters on the 28th, and were eager to solicit a suspension of arms.

Lord Wellington informed them, that he wished to consult with Prince Blucher on this point; and on the 29th of June, at half after eleven in the evening, he sent them the following answer.

Head quarters of Prince Blucher,
June the 29th, 1815, 11-1/2 at night.

"Gentlemen,

"I have the honour to acquaint you, that having consulted Marshal Prince Blucher on your proposal for an armistice, his highness has agreed with me, that, under present circumstances, no armistice can take place, while Napoleon Bonaparte is in Paris, and at _liberty_; and that the operations are in such a state, that he cannot stop them.

"I have the honour, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

On the 1st of July in the morning, they had a conference, of which they gave an account to the government by the following despatch, addressed to Baron Bignon, secretary of state, assistant to the minister of foreign affairs.

"Louvres, July the 1st, 1815, forenoon.

"Monsieur le Baron,

"The despatches, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, which we have had the honour to address to you, remain unanswered[82]. We are absolutely deprived of the knowledge of what is passing at Paris, and in the rest of France. To whatever cause this want of communication is to be ascribed, it renders our situation painful, and is detrimental to the activity of our proceedings. It may render them useless: we request you, to remedy this as speedily as possible.

[Footnote 82: As these despatches are now uninteresting,
I have not inserted them.]

"At present we are authorized to think, that, as soon as you have made known, that Napoleon Bonaparte is at a distance, a suspension of hostilities for three days may be signed, in order to adjust an armistice, during which a treaty for peace may take place.

"Directed by the instructions given us, to listen to what may be said to us, and make you acquainted with it, we have to inform you, the Duke of Wellington has repeated to us several times, that as soon as our government has a head, peace will speedily be concluded.

"Speaking, as he says, merely as a private individual, but supposing however, that his opinion may be taken into consideration, he more than objects to the government of Napoleon II.; and thinks, that, under such a reign, Europe could enjoy no security, and France no repose.

"They say, that they do not pretend to oppose the choice of any other head to the government. They repeat on every occasion, that the powers of Europe do not pretend, to interfere in this choice: but they add, that, if the prince chosen were such, as by the nature of his situation to excite apprehensions for the tranquillity of Europe, by rendering that of France problematical, it would be necessary for the allied powers to have guarantees; and we have reason to believe, that these guarantees would be cessions of territory.

"One person alone, Louis XVIII. seems to unite all the conditions, that could prevent Europe from demanding guarantees for its security.

"Already, they say, he resides at Cambray. Quesney has opened its gates to him. These places, and other towns, are in his power; either by having delivered themselves up, or having been put into his hands by the allies.

"The Duke of Wellington admits and enumerates a considerable part of the faults committed by Louis XVIII. during his government of a few months. He puts in the first rank his having given to the princes of his family entrance into his council; his having had a ministry without union, and without responsibility; his having created a military household, not chosen from the soldiers of the army; and his not having placed about him persons, who were truly interested in the maintenance of the charter.

"It seems to him, that, by making known our grievances, _without settling conditions_, engagements might be formed with the public, which would remove its apprehensions for the future, by giving France the guarantee, it might desire.

"If a discussion of conditions take place, others beside the actual authorities might deliberate, resumed the Duke.

"If any time be lost, generals of other armies might interfere in the negotiations; and they would be rendered more complicated by additional interests.

"We add two proclamations of Louis XVIII. &c.

(Signed) "ANDRÉOSSY,
"Count BOISSY D'ANGLAS,
"FLAUGERGUES,
"VALENCE,
"LABESNARDIER."

M. Bignon's despatch, announcing the departure of Napoleon, having reached them after the conclusion of this first conference, they hastened to communicate it to Lord Wellington; and to claim a suspension of hostilities, in order to conclude an armistice, to which the presence of Napoleon had hitherto been the only obstacle.

Lord Wellington answered them: "that it was necessary for him, to confer with Prince Blucher, and that he would give them an answer in the course of the day."

In the evening they had a fresh conference with this general, which gave occasion to the following despatch:

"Louvres, July the 1st, half after 8 in the evening.

"Lord Wellington has communicated to us a letter from Manheim, written in the names of the Emperors of Russia and Austria by MM. de Nesselrode and de Metternich. This letter strongly urged the continuance of operations; and declares, that, if any armistice be entered into by the generals, who are at this moment near Paris, their majesties will not consider it as putting any stop to their march, but will order their troops, to approach Paris.

"The Count d'Artois has just arrived at the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington, who received us alone in his saloon. We did not perceive the prince; he was in a separate apartment.

"We insisted on the execution of the promise given us. The Duke of Wellington answered, that he had always declared to us, he could enter into no definitive engagements, till he had conferred with Marshal Prince Blucher; to whom he would go, to prevail on him to join with him in agreeing on an armistice.

"He added, he would not conceal from us, that the Field Marshal had an extreme aversion to every thing, that would stay his operations, which extended already to the left bank of the Seine; and that he could not avoid supporting his movements, if he could not bring him to agree in his opinion.

"He communicated to us a proposal for an armistice, made by the Prince of Eckmuhl, which he had just received.

"He assured us, that, as soon as he had seen Prince Blucher, he would return, and join us at Louvres; and sent to request us, to repair to Gonesse.

"In talking on the possible conditions of an armistice, he insinuated, that he should require the army to quit Paris; which we declined, objecting, that on the contrary it was proper for the army of the allies, to take remote positions; otherwise it would be impossible, to deliberate freely on the important interests of our country, the influence of which on those of Europe he appeared to acknowledge.

"The conference thus terminating, we have some reason to think, that Lord Wellington will give the Count d'Artois to understand, that he ought to remain at a much more considerable distance from Paris."

To this Baron Bignon immediately sent the following answer:

"_To Messieurs the Commissioners charged with the Armistice._

July the 1st.

"You announced to us, gentlemen, that you were authorized to believe, that, if Napoleon Bonaparte were away, a suspension of hostilities might be signed, during which a treaty for peace might be entered into. _The desired condition being fulfilled_, there is at the present moment no motive, that can oppose a suspension of hostilities, and an armistice. It is strongly to be desired, that the suspension of hostilities, instead of being for three days only, should be at least for five.

"We do not think, that the English and Prussians alone will attempt to force our lines. It would be gratuitously incurring useless losses. According to their own account, they can be joined by the Bavarians only in the first fortnight of this month: so that it may be convenient to them to wait for this reinforcement, which is an additional reason for their not refusing an armistice, that will be attended with as much or more advantage to themselves than to us. In fine, if the allies do not choose, to forget altogether their solemn declarations, what do they now require? The only obstacle, that, according to them, opposed the conclusion of peace, is irrevocably removed: thus nothing any longer opposes its re-establishment; and, to arrive at peace, nothing is more urgent than an armistice.

"The committee of government has had laid before it all the particulars, that you have transmitted, of the language held to you by the Duke of Wellington. It desires, gentlemen, that you will persist in distinguishing the political question of the form of government of France from the actual question, the conclusion of an armistice. Without repelling any of the overtures made you, it is easy, to give the Duke of Wellington to understand, that, if, in the present state of affairs, the political question of the government of France _must inevitably become the subject of a sort of discussion between France and the allied powers_, the general interest of France, and of the powers themselves, is to do nothing precipitately; and not to decide on a definitive part, till after having maturely weighed what will offer real guarantees for the future. It is possible, that the allied powers themselves, when better informed of the sentiments of the French nation, will not persevere in the resolutions they may have formed from different data. Napoleon is no longer at Paris, and has not been for nearly a week. His political career is at an end. If any national disposition in favour of the Bourbons existed, this disposition would have been loudly manifested, and their recall would have been already consummated. It is evident, therefore, that the re-establishment of this family is not the will of the nation. It remains for the allied sovereigns to examine, whether, in wishing to impose it on the nation in despite of its will, they do not themselves act contrary to their own intentions; since, instead of securing the internal peace of France, they would only be sowing in it the seeds of fresh discord.

"The proclamations of Louis XVIII. are known here: and the nature of these proclamations already destroys all the hopes, that the language of the Duke of Wellington might give. It may be judged from the spirit that breathes in these pieces recently published, that the present royal ministry either could not, or would not prevent, what the French nation might expect from that government.

"For the rest, gentlemen, you should confine yourselves to hearing every thing: you ought to affirm, that France itself desires nothing, but what will be of the greatest benefit to the general interest: and that, if it would prefer any plan to the re-establishment of the Bourbons, it is because there is none, that offers it so many inconveniences, and so few advantages.

"You must strongly repeat, gentlemen, to the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher, that, if the French government warmly insist on an armistice, it is because it perceives the possibility of coming to a good understanding on points, on which opinions appear to be farthest divided. It is because the communications and connexions, established between their head-quarters and us, enable us thoroughly to appreciate the true spirit of France. We think in particular, that the nobleness of the Duke of Wellington's character, and the wisdom of the allied sovereigns, cannot lead them to a desire, to force the French nation to submit to a government, that is repugnant to the real wishes of the great majority of the population."

This language, so remarkable for its moderation, was corroborated by the _ostensible_ letter below, which the Duke of Otranto thought proper to address to each of the generals in chief of the besieging armies.

"My Lord (or Prince),

"Independently of the course of our negotiations, I make it my duty, to write personally to your lordship on the subject of an armistice, the refusal of which, I confess, seems to me inexplicable. Our plenipotentiaries have been at head-quarters ever since the 28th of June, and we have not yet a positive answer.

"Peace already exists, since the war has no longer an object. Our right to independence, and the engagement taken by the sovereigns to respect it, would not the less subsist after the taking of Paris. It would be inhuman, therefore, it would be atrocious, to engage in sanguinary battles, that would make no alteration in the questions to be decided.

"I must speak candidly to your lordship; our state of possession, our legal state, _which has the double sanction of the people and of the chambers, is that of a government, where the grandson of the Emperor of Austria is the head of the state. We cannot think of altering this state of things, unless the nation acquires a certainty, that the powers revoke their promises, and that the preservation of our present government is in opposition to their common wishes_.

"What then can be more just, than to conclude an armistice? Are there any other means of allowing the combined powers time to explain themselves, and France time to be acquainted with their wishes?

"It will not escape your lordship, that already one great power finds in our state of possession a personal right to interest itself in our interior concerns. As long as this state remains unaltered, the two chambers have hence an additional obligation, not to consent at present to any measure capable of altering our possession.

"Is not the step, that has been adopted on our eastern frontier, the most natural to follow? It was not confined to an armistice between General Bubna and Marshal Suchet: it was stipulated, that we should return to our limits according to the treaty of Paris; because, in fact, the war ought to be considered as ended by the simple fact of the abdication of Napoleon.

"Field-marshal Frimont, on his part, has agreed to the armistice, to meet by preliminary arrangements those, that may take place between the allies. We do not even know, whether England and Prussia have changed their minds on the subject of our independence; for the march of the armies cannot be any certain indication of the minds of the cabinets. Neither can the will of two powers suffice us; it is their general agreement we want to know. Would you anticipate this agreement? Would you oppose an obstacle to it, in order to give rise to a new political tempest from a state of things so near to peace?

"I am not afraid, for my own part, to anticipate all objections. Perhaps you suppose, that the occupation of Paris by two of the allied armies will second the views you may entertain of restoring Louis XVIII. to the throne. But can an augmentation of the evils of war, which can be ascribed to this motive alone, be a means of reconciliation?

"I must declare to your lordship, that every sinister attempt to impose on us a government, before the allied powers have explained themselves, would immediately oblige the chambers to take measures, that would not leave the possibility of a reconciliation in any case. It is even the interest of the King, that every thing should remain in a state of suspension: force may replace him on the throne, but cannot keep him there. It is neither by force, nor by surprise, nor by the wishes of one party, that the national will can be brought to change its government. It would even be in vain, at the present moment, to offer us conditions, to render a new government more supportable. There are no conditions that can be examined, as long as the necessity of bending our necks to the yoke, of renouncing our independence, is not proved to us. Now, my lord, this necessity cannot even be suspected, before the allied powers are in accord. None of their engagements have been revoked: our independence is under their protection: it is we, who enter into their views; and, according to the sense of their declaration, it is the besieging armies, that deviate from them.

"According to these declarations, and never were there any more solemn, every employment of force, in favour of the King, by these armies, on that part of our territory, which is solely in their power, will be considered by France as an avowal of the formal design of imposing on us a government against our will. We may be allowed to ask your lordship, whether you have received any such authority. Besides, force is not a pacificator: a moral resistance repelled the late government, that the King had been made to adopt: the more violence is employed toward the nation, the more invincible would this resistance be rendered. It cannot be the intention of the generals of the besieging armies, to compromise their own governments; and to revoke in fact the law, that the allied powers have imposed on themselves.

"My lord, the whole question lies in the compass of these few words.

"Napoleon has abdicated, as the allied powers desired: peace is therefore restored: who the prince shall be, that is to reap the fruit of this abdication, ought not even to be brought into the question.

"Is our state of possession to be altered by force? The allied powers would not only violate their promises, promises made in the face of the whole world, but they would not obtain their end. Is the change to come from the will of the nation? Then it is necessary, in order to lead this will to declare itself, for the allied powers first to make known their formal refusal, to let our present government subsist. An armistice, therefore, is indispensable.

"The full force of these considerations, my lord, it is impossible not to perceive. Even in Paris, should the event of a battle open its gates to you, I should still hold to your lordship the same language. It is the language of all France. Were rivers of blood made causelessly to flow, would the pretensions, that gave rise to them, be more secure, or less odious?

"I hope soon to have an intercourse with your lordship, that will lead us both to the work of peace, by means more conformable to reason and justice. An armistice would allow us, to treat in Paris: and it will be easy for us to come to an understanding on the great principle, that the tranquillity of France is a condition inseparable from the tranquillity of Europe. It is only from a close inspection of the nation and of the army, that you can judge, on what the quietness and stability of our future condition depend.

"I beg, &c. &c."

Though in this letter the Duke of Otranto pleaded the cause of Napoleon IL, and pretended to be ignorant of the dispositions of the allies, it was nevertheless very easy to perceive, that he considered the question as irrevocably decided in favour of the Bourbons. Their name, which he had long avoided mentioning, was incessantly on his lips: but always the same, always inclined naturally and systematically, to have more strings than one to his bow, he appeared to incline alternately _for the younger branch, and for the reigning branch_. At one time the former seemed to him to offer preferably, and in a higher degree, all the guarantees the nation could desire: at another he insinuated, that it would be possible, to come to an accommodation with the King, if he would consent, to dismiss certain dangerous persons, and make fresh concessions to France.

This change, too sudden not to be noticed, drew on his conduct more than ever the scrutinizing eyes and reproaches of the antagonists of the Bourbons.

He was accused of encouraging by impunity the newspaper writers and pamphleteers, who openly advocated the recall of the ancient dynasty of protecting the royalist party; and of having restored to liberty one of its most subtle agents, Baron de Vitrolles.

He was charged with holding nocturnal conferences with this same M. de Vitrolles, and several eminent royalists; and with daily sending emissaries, unknown to his colleagues, to the King, to M. de Talleyrand, and to the Duke of Wellington.

Two of the deputies, M. Durbach and General Solignac, went to him, and declared, that they were acquainted with his manoeuvres; that his ambition blinded him; that no compact could ever subsist between Louis XVIII. and the murderer of his brother; and that sooner or later France would take vengeance on this treason.

An old minister of state, M. Deferment, reproached him to his teeth with privately selling the lives and liberties of the French.

Other accusations, not less serious, or less virulent, were addressed to him by M. Carnot, and by General Grenier. "If he betray us," said the latter, "I will blow his brains out."

The Duke of Otranto, accustomed to brave political storms, coolly repelled these imputations. He reminded his accusers of the numerous pledges he had given to the revolution. He offered his head as the guarantee of his fidelity. His protestations, his oaths, and the imperturbable assurance, with which he answered for the safety and independence of the nation, if he were suffered to go on his own way, allayed the storms: but he had too much penetration, not to be aware of the ground on which he stood; he could not but feel, that he was lost, if he did not hasten to a conclusion; and there is every reason to believe, that he rejected _no means_ of arriving speedily at a decisive result[83].

[Footnote 83: If we may believe the declaration of M.
Macirone, confirmed by the testimony of two other secret
agents, MM. Maréchal and St. Jul***, the Duke of Otranto
wrote to Lord Wellington, by a letter of which M.
Macirone was the bearer, and which he concealed in his
stockings, that the enthusiasm of the federates and
Bonapartists was at the height; and that it would be
impossible, to restrain them any longer, if the Duke of
Wellington did not hasten, to come and put an end to
their fury by the occupation of Paris.]

Blucher, however, to whom only a shadow of defence was opposed, had crossed the Seine at the bridge of Pecq, which had been preserved by the care of a journalist named Martainville, and appeared to intend, to spread his troops round the south-west of Paris[84]. Our generals, witnessing this adventurous march, were unanimously of opinion, that the Prussians had compromised themselves. They summoned the Prince of Eckmuhl to attack them; and he could not avoid assenting to it.

[Footnote 84: It was just at this moment, that the
Emperor declared to the government, that he was certain
of crushing the enemy, if they would entrust him with
the command of the army.]

The whole army, generals, officers, soldiers, were still animated with a devotion, that nothing could rebut. Proud of the confidence placed in them by the national representatives, they had answered their appeal by an address full of spirit and patriotism; they had sworn to each other, to die in defence of the honour and independence of the nation; and they were impatient, to fulfil their oaths.

General Excelmans was sent after the Prussians with six thousand men. A corps of fifteen thousand infantry, under the command of General Vichery, was to follow him by the bridge of Sevres, and connect its movements with six thousand foot of the 1st corps, and ten thousand chosen horse, who were to march by the bridge of Neuilly. But at the moment of executing these movements, the success of which would unquestionably have ensured the destruction of the Prussian army, counter-orders were issued by the Prince of Eckmuhl, from what motives I know not. General Excelmans alone maintained the battle. He attacked the enemy in advance of Versailles, drove them into an ambuscade, cut them to pieces, and took from them their arms, baggage, and horses. Generals Strulz, Piré, Barthe, and Vincent, colonels Briqueville, Faudoas, St. Amand, Chaillou, Simonnet, Schmid, Paolini, and their brave regiments, performed prodigies of valour, and were intrepidly seconded by the citizens of the neighbouring communes, who had preceded as sharpshooters the arrival of our troops on the field of battle, and during the battle proved themselves worthy, to fight by their side.

This victory filled the Parisian patriots with hope and joy. It inspired them with the noble desire of imitating the fine example, that had just been set them. But when it was known, that a general engagement had been unanimously desired and agreed upon; and that the enemy, had it not been for counter-orders, surprised and cut off, would have been annihilated, this intoxication was changed into depression, and a cry was raised on all hands of infamy and treason.

Excelmans and his brave men, not being supported, were obliged to retreat. The Prussians advanced, the English moved out to support them; they formed a junction, and came and encamped together on the heights of Meudon.

The committee hastened to inform the commissioners of the critical situation of Paris, and desired them, as the Duke of Wellington was incessantly sending them from Caiphas to Pilate, to endeavour to see Prince Blucher. They answered, "that they had never been able to have any communication with the marshal; and that they could not establish a conference with him, unless through the intervention of Lord Wellington, without the risk of occasioning a rupture."

They added to their despatch a fresh letter, by which his lordship announced to them, that "Prince Blucher continued to express to him the greatest repugnance to the conclusion of an armistice," &c. &c.

The government no longer doubted the ill will of the English general. Count Carnot said, "that they must address themselves definitively to the brutal frankness of Blucher, rather than live in the uncertainty, in which they were kept by the civilities of Wellington."

The Duke of Vicenza thought the same, that the only way of coming to a conclusion was by bluntly making a proposal without the knowledge of the English. He remarked to the committee, that the great repugnance shown by Marshal Blucher to concluding an armistice, no doubt, arose from his being probably unwilling, to negotiate under the direction and influence of Wellington, to whose head-quarters he apparently avoided paying a visit. That he would be much more tractable, if he were addressed directly. That, by taking this step, they would also have the advantage of removing the negotiations from the place, where the Bourbons were; and of being able more easily to avoid the political question, on which Wellington seemed far more decided than Blucher. The commission, influenced by these observations, adopted the advice of M. Carnot; and the Prince of Eckmuhl was ordered, to address to Marshal Blucher direct proposals, founded principally on the armistice concluded with the chiefs of the Austrian forces.

The prince immediately answered:

"If Marshal Frimont have thought himself authorised, to conclude an armistice, this is no reason for our doing the same. We shall follow up our victory: God has given us the means, and the will.

"Consider what you have to do. Do not precipitate a city anew into calamities; for you are aware to what lengths an enraged soldiery may go, if your capital be taken by assault. Would you draw down on your head the curses of Paris, as you have those of Hamburgh?

"_We are resolved to enter Paris, to secure the honest people there from the plunder; with which they are threatened by the populace_[85]. It is only in Paris, that we can conclude a secure armistice."

[Footnote 85: From this passage it appears
unquestionable, that Wellington had communicated M.
Fouché's letter to Prince Blucher.]

This letter was revolting to the committee; but however great its just indignation, there was now no middle path: _the commander in chief had refused, to avail himself of a palpable fault of the enemy: the opportunity of victory had been let slip: it was necessary, to sustain a siege, or capitulate._

The committee, sensible of all the importance of the part it should take, was desirous of having recourse to the skill, the councils, and the responsibility of the most experienced men. It sent for the immortal defenders of Genoa and Toulouse, the conqueror of Dantzic, Generals Gazan, Duverney, and Evain, Major-General Ponton of the engineers, who had distinguished himself at the siege of Hamburgh, and in fine the presidents and committees (_bureaux_) of the two chambers.

Count Carnot, who had been to examine our positions and those of the enemy in company with General Grenier, made a report on the situation of Paris to the assembly.

He stated:

That the fortifications erected on the right bank of the Seine appeared sufficient, to secure Paris against any assault on that side. But that the left bank was entirely open, and presented a spacious field to the enemy's attempts.

That the English and Prussian generals had moved the greater part of their armies to this vulnerable point _with impunity_: and appeared disposed, to attempt an attack with open force. That, if they failed the first time, they might return to the charge a second; and renew their attempts, till they rendered themselves masters of the capital. That they would have fresh troops, to oppose to us continually; while ours, obliged to be constantly on their guard, would soon be exhausted with fatigue.

That the arrival of subsistence was becoming difficult; and that a corps of sixty thousand Bavarians would apparently block up the way between the Seine and Marne in the course of a few days.

That the enemy, already masters of the heights of Meudon, and the best surrounding positions, might entrench themselves there, cut off our retreat, and reduce Paris and the army, to surrender at discretion.

The president of the committee, after having called the attention of the members of the assembly to these serious considerations, requested them to give their opinions.

It was observed to him, that it appeared necessary, previously to make known the present state of the negotiations. This the committee did not refuse: but the communication having brought on a discussion respecting the Bourbons, the committee reminded them, that they ought to confine themselves to the military question; and that the point was, purely and simply to decide, whether it were advisable or possible, to defend Paris.

The Prince of Essling, being called upon, said, that this city would be impregnable, if the inhabitants would make of it a second Saragossa: but there was not sufficient harmony in their sentiments, to think of a resolute resistance and the most prudent part would be, to obtain a suspension of hostilities at any price.

The Duke of Dantzic declared, that he did not think it impossible, to prolong their defence, by rapidly accelerating the works begun in the plains of Montrouge.

The Duke of Dalmatia maintained, that the left bank of the Seine was not tenable: that it was even very hazardous, since the occupation of Aubervilliers, to remain on the right side: that if the line of the canal, that joins St. Denis to Lavillette, should be forced, the enemy might enter by the barrier of St. Denis pell-mell with our troops.

Some of the members, agreeing in opinion with the Duke of Dantzic, demanded, that positive information should be procured respecting the possibility of putting the left bank into a state of defence, previous to coming to a decision. In fine, after some debate, it was decided, that the assembly was not competent, to determine such a question: and that it should be submitted to the examination and decision of a council of war, which the Prince of Eckmuhl should convene for the night following.

The occupation of Paris by the foreigners was the object of the impatient wishes of the royalists, and of the men who had sold or devoted themselves from policy, ambition, or fear, to the party of the Bourbons. Persuaded, that it would decide the fate of France in 1815, as it had done in 1814, they had omitted beforehand no step, no promise, no threatening insinuation, that could tend to accomplish their wishes and their triumph by the surrender of the city.

The Duke of Otranto, whether he were in concert with the royalists, or considered the speedy capitulation of Paris necessary to his own security; or were desirous of making a merit, at some future day, of having brought France under the sway of its legitimate sovereign without effusion of blood; appeared to consider it of great importance that the defence of Paris should not be prolonged. "Every thing is on the point of being settled," said he to the members, who had most influence in the chambers and in the army: "let us be very careful not to sacrifice a secure present to an uncertain future. The allies are agreed, that we shall have _a_ Bourbon; but it is necessary, that he submit to the conditions imposed on him by the nation. The chamber will be retained, the generals will remain at the head of the army; all will go well. Is it not better to submit, than to expose France to be partitioned, or delivered over to the Bourbons bound hand and foot? A prolonged resistance would have no other result, than to retard our fall. It would rob us of the price of a voluntary submission, and authorise the Bourbons to be implacable." If little disposition were shown, to share his confidence and his sentiments; he imposed silence on the refractory by all the forms of the most lively interest. "Your opposition," he said to them, "astonishes and grieves me: would you pass for an incendiary, and incur the penalty of being exiled? Let us go on our own way, I conjure you: I will answer for the future.".... An internal presentiment warned the hearers, that this future would be far from answering the expectations of M. Fouché: but his political life, his great talents, his connexions with the foreign ministers, the attention paid him in 1814 by the Emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia, gave such weight, such an ascendancy, to his words, that they ultimately did violence to their own reason, and gave themselves up, though not without murmuring, to confidence and hope.

The council of war assembled on the night of the 1st of July at the head-quarters at Lavillette, under the presidentship of the Prince of Eckmuhl. Care was taken, it appeared, to keep away some suspected generals; and not to neglect calling those officers, whose principles, moderation, or weakness, was known. All the marshals present in the capital were admitted; and they, who had lately refused to fight, did not refuse to come to capitulate.

The committee, in order to prevent all political discussion, had stated the questions, to which the members of the council were to confine their deliberations: but this precaution, as might be supposed, did not prevent their entering familiarly into the moral and political considerations, that might influence the defence or surrender of the place besieged. Marshal Soult pleaded the cause of Louis XVIII.; and was eagerly seconded by other marshals, and several generals, who, though they entered into the council under the national colours, would willingly have gone out of it with the white cockade.

It is impossible, to recapitulate the opinions, given in turn or confusedly by the fifty persons, who were called to take a share in this great and important deliberation. Their speeches, or rather their conversation, turned alternately on Paris and on the Bourbons.

"We are told," said the partisans of Louis XVIII. and the capitulation, "that Paris, covered without by an army of eighty thousand men; and defended within by the federates, the sharpshooters, the national guard, and an immense population; might resist the efforts of the allies for twenty days at least. We are told, that its immense extent will render the arrival of provision easy. We admit the possibility of all this: but what will be the ultimate effect of this resistance? To allow the Emperor Alexander, and the Emperor of Austria, time to arrive.... The allies, we know perfectly well, promise to leave us the power of choosing our sovereign: but will they keep their promises? and what conditions will they annex to them? Already Wellington and Blucher have announced, that they will require guarantees, and fortified towns, if Louis XVIII. be rejected. Is not this equivalent to a formal declaration, that the allies are resolved, to retain that sovereign on the throne? Let us voluntarily rally round him, therefore, while we still can. His ministers led him astray, but his intentions were always pure: he knows the faults he has committed; he will be eager to repair them, and to give us the institutions yet necessary, to consolidate the rights and liberties of the people on bases not to be shaken."

"This reasoning may be just," answered their opponents; "but experience, of more weight than any reasoning, has convinced us, that we must not rely on empty promises. The hopes you have conceived rest on conjecture, or on the word of the agents of the Bourbons. Before we surrender ourselves into the hands of the King, he must make known to us the guarantees, by which we are to be secured. If they be agreeable to us, then we may deliberate but if we open our gates without conditions, and previous to the arrival of Alexander, Wellington and the Bourbons will make a jest of their promises, and oblige us to submit to the will of the conqueror without pity. Besides, why should we despair of the safety of France? Is the loss of a single battle, then, to decide the fate of a great nation? Have we not still immense resources, to oppose to the enemy? Have the federates, the national guard, and all true Frenchmen, refused to shed their blood in defence of the glory, the honour, and the independence of their country? While we are fighting under the walls of the capital, the levy in mass of the patriots will be arranged in the departments: and when our enemies see, that we are determined to defend our independence, they will rather respect it, than expose themselves to a patriotic and national war for interests not their own. We must refuse, therefore, to surrender; and place ourselves in a situation, by a vigorous defence, to give the law, instead of receiving it."

"You maintain," it was replied, "that we may raise in mass the federates and the patriots. But how will you arm them? we have no muskets. Besides, can a levy in mass be organised on a sudden? Before you could have a single battalion at your disposal, Paris would have under its feeble ramparts sixty thousand Bavarians, and a hundred and forty thousand Austrians more to fight. What will you do then? You must ultimately surrender: and the blood you will have shed will be lost without return, and without utility. But will not that we shall have spilt of the enemy fall on our own heads? Will they not make us expiate our mad and cruel resistance by a disgraceful capitulation? If the allies, at the present moment, think themselves strong enough to refuse you a suspension of hostilities, what will they do, when they have their twelve hundred thousand soldiers on our territory? The dismemberment of France, the pillage and devastation of the capital, will be, perhaps, the fruit of the rash defence you propose to us."

These considerations, the force of which was generally felt, were unanimously approved. It was acknowledged, that it would be unquestionably most prudent, not to expose the capital to the consequences and dangers of a siege, or of being taken by assault. It was acknowledged, too, at least by implication, that, the return of the Bourbons being inevitable, it was better to recall them voluntarily, under good conditions, than to leave to the allies the act of restoring them. But the members did not think proper, to explain themselves on this delicate subject; and accordingly confined themselves to laconic answers of the questions proposed by the committee.

_Questions proposed by the Committee of Government to the Council of War, assembled at la Villette, July the 1st, 1815._

"1st. What is the state of the intrenchments raised for the defence of Paris?--_Answer._ The state of the intrenchments, and their supply of ordnance, on the right bank of the Seine, though incomplete, is in general satisfactory enough. On the left bank the intrenchments may be considered as null.

"2d. The army, can it cover and defend Paris?--_Ans._ It may: but not indefinitely. It ought not to expose itself to a want of provision, or to have its retreat cut off.

"3d. If the army were attacked on all points, could it prevent the enemy from penetrating into Paris on one side or the other?--_Ans._ It would be difficult for the army to be attacked on all points at once: but should this happen, there would be little hope of resistance.

"4th. In case of a defeat, could the commander in chief reserve, or collect, sufficient means, to oppose a forcible entry?--_Ans._ No general can answer for the consequences of a battle.

"5th. Is there sufficient ammunition for several battles?--_Ans._ Yes.

"6th. In fine, can you answer for the fate of the capital? and for how long a time?--_Ans._ We can warrant nothing on this head.

(Signed) "The Marshal Minister at War,
"The Prince of ECKMUHL.

"July the 2d, 3 o'clock in the morning."

The answer of the council of war was transmitted immediately to the Tuileries, and there became the subject of a long and profound deliberation.

In fine, after having weighed the advantages and dangers of a protracted defence; after having considered, that Paris, without hope of succour, and surrounded on all sides, would either be taken by assault, or forced to surrender at discretion that the army, without any means of retreat, would find themselves perhaps reduced to choose between the disgrace of surrendering themselves prisoners, and the necessity of burying themselves under the ruins of the capital; the committee decided unanimously, that Paris should not be defended, and that they would submit to deliver it into the hands of the allies, since the allies would not suspend hostilities at any other price.

General Ziethen, who commanded Prince Blucher's advanced guard, was informed of this determination by the Prince of Eckmuhl. He returned him the following answer:

"_To the Prince of Eckmuhl._

"July the 2d.

"Monsieur General,

"General Revest has communicated to me verbally, that you demand an armistice, to treat of the surrender of Paris.

"In consequence, M. General, I have to inform you, that I am in no way authorized to accept an armistice. I dare not even announce this demand to his Highness Marshal Prince Blucher: but however, if the deputies of the government declare to my aide-de-camp, Count Westphalen, that they will surrender the city, _and that the French army will surrender itself also_, I will accept a suspension of hostilities.

"I will then communicate it to his highness Prince Blucher, to treat of the other articles.

(Signed) "ZIETHEN."

When Brennus, abusing his victory, offered an insult to the vanquished, the Romans ran to arms. We, less sensible, and less proud, heard, without shuddering, the insult offered to our eighty thousand brave soldiers, and accepted, without blushing, the disgrace thus inflicted upon them and us!

Our only revenge was to despatch MM. de Tromeling and Macirone, the former to Prince Blucher, the latter to Lord Wellington.

The Duke of Otranto, without the knowledge of the committee, delivered to M. Macirone a confidential note in the following terms:

"The army is dissatisfied, because it is unhappy; encourage it: it will become faithful and devoted.

"The chambers are indocile for the same reason; encourage every body, and every body will be on your side.

"Let the army be sent away: the chambers will consent to it, on a promise to add to the charter the guarantees specified by the King. In order to come to a good understanding, it is necessary, that explanations should take place: do not enter Paris, therefore, in less than three days; in this interval every thing will be settled. _The chambers will be gained; they will fancy themselves independent, and will sanction every thing._ It is not force that must be employed with them, but persuasion."

I know not whether M. de Tromeling were also furnished with a similar note, or whether Lord Wellington interposed his authority; but Prince Blucher, become on a sudden more tractable, consented to treat of the surrender of Paris.

On the 3d of July, General Ziethen announced on his part to the Prince of Eckmuhl, "that the deputies of the government might present themselves: that they would be conducted to St. Cloud, where they would find deputies from the English and Prussian generals."

Baron Bignon, Count de Bondy, and General Guilleminot, provided with powers from the Prince of Eckmuhl (Blucher having declared, that he would have nothing to do with any person but the chief of the French army), repaired to the Prussian advanced posts, and were conducted to St. Cloud; _where, without any regard to the laws of nations, they were deprived of all means of communicating with the government, and kept in a private prison, during the whole continuance of the negotiations._

Baron Bignon, the principal negotiator, and his two colleagues, defended the political rights, the private interests, the inviolability of persons and property, national and individual, with inestimable firmness and zeal. They were far from foreseeing, that the following convention, which they considered as sacred, would subsequently open such a fatal!! door to the interpretations of vengeance and bad faith.

CONVENTION.

This day, July the 3d, 1815, the commissioners named by the commanders in chief of the respective armies, namely:

M. Baron Bignon, having in charge the portfolio of foreign affairs; M. Count Guilleminot, chief of the staff of the French army; M. Count de Bondy, prefect of the department of the Seine; furnished with full powers by Marshal the Prince of Eckmuhl, commander in chief of the French army, on the one part;

And M. Major-General Baron de Muffling, furnished with powers by his Highness Marshal Prince Blucher, commander-in-chief of the Prussian army; and M. Colonel Hervey, furnished with full powers by his excellency the Duke of Wellington, commander-in-chief of the English army, on the other;

Have agreed on the following articles:

ART. I.

There shall be a suspension of hostilities between the allied armies commanded by his highness Prince Blucher, his excellency the Duke of Wellington, and the French army, under the walls of Paris.

ART. II.

To-morrow the French army shall commence its march, to retire behind the Loire. The total evacuation of Paris shall be effected in three days, and its movement of retiring behind the Loire shall be finished in eight days.

ART. III.

The French army shall take with it its stores, field artillery, military convoys, horses, and property of the regiments, without any exception. This shall equally apply to what belongs to (_le personnel des_) the dépôts, and the different branches of administration, belonging to the army.

ART. IV.

The sick and wounded, as well as the medical officers, whom it may be necessary to leave with them, are under the particular protection of MM. the commissaries in chief of the English and Prussian armies.

ART. V.

The military and non-military persons, mentioned in the preceding article, may rejoin the corps to which they belong, as soon as they are recovered.

ART. VI.

The women and children of all persons belonging to the French army shall be at liberty to remain in Paris.

These women shall meet with no obstruction to their quitting Paris, to rejoin the army, or to taking with them their own property or that of their husbands.

ART. VII.

The officers of the line employed with the federates, or with the sharpshooters of the national guard, may either rejoin the army, or return to their place of residence, or to the place where they were born.

ART. VIII.

To-morrow, July the 4th, at noon, St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly, shall be delivered up; the next day, July the 5th, at the same hour, Montmartre shall be delivered; and on the 3d day, July 6, all the barriers shall be delivered.

ART. IX.

The interior duty of Paris shall continue to be performed by the national guard, and by the corps of municipal gendarmerie.

ART. X.

The commanders in chief of the English and Prussian armies _engage to respect, and to make those under them respect, the present authorities, as long as they subsist_.

ART. XI.

_Public property_, except what relates to war, whether it belong to the government, or depend on the municipal authority, _shall be respected_, and the allied powers will not interfere in any manner in its management, or in its conduct.

ART. XII.

The persons and property of individuals shall be equally respected: the inhabitants, and all persons in general, who happen to be in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, _without being molested, or any inquiry being made into the functions they occupy or may have occupied, their conduct, or their political opinions_.

ART. XIII.

The foreign troops shall oppose no obstacle to the supply of the capital with provision; and on the contrary shall protect the arrival and free circulation of articles intended for it.

ART. XIV.

The present convention shall be observed, and serve as a rule for the mutual conduct of the parties, till a peace is concluded.

In case of a rupture, it shall be announced in the usual forms at least ten days beforehand.

ART. XV.

_If any difficulties arise_, respecting the execution of some of the articles of the present convention, _the interpretation shall be in favour of the French army_, and of the city of Paris.

ART. XVI.

The present convention is declared common to all the allied armies, saving the ratification of the powers, to which those armies belong.

ART. XVII.

The ratifications shall be exchanged to-morrow, at six o'clock in the morning, at the bridge of Neuilly.

ART. XVIII.

Commissioners shall be named by the respective parties, to superintend the execution of the present convention.

Done and signed at St. Cloud, in triplicate, by the commissioners undernamed, the day and year above mentioned,

(Signed) Baron BIGNON.
Count GUILLEMINOT.
Count DE BONDY.
Baron DE MUFFLING.
B. HERVEY, Colonel.

Approved and ratified,

(Signed) Marshal Prince ECKMUHL.

The title of capitulation was originally given to this treaty: but the Duke of Otranto, aware of the power of words, and dreading the impression this would produce, hastened to recall the copies already distributed, and to substitute the milder title of convention. This precaution, however, fascinated the eyes only of a few friendly deputies. Numerous groups were formed: the government and Prince Eckmuhl were openly charged with having a second time delivered up and sold Paris to the allies and the Bourbons. The patriots, the sharpshooters, the federates, who had offered to defend the city with their lives, were equally indignant, that the city had been given up without firing a single shot. They resolved, to seize on the heights of Montmartre, join the army, and sell dearly to the enemy the last sighs of liberty and of France. But their threatening clamours were not unheard by the government. It called out the national guards; and these at length appeased the malecontents, by opposing to them the example of their own resignation.

The publication of the convention produced an effervescence not less formidable in the camps. The generals assembled, to protest against this impious act, and oppose its accomplishment. They declared, that the Prince of Eckmuhl, _in whose house they had frequently caught M. de Vitrolles_, had forfeited the esteem of the army, and was no longer worthy to command it. They repaired to General Vandamme, and offered him the command. But this officer, who had made one of the council of war, which they did not know, and approved its sentiments, refused his consent to their wishes. The soldiers, who had been made to swear by the representatives of the people, that they would never suffer the enemy to penetrate into the capital, spontaneously shared the indignation of their leaders; and declared, like them, that they would never consent, to surrender Paris. Some broke their arms, others brandished them in the air with curses and threats; all swore, to die on the spot, rather than desert it. A general insurrection appeared inevitable and at hand; when the General, alarmed at the calamities it might occasion, harangued the soldiers, and at length calmed their irritation. The imperial guard, yielding to the ascendancy the brave and loyal Drouot possessed over it, gave the first example of submission, and every thing was restored to order.

The government, to justify its conduct, and prevent similar insurrections in the other armies, and in the departments, published the following proclamation, a pompous tissue of eloquent impostures, and of fallacious promises[86].

[Footnote 86: It was the performance of the Duke of
Otranto.]

"_The Committee of Government to the French._

"Frenchmen,