Chapter IV: Letter 3

_The annexation of Texas, the unavoidable cause of war—The
energetic prosecution of the war the only way to obtain
peace._

SEPTEMBER, 1846.

SIR: If the editor of the “Commercial Journal,” will look over
his files he will find, that two years ago I gave my opinion,
that the annexation of Texas would not merely _lead_ to war, but
would be war—that it would be a long war, and that if we carried
the war into Mexico, would require an addition to our regular
force of at least thirty thousand men, and an annual expenditure
of thirty millions of dollars. I ask you whether my prediction
has not been fulfilled? Yet, you must suppose, that I say this
from friendship to Mexico; I have no sympathy with either her
people or her military despotism. I feel interested in the honor
of my own country, and all my hopes and wishes are for the
success of her arms.

I do, moreover, honestly believe, that as respects Mexico, our
cause is just. Whether it was within the scope of possibility
for the Government, (I mean the whole Government, not the
Executive branch alone,) by prudent measures, and by
forbearance, to avoid hostilities, is a question which I do not
choose to discuss at present. But I contend, that Texas had a
right to annex herself to the United States, if she chose; that
we neither violated any right of Mexico nor any treaty
stipulation in accepting the offer, although, there is no doubt
that, looking at things as they actually exist, the joint
resolution of Congress annexing Texas would, inevitably be
followed by war.

Mexico has rejected, and continues to reject, all overtures of
peace, excepting on the condition of our retiring beyond the
Sabine, and making compensation for the wrong alleged to have
been done her, by the annexation and military occupation of her
province of Texas. Having thus got into war in consequence of
this step, the war has become the act of the nation, and there
is no hope of peace without concessions, which we cannot make.
It is useless for highly sublimated moralists, and highly
honorable statesman, to propose such concessions—every one
knows, as a matter of mere fact, that the nation will not
consent to them. We are in for the war, and must fight it out.
Judging of nations and men as they are, and not, perhaps, as
they ought to be, there is no other course.

Besides, there are points in which we are bound by positive
obligations, not by mere abstract morality. We are bound to
maintain the right of Texas to the boundary of the Rio Grande,
and we are bound to secure the amount of spoliations due by the
Mexican Government to our own citizens. As we are now at war,
(and it is not material as to this, whether by our act, or that
of Mexico,) the payment of that debt must be secured by
sequestration of California or other territory, and at the same
time, there must be indemnity for the expenses of the war. As to
the prospects ahead, that is, as to the results of the war, they
do not appear to me encouraging, and as to the prospects of
peace, they are still more gloomy.

I believe there is no nation on the Globe more powerful for
defence, than we are. But our power for warlike conquest, is an
idea which ought not to be encouraged, and no people had ever
less necessity for it. In order to be conquerors, we must have
regular standing armies; we must have tributary provinces as
Rome had, and, consequently, a system incompatible with our
simple democratic republican institutions. Unoccupied countries,
like California, may be conquered by our settlements, as Texas
and some of our States were conquered. In the course of time,
the whole of North America, and, perhaps South America, will
gradually and imperceptibly, yield to this kind of conquest. But
at present, the countries beyond the Rio Grande are inhabited by
a different race of people, too numerous to be at once absorbed
or displaced, and whose habits and character do not fit them to
become integral portions of our confederacy. Mere dependencies
and colonies do not suit the spirit of our free institutions.

The western side of the Rio Grande presents a very different
case from that of Texas, settled by our own people, and which
but a few years ago was little better than a wilderness, a
frontier to Mexico, as well as to us. The States of New Leon,
Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, contain half a million of people, have
been settled two hundred years, and contain ancient cities and
towns. They are spread over a surface as large as Virginia and
the Carolinas, and backed by other more extensive States towards
Mexico. If the struggle lay only between the Mexican military
and our armies, a few decisive battles might end the contest.
But we have to overcome the prejudices, ignorance, and
antipathies of the population, a conquest a thousand times more
difficult than that of arms. And are we certain that the people
of those States will remain perfectly passive, and that their
countrymen beyond the Sierra Madre, cannot be rendered
formidable as guerrillas? Our estimate of them may be too low.
In case of some severe reverse, their numbers, should they rise
_en masse_, may overwhelm detached bodies of our troops. The
proclamation of Ampudia, denouncing as traitors, all who will
hold intercourse with our people, has had its effect. The people
will become exasperated at the outrages which will, in all
probability, be committed by our irregular troops, and the
guerrilla warfare will bristle over the whole country. Few among
us are aware of its vast extent. It is for the greater part
composed of barren mountains and arid plains, interspersed with
fertile valleys, and entirely unlike our western States. We will
have to guard a frontier of two thousand miles, from Santa Fee
to Matamoras, without mentioning California. We will have to
garrison all the principal towns between the Rio Grande and the
Sierra Madre. If we attempt to advance beyond Monterey, we must
force our way through a population of several millions, after
crossing a desert of several hundred miles. Conquests are easy
enough, when people are willing to be conquered, but when they
determine to resist, it is a very different matter. When
Napoleon attempted the conquest of Spain, after the manner that
Edward I undertook that of Scotland, he had possession of Madrid
and all the principal cities, with five hundred thousand of the
best troops in the world, and yet, in less than three years, his
Generals were driven out with a remnant of thirty thousand men!
The capture of Burgoyne and of Cornwallis, show what a critical
thing it is for an invading army to penetrate an enemy’s
country, with the wave of an unconquered people closing behind
them. Our armies are about to operate in a country without
roads, without supplies or resources, through defiles, over
deserts without water, and under a burning sun. I have great
confidence in them, and I believe that whatever can be done,
they will do, but shall not expect impossibilities of them. They
may reach and take Monterey, after hard fighting and much
suffering, and then be compelled, by superior numbers, to fall
back on the Rio Grande, and fortifying themselves, carry on a
war of detachments with little prospect of any definitive
result. There is no hope of bringing the war to a speedy close
without putting in the field at least twenty thousand regulars
and thirty thousand volunteers, and their advancing from
Monterey and Vera Cruz, after taking those places. The advance
on the capital ought to be made at the same time, so as to
compel Santa Anna to divide his force.

A good deal has been said about the extension of slavery beyond
the Rio Grande. My design in these letters is simply to state
facts and give honest opinions. I am not an abolitionist, nor
interested in the question of slavery, nor will I suffer my
party feelings to bias my judgment in relation to Mr. Polk and
the democratic administration. The idea of negro slavery beyond
the Rio Grande, is, in my opinion, erroneous. The climate is
doubtless, adapted to the culture of sugar and cotton; but then
negro slaves cannot be retained on the Mexican frontier longer
than they shall think proper to remain in slavery. They would
escape into Mexican territory when they pleased; and there being
but few negroes in that country, and none having been held in
slavery, they would enjoy a consideration there, unknown even in
the free States of the Union. The wealthy Mexicans would not
want their services, as they have already a cheaper kind of
servitude in their peons, or half indian laborers. Negro slavery
was once attempted to be introduced into Mexico for the culture
and manufacture of the sugar cane, but failed, and the slaves
set free. The peons, with a nominal freedom, are actually
slaves. They receive trifling wages, scarcely sufficient to
provide them with the bare necessaries of life. It is even
doubtful, whether a slave population can be placed nearer than
the Nueces, on account of their facilities for escape. A large
proportion of Southern Texas presents the same objection to the
removal of the Southern planter. These Mexican acquisitions, or
proposed acquisitions, are greatly overrated in the slave
holding States, and the danger is equally magnified in the minds
of those who are opposed to the further extension of slavery.
Neither of these parties are disposed to view the subject in a
practical light; it is like the dispute in the fable about the
color of the Chameleon—one asserted that it was black, and the
other that it was white, but when exposed to view, it proved to
be green!

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