Chapter XI: Section III: Ideal Pantheism

We have already seen that the system of Spinoza equally recognized the two "attributes" of extension and thought, and the two corresponding "modes" of body and soul, in connection with the one infinite and eternal "Substance." We have also seen that most of his followers have taken a one-sided view of the subject, and have either merged the spiritual into the corporeal, so as to educe a Material or Hylozoic Pantheism, or have virtually annihilated the material by resolving it into the mental, so as to educe a system of Ideal or Spiritual Pantheism.

"In Spinoza," says Mr. Morell, "we see the model upon which the modern Idealists of Germany have renewed their search into the absolute ground of all phenomena;" and there can be no doubt that his speculations contain the germ of Ideal as well as of Material Pantheism. The historical filiation of modern Pantheism cannot be satisfactorily explained, in either of its two forms, without reference to his writings; and yet its precise character, as it is developed in more recent systems, demands for its full elucidation some knowledge of the course and progress of philosophical speculation in the interval which elapsed between the death of Spinoza and the subsequent developments of his theory.

We cannot here attempt to trace the history of German Idealism, from its source in the writings of Leibnitz, through the logical school of Wolfius and his successors, till it reached its culminating point in the philosophy of Hegel:--we shall content ourselves with a brief reference to the fundamental principles of Kant's system, which may be justly said to have contained the prolific germs, or, at least, to have determined the prevailing character, of all the subsequent speculations of the German schools. For if modern Pantheism be indebted to Spinoza for its _substance_, it is equally indebted to Kant for its _form_; and no intelligible account can be given of the phases which it has successively assumed, without reference to the powerful influence which his Philosophy, in one or other of its constituent elements, has exerted on all his successors in the same field of inquiry.

The Philosophy of Kant has a most important bearing on the whole question as to the validity of the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God. We shall confine our attention to those parts of his system which give rise to the speculations that have issued in the recent theories of Ideal or Spiritual Pantheism.

In attempting to explain the nature and origin of the whole system of human knowledge, Kant divides our intellectual being into _three_ distinct faculties,--sensation, understanding, and reason. He supposes that from sensation we derive the whole _matter_ of our knowledge; that from the understanding we derive its _form_, or the manner in which it is conceived of by us; and that from reason we derive certain general or abstract notions, which are highly useful, since they give a systematic unity to human thought, but which have no _objective validity_, that is, either no reality in nature that corresponds to them, or none, at least, that can be scientifically demonstrated. From this fundamental principle of his system it follows, that the only part of our knowledge which has any objective reality is that which is derived from our sense-perceptions, all else being purely _formal or subjective_, and arising solely from the laws of our own mental nature, which determine us to conceive of things in a particular way; and that even that part of our knowledge which is derived from sense-perception is purely phenomenal, since we know nothing of any object around us beyond the bare fact that it exists, and that it appears to us to be as our senses represent it. Hence the _skeptical_ tendency of Kant's speculations, in so far as the scientific certainty of our knowledge is concerned. The _practical utility_ of that knowledge is not disputed, but its _objective reality_, or the possibility of proving it, is, to a large extent, denied. Still he admits a primitive _dualism_, and a radical distinction between _the subject and the object_, between the mind which thinks and the matter of its thoughts. The _matter_ comes from without, the _form_ from within; and the senses are the channels through which the phenomena of nature are poured into the mould of the human mind. All knowledge implies this combination of _matter_ with _form_, and is possible only on the supposition of the concurrent action both of the _object_ and _subject_; not that either of the two is known to us in its essence, or that their real existence can be scientifically demonstrated, for we know the subject only in its relation to the object, and the object only in its relation to the subject; but that this _relation_ necessarily requires the joint action of both, by which alone we can acquire the only knowledge of which we are capable, and which is supposed to be purely phenomenal, relative, and subjective. It is true that we are capable of forming certain grand ideas, such as that of God, the universe, and the soul; but these are the pure products of Reason, the mere personifications of our own modes of thinking, and have no objective reality, at least none that can be scientifically demonstrated. But, while "the Speculative Reason" is held to be incompetent to prove the existence of God, "the Practical Reason" is appealed to; and in the conscious liberty of the soul, and its sense of incumbent moral duty,--"the Categorical Imperative,"--Kant finds materials for reconstructing the basis and fabric of a true Theology, not scientifically perfect, but practically sufficient for all the purposes of life.

It was scarcely possible that Philosophy could find a permanent resting-place in such a theory as this; for, while it recognized both the "object" and the "subject" as equally indispensable, the one for the _matter_, the other for the _form_, of human knowledge, it did not hold the balance even between the two. It assigned so much to the "subject," and so little to the "object," and made so large a part of our knowledge merely formal and subjective, that it could neither be regarded as a self-consistent system of Skepticism, nor yet as a satisfactory basis for Scientific Belief. It was almost inevitable that speculative minds, starting from this point, should diverge into one or other of _three_ courses; either following the line of the "subject" exclusively, and treating the "object" as a superfluous incumbrance, so as to reach, as Schulz and Maimon did, a pure Subjective Idealism, akin to utter Skepticism; or following the line of the "object," and giving it greater prominence than it had in the system of Kant, so as to lay the foundation, as Jacobi and Herbart did, of a system of Objective Certitude; or keeping _both_ in view, and attempting, as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel did, to blend the two into one, so as to reduce them to systematic unity.[135]

In Kant's system a _dualism_ was admitted, a real distinction between the "subject" and "object" of thought; but he had ascribed so much to the subject, and so little to the object, that Fichte conceived the idea of dispensing with the latter altogether, and constructing his whole philosophy on a purely subjective basis. Since Kant had taught that all objects are conceived of either according to the forms of our sensational faculty, or the categories of our understanding, or the ideas of pure reason, it seemed to be unnecessary to suppose the existence of any object distinct from the mind itself. For if it be the mind which furnishes the form of Space, and gives us the idea of Substance, of Cause, of Being, the mind alone might suffice to account for the whole sum of human knowledge. Fichte was followed by Schelling, and Schelling by Hegel, each differing from his predecessor, but all concurring in the attempt _to identify "Seyn," or absolute Being, with Thought_, and to represent everything in the universe as a mere mode or manifestation of one Infinite Essence. The _identity_ of Existence and Thought is the fundamental principle of Hegel's doctrine. With him, Being and the Idea of being, are the same; and Being and Thought are combined in the "Absolute," which is at once ideal and real (l'être and l'idée). With him, the idea of God is that of _a logical process of thought_, "ever unfolding itself, but never unfolded,"--a dialectic movement rather than a Divine Being, which realizes itself, and reaches a state of self-consciousness in man. God, nature, and man, are but one process of thought, considered in different aspects; all finite personalities are only so many thoughts of one eternal mind; God is in man, and man is in God, and the progress of humanity, in all its stages, is a Divine development.

This bare outline of these systems must suffice for our present purpose, and we now proceed to offer a few remarks on the doctrine of Ideal as distinguished from Material Pantheism.

1. The whole system of "Idealism," as propounded in the German schools, is utterly baseless, and contradicts the intuitive, the universal convictions of the human mind. For what is Idealism? Reduced to its utmost simplicity, and expressed in the briefest formula, it amounts, in substance, to this: _that the whole universe is to us a mere process of thought_, and that nothing exists, or, at least, can be known by us, beyond _the ideas of our own minds_. And what is the ground on which it rests? It rests entirely on the assumption, that, since we can know nothing otherwise than through the exercise of our mental faculties, these faculties must be the sole sources of all our knowledge, and altogether independent of any external object. According to this theory, the mind is not informed or instructed by the universe, but the universe is created by the mind; the objective is developed from the subjective; and there is no reality anywhere except in the region of consciousness. Nature is seen only as it is imaged in the mirror within; and to us it is a mere phantasmagoria, a series of phenomena, a succession of thoughts. "The sum total," says Fichte, "is this; there is absolutely nothing permanent, either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images there are; they constitute all that apparently exists; and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition; that consist, in fact, of the images of images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream,--into a dream made up only of a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought--the source of all existence, and all the reality which I imagine to myself of _my_ existence, of my power, of my destination--is the dream of that dream."[136]

The tendency of such speculations as these towards universal Skepticism, or even absolute Nihilism, with the exception only of certain fleeting phenomena of Consciousness, is too apparent to require any formal proof; and it must be equally evident that they contradict some of the most universal and deeply-rooted convictions of the human mind. The ultimate ground of every system of Idealism which excludes the knowledge of an external world must be one or other of these two assumptions, or a combination of both: either, that our knowledge cannot extend beyond the range of consciousness, which takes cognizance only of ideas, or of subjective mental states; or that any attempt to extend it beyond these limits, so as to embrace external objects as really existing, can only be successful on this condition,--that we _prove_, by reasoning from the subjective to the objective, that there is a necessary _logical_ connection between the state of the one and the reality of the other. Each of these assumptions is equally groundless. It is true that consciousness, strictly so called, takes cognizance only of what passes within; it is not true that consciousness, in this restricted sense, is commensurate with our entire knowledge. It is true that we acquire our knowledge only through the exercise of our mental faculties; it is not true that our mental faculties are the only sources of our knowledge, nor even that, without the concurrence of certain objects, they could give us any knowledge at all. It is true that there must be a connection between the subjective and the objective; it is not true that this connection must be established by _reasoning_, or that we must _prove_ the existence of an external world distinct from the thinking mind, before we are entitled to believe in it. For a great part of our knowledge is _presentative_, and we directly perceive the objects of Nature not less than the phenomena of Consciousness.

When it is said, in the jargon of the modern German philosophy, that "the Ego has no immediate consciousness of the Non-Ego as existing, but that the Non-Ego is only represented to us in a modification of the self-conscious Ego, and is, in fact, only a phenomenon of the Ego,"--a plain, practical Englishman, little tolerant of these subtle distinctions, might be ready, if not deterred by the mere sound of the words, to test them by a particular example. What am I to think, he might say, of my own father and mother? They are familiarly known to me. I have seen them, and talked with, them, and loved them as my own soul. I have hitherto believed that they existed, and that they were really a father and mother to me. But now I am taught that they are--mere modifications of my own mind; that they are nothing more than simple phenomena of the self-conscious Ego; and that, so far from being the earthly authors of my existence, they are themselves--the creation and offspring of my own thought. And on what ground am I asked to receive this astonishing discovery? Why, simply because I can be sure of nothing but the facts of consciousness. But how are _these facts proved_? They "need no proof; they are self-evident; they are immediately and irresistibly believed." Be it so. I can just as little doubt of the existence of my body, of the distinct personality of my parents, and the reality of an external universe, as of any fact of consciousness. May it not be, whether we can explain it or not, that the one set of facts is as directly _presented_, and needs as little to be _proved_, as the other?

2. The doctrine of "Identity" constitutes a prominent and indispensable part of the theory of Idealism, and is the ground-principle of Philosophical Pantheism. It amounts, in substance, to the proposition, that Existence and Thought are _one_, that the "subject" and "object" of knowledge are _one_. "If the doctrine of Identity means anything, it means that Thought and Being are essentially one; that the process of _thinking_ is virtually the same as the process of _creating_; that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same thing as Deity accomplishes in developing himself in all the forms and regions of creation; that every man's reason, therefore, is really God; in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the world."[137] It is through the medium of this doctrine of Identity that Idealism passes into Pantheism,--not, indeed, the Idealism of Berkeley, which recognized, consistently or otherwise, the existence of the human mind and of the Divine Spirit, while it denied the independent existence of matter,--but the Idealism of Fichte and others, which resolved mind into a mere process of thought, a continuous stream or succession of ideas. To _such_ a theory the doctrine of Identity was indispensable. Its advocates were bound to show that nothing existed, or could be proved to exist, in the universe but _thought_, and that, in every case, the _subject_ and _object_ of thought might be identified as one. We find, accordingly, that from the earliest ages down to the present time, the idea of "absolute unity," or "universal identity," has been frequently exhibited in connection with the speculations of philosophical Idealists. The disciples of the Eleatic school in ancient Greece, not less than those of the modern schools of Germany, insisted on the identity of thought and its object, and regarded everything that might seem to be external to the mind as a mere illusion.

It may be difficult for the British mind, familiarized from infancy with the philosophy of common sense, to grasp the idea which this doctrine involves; but, on the principles of absolute Idealism, it may be easily explained, and may even seem to have some foundation in facts that must be acknowledged by all. There are _two_ cases, particularly, which may serve to illustrate, if they cannot suffice to prove, it. The first is that of the Supreme Intelligence, conceived as existing before the production of a created universe, when He was himself the sole "subject" and the sole "object" of thought; in other words, the absolute "Subject-Object." The second is that of the human consciousness, conceived as occupied solely with certain subjective mental states, when the mind may be said to be at once the "subject" and the "object" of its own thought. There are cases, then, in which mind may be regarded as a "subject-object;" the case of human consciousness, when the mind takes cognizance of its own states or acts, and the case of the Divine consciousness, while as yet the created universe had not been called into being. But the question is, whether, _in all cases_, the "subject" and "object" of thought are the same? or, whether existence and thought are _universally_ identical? An affirmative answer to this question would imply, that nothing whatever exists except only in the mind that perceives it; that, according to Bishop Berkeley, "the existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived" is an absurd or impossible supposition; that "their _esse_ is _percipi_," that is, that their being consists in their being perceived or known; whence it would follow, as Berkeley himself admits, that we have no reason to believe in the continued existence of the desk at which we write, after we have left the room in which we see it, excepting such as may arise from the supposition, that if we returned to that room we might still see it, or that in our absence it may still be perceived by some other mind. Existence is identified with thought, and nothing exists save only as it is thought of. Why? Simply because it can become known to us only through the medium of consciousness, and that, too, in no other character than as _a phenomenon of our own minds_.

That this doctrine is at direct variance with the universal convictions of mankind, is too evident to require the slightest proof. That it is _unphilosophical_, as well as _unpopular_, may be made apparent by two very simple considerations. The _first_ is, that it assumes without proof the only point in question, namely, that the objects of our knowledge are nothing but the ideas of our own minds; whereas it is affirmed, on the other side, and surely with at least an equal amount of apparent reason, that we are so constituted as to have a direct perception of external objects as well as of internal mental states. The _second_ is, that the very formula of Idealism, which represents the "Non-ego" as a mere modification of the conscious "Ego," seems to involve a palpable contradiction; since it recognizes, in a certain sense, _the difference between the "Ego and the Non-ego,"_ and yet, in the same breath, annihilates that difference, and proclaims their "identity."[138] Fichte admits, indeed, that we have the idea of something which is _not-self_; but instead of ascribing it to an external object, he accounts for it by a law of our mental nature, which constrains us to _create a limit_, so as to give a determinate character to our thought. The three technical formulas, therefore, which are said[139] to express, respectively,--the affirmation of self,--the affirmation of not-self,--and the determination of the one by the other,--are all equally the products of our own mental laws, and do not necessarily require the supposition of any external object; and hence it follows that Self is the one only absolute principle, and that everything else that is conceived of is constructed out of purely subjective materials. The question whether the "object" be the generative principle of the "idea," or _vice versâ_, is thus superseded; for there is no longer any distinction between "object" and "subject;" existence is identified with thought; the _Ego_ and the _Non-ego_ unite in one absolute existence; and Self becomes the sole Subject-object, the percipient and the perceived, the knowing and the known.

Of course, on this theory, there is no knowledge of God, just as there can be no knowledge of Nature, and no knowledge of our fellow-men, as distinct objective realities; it is a system of pure Idealism, which, if consistently followed out, must terminate in utter _skepticism_ in regard to many of the most familiar objects of human knowledge; or, rather, in the hands of a thoroughly consequent reasoner, it must issue, as Jacobi endeavored to show, in absolute _Nihilism_; since we can have no better reason for believing in the existence of Self than we have for believing in the reality of an external world, and the coexistence of our fellow-men. Each of these beliefs is equally the spontaneous product of certain mental laws, which are just as trustworthy, and need as little to be proved, in the one case as in the other.

Fichte seems to have become aware of this fundamental defect of his system; and, at a later period, he attempted to give it a firmer basis by representing _self_, not as individual, but as Divine, that is, as the Absolute manifesting itself in Man. He now admitted what, if he had not denied, he had overlooked before, an essential reality as the substratum both of the _Ego_ and _Non-ego;_ a reality of which all things, whether within or without, are only so many "modes" or manifestations. And it is at this point that his subjective Idealism passes into Pantheism, and that we mark the close affinity between his speculations and those of Spinoza. There is, in some respects, a wide difference between the two; Spinoza assumed, Fichte denied, the existence of matter; the former affirmed Substance to be the absolute and infinite Essence; the latter proclaimed a spiritual universe, whose essence was the infinite reason, or the Divine idea: but still, with these and other points of difference, there existed a real, radical affinity between the two systems, that of Fichte, not less than that of Spinoza, being based on _the identity of existence and thought_; and both systems being directed to show that there is but one Absolute Being, of which all phenomena, whether material or mental, are only so many modes or manifestations.

3. The philosophy of "the absolute," as applied in support of German Pantheism, depends on the doctrine of "Identity," and must stand or fall along with it.[140] The "absolute" is described as being at once _ideal_ and _real_, pure _being_ and pure _thought_, and as developing itself in a great variety of forms. The philosophy of the "absolute" is represented as the _only science_, properly so called: it is assumed that there can be no science of the finite, the variable, the contingent, the relative, but only of the absolute, the unchangeable, and the infinite. To constitute _this_ science, the doctrine of "identity" is indispensable; the subject and the object of thought, knowledge and being, must be reduced to scientific unity. Realism and Idealism are thus blended together, or rather identified in the philosophy of the "absolute." The idea of the "absolute," in which _being_ and _thought_ are identical, is the only foundation of science, and the ultimate ground of all certitude. And Pantheism is inferred from this idea; for the "absolute," in which _being_ and _thought_ are identified, is properly _the sole existence_, which develops and manifests itself in a great variety of finite forms.

We are not disposed to treat the philosophy of the "absolute" either with levity or with scorn. We feel that it brings us into contact with some of the most profound and most deeply mysterious problems of human thought. Finite as we are, we are so constituted that we cannot avoid framing the _idea_, although we can never attain to a _comprehension_, of the Infinite. There are absolute truths, and necessary truths, among the elements of human knowledge. Account for them as we may, their reality cannot be reasonably denied, nor their importance disparaged. There is a tendency--and a most useful one--in the human mind, to seek unity in all things, to trace effects to causes, to reduce phenomena to laws, to resolve the complex into the simple, and to rise from the contingent to the absolute, from the finite to the infinite. There are few more interesting inquiries in the department of Psychology than that which seeks to investigate the nature, the origin, and the validity of those ideas which introduce us into the region of absolute, eternal, and immutable Truth; and it were a lamentable result of the erratic speculations of Germany did they serve to cast discredit on this inquiry, or even to excite a prejudice against it, in the more sober, but not less profound, minds of our own countrymen. But there need be little apprehension on this score, if it be clearly understood and carefully remembered, that the philosophy of the absolute, as taught in Germany and applied in support of Pantheism, rests ultimately on the theory of Idealism and the doctrine of Identity, by which all is resolved into one absolute "subject-object," and _existence_ is identified with _thought_. _This_ system may be discarded, and yet there may still remain a sound, wholesome, and innocuous philosophy of the "absolute;" a philosophy which does not seek to identify things so generically different as _existence_ and _thought_, or to reduce mind and matter, the finite and the infinite, to the same category; but which, recognizing the differences subsisting between the various objects of thought, seeks merely to investigate the nature and sources of that part of human knowledge which relates to absolute or necessary truths. The former of these rival systems may be favorable to Pantheism, the latter will be found to be in entire accordance with Christian Theism.

The fundamental principle of philosophical Pantheism is either _the unity of substance_, as taught by Spinoza, or _the identity of existence and thought_, as taught, with some important variations, by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Absolute is conceived of, not as a living Being to whom a proper personality and certain intelligible attributes may be ascribed, but as a vague, indeterminate _somewhat_, which has no distinctive character, and of which, in the first instance, or prior to its development, almost nothing can be either affirmed or denied. But this absolute existence, by some unknown, inherent necessity, develops, determines, and limits itself: it becomes being, and constitutes all being: the infinite passes into the finite, the absolute into the relative, the necessary into the contingent, the one into the many; all other existences are only so many modes or forms of its manifestation. Here is a theory which, to say the very least, is neither more intelligible, nor less mysterious, than any article of the Christian faith. And what are the proofs to which it appeals, what the principles on which it rests? Its two fundamental positions are these; that finite things have no distinct existence as realities in nature, and that there exists only one Absolute Being, manifesting itself in a variety of forms. And how are they demonstrated? Simply by the affirmation of universal "Identity." But what if this affirmation be denied? What if, founding on the clearest data of consciousness, we refuse to acknowledge that _existence_ is identical with _thought_?[141] What if we continue to believe that there are objects of thought which are distinct from thought itself, and which must be _presented_ to the mind before they can be _represented_ by the mind? What if, while we recognize the idea both of the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute, the contingent and the necessary, we cannot, by the utmost effort of our reason, obliterate the difference between them, so as to reduce them to one absolute essence? Then the whole superstructure of Pantheism falls along with the Idealism on which it depends; and it is found to be, not a solid and enduring system of truth, but a frail edifice, ingeniously constructed out of the mere abstractions of the human mind.

The advocates of this system assume that the relations which subsist between _beings_ are the same as the relations which subsist between our _ideas_, and infer that _logic_ is sufficient to construct a system of _metaphysic_. But Professor Nicolas has well said, that "while it is certain we cannot know things but by the notions which we have of them, and a certain parallelism may thus be established between _what exists_ and _what we think_ of that which exists, yet from this to the _identity of being and thought_, such as Pantheism requires, there is a vast distance, and we have no ground for believing that the _logical relations_ of our ideas are identical with the _real relations_ of beings. Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this assumption. It describes the relations of being according to the logical relations of our thought; and it takes _logic_ for a kind of _metaphysic_. It confounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It seeks to solve the question, What is the first Being, and what are its relations to other beings? That Being must necessarily be the condition of all other beings, and must virtually contain them all; nay, it must be capable of becoming all things. It must therefore be simple, indeterminate, indifferent, possessing no essential character, resembling nothing that we actually know. All this is true of our _ideas_, but not of _beings_. The highest idea,--that which is the logical condition of all others, and also the most general, the most abstract, the most indeterminate,--this idea contains all others, and by receiving this or that determination, it becomes this or that particular idea. But what is true of the _idea_ is not true of the _being_; no such vague, indeterminate, indifferent being exists; and yet Pantheism confounds _the idea_ with _the being_, and rests entirely on that confusion of thought."

* * * * *

In bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we may offer a few remarks illustrative of its _nature and tendency_, whether considered as a system of speculative thought, or as a substitute for religious belief.

In this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the theory of "Idealism," and the doctrine of "Identity," which constitute the groundwork of the more spiritual form of Pantheism, are not more adverse to our belief in the existence and personality of God, than they are to our belief in the reality of an external world, or in the existence and personality of man himself. They stand equally related to each of these _three_ topics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be impartially applied, and consistently carried out into all their legitimate consequences, as the only philosophical solution of the whole question of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood; certainly it has not been duly considered by the more superficial _litterateurs_, who have been slightly tinctured with Pantheism; but it will be acknowledged at once by every consistent Idealist, who understands his own philosophy, and who is honest or bold enough to carry it out into all its practical applications. He knows very well, and, if sufficiently candid, he will frankly confess, that the principles on which he founds, if they be conclusive against the existence of a living, personal God, are equally conclusive against the reality of an external world, and against the doctrine of our own personality or that of our fellow-men. With most minds, this consideration would be of itself a powerful counteractive to all that is most dangerous in the theory of Idealism, were it only clearly apprehended and steadily kept in view; for an argument which proves too much is justly held to prove nothing, and that theory which leaves us no right to believe in the existence of Nature, or in the distinct personality of our fellow-men, can scarcely be held sufficient to disprove the existence of God.

It may be observed, further, that Ideal Pantheism has a strong tendency to engender a spirit either of Mysticism, on the one hand, or of Skepticism on the other. It terminates in Mysticism when, seeking to avoid Skepticism, it takes refuge in the doctrine of an "intellectual intuition," such as gives an immediate knowledge of the Absolute: and it terminates in Skepticism when, seeking to avoid Mysticism, it rejects the doctrine of "intellectual intuition," and discovers that it has no other and no higher claims to our confidence than such as are equally possessed by any one of our common faculties, whose testimony the Idealist has been taught to distrust and doubt.

It is further worthy of remark, that the philosophy of the Absolute, as taught in the German schools, has been applied to the whole circle of the Sciences, not less than to Theology, and that it has given birth to numerous speculative systems, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Ethics, in History, and in Politics, all strongly marked by the same characteristic feature--the substitution of _à priori and deductive_ speculation for the more sober and legitimate method of Inductive inquiry. The province of Natural Science, in which, if anywhere, we should be guided by the light of experience and observation, has been rudely invaded by this transcendental philosophy, which offers to construct a theory of universal knowledge on the basis of a certain self-development of the Absolute. We are indebted to Mr. Morell for a specimen,[142] alike amusing and instructive, of Schelling's speculations on this subject. We shall not attempt to interpret its meaning, for, in sooth, we do not pretend to understand it: but one thing is clear, the laws of Matter, of Dynamics, of Organic structure and life, the laws of Knowledge, of Action, and of Art, are all exhibited as mere deductions or corollaries from the "idea of the Absolute;" and in the name of Natural Science, not less than on behalf of Theology, we protest against this vicious method of Philosophy, and do most earnestly deprecate the substitution of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in the place of our own Bacon, and Boyle, and Newton, as models of scientific thought.

The _practical influence_ of Pantheism, in so far as its peculiar tendencies are not restrained or counteracted by more salutary beliefs, must be deeply injurious, both to the individual and social welfare of mankind. In its Ideal or Spiritual form it may be seductive to some ardent, imaginative minds; but it is a wretched creed notwithstanding; and it will be found, when calmly examined, to be fraught with the most serious evils. It has been commended, indeed, in glowing terms, as a creed alike beautiful and beneficent,--as a source of religious life nobler and purer than any that can ever spring from the more gloomy system of Theism: for, on the theory of Pantheism, God is manifest to all, everywhere, and at all times; Nature, too, is aggrandized and glorified, and everything in Nature is invested with a new dignity and interest; above all, Man is conclusively freed from all fantastic hopes and superstitious fears, so that his mind can now repose, with tranquil satisfaction, on the bosom of the Absolute, unmoved by the vicissitudes of life, and unscared even by the prospect of death. For what is death? The dissolution of any living organism is but one stage in the process of its further development; and whether it passes into a new form of self-conscious life, or is reabsorbed into the infinite, it still forms an indestructible element in the vast sum of Being. We may, therefore, or, rather, we must, leave our future state to be determined by Nature's inexorable laws, and we need, at least, fear no Being higher than Nature, to whose justice we are amenable, or whose frown we should dread.[143] But, even as it is thus exhibited by some of its warmest partisans, it appears to us, we own, to be a dreary and cheerless creed, when compared with that faith which teaches us to regard God as our "Father in heaven," and that "hope which is full of immortality." It is worse, however, than dreary; it is destructive of all religion and of all morality. If it be an avowed antagonist to Christianity, it is not less hostile to Natural Theology and to Ethical Science. It consecrates error and vice, as being, equally with truth and virtue, necessary and beneficial manifestations of the "infinite." It is a system of Syncretism, founded on the idea that error is only an incomplete truth, and maintaining that truth must necessarily be developed by error, and virtue by vice. According to this fundamental law of "human progress," Atheism itself may be providential; and the axiom of a Fatalistic Optimism--"Whatever is, is best"--must be admitted equally in regard to truth and error, to virtue and vice.

It may be further observed, that modern Pantheism, whether in its Material or Ideal form, is nothing else than the revival of some of the earliest and most inveterate Principles of Paganism,--the same Paganism which still flourishes among the "theosophic" dreamers of India, and which exhibits its practical fruits in the horrors of Hindoo superstition. For Pantheism, although repeatedly revived and exhibited in new forms, has made no real progress since the time when it was first taught in the Vedanta system, and sublimed in the schools of Alexandria. Christianity, which encountered and triumphed over it in her youth, can have nothing to fear from it in her mature age,[144] provided only that she be faithful to herself, and spurn every offered compromise. But there must be no truce, and no attempt at conciliation between the two. The Pantheists of Germany have made the most impudent claims to the virtual sanction of Christianity; they have even dared to make use of Bible terms in a new sense, and have spoken of Revelation, Inspiration, Incarnation, Redemption, Atonement, and Regeneration, in such a way as to adapt them to the Pantheistic hypothesis. Common honesty is outraged, and the conscience of universal humanity offended, by the conduct of individuals--some of them wearing the robes of the holy ministry--who have substituted the dreams of Pantheism for the doctrines of Jesus Christ, and assailed, both from the pulpit and the press, the sacred cause which they had solemnly vowed to maintain. But even in Germany itself a powerful reaction has commenced; and the learning and labors of such men as Olshausen, and Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, may be hailed as the dawn of a better and brighter day.

It may be observed, _finally_, that Pantheism stands directly opposed to Christian Theism in several distinct respects. The following are the principal points of collision between the two:

1. Pantheism denies,--Christian Theism affirms, the existence of a _living, personal God_, distinct from Nature, and superior to it.

2. Pantheism supersedes,--Christian Theism reveals, the doctrine of a real creation.

3. Pantheism contests,--Christian Theism confirms, the doctrine of the constant providence and moral government of God.

4. Pantheism disowns,--Christian Theism declares, the doctrine of _a conscious, personal immortality_.

5. Pantheism rejects,--Christian Theism receives, the whole scheme of Revelation, considered as a supernatural code of Divine truth. The one accounts for its origin on the principle of natural development, the other on that of supernatural interposition.

6. Pantheism has no living, self-conscious, personal God, no loving Father, no watchful Providence, no Hearer of Prayer, no Object of confiding trust, no Redeemer, no Sanctifier, no Comforter: it leaves us with nothing higher than Nature as our portion here, and nothing beyond its eternal vicissitudes as our prospect hereafter.

FOOTNOTES:

[103] AMAND SAINTES, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza, Fondateur de l'Exegése et de la Philosophie Modernes."

[104] M. COUSIN, "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie," I. 403. See also "Fragmens Philosophiques," Preface, second edition, p. XXVII.; "Nouveaux Fragments," pp. 9, 160.

[105] M. AD. FRANCK, "De la Certitude," Preface, p. XXI.

[106] M. A. JAVARI, "De la Certitude," p. 509.

[107] AMAND SAINTES, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza," pp. 208, 210.

[108] ABBÉ MARET, "Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les Sociétés Modernes," pp. 6, 11, 31. Ibid., "Theodicée Chretiénne," pp. 437, 444, 449.

[109] MR. MORELL'S "Historical and Critical View," II. 104, 153.

[110] PIERRE LEROUX, "De l'Humanité," I. vi. 3, 295.

[111] L. D. CROUSSE, "Des Principes, ou Philosophie Première," 2d Edition, Paris, 1846.

[112] ABBÉ MARET, "Theodicée Chretienne," p. 94.

[113] ABBÉ GOSCHLER, sur "l'Histoire du Pantheisme." ABBÉ MARET, "Essai," chap. IV.

[114] PIERRE LEROUX, "De l'Humanité," I. 249. M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp. 199, 211, 296. BAYLE, "Pensées," III. 67. The well-known lines of the sixth Æneid, "Principio coelum, ac terras, camposque liquentes," &c. are thus applied.

[115] ABBÉ MARET, "Essai," pp. 152, 156, 221.

[116] DR. MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ, "History of Reformation," V. 84.

[117] ABBÉ MARET, "Essai," p. 89; "Theodicée," p. 368.

[118] FRED. VON SCHLEGEL, "Philosophy of Life," p. 417. See, also, DR. THOLUCK'S remarks on the same point in the "Princeton Theological Essays," I. 555.

[119] MUSÆUS, "Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen examinatus," 1674. REGNERI A MANSVELT, "Adversus anonymum Theologico-politicum, Liber singularis," 1674. FRANCOIS CUYPER, "Arcana Atheismi Revelata," 1676. JOHN BREDENBOURG, "Enervatio Tractatus Theol.-polit." CHRIST. WITTICHII, "Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen," 1690. PIERRE POIRET, "Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Absurditatis Spinozianæ." FENELON, "De l'Existence de Dieu," p. II., c. III., "Refutation du Spinozisme." HUET, "La Conformité de la Raison avec la Foi," 1692. HOWE, "Living Temple," I. 262. S. CLARKE, "Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God," pp. 25, 44, 58, 80.

[120] JEAN COLERUS, "Vie de Spinoza," reprinted by Saisset, p. 4.

[121] SPINOZA, "Ethica," Definitions III., IV., V.

[122] "Il construit le systéme entiere des êtres avec ces trois seuls elements; la substance, l'attribut, et le mode."--"Voila l'idée mere de la metaphysique de Spinoza."--SAISSET.

[123] SAISSET, "Introduction," p. XXXIX.

[124] SPINOZA, "De Intellectus Emendatione." This treatise contains the exposition of his method.

[125] M. F. PERRON, "Essai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idées Fondamentales," 1843.

[126] "Ici, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu'il soit demontré qui _la Creation est impossible_, principe justement cher au Pantheisme; tandis qu'au fond, tout ce qui est demontré, c'est que _l'Etre en soi est necessairement incréé_,--verité incontestable, dont _le Pantheisme n'a rien a tirer_."--PROF. SAISSET, Introduction, p. XLII.

[127] M. L'ABBÉ DE CONDILLAC, "Traité des Sensations," 2 vols.

[128] The HON. ROBERT BOYLE, "Theological Works," II. 79.--"A Free Inquiry into the Received Notion of Nature."

[129] "Systême de la Nature," II. 75, 110, 115.

[130] "Tout est toujours dans l'ordre rélativement à la Nature, où tous les êtres ne font que suivre les loix qui leur sont imposées. Il est entré _dans son plans_ que de certaines terres produiroient des fruits delicieux, tandis que d'autres ne fourniroient que des épines, des vegetaux dangereux. _Elle a volu_ que quelques societés produise des sages," &c.--Vol. I. 265, also 267.

[131] "Systême de la Nature," II. 102.

[132] M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," Paris, 1846, pp. 81, 93: "Pour qui sait voir, le Monde sent, se ment, parle, et pense."

[133] "The Purpose of Existence," pp. 85, 89. London, 1850.

[134] "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development." By H. G. ATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU. London, 1852.

[135] MR. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," II. 71.

[136] SIR WM. HAMILTON'S Edition of DR. REID'S "Works," p. 129.

[137] MR. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," II. 127. M. MARET, "Essai sur le Pantheisme," pp. 129, 133, 143, 192, 276. Ibid., "Theodicée," pp. 5, 123, 192, 199.

[138] SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S edition of REID'S "Works," p. 281. Sir William does not seem to admit that there is a contradiction such as I have noted.

[139] 1. "The _ego_ or _moi_ affirms _itself_." 2. "The _ego_ or _moi_ affirms a _non-ego_ or _non-moi_." 3. "The _ego_ or _moi_ affirms itself to be determined by the _non-ego_ or _non-moi_."

[140] M. MARET, "Essai," pp. 129, 142, 146, 175, 192, 225, 276. Ibid., "Theodicée," pp. 193, 366, 378, 386, 394. MR. MORELL, "History," II. 127, 138.

[141] PROFESSOR NICOLAS, "Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme," pp. 20-31.

[142] MR. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," II. 129.

[143] M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes." M. MARET, "Essal," pp. 69, 86, 150; "Theodicée" pp. 311, 314. VALROGER, "Etudes Critiques," pp. 97, 101, 115, 151, 412.

[144] M. MARET, "Essai sur Pantheisme," p. 107. "Le Christianisme saura vaincre dans son âge mûr l'ennemi qu'il a terrassé en naissant."