Chapter VIII: Part 8

There is, indeed, a marked tendency toward an increased reliance on the principle of societism as civilization progresses and our life becomes necessarily more intense and complex. A community of plain farmers, isolated from each other, can live their individual lives about as they please, without any interference of the government becoming necessary to protect the rights of each man from infringement by his neighbors. But the resident in a large village must submit to certain restrictions for the common good. He must not carry on any kind of business likely to become a public nuisance. His cattle may not graze in the streets. He must give part of his earnings toward maintaining a water supply for a protection against fire. The citizen of a great city is subject to far more restrictions. The government assumes the control of education, charities, the care of the public health, the drainage of the streets, the collection of offal, and a multitude of other duties which in a less intense civilization each family performs for itself.

The advance in science and the arts, too, has brought about a revolution whose effect we must recognize. A hundred years ago almost every community, and to a large degree every family, was industrially almost independent of every other, as we have already shown. To-day each man relies on a million others to supply him with the commonest necessaries of life. The armored knight was proof against all foes, save the few antagonists similarly clad. To-day my life is dependent on the fidelity and vigilance of ten thousand men, and every man I meet has me in his power. Given the malignant will and fiendish cunning necessary, and one single man can kill a thousand human beings and destroy a million dollars at a blow. To sum up, each advance in civilization makes men more dependent upon each other, and increases the advantage and necessity of having industries most important to the common welfare controlled by society as a whole instead of by individuals.

It is contended by some that from the increased interference of government with private affairs, there is danger that the liberties of the people will be curtailed, and that their rights will be so hedged about by restrictions that the result will be evil instead of beneficial. To this it must be answered that the people themselves are the source of the government's authority and power of restriction, and that in no case will a restriction of the government be long maintained which does not benefit far more in conserving the rights of men than it injures by infringing them. Apply this rule to any case of government action in industrial matters. A city government, for instance, constructs a system of sewerage. All taxpayers must contribute something towards its expense, and their right to spend that money in such other ways as they choose is abridged; but, at the same time, the more important right of having healthy and safe drainage for their houses is conserved. In a similar way, the government may pass laws of various sorts to restrict and control what seems to be at first sight purely private business, such as the sale of explosives, spirituous liquors, poisons, drugs, and many other articles. In every instance, this is done on the ground that the interference of government is necessary to protect the rights of the community as a whole, even though the liberties of certain classes are abridged.

The study of these facts brings to our attention an important principle of governmental action, which should always be remembered when in any industrial matter we find that the principle of individual action is producing unsatisfactory results, and conclude, therefore, to ask the government to take some part in its control. This principle is as follows: _government, as the representative of the will of the whole people, should in general, attempt the regulation, or control, of industrial matters only to benefit the people as a whole_.

Of course it cannot be said that all government action for the benefit of special classes of the community is wrong. The granting of pensions to those defenders and upholders of the government who deserve it, is a case in point where special legislation is justifiable and proper; and many other cases exist. Nevertheless, the shaping of legislation to effect the interests of special classes of the community is one which is now working the nation serious injury; and it has obtained so firm a bold that it will take a long time for us to throw it off. It causes men of all classes to consider the government as a paternal benefactor, whose duty it is to aid them, either in their schemes for getting rich or their struggles to earn a living; when its real office is to protect all citizens in their individual rights, undertake only such industrial enterprises as can manifestly be better and more economically conducted by it than by private enterprise, and enforce restrictions upon industry only as they are needed to protect personal rights or the interests of the community as a whole. Worst of all, the use of government to advance special interests places a premium on the efforts of those who seek to corrupt the expression of the popular will in its every stage, from the voters at the polls to the chief rulers in the seats of government. For by combining to accomplish their mutual purposes, they are able to turn aside all departments of government from their legitimate work and occupy them with measures to advance special interests, some commendable enough, others a mere excuse for stealing from the public treasury, but all alike claiming attention and action, while the business of the people goes all awry.

It has seemed necessary to thus briefly discuss these two opposing theories of society, individualism and societism, in order to show the impracticability of either when applied to the society of to-day without limitation and modification by the other; and that in adopting or rejecting any remedies that may be proposed for the industrial evils which we have discussed, we should be guided by the facts as we find them, and not by blind adherence to abstract principles.

Let us now gather up the salient decisions which we have reached in all our past investigation. We have discovered that a great industrial revolution is in progress, by which manufacturing, mining, and transportation to a very great extent, and other industries to a considerable extent, have been and are being concentrated in the hands of a very few competitors. We have found that by the laws of competition this reduction in the number of competitors greatly increases the intensity of competition and the resulting waste and instability of price, and finally brings monopoly into existence. This monopoly we have determined to be a serious infringement on the rights of the people, and we have found that the losses due to intense competition and the fruitless attempts to defeat monopoly by adding new competing units have wasted the wealth of the nation in uncounted millions. We are now to consider the remedies proposed for these evils.

The most obvious remedy for monopoly, and the one which has been tried and persevered in with the most remarkable faith, is _the creation of new competitors_. Does a railroad monopoly oppress us? Build a competing line. Is the gas company of our city charging us $3 per thousand for gas which cost but 50 cents to produce and deliver? Let us start another gas company and tear up all our pavements again to lay its mains. Has the sugar trust put up the price of sugar two cents per pound? Well, "sugar can be produced anywhere by the expenditure of labor and capital," the Trust's lawyers say, and so _we_ will "trust" that some enterprising manufacturer will take the field against the combination. But if we do any of these things, we have added only _one_ competitor to the number in the field. And with only _two_ competitors in the field, competition is sure to be so _intense_ and _wasteful_ that the formation of a new monopoly is a matter of but a short time.

This is the conclusion to which the theory brings us; and the more one studies the history of actual attempts to create competition in this way, the more thoroughly convinced he must be that the inevitable result will be the same,--the tacit or formal combination between the old monopoly and the new competitor, resulting in the re-establishment of the absolute reign of monopoly. The author has thoroughly studied the actual working of hundreds of schemes, in every part of the United States, whose object was to create competition in railroad transportation. It is a most astonishing fact to see the eagerness with which thousands of municipalities, all over the country, which have taken great loads of debt upon their shoulders to secure "competing lines," and have seen these lines swallowed up by their rivals, are still anxious to repeat the folly and assume new burdens to aid in building new lines, which will inevitably be absorbed like those which they preceded. If the people as a whole learn wisdom by experience, they seem to learn with painful slowness. The first great lesson for the people who are groaning under the burden of monopoly to learn, then, is that when we try to defeat monopoly by creating new competing units, the remedy is worse for the community at large than the disease, and effects at best but a temporary relief.

Another class of remedies against monopoly seek to accomplish their purpose by opposing the tendency to a reduction in the number of competing units. There are not wanting people who, having gained a dim perception that monopolies are an inevitable result of the modern concentration of industry, conclude that, after all, "the former days _were_ better than these," and that our wisest course is a retrograde one. Fortunately, however, these people are comparatively few. It is a fact so plain that even the dullest can hardly fail to perceive it, that the consolidation and concentration of industry which have gone on everywhere have wonderfully cheapened the cost of production,--made it possible for us to make better goods with a less expenditure of labor and material. The revolution in our industries could not be undone without a more radical action toward vested property rights than could be countenanced now; and as already seen, it would work to the detriment of every person in the community. We cannot go back to the stage-coach, the workshop, and the hand-loom of our ancestors; we cannot, if we would, undo the growth of a century in civilization; and it is well that it is so.

But while most men see the benefit which has resulted from the consolidations already effected, there are but few who are not opposed to further consolidations. It is argued that the reduction in the number of competing units results in increasing the intensity of competition, which is assumed to be a desirable end; and that it has also worked great benefit in the reduction in cost. Having attained this, it is proposed to stop further consolidations and prevent the establishment of monopoly. This is what most of the present plans for giving relief from monopoly propose to accomplish. Certainly the task is no easy one; let us inquire if it be even possible.

We may safely assume, in the first place, that the competitors in any industry will always be reduced to a very small number before the public will be sufficiently aroused to make any movement for the prevention of consolidation. So long as a monopoly is not imminent, usually, indeed, so long as it is not in actual operation, no one cares or notices how far consolidation and combination goes. Now by the laws of competition, when the number of competing units is small, competition is intense and wasteful, and acts to so reduce the returns from industry that combination and the establishment of a monopoly are a natural sequence.

Evidently this result can only be prevented by some interference outside the industry itself. If we allow it to take its own course, a monopoly is certain, sooner or later, to be formed. But the only agency which has the right and power to interfere is government. The question then is, can government successfully interfere to prevent intense competition from bringing about monopoly? In order to do this it must of course keep competition in action; but it cannot do this directly. Competition is essentially a strife. No law was ever enacted which could force two men to fight if they were really determined to be at peace. No law was ever enacted which could force two manufacturers or merchants to compete with each other in price, if they really were agreed to sell at the same price. The common-law principle that contracts in restraint of competition are void, so often appealed to nowadays, has really but slight power. It merely prevents the parties who make an agreement to restrain competition, from enforcing such agreements in court. Attempts have also been made to apply this principle to secure an annulment of the charter of corporations which engage in monopolistic combinations. Even if this be successful, the only result probable is that private parties instead of corporations will carry on the monopolies in a few cases, while in most cases the competition-destroying agreements will be made so secretly that it will be impossible to prove their existence.

It is thus plain that the action of the government in declaring the restriction of competition to be illegal is wholly ineffectual to check the growth of monopoly. And, further, the fact is that it is hardly possible for the government to take any more extreme stand in the matter. Let us suppose that it does declare, not only that these combinations are against public policy, but that they shall be punished. Then would it be a punishable offence for two country grocers who had been selling sugar below cost to agree that henceforth they would charge a uniform price and make an eighth of a cent per pound! It is to be remembered that _competition_ necessitates _action_. Can the government, therefore, _compel_ a man to compete, to cut prices below his neighbors, or to carry on his business at all, if he does not choose to do so? Such a law would establish the government's right to regulate the conduct of purely private business to a degree never before known. Such a law to protect the theory of individualism would be a most flagrant infringement of the rights of individuals. It is plain, then, that government cannot possibly keep up competition by direct action.

Whether it is possible to do so by indirect means is a much harder question. Monopoly results, as we have found, from the intensity of competition. If it is possible to modify the intensity, to keep the candle from burning itself out too quickly, so to speak, it is possible that competition may be kept alive by legislative enactment. So far, practically nothing has been done in this direction, and it remains yet to be seen what remedies of this sort may accomplish.

A pertinent example of an attempt by the government to keep competition alive is the Interstate Commerce law. Before its passage the railway companies had a patched-up and nominally illegal species of combination to restrict competition, known as pooling. As described by President Charles Francis Adams of the Union Pacific Railway, "it was merely a method through which the weaker corporations were kept alive." The Interstate law prohibited this restriction of competition, and also, by enactment of the long-and short-haul clause, made the competition more widespread and injurious to the railways. As a result an astonishing impetus has been given to the growth of the great systems and the consolidation of the minor competing roads. More than that, however, the great increase in the intensity of competition has done so much to drain the resources of the companies and injure their revenues, that some measure for uniting all the railroads of the country under one management is now being seriously planned by many men in railroad circles. Thus this result, which was probably inevitable, has doubtless been hastened many years by the action of the law. The means taken to intensify competition has operated, as might have been expected, to hasten the complete establishment of monopoly.

We have now found that monopoly is the inevitable result of the concentration of competition in any industry in a few hands, if events are allowed to take their natural course; that the only agent which has either the right or the power to interfere in the case is the government,--National, State, or Municipal; that government cannot punish directly those who form combinations to restrict competition, without exercising to an unprecedented degree its right to interference with private affairs; while its attempt to deter men from establishing monopolies by refusing its protection to them in their contracts to restrict competition has proved to be but a slight hindrance to the growth of monopoly.

There are, then, but two ways of preventing monopoly from establishing itself and laying such a tax upon the people at large for the supply of the commodity which it controls as it chooses. The first is, action to reduce the intensity of competition so that the weaker competitors may maintain their independence and not be forced to consolidate with their stronger rivals. The second is, action to permit or encourage the establishment of monopoly, and regulate by some means other than competition the prices which it shall charge for the products and the quality of product which it shall supply. These two general classes of remedies which we find to be feasible we will discuss here only in a general way. The first, reduction in the intensity of competition, has hardly been tried in any form, and we cannot yet say what practical means should be taken to put it into effect. We will return to this at a later period in our discussion.

The second remedy is the one towards whose adoption we are rapidly working. State and Interstate Commissions have already been established to regulate railway monopolies; and in general it is true that the people who feel the burden of monopolies are looking to the government for relief, and expect it to take positive action for the control of other monopolies as it has for the control of railways. It will be seen that we have now arrived by a study of the various possible remedies for monopoly at the same irresistible conclusion to which we were brought by our study of the laws of competition. _The proper remedy for monopoly is not abolition but control._ It seemed necessary to conduct this independent investigation in order that no blind adherence to individualism and no thought of the possible efficacy of other remedies might lead us to doubt this important truth.

We have next to consider the fact that the government can control monopolies in two ways. It can either permit the monopoly to remain under private ownership, and regulate its operations by law and by duly appointed officers; or it can itself assume the entire ownership and control of the monopoly. Which of these plans is the better, is a question of public policy over which future political parties are likely to dispute. One party will hold that when it is necessary for the government to interfere to protect those whom it represents from the oppression of monopoly, it should assume at once the whole ownership and management of the monopoly. Their opponents will argue that government should interfere only to the extent needful to maintain the rights of the public; and that it is far better that industry should be directed by the private individuals whose interests are at stake than by government officials. To discuss fully the arguments for each of these two principles of our future practice in dealing with monopolies, would be beyond the intended scope of this volume. It can only be briefly said that the arguments presented will certainly indicate that the conditions surrounding each given monopoly will have great weight in determining which policy is the most advantageous. It would be manifestly unwise, for instance, to place our postal facilities under the direction of a corporation, even though its operations were regulated by government. It would be even more unwise to place the operations of the flouring mills of the country in the hands of a department of the government. The important factors to be considered in deciding any given case are, first, the importance and necessity to the public of the service, and, second, the question whether production in the given case is likely to be carried on more economically by the government or by private enterprise. The former has an advantage in that it can secure its capital at a lower rate of interest. The latter, an advantage in that it secures greater efficiency from the labor it employs. Other circumstances being equal, it would appear wisest, then, for government to take direct charge of those monopolies in which the greatest amount of capital is invested and the least labor is employed, leaving to private enterprise under government regulation the operation of monopolies in which the opposite set of conditions prevails.

As already stated, however, the question is complicated by the social and industrial effects which might follow a large transfer of enterprise from private to governmental direction; and these effects we will not now discuss.

XV.

THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE AND OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVE, THE GOVERNMENT.

We have now at last deduced the important facts, that the only remedy for the evils of monopoly must come from the popular will, expressed in direct action by the government; that the government may possibly keep competition alive by checking its intensity, or can certainly allow events to take their natural course and permit monopolies to be established. It can then protect the public, either by assuming itself the ownership and operation of the monopoly, or by taking the less radical step of placing the monopoly under official supervision and control while permitting its private ownership to continue. This conclusion is of the utmost importance, for it marks out one single direction as the one in which relief from the evils which vex us may be found. If we can once make the thinking people of the country understand the effect which monopolies have upon their welfare, and that the evil will not cure itself and cannot be cured by attempts to create competition or by any remedy short of direct action by the government, we shall have made a great advance.

But with this goal reached, new questions at once present themselves. Can the interference of the government with private industries be defended? How shall government exercise its control, so as to protect the people without infringing vested property rights and discouraging private enterprise? It may be objected, too, that, while our preceding discussion has fully proved the weakness of other methods of dealing with monopoly, compared with that by the direct action of government, it has not been shown that the latter is practicable, or that it would not be likely to result in more harm than good to the people at large.

These questions are coming before the people in a thousand practical forms. They are being fought over in courts and legislatures and councils, and are destined to be fought over at the polls. How important their right decision is, we have already seen. Let us make some attempt to find what this right decision is.

In taking up first the question of the rights of private property holders, we touch a point over which there is likely in the future to be serious dispute. A certain faction vigorously contend that past precedents are no ground on which to base future action, and that little attention need be paid to the rights of private owners if the public interest is at stake. A far stronger and more influential faction are jealous of every thing which seems to question their right to hold and use their property in whatever way they see fit. But certainly, if their claims are just, they need not fear the result of that investigation which every idea we have inherited from former generations has in these days to receive. It would be beyond the scope of our investigation to make any exhaustive study of this subject, but it is necessary to note some of the important facts in connection with property rights as light upon the question at issue.

In the first place, it must be conceded that the question is to be decided upon its merits, and not by precedent. It is of little use for one faction to show, as they can, that the idea of private property is largely of modern growth; or for their opponents to prove, as they may, that the progress of law and government has been continually toward better protection of the rights of property. The question must be, on what grounds of inherent right or public expediency is property held to-day in private ownership? Distasteful as it may be, to realize that what has been considered a fundamental principle of civilized society is here challenged and put upon the defensive, the fact remains that the defence must be made, and must be based only on what is just and wise to-day, for the opposing side may properly reject arguments based on the wholly different conditions under which past generations lived.

The question of the rights of property in the products of labor we may pass briefly, as it is almost undisputed; and while certain thinkers have asserted that there is no such thing as a natural right to the ownership of property of any sort, it seems certain that this is true only in a technical sense; and that a man's right to hold, control, dispose of, and enjoy the fruits of his own strength or skill is as certain as his right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and follows from that right as a natural sequence. The most radical revolutionist hardly ventures nowadays to argue against this fact. Thus, though it is recognized that private property even in one's own strength and skill must, at times, be subjected to the higher law of public necessity--as when in time of war a man may be obliged to give up his time, strength, and even life for the public welfare--in general the right to hold the results of labor as private property is well established, on the grounds both of natural right and public expediency.

But when we consider the private ownership of the gifts of Nature and of public franchises, it is apparent that we are on very different ground. These forms of property, which constitute a great proportion of the world's total wealth, are not created by labor. Nature's gifts were not stored up to enrich and benefit any one man, but the whole race. It follows, therefore, that they are always, in the first instance, public property.

The argument presented to prove any inherent right of the private owners to any form of natural wealth seem to be insufficient to prove the case. The fact seems to be that the inherent right to the benefit of every one of Nature's gifts is vested, if perfect equity were established, in the whole human race; or, as a reasonable approach to this, in that portion of the public to whom this gift is a direct benefit. The title which the public holds may be transferred to private individuals, as a matter of expediency; but the public must still retain a prior claim upon the property. Its right to have the property used for the general welfare, transcends the right of any private owner to direct it solely to his own profit and the public injury.

It is thus plain that the private ownership of our natural wealth and of all public franchises rests on the grounds of expediency alone. All the lands and mineral wealth, all franchises for railway lines and for the various public works discussed in the chapters on municipal monopolies were the heritage of the whole people in the first instance, and they have only transferred the title to private owners because it seemed expedient so to do. On the grounds of expediency alone, then, is the private ownership of natural wealth to be considered.

It can hardly be doubted that in the case of our own country, the transfer to private owners of the title to our natural resources has been in the past the wisest and only proper course. It is a fact not often realized that the title to nearly all the natural wealth of the country, almost all the lands and mines and forests, has been held directly by the public within a century, and that the transfer to private owners of a great part of it has taken place within a generation.

The question now comes: Did the public, in transferring the title to a private owner, relinquish all its right to the future control of these valuable properties, as a private owner would have done? The answer must be in the negative. Regarded simply as a matter of expediency, it is plain that to cause the act of any public official to bind all succeeding generations, living under dissimilar conditions and circumstances, which were then unknown and unprophesied, might result in unbearable evils. Necessary as it might be at the start to give away valuable properties to meet present needs, one generation or its representatives has no conceivable right to sell for a mess of pottage the heritage of all succeeding ones. The fact is, then, that the natural title to all gifts of Nature is vested in the public at large; and while it is in duty bound to observe the contracts which it makes with private parties, it is also not to be thought that the dishonesty or incompetence of a public official, or the failure to foresee the future, can work for too long a time an injury to the community.

It seems certain that, in every case where the public has transferred to private owners the title to any gift of Nature, or has conferred any franchise upon a corporation, under whatever conditions, the right of supreme control still remains with the natural owner, the public; and when the need arises, this control may be exercised. The rights of the owners and the contract obligations into which the public has entered should be regarded so far as possible; but when the public necessity demands, control on its behalf can always be exercised.

This may seem like a formidable and revolutionary doctrine, but, in reality, it is based on every-day acts of the public representatives, with which every one is familiar. Suppose it is conceived to be for the public interest that a certain railway shall be built. To do this it is necessary to cross many hundred tracts of land, the title to which was many years ago transferred by the public to private owners who have bought and sold since then as they pleased, as if their control were absolute. Many of the owners of these lands may be opposed to parting with the right of way necessary for a railroad, but their private wishes must not stop the progress of improvements necessary to the general welfare. The State, which has the natural title, asserts its right to supreme control; and, if necessary, will use all its power to force these private owners to relinquish their land for the public good. This is the commonest example of the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but other cases frequently occur. The laying out of city streets, building public bridges, and, in fact, highways of every class, furnish a similar example. Provision of public water supply often requires an exercise of this power even more positive than in the cases just cited. By the construction of one great reservoir to store the flow of the Croton water-shed for the supply of New York City, it is proposed to condemn the dwellings and lands now owned and occupied by several thousand people. It is to be noted that, in every case, the rights of the private owners are observed, and compensation is made them for the damage done.

Under the common law the owner of lands bordering a running stream has certain rights to its use; and these riparian rights, as they are called, have been established by precedent for centuries. But, in the State of Colorado, it was found that the water in the streams was of such value for irrigation that the old system of permitting private ownership of these riparian rights led to grave abuses. The State Constitution, therefore, declares that all water in running streams is the inalienable property of the whole people, and the system providing for its use by private parties is based on this principle.

So much for the power of the public to exercise its supreme control, when public exigency requires, over Nature's gifts in land and water. As an example of the supreme control of the public over the franchises which it grants, take the case of the railway again. It is well established that the public has the right through its legal representatives to regulate the management and operation of the railway in every detail; and not only that, but the rates which the railway may charge for its services as well. Many other examples might be given, for the necessities of the present decade have awakened men as never before to the facts which we have just discussed. The final conclusion must inevitably be that _the public as the sole possible holder of the natural title to the gifts of Nature, while it may find it expedient to transfer this ownership to private owners, retains always supreme control, which may be exercised as the public exigency demands_.

We have next to determine in what cases the exercise by the public of this right of supreme control over its heritage is demanded. We are greatly aided here, however, by the thorough study we have made of the laws of competition. It is evident at once that competition in the case of natural agents acts according to the laws already found. Agricultural land in this country is so abundant and its ownership is so widely diffused that any monopoly of it is now impossible. Each farmer competes with every other farmer, and the extension of transportation facilities has so broadened the field of competition that in no industry is the day when the few competing units shall replace the many, and monopoly shall ensue, farther off than in this. In Great Britain and Ireland opposite conditions prevail. A limited amount of land is held by a few owners, and its rental is fixed without competition; consequently the land question has been almost, if not quite, the chief issue in British politics during this decade.

If we examine Nature's gifts to the world in the shape of metals, we find iron to be so widely distributed that competition has always acted to reduce profits, and that combinations to restrict competition in the production of the metal have only recently become even possible. On the other hand, the workable deposits of copper are so scarce and the number of competitors in its production is so much smaller, that it has become the subject of the greatest monopoly the world has ever seen.

With these examples--and any number of others might be cited--is it not plain enough that the laws of competition are exactly applicable to aid in solving the problem? The smaller the number of competing units, the stronger the tendency to monopoly. Certain gifts of Nature are given to us in profusion. The people transfer the title to private owners, and of these there must of necessity be so many that they will compete steadily with each other. The consequence is that the people receive the benefit from the country's natural resources, while the private owner gets only enough to compensate him reasonably well for the labor he employs and the capital which he invests. Certain other gifts of Nature are, as we have found, very scarce; the number of men who can own and use them and compete with each other in offering their advantages to the public is necessarily small. The inevitable result of this condition is, first, intense competition and then monopoly.

It is thus evident that there is no necessity for the State to interfere with the private ownership of those gifts of Nature which are so widely distributed that competition can act for the protection of the public. As regards those other gifts which are so limited in their extent that their control has become a matter of monopoly, the right of the public to exercise its control is already proven. Whether in any given case the exigency is so great as to call for the assertion of this power, is a question which must be decided in each case separately.

It may be objected, with truth, that nothing short of the actual ownership of all Nature's gifts by the public is in accord with absolutely perfect justice; but as a matter of fact every human work carried out by human hands and brains is only an approach to perfection. It will never be possible by any human agency to distribute the wealth production of the world with absolute equity. A careful writer says: "The view that the right of every human being to his share in the gifts of Nature should be recognized is not an unreasonable one." But by no system possible of putting into practical execution can these gifts be equitably divided among all men. What can be done is to cause the benefit of these gifts to be widely distributed, and to prevent them from being monopolized for the benefit of a few.

The fact maybe alluded to, that even under widespread competition the holders of the most favorably situated and richest lands, mines, etc., receive a benefit which in absolute equity should be divided among all men. But the vastly more important matter of the monopolies which prevent the public from obtaining the benefit of the natural resources to which it holds an inalienable title, so overshadows such trivial injustices that they may be neglected. So much attention has been called of late, however, to the fact that land as a gift of Nature should, if absolute justice were done, have the benefit from its use equally divided among all men, that something further on this subject may be said.

Let us first note the fact, which no one will dispute, that the title held by the public refers only to the "site value." The value of all improvements which are the product of labor belongs to the owner by natural right. Now it is conceivable that of the total value of $10,197,000,000 at which the farms of the United States were valued at the last census, $7,000,000,000 may perhaps have been the value of the land apart from the value of the buildings and improvements made since the country was settled. In 1880 there were at least 3,500,000 farmers who owned agricultural lands. It is a well-known fact that the holding of agricultural land in large parcels is the rare exception. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the "site value" held by each farmer was about $2,000. This is the sum which in absolute equity is said to belong to the public at large. But let us reflect that each farmer has only received a small proportion of this $2,000 through the increase in the value of his land. The fact is that the land which at first was actually valueless has increased in value with each generation, and it is this increase alone, apart from the increase due to the betterments, after which the public has any right to inquire. Remembering the number of sales and changes in the ownership which take place in this country, how often the benefits which have accrued to a single property are divided up among a number of heirs, and that each owner represents on the average a family of three individuals, it seems reasonable to suppose that this increase in the "site value" of each farm may have been divided among twenty different persons. Thus, while the statement may be made that the public has a claim upon the farms of the country of $7,000,000,000, it must be remembered that this sum has been divided among about 70,000,000 different people, and that this division has been in progress for over two centuries. When the benefits of our natural resources are so widely distributed as this, there can be little occasion to alarm ourselves regarding injustice through the private control of farming lands.

This, however, is somewhat apart from our argument. The main point, of which we must not lose sight, is that the private ownership of those gifts of Nature which are widely distributed operates to the general benefit of the community far more than any system of public ownership that could be devised. But, on the other hand, in the case of natural agents limited in amount, it is practically certain that sooner or later a monopoly will be established by their private owners, to the serious detriment of the public at large. The sovereign right of the public in this latter case to take such steps as are necessary for its proper protection, is something which both _a priori_ reasoning and judicial decisions amply prove.

The great problem of monopoly would be a far easier one to solve, both theoretically and practically, were it as easy to regulate justly those forms of monopoly whose strength lies in combination only, as it is those whose power depends on the possession of gifts of Nature, which we have just considered. In dealing with trusts, monopolies in trade, and labor monopolies, we are in danger, on the one hand, of sanctioning oppressive interference with private business, and on the other of permitting a license in the conduct of private business which encourages its managers to continue to extort unjust gains from the public. In the face of this difficulty, which careful consideration shows to be very serious, and in the dread of other evils, such as the government proving incompetent to safely undertake these new and strange responsibilities, we may well feel like trying to get along with the aid of those old defenses against monopolies that have always, until the modern concentration of industry was accomplished, been ample to hold them in check.

But the one argument which prevents this is the fact that this tendency to concentration and consolidation is still actively at work. In the words of Prof. Ely: "Production on the largest possible scale will be the only practical mode of production in the near future." It is for this reason that we must not cease to look about for some better protection against this new class of monopolies than are afforded by merely placing stumbling-blocks in their way. We shall have need, for many years yet, of such weapons in fighting monopoly as the public is already familiar with; the creation of new competitors and their support by public opinion, judicial decisions against combinations, and the like. But before these grow absolutely useless, we ought to be prepared to meet the new conditions of industry with something better than mere opposition; and even now be experimenting and studying upon a permanent and consistent policy.

In attempting to control monopolies which are not dependent on natural agents for their strength, we are met at once by the declaration that the government has no power or right to interfere with property which is the product of labor; and that the owner cannot be prevented from making such disposition of it as he chooses. The President and Counsel of the Sugar Trust said after Judge Barrett's decision was announced: "We do not believe that the law prevents two persons engaged in rivalry with each other from uniting their interests." This seems indeed true; and yet, on reflection, it appears to be absolutely certain that power must reside in the sovereign people to protect themselves from the unjust taxation which a monopoly may seek to enforce. Let us brush away cobwebs and set the facts clearly before us. That competition among producers is the sole present protection of the public against extortionate prices is undoubted. When by combination this defense is abolished, has not the public a right to adopt some other means of protection? There can be no doubt that it has; the only question is, what form should that protection take?

It must be plain that, as a general rule, it is unfitting that government should own and operate industrial establishments. Practical experience has indicated that this experiment is wellnigh certain to result in failure, for reasons so evident as to require no mention here. The only alternative remaining is government regulation with private ownership and management. The essential features in the adoption of any plan should be that the returns of the private owner should be in proportion to the skill and economy which he exercises in managing his business; that competition and its resulting waste be done away with; and that the industry be placed on such a safe and stable basis that the capital invested in it shall receive the lowest possible rate of interest, thus leaving the greatest possible amount for the payment of wages of labor and permitting sales of the product at a low price.

XVI.

PRACTICAL PLANS FOR THE CONTROL OF MONOPOLIES.

The investigation of the preceding chapters, leading up to the final conclusion that the proper and only wise remedy for the evils of monopoly lies in direct action of the government to protect the rights of the people, finishes the chain of our argument and really accomplishes the work laid out in the opening chapter. The laws which we have found to govern competition in modern industry are so far-reaching in their effects, and their correct apprehension by the people at large is so important to the general welfare, that economists ought to unite in recognizing and teaching their truth, while all who desire to work for the alleviation of present crying evils of society should understand these laws and be guided by them.

In the practical application of these truths, however, so many complicated details are involved that there is ample reason for the widest differences of opinion. To decide intelligently upon these practical methods demands special knowledge, in order that all necessary details may be provided for, and rare practical judgment to adapt the method to the means at hand.

The investigations which the author has pursued in the preparation of the preceding chapters and for certain other purposes have suggested to him certain principles in the practical execution of plans for the control of various monopolies, which seem to him necessary to success in the work. Well understanding the fallibility of any one man's judgment, especially in these matters of detail, he has determined to outline in a brief way what seem to him the most feasible plans for the control of each class of monopolies. These suggestions, however, are to be regarded in an entirely different light from the general laws propounded in the preceding chapters; and they are presented with a full knowledge of the fact that slight variations in circumstances may necessitate wide changes in plans and processes.

Taking up the monopolies which by their use of natural agents or their exercise of a franchise granted by the public, are already acknowledged to be subject to the public control, let us consider first the railway system. The two years in which the Interstate Commerce law has been in force have seen a great progress toward the final solution of this problem, even though railway affairs are at present in so unsatisfactory a condition. The important features of our future policy which now seem to be quite generally understood are: full State and national control over both tariff rates and facilities; the abolition of competition, either by consolidation or by legalized agreements to that end; and strict prohibition of the construction of parallel lines not warranted by the traffic.

That we are working very rapidly in this direction, no one will deny who is familiar with the progress of legislation affecting railway interests and with the opinions of railway men. Evidently, however, government cannot justly take so prominent a part in railway management without becoming in some degree responsible to railway stock- and bond-holders for the protection of their interests; and it is a difficult question to say in what manner this responsibility should be met. It has been the intention of the author in devising the following plan for the control of our railway system to make this responsibility a definite one, and not leave it as now, a vague constitutional right. For according to the law at present, State and national legislators may make laws to vary the receipts and expenditures of the railway companies as much as they please, and the only redress of the railway owner is an appeal to the courts, the judges of which must decide whether the company's revenue is so injured that its legal rights are infringed.

Space will not permit here a full statement of the many serious evils and abuses with which our present system of railway management is burdened. The study which the author has made of them has convinced him of their importance and magnitude. The following plan is designed to permit their remedy as well as to remedy the special evils of monopoly with which our present investigation is concerned:

Let the government acquire the title to the franchise, permanent way, and real estate of all the railway lines in the country. Let a few corporations be organized under government auspices; and let each, by the terms of its charter, receive a perpetual lease of all the railway lines built or to be built within a given territory. Let the territory of each of these corporations be so large and so planned with regard to its neighbors that there shall be, so far as possible, no competition between them. For instance, one corporation would operate all lines south of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi rivers; another all lines east of the Hudson and of Lake Champlain, etc. Let the terms of rental of these lines be about 3¼ per cent. on the road's actual "present cost" (the sum of money it would cost to rebuild it entirely at present prices of material and labor) less a due allowance for depreciation. The corporations would be obliged to keep the property in as good condition as when received, and would own absolutely all their rolling stock, machinery, etc.

It is not proposed, however, that the government shall own any interest in the railways save the legal title. Bonds would be issued to the full amount of the appraised valuation, running twenty-five years and bearing interest at 3 per cent., principal and interest guaranteed by the government, and these would be sold to the highest bidder. Thus the real ownership of the roads would be vested in the bondholders. As is well known, there is a great and fast increasing need for investments of absolute safety, even though they bear very low rates of interest. This is especially desirable for the continuance of our national banking system, in order to insure us a safe, stable, and ample currency. Such bonds would find a market at a premium as fast as offered.

It would not even be necessary that the money to pay the interest coupons should pass through the government's hands. The operating company would pay it directly to the bond-holder and at the same time the ¼ of 1 per cent. would be paid into the government treasury.