Chapter III: Part 3

After the 2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry had completely occupied Bois Frehaut and established our line along the northern boundary and also the eastern boundary of that wood (it was much farther north than the northern boundary of Bois Voivrotte) it became impracticable for the enemy to send or keep troops in Bois Voivrotte unless he drove my Battalion from Bois Frehaut. He was still at liberty, however, to rain artillery fire upon it. But here it is officially from the commander of the 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. On page 151, Brigade report: “3:05 p. m. Telephone message from C. O. 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. that he had withdrawn his lines to southern edge of Bois Voivrotte because of heavy enemy shelling--high explosives and gas in woods.” This final cessation of their efforts to hold Bois Voivrotte and withdrawal of their lines to the _southern_ edge of it was _one_ reason for the next entry on same page: “3:55 p. m. Orders received from Commanding General 92nd Division not to launch attack as planned for 5 p. m., but to consolidate positions gained, holding them at all costs against possible counter attacks.” For how could the other units that were supposed to attack through the units supposed to be holding Bois Voivrotte advance beyond its northern boundary when as a matter of fact according to the Battalion C. O.--directly in command--they were only _holding_ the _southern_ boundary. Obviously it was necessary to _recapture_ Bois Voivrotte and _hold_ it--all of it, before they could consider capturing anything beyond, or north of it.

The _other_ reason for the calling off by the Division Commander of the attack scheduled to be launched from the northern boundaries of Bois Frehaut and Bois Voivrotte at 5 p. m., on the 10th, was equally obvious. For how could the units scheduled to attack through the 2nd Battalion of the 365th then holding the _northern_ boundary of Bois Frehaut, be expected to advance _beyond_ us when they had never succeeded, due to enemy artillery fire, in reaching even the _southern_ boundary of Bois Frehaut.

At the time when the attack _beyond_ Bois Voivrotte was almost due to be launched by other units of the 366th they were _not holding_ Bois Voivrotte but had withdrawn their line to the southern edge and were holding what previously had been no-man’s land--very much narrower there than in front of Ferme de Belle Aire. As can readily be seen, this failure to hold, on their part, left me in a precarious condition should the enemy in force attempt to envelop us through Bois Voivrotte. This was largely the cause for the order to the artillery mentioned in the Division Report, page 160: “11 Nov. 3:59--Artillery directed to put down barrage on northern edge of Bois Voivrotte, this point not being occupied by our troops.” I think, bearing in mind General Pershing’s brief remarks relative to attacks on the 11th of November, that this covers them all, including troops of the 7th Division attacking through the C. R. adjoining the 367th on the left.

What does all this mean? It means that of all the battalions concerned or engaged in attacking toward Metz during the drive that started the morning of November 10th, the only battalion that accomplished its mission, or in other words, the only one that was able to carry out its orders--the only one that captured and held anything, was the 2nd Battalion of the 365th Infantry. Had this battalion _not_ succeeded in capturing and holding Bois Frehaut, in fact had it not succeeded in all of its various missions at all times, and had its companies, as companies, not succeeded in all their various missions, I would not be publishing any book about it at all, let alone praising the battalion as I have.

But let us see some more quotations from things included in Dr. Scott’s History. Ralph W. Tyler, the colored war correspondent, writing, necessarily from hearsay mostly, at a time when the confusion and din of battle made it impossible to foresee results, could, however, see the landscape in general and he knew who was attacking and later who was holding Bois Frehaut. He also visited Bois Frehaut after the armistice, so among other things he wrote, page 289: “... and so the 2nd Battalion went into action with but one white officer, the Major. No unit in the advance had a more difficult position to take and hold than the position assigned to the 2nd Battalion of the 365th. The Bois Frehaut was a network of barbed-wire entanglements, and the big guns in Metz had nothing to do but sweep the woods with a murderous fire, which they did most effectively. French and Senegalese in turn had failed to hold these woods, for it was worse than a hell--it had become the sepulchre of hundreds. I (Ralph W. Tyler) was over and through these woods; I saw the mass of barbed-wire entanglements; I saw the nests in the trees in which Germans had camouflaged machine guns that rained a fire upon the Allied troops.

“It is impossible to describe this scene of carnage. The order to the colored men of the 365th was to ‘take and hold’ although it was believed, almost to a certainty, that they could not hold it, even if they did take it. But they did take and hold it, and these men of the 2nd Battalion, with Spartan-like courage; with an endurance unbelievable, would be holding the position at this writing had not the armistice been signed or had they not received orders to retire.”

He also says that “the Major commanding stated to me that the world had never produced gamer fighters than the colored men who made up his battalion of the 365th infantry.” But his next three paragraphs as quoted in “Scott’s History” are mostly erroneous as to previous conditions. The records will show (the necessary records are not in that book), but every one who was in the 365th Infantry and most every one in the Division knows that the 2nd Bn. 365th held the front line battalion sector east of the Moselle called C. R. Musson _continuously_ for thirty-one days, then went back, occupied the second line of defense for three days (during which time various units marched up and engaged the enemy to ascertain his strength), returned to Pont-a-Mousson on the 9th and attacked on the morning of the 10th. During this time the 1st and 3rd Battalions took turns holding the C. R. on our right--C. R. Les Menils. I had not read Dr. Scott’s book at the time I made my lecture. During the Division’s occupancy of the St. Die sector this battalion held a front line sector continuously. In the Argonne it did road work as close to the advanced line as any of the battalions. The Division was praised by General Pershing for its work in facilitating traffic during the Argonne Meuse drive, that is, the early part of that drive. Elements of the 368th Infantry were in the attacking line for a short time. Early in October the entire Division was moved out of the Argonne-Meuse section and to the Marbache sector. No battalion of the 368th Infantry ever held a front line position in the Marbache sector.

To show you how Mr. Tyler was impressed with Bois Frehaut I will quote from his writings again. Page 286, Dr. Scott’s book: “The armistice stopped their advance into Berlin, but they did reach the nearest point to the German city of Metz in what was designed as a victorious march to Berlin, and the valor they displayed, their courageous, heroic fighting all along that advance, won for our men in the 92nd Division high praise from superior officers, including the corps and division commanders, for they never wavered an instant, not even in that awful hell, the Frehaut Woods, upon which the big guns of Metz constantly played, which the Senegalese were unable to hold, but which our colored soldiers from America did take and did hold, until the signal came announcing the cessation of hostilities.”

I shall now give a few more extracts from the Brigade Commander’s report. On page 150, same book: “At 10 a. m. (Nov. 10th) a runner message was received from the Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn., 365th Inf., to the effect that they were being heavily shelled in the Bois Frehaut by enemy artillery, and requesting counter battery fire; it was also stated that their advance had almost reached the northern edge of Bois Frehaut. Heavy artillery was asked to counter-fire on enemy artillery, which they promptly did.” I sent this message about 9 o’clock.

On page 151, Brigade report: “At 11:15 a. m. a message from the C. O. 2nd Bn. 365th Inf. to the effect that Bois Frehaut was completely occupied, that Boches were shelling woods with gas and high explosives, and requesting counter battery fire.” This was the message spoken of in the lecture that I sent at 10 o’clock by pigeon to Division Headquarters. It was read there and relayed to Brigade Headquarters (situated in another village).

Page 152, Brigade report: “Our advance was for a depth of about three and one-half kilometers. When this Brigade took over the sector just east of the Moselle river there was a deep re-entrant next to the river, due to the St. Mihiel drive which advanced the line several kilometers on the west bank of the Moselle river, while the line on the east bank remained in place.”

The reason it “remained in place” was that neither French, Americans nor Senegalese troops had succeeded in getting into it (Bois Frehaut) very far--let alone taking and holding it.

Page 153, Brigade report: “Full use was made of auxiliary arms, machine guns, 37 millimeter guns, Stokes mortars and rifle grenades. All of these weapons, except Stokes mortars were brought into play in the heavy fighting in the Bois Frehaut to combat enemy machine gun nests. 37 mm. guns were pushed well to the front when direct fire at enemy machine gun positions could be obtained. It was to the extensive use of these weapons that the rapid advance through Bois Frehaut was due. Machine guns were used frequently to cover the flanks of the attacking infantry. They aided materially in protecting the N. E. corner of the Bois Frehaut from an enemy counter attack from Bouxières. Trench mortars were placed in position after the Frehaut woods were taken, to cover the new front.”

Page 154, Brigade report: “The lines held by the Germans were unusually strong, being the result of four years of stabilization in that sector. Their artillery was most active, as unquestionably during these years they had registered on every point of importance in the sector. Furthermore, their positions were the first line of defense of Metz. The troops occupying them were young, efficient men and not old soldiers from a rest sector.”

I wish to state here that our Division artillery rendered excellent service. This is especially true when we consider that it had been in the line only a few days.

But a very apparent inconsistency appears in the Brigade report and is embodied in the Division report, page 161: “The attack was renewed on the morning of the 11th, the lines being advanced to the northern edge of the Bois Frehaut a distance of three and one-half km. from an original line.” The _Division_ report says, as you notice, that the line was advanced on the 11th to the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, the Division commander well knowing that the line never was advanced beyond the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, for the next paragraph refers to the final battle line, which the co-ordinates show _was_ the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, but the Brigade report upon which this part of the Division report is based by a Division commander who took command just after the armistice says, page 152: “The attack on the morning of Nov. 10, by units of the Brigade wiped out this re-entrant by advancing our lines on the east bank of the Moselle river a distance of two and one-quarter km. The advance thus made was held against heavy artillery and machine gun fire and high concentration of gas. The attack was renewed on the morning of Nov. 11, lines being advanced a distance of three and one-quarter km. an original line.”

That would indicate an advance of one km. on Nov. 11th. I don’t care to discuss that further than to say that it is _incorrect_. The final battle line shows as the northern edge of Bois Frehaut. The Division report says, “the attack was renewed on the morning of the 11th the lines being advanced to the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, a distance of three and one-half km. from an original line.” Since, as clearly shown, the line was never advanced beyond the northern edge of Bois Frehaut _where_ was _that_ advance made? Speaking of this mysterious advance of the 11th the Brigade report says, “Our liaison with troops west of the river was thereby greatly improved,” indicating that the said unexplainable and vague “advance” was near the river--hence on my front.

General Pershing says that “examination of the records shows that the 2nd Battalion did take the Bois Frehaut on November 10th and that this battalion held this position until the armistice went into effect.” How could he say that we took the Bois Frehaut on Nov. 10th if there was a km. (which is almost a mile) remaining of it to be taken on Nov. 11th? Of the advance of the 11th he says, “advanced a short distance but _had retired_ to cover.”

This same Brigade report shows that at 10 a. m., Nov. 10th, a message was received showing that the 2nd Bn. 365th Inf. had almost reached the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, and that at 11:15, Nov. 10th a message was received showing the Bois Frehaut was _completely occupied_. The quotation above from the same report says that the re-entrant was wiped out by advancing our lines on the east bank of the Moselle on November 10th and that the advance thus made _was held_ against heavy artillery and machine gun fire, etc. The Brigade order for the attack on November 11th--the order from which Gen. Pershing quoted, plainly shows that that attack was to be launched from the northern edge of Bois Frehaut--our front line.

It is too bad to have to spend time correcting such a discrepancy as that, but that’s the way it reads in Dr. Scott’s book and I have no reason to think that the Brigade and Division reports are erroneously printed in that book. It _might_ give a wrong impression to a casual reader. Some might not take the trouble to _see_ that _no_ advance was made and held on the 11th of November. The line was advanced to the northern edge of Bois Frehaut on November 10th and never receded so much as one foot for a single instant. Few enough colored battalions had the opportunity to prove their true worth. I do not propose to leave a single cloud on the record of the glorious _success_ and _achievements_ of _one_ colored battalion. This does not in the least detract from the glory of other units but will _add greatly_ to the prestige and standing of colored soldiers as a whole.

In another place the report of the general commanding our Brigade says, page 154, Dr. Scott’s book: “The commanding officers of units making the attack, and also of the artillery, were constantly stating that they were hurried into these movements without proper preparation. Had they been familiar with such operations, the time allowed would have been sufficient.” The Major General, commanding the 92nd Division who made the Division report on the operations of November 10th and 11th says, page 162, same book: “The attack was made on very brief preparation, too brief in view of the strength of the enemy positions, which were very strongly held.”

I told in the lecture what the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and Sixth-fifth Infantry had undergone in the Marbache Sector and how we worked all of the night preceding the attack on things that _had to be done_ regardless of familiarity with anything. I do not remember that I made any complaints about the shortness of time for preparation. Possibly I did, for I was at all times doing anything and everything to insure success against the enemy. But whether the time was too short or too long I again call your attention to the fact that _this_ battalion accomplished its mission, fully, completely, magnificently, under the guns of Metz.

Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Deitsch, a veteran of the Regular Army, who was my immediate superior and was in command of our Regiment during that drive, and who, before coming to our Regiment, had served in other Divisions in the battle line, said in a letter to me: “The handling of your battalion during the ninth, tenth and morning of November eleventh, 1918, (which lead to the capture of Bois Frehaut) could not, I believe, have been conducted any better. As you well know the capture of this position is credited to you and your battalion.”

On page 154, same book, the Brigade report, speaking of the work of the Brigade as a whole, says: “There is no doubt that some details of the operation were not carried out as well as might have been done by more experienced troops. These were the results of mistaken judgment due to lack of experience rather than to lack of offensive spirit.”

This is true of the Brigade as a whole and the report from which it is copied is a very general statement of the work of the _entire_ Brigade in that series of operations. I say and have shown and am ready to prove more exhaustively if necessary that the above statement does not concern _one_ of the six infantry battalions of that Brigade, namely, the Second Battalion, Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth.

Suppose I should admit or should say that the battalion that captured this seemingly impregnable position and held it continuously under the defenses of Metz, was only a very mediocre battalion, or suppose I should admit or should say, “Oh, yes, the men were anxious enough and after they got going fought savagely with razors or knives or bayonets, but the colored officers had no judgment and could not handle their men and it was a pretty poor battalion.” What then could be said, what would _have_ to be said of the _other_ units of the Ninety-second Division and of units engaged of the Seventh Division that _failed_ utterly to accomplish their missions during the same attack?

The truth is that those other battalions and units that failed to advance and hold against the world’s strongest position--Metz--were excellent troops and in many instances did most heroic work. They were fully equal on the average to battalions and units of the foremost American Divisions. The truth is equally clear to every one who knows or _wants_ to know that the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth Infantry was a most _exceptional_, a most _wonderful_ battalion, fully equal in _all_ respects to the very finest battalions in the American Army or any army that fought in the Great World War. I challenge any one to disprove this statement.

They _were_ wonderful fighters with the trench knife and bayonet, but they were equally efficient and energetic with all other infantry arms. Take the other extreme from fighting--paper work. The paper work that had to be done in a company of our army was staggering. It required ceaseless work and absolute accuracy. The companies of this battalion were unsurpassed. “H” Company, for instance, as is well known, did and turned in paper work that was practically perfect at all times. Then there was march or road discipline. Some of the marches made were very trying. As an example, the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth Infantry marched from Camp d’Italien in the Argonne Forest to Camp Cabaud north east of Les Isilett during the night, through mud and through the confusion and blockade of traffic you have all heard about, just preceding the Argonne Offensive, and _arrived_ with every man who started. _Not one straggler._ I furnished signed certificates before it could be believed by my superiors. I have already referred to the very significant fact that no officers were ever placed under arrest or sent before efficiency boards. Every statement I have made and every inference I have drawn is based on a personal knowledge of _facts_.

My efforts to make that Battalion a real success were due solely to the fact that it was an American Battalion engaged in the fight against our Nation’s enemies. My enlisted men were colored and they wore the American uniform. My Officers were colored and they were commissioned, _not by me, but by the United States Government_. If you are colored or if perchance you are white and care to do some thinking about me and about my Battalion and about many things in general, read on pages 433 and 438 of the book I have been referring to. By the way, the Battalion Commander there referred to relieved me (he was then a Lieutenant Colonel) of the command of the Regiment (Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth Infantry) the second day after the Armistice took effect.

It is my idea of justice that the race--namely the American Negro--that produced men who served their country so loyally, so bravely, so capably both as officers and as enlisted men under my command, should _know the truth_ about my battalion. It would matter little whether the outfit were a division, a brigade or a battalion. It happens to have been a battalion. And it matters little _what_ colored battalion it was, but it does matter a great deal and mean a great deal to Colored Americans that one of the very finest and greatest battalions in the American Army and in the world was an American _colored_ battalion.

If what I have said about my Colored Battalion shall in any way aid, or shall inspire and stimulate Colored Americans in their struggle for advancement and for the attainment of Righteousness that “Exalteth a nation,” I shall be gratified.

The following is the _testimonial_ I referred to. It substantiates some things spoken of in the lecture.

HEADQUARTERS 365TH INFANTRY.

Major Warner A. Ross, 365th Infantry, commander of the 2nd Battalion,
while leading his battalion and part of the First Battalion into
action in the “Bois Frehaut” on the east bank of the Moselle River
north of Pont-a-Musson and under the guns of Metz, on the morning of
November 10th, 1918, with Brigade orders to capture and hold this
strong German position, displayed most exceptional bravery, coolness
and efficiency under heavy fire. He personally led his forces and
established his first waves in their firing position in no-man’s
land immediately in front of the enemy’s observers, machine gunners
and snipers. He then, after encouraging his men through enemy wire,
under heavy barrage established his Post of Command in the edge of
the “Bois Frehaut” in what just before was enemy territory. This Post
of Command was a shell hole with no protection from artillery fire
and was established in this place so that runners coming back from
platoons and companies could follow the edge of the wood and easily
find him. This he maintained as his P. C. until 10:30 o’clock on the
morning of the 11th, when news of the Armistice reached him.

Major Ross refused to move his Headquarters despite the fact that a
hostile plane had located it and that others abandoned it. Shrapnel
burst over it and high explosive shells tore great holes all around
it. The sides were caved in and he was once almost completely buried.
During the night it became filled with mustard gas. He ordered lime
sprinkled in it and a fire built and remained. By moving to a less
exposed position or to a dugout his liaison would have been impaired.
It was excellent liaison that enabled him to send in reinforcements
to meet counter attacks and flank movements attempted by the enemy.

The bravery of Major Ross and his indifference to personal safety in
his determination to win this battle are considered worthy of special
recognition. Such conduct is far in excess of the ordinary line
of duty of a Battalion Commander. The “Bois Frehaut,” “Belle Aire
Ferme,” “Ferme de Pence” and “Bois de la tete d’Or” were taken from
the enemy and the battle line changed by this victory.

Witnesses (Signed):

EDWARD B. SIMMONS,
_Major, Medical Corps, Regimental Surgeon._

F. E. SWEITZER,
_Captain, 365th Inf., Regtl. Adjutant._

T. C. HOPKINS,
_Captain, 365th Inf., Regtl. Intelligence Officer._

WALTER R. SANDERS,
_Captain, 365th Inf., Second in Command at that time._

WM. W. GREEN,
_Captain, 365th Inf., Comdg. Co. H, 365th Inf._

JOHN F. PRITCHARD,
_1st Lieut., 365th Inf., Adjutant, 2nd Bn._

GARRETT M. LEWIS,
_1st Lieut., 365th Inf., Comdg. Reserve Co. at that time._

U. J. ROBINSON,
_1st Lieut., 365th Inf., Chaplain._

THE END

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:

Italicized text is surrounded by underscores: _italics_.

Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.