Chapter XXIX: Appendix: II

Memorandum as to the Evacuation of Egypt

The evacuation of Egypt is a question partly of honour, partly of prudence. Of honour, in view of the pledges given; of prudence on military grounds.

If Egypt could be held honourably and without risk of war, there is much to be said in favour of continuing the English protectorate. It secures our Mediterranean route to India at a small cost. Its prestige to us is of value, and we should be spared the discredit of a withdrawal under French pressure. We owe it, too, to the Egyptians, whose army and political aspirations we destroyed in 1882, to continue to them our assistance in their weakness as against other Powers.

Nevertheless the risks appear to me great. Egypt’s position on the Suez Isthmus is too important geographically to be allowed permanently to any one European Power by the rest of the Powers. It stands marked out for neutrality as between them, and France will certainly not consent to our holding it permanently without a war. As a question of near danger I have reason to feel sure that a complete agreement has been come to between France and the Sultan (probably, too, the Czar) regarding it, and that the return of the Liberal Party to office in England will determine their joint action.

It is therefore of some urgency to consider whether we are strong enough by land and sea to refuse at all hazards.

I agree entirely with Mr. Gladstone when he hopes that Lord Salisbury rather than himself may negotiate the evacuation. Mr. Gladstone’s position abroad will be weak, as he will be without cordial support from the Central Powers, while his position in honour towards France will be hampered by his many pledges. Lord Salisbury could get better terms for the Egyptians, and would be less likely to sacrifice them to the exigencies of European diplomacy.

I believe an evacuation might be effected on one or other of the following lines:

(1) The simplest and most expeditious plan would probably be to hand over the military responsibility to the Sultan. This would have the advantage of postponing the ultimate question. It would place Egypt, as regards European ambitions, under whatever degree of integrity the Ottoman Empire enjoys. Ottoman troops could certainly guard her southern frontier and prevent surprise from other quarters. England, this quarrel about Egypt settled, would then revert to her former friendly relations with Turkey, and in the event of a break-up of the Empire would be free to take whatever steps her interests required. As regards Egyptian opinion, I believe that on the whole it would be not unfavourable to such a solution. There is no love for the Turks among the fellahin, but the Sultan’s authority would be accepted by them as natural and legal, while it must be remembered that the Khedivial rule is also Turkish. The Sultan, indeed, might be expected to protect in some measure the Arabic- speaking population against a renewal of oppression by the Turkish Circassian Pashas, and, in any case, he would be jealous in their favour of European aggression.

No administrative interference, however, need be conceded if the transfer of military protection be made under agreement. It is probable that, if the right claimed for England in the Wolff Convention of ultimate intervention were withdrawn, France and Russia would not oppose such a solution.

(2) A better plan, if honestly attempted by England, and as honestly accepted by the Powers, would be to re-establish the National Government on liberal and progressive lines, under guarantee of neutrality.

Although much time and opportunity have been wasted during our nine years of occupation in repressing political life among the Egyptians, I am still of opinion that something in the shape of Constitutional Government would give them their best chance of permanent independence and progress as a race. It must not be forgotten that in 1882 a Constitution on a European model (decree of March, 1882) was obtained by the Egyptian National Party, which gave considerable promise of efficiency as a means of asserting native right against both the Turkish ruling caste and the European colonists. If it had not been put down by England’s armed intervention, it would in all likelihood have given a new impulse of progress not only to Egypt, but to the surrounding Mohammedan lands. I am of opinion that even yet its restoration at Cairo would have this effect, and is not impossible. The National Constitutional Party, though broken as an organization, exists in the individuals who composed it, and in younger men of a new generation holding similar ideas. From among these a Ministry could be formed to set the Constitutional machine in motion under sympathetic English auspices, nor do I doubt that within a couple of years it would be found competent to conduct the business of the country without further military aid. It is by men of this party alone that Sir Evelyn Baring’s better work in Egypt is appreciated, and it is only to their hands that the work of continuing it could be reasonably entrusted.

Unfortunately for such a solution, the Constitutional idea finds many adverse influences under present conditions. The Khedive and the Turkish Party, which we have replaced in office, are wholly opposed to it. The European officials representing financial interests consider any form of popular government less manageable by them than the present absolute _régime_. And Sir Evelyn Baring would as little approve. Lastly—and this is perhaps the greatest obstacle—the French and foreign policy generally in the East desires nothing so little as to see a genuine resuscitation of political vitality among the native races. Under the present despotic yet feeble _régime_, France counts on succeeding England in controlling a weak prince and weaker people until such time as Egypt may fall to her share of the Ottoman spoils.

The attempt, therefore, if made at all, must be made honestly and with the thoroughgoing support of a sympathetic English representative, otherwise it cannot but fail.

(3) The third solution of placing Egypt under joint European guardianship and political control, is one against which, however it may recommend itself as a settlement of European differences, I feel bound to protest in native Egyptian interests.

Under English rule the native populations have been carefully protected, and their rights maintained against the encroachment of foreign colonists. But under any other European rule than England’s the reverse would certainly be the case. Egypt under French or Italian or joint European control would be exploited in whatever direction it was thought that revenue could be best increased. The fellahin now enjoying their hereditary lands would be speedily dispossessed and reduced to a practical slavery worse than any they have hitherto known, and as a race would probably be little by little displaced, demoralized, and extirpated.

As already remarked, the fellahin in 1882, alarmed at this very danger under the Anglo-French control, had asserted themselves politically and forced their rulers to grant them a means of self-defence in the form of a Constitutional Government. They had acquired the support of a large army with sufficient prestige to deter attack from more than one of the Powers, and they were backed by much sympathy east and west in their attempted reforms. Having for our own reasons suppressed all these possibilities of good for them, it would be a supreme injustice to overlook their interests now in the settlement to be made. To Mr. Gladstone especially, who is so largely responsible for the intervention, it should be a matter of honourable concern that this race and people should not perish.

(4) To withdraw the British garrison under present conditions and without a political settlement would be to court future difficulties.

Sir Evelyn Baring’s policy of the last five years, based as it has been on the view that Egypt was to remain a permanent annex of the Indian Empire, has practically destroyed all authority there but that of the English Occupation. Egypt’s present government is a mixed European, Armenian, and native bureaucracy controlled by half-a-dozen Englishmen with the British garrison at their back. No native government in any sense of authority exists. The Khedive, indolent and without initiative, is a mere dummy Prince. His Ministers, most of them Turks of advanced years, have been chosen for their pliancy rather than their ability. Their names have no weight, and their duties are little more than to sign without reading the documents placed before them. The great departments of Finance, Irrigation, War, and latterly Justice, are directed by Englishmen. The army and police have English superior officers; and even the Interior is, I believe, in process of being taken over by us.

This Anglicized condition of the Government could not long survive a withdrawal of the English troops. Even were it consented to by France, it would rapidly lose its authority. English control, though not unpopular with the fellahin, is disliked by every class in Cairo and the towns, and would at once be the object of attack, open or secret.

It is a mistake to suppose the Khedive attached to English influence, or to be depended on in any way to support it. On the contrary, while leaning on English support these last ten years he has deeply resented the usurpation of his authority, and the many indignities he has been made to accept. It is more than probable that seeing French influence in the ascendant, he would secretly favour the intrigues which would be begun against the English commands in the Army and the English Civil officials. A couple of years would thus see the downfall of the whole structure of English influence so elaborately reared. In the absence of any native political organization in the country its government would then become practically French; and this is doubtless what the French Foreign Office counts upon. I deprecate such a result both for English interests, and especially for the Egyptians for the reasons already given.

Such, I take it, are the various lines on which evacuation could be effected. If the Liberal Party is prepared with a definite plan by which Egypt could be provided with a satisfactory Government preparatory to withdrawing our troops under settlement with the Sultan and Powers, I think its leaders do well to press evacuation on public attention. But it is idle for them to entertain the idea that any such Government has been already formed, or even that a first step in that direction has been already taken. Sir Evelyn Baring’s policy is entirely one of remaining in Egypt, and each year sees more and more authority placed in English hands. Otherwise I see no alternative but to re-establish the Sultan’s military authority, or to brave the danger of European complications, as Lord Salisbury will doubtless do, and remain. An English protectorate would be a lesser evil to the Egyptians than any form of European Joint Control.

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

Paris, _Nov. 5_, 1891.

N.B. This memorandum was written for Lytton while staying at the Paris Embassy, but I am not sure whether he ever read it, for he was lying on his death bed. Edwin Egerton, however, then first Secretary and _chargé d’affaires_ of the Embassy, highly approved of it—so much so that he gave a copy of it to Blowitz, who sent it to the “Times,” where it may be found, though not quite in its full text.

W. S. B.