Chapter XI: Combat on Limestone Ridge (2)

Following this Major Gilmore was asked by the Court, whose members seem from first and to the end, to have had a very imperfect knowledge of what occurred on the field, and small wonder, as they shut themselves up against information, refusing to permit any one who could have directed their inquiries to hear what was said by others, except Lt.-Col. Booker, and peremptorily stopping explanatory observations of witnesses, when they attempted to lead the Court into a clear channel of information; Major Gilmore was asked: “When three companies of the 13th were sent out to relieve the Queen’s Own, had the movement been executed before the retreat was sounded?” ANS. “No; so far as my knowledge extends. Both lines of skirmishers, Rifles and 13th came in together.” The 13th had been out and their movement executed nearly, if not quite one hour. Their movement was to drive back the enemy. With the skirmishers of the Q. O. who remained in front they did it.

Major Gilmore could not see from his position at letter C on the map, where the right wing of the 13th were. He may have seen the rear of the left wing, in the orchard before him.

“Did you notice,” asked Lt.-Col. Booker, “men coming down the hill to our front at a double in front of the reserves crying, ‘cavalry’?” ANS. “No.”

Previous to this Court of Inquiry, the story had been that the cry of cavalry came along the Ridge road from direction of the brick house.—That story being given up it was tried, on Booker’s behalf, to fix the cry as coming down the hill from what he calls “our front,” but which was his right flank, for he had never changed front, at least his troops had not. That company was No. 1 of the 13th, coming in at a run in obedience to the _retire_ and _double_. They had heard no cry of cavalry.

No. 6 Company of the 13th being of the supports, the one nearest the Q. O. reserve, got over the rails, not in time for the square, but to form in rear of it. No other men in scarlet had reached that square then, except they with the colours and the orderlies of the 13th. But just as the Q. O. were being re-formed into column from the square, which had been imperfectly formed and but momentary, (for, says Major Gilmore, a sharp fire was then directed on it from the enemy’s front and left,) No. 1 Company reached the ground. They hurrying over the railings into the road, were about to form in rear of that reserve, now half square half column, when it broke. It broke through No. 6 of the 13th, and through No. 1. Capt. Grant was violently thrust against the fence rails on a heap of stones. He saw some of his men trodden down. Ensign Roy of No. 6 and some of his men were trodden down. And in that moment of emergency Lt.-Col. Booker called the orderly who held the horse, Major Skinner’s horse, and quickly vaulting into the saddle rode off rapidly to the rear. All this has been denied on behalf of Lt.-Col. Booker. Capt. Grant is a gentleman whose word is not to be doubted. He saw the act of riding away. Others saw the same. The companies of the 13th, which had been coming into the road at the call of _form square_, on seeing the reserve broken and hurriedly retreating continued their line of retreat across the fields towards garrison road. The companies at the front which had not heard the bugle call to retire, observed their supports gone, and retreated along the ridge road. When arrived where the reserve had been there was no reserve, no square, no column, no Queen’s Own.

Bugler Clarke says Booker ordered and he obeyed to sound the halt.—It was sounded, but most say who heard it, rather faintly, bugler and colonel being both in a hurry. The Court of Inquiry makes one witness, Mr. Urquart assistant editor of the Hamilton _Spectator_, and who was in the ranks of the 13th to say:

“Several attempts by officers of the 13th and the Rifles were made
to rally or re-form the men. I noticed Colonel Booker and Adjutant
Henery do this, and Ensign Armstrong who carried the colours.”

Mr. Urquart did not say this. The Court made several answers into one; thereby placing Booker where he was not. Adjutant Henery was not where Booker was. Mr. Armstrong was with the colours, but Booker was not there. Mr. Urquart was in No. 4 Company, which under Lieut. Routh was one of the supports at the head of the orchard to the right front of the square C. “What made your Company retreat?” asked the Court. “We retreated because the bugle sounded retreat; and we were also ordered to retreat by Lieut. Routh the officer in command of our Company, who afterwards said it must have been a mistake as it should have been the advance, and ordered us to halt and front—and we halted and fronted accordingly.” Then, as the skirmishers came in rapidly in obedience to the call of _double_, they all retreated. There was no reserve to go to, it had melted away. No. 4 Company and No. 5 under Captain Askin again halted and formed at the corner of garrison and Ridge roads. By that time also Major Skinner, Adjutant Henery and they who had been in the most advanced front got up; all tried their utmost to re-organize a force to withstand the enemy now steadily though cautiously coming in pursuit. Lieut. Gibson of No. 4 saw Adjutant Henery near the log house (see map) at a tree, assembling men around him; also Major Skinner near the same spot endeavoring to arrest and re-form the retreating current, which was then a mixture of green and red uniforms. He saw Captain Davis of the York rifles making efforts to organize a force near Mrs. Ryerson’s house. Major Skinner had partially succeeded in forming a red line across the road with fixed bayonets directed against the retreat. But his men were overborne by a rush from behind. Lieut. Routh was there shot through the body and carried into one of the houses. The University and Highland companies were then streaming along, having left several dead and wounded on the track of their retreat. Brave spirits all. Youths of fair promise cut down in the morning of life, who an hour before had, with the rest, driven the invading strangers before them, now destroyed on a retreat which should never have occurred, for which there was no cause, the culpable author of which was away on horseback to the front, among the leaders of the panic.

He denies, and loud denials have been made on his behalf that he went away on horseback. Captain Grant saw him ride off, when the square and the column dissolved. The Revd. Mr. Inglis who, as a minister of religion accompanied the 13th from Hamilton, and witnessed as much of the action as lay between Garrison road and concession road, and was now on the ammunition waggon with Q. S. Stoneman, says; “I saw Colonel Booker on the horse (Major Skinner’s) coming towards Ridgeway.” “Oh no,” said Colonel Booker to the Revd. gentleman when before the Court of Inquiry, “I was on foot, not on horseback.” But Mr. Inglis was not mistaken, and he is a witness not to be overborne by such questionable obliquity of an inculpated party. Lieut. McKinnon, Caledonia company, said “Col. Booker was on horseback when he came to Ridgeway.”

But, “Colonel Booker may have hastened to the front of the retreat to intercept it.” Did he? What in this supposition comes of the want of evidence of his trying to stem the panic which he had made? What comes of facts to the contrary, showing that he not only hurried away himself but prevented others from arresting the retreat? Here are facts which would have been given in evidence to the Court of Inquiry, which sat at Hamilton in July, had its members summoned witnesses whose names were furnished to them, but whom they did not call. A volunteer officer who commanded a company in the action wrote to Hamilton for the information of the officers of the 13th. He said; “Have Lieut. Davis of York Rifles, and Capt. Jackson of Caledonia Rifles summoned, witnesses as to the language and action of Col. Booker upon the 2nd ult. I will give you a resume of what they will swear. Mr. Davis stopped the Colonel (Booker) and begged him to halt, and rally the men as they knew him. The reply he got was: ‘We must go to the lake shore.’ Some distance farther on he came up to Captain Jackson’s company which was the rear guard. He asked, ‘what company, and who commands?’ and received the reply as above (that it was rear guard, Caledonia company, commanded by Capt. Jackson). Then Colonel Booker said: ‘Save yourselves men, the Fenians are after you!’ The company broke at once, until stopped by their Captain.”

The writer continued: “I have not the slightest ill-feeling, or wish, for Col. Booker. On the contrary I feel heartily sorry for the man; but I do not think it fair that the good name and fame of the officers and men of a good regiment should be impugned, much less sacrificed, to shield the incompetence of any man. I think I am only doing my duty as a man who loves his country, and as a volunteer who knows the stuff there is in the force, if I can throw any light upon the cause of the disaster of the 2nd of June.”

The gentlemen indicated by this officer were not called, though their names, on behalf of the slandered 13th, were furnished to the Court of Inquiry. As was also the name of Captain McGrath, Manager of the Welland Railway, whose important statement will be read presently. At the end of August while these pages are preparing for the press, I am in receipt of a letter; from which the following extract is made in reference to the passages just quoted: “Had Lieut. Davis been called before the court he would have given his evidence without any malice, fear, or favour.”

“Must go to the lake shore.” Could not halt then. The lake shore, from the point where this fugitive speech was made, Mrs. Ryerson’s house or thereabout, was eight, or ten, or more miles away according to the road he might take. By the road he took it was twelve miles away.

Major Gilmore says (C. of In.) he could have at any time halted and gathered around him a few hundreds of men, but deemed the effort of no use. He saw officers at different points of the road “exciting themselves frantically” to arrest the retreat. Such were his words, but he was more cool and allowed things to happen as fate and confusion without a commander would have it. Lieut. Arthur of the Q. O. has been reported as grandly stemming the tide of retreat, in its very front, at Ridgeway. He may have been one of those who “frantically excited themselves.” A more practical question, is; how did Lieut. Arthur get there so soon? Mr. Arthur a civilian gave evidence to the Court of Inquiry somewhat exculpatory of Booker. But it is not forgotten at Hamilton that this same Mr. Arthur returned from the field of action, where he had been a non-combatant, on the evening of 2nd of June, and at the railway depot was the first to give intimation that Booker had broken down as commander and made a fool of himself.

Men of the 13th called to mind on the line of retreat, that when Booker was largely pompous at the Hamilton drill-shed on the previous morning he said, “I know you will follow me.” They followed, but only a few could get sight of him.

Captains Grant, Askin, Ferguson, Lieut. Gibson, and other officers of the 13th got sight of him half a mile past Ridgeway. A considerable force was then halted on the road. They expected that a stand would be made, the ground being advantageous for resistance, and fighting. Booker was heard calling for somebody to show the road to Port Colborne. To a farmer looking on, he trotted up, then returning to the imperfect column cried “Fours right, quick march!” And so the return to Colborne was continued in that disorder which incompetency had initiated, and aggravated. Sometimes he was seen riding, again walking, and trotting on foot in the semblance of a man crazed in the head. At Sherkston, five miles west of Ridgeway, they got a railway train to Colborne. It took them at two trips.

At some point on the road Booker turned to observe the dislocated column and accosted Sergeant Gibbons whom I have named as affirming with others that the bugle calls of _retire_ and _double_ gave origin to the retreat. This general of brigade, who had been so grand yesterday, that “he looked and talked as if able to command fifty thousand men,” and who at Port Colborne had asserted his seniority and displaced the officer who came in command from Toronto, now murmured in whining tone, and broken speech; “Sergeant, I suppose this is not your first engagement with an enemy? It is mine.” He gave the horse to carry a sick man, and on this his apologists form a claim for magnanimity. It would have been the attitude of a General to remain mounted, especially on the retreat, that his person might be observed, his place known, his command heard. A true soldier, while modest, mild, keenly perceptive that necessary equipments were present with his force, while days were pleasant and peaceful, would have now risen with the crisis, firm in his saddle, firm in mind, lofty with the great emergency, to retrieve order out of confusion.

But Brigadier-General Booker straddled on foot a little while, then got on the horse a little while, got down again, and again ambled on foot, seeking sociality with the bugler, the groom, the sergeant, abjectly mumbling that he had never previously been in battle; then getting hold of a Lieutenant’s arm said; “I am a failure; I have failed; I acknowledge my failure.” And to a Captain uttering words to the same effect. And at Port Colborne continuing his abject confession to others.

Generous minds might have forgiven him after his miserable confessions however much they deplored the unhappy consequences of his incompetency, triumph to the enemy, derision of the Province by Americans; wild invention of calumnies against the 13th battalion, because he, its Lt.-Col., had involved the Q. O. Rifles in discredit. In face of all this his subordinate officers and battalion might have pitied the man while they deplored his military failure. But with a feeling of safety to his own person, he began to retract his confessions of incapacity, and to give currency to accusations of blame on his troops, and proclaim himself a martyr. At Colborne a report of the morning’s work was written for the authorities, imperfect, and untrue. He did not seek the assistance of any officer of the 13th all of whom could have informed him of as much of the action as they engaged in the front could know. He did not employ his own orderly room clerk to write for him. He got a person of the Q. O. to write, in order to satisfy Major Gilmore; and even then the Major gave only a general assent to the report. “Yes, its general tenor was correct, and I assented to it.” But Major Gilmore was not quite exact about it himself according to his own statement. The report said the telegram arrived at 9.30 after an hour and a half of hot fighting. That was not true. It spoke of driving the enemy from their rifle pits. There were no rifle pits. It said we were in a cul de sac. There was no cul de sac. All was open to the front except intervening woods. The enemy had retreated through the woods. The report said nothing of the 13th having as a battalion advanced from garrison road across fields and fences half a mile, the enemy retiring before their beautiful red line, and then across concession road; they engaged in fight one hour, except the supports lying within 150 yards of the skirmish line, which however were actually advancing to the relief of their right wing when the retire stopped them; while most of that _one hour_ the Q. O. were in reserve, two companies on the right front, and one on the extreme left front only excepted. On the contrary Lt.-Col. Booker caused a telegram to be sent to his superiors reporting the 13th as demoralized, and unfit for duty. It has been denied by himself and friends that he did so. But it is known on the highest railway authority that such messages with his name appended, went over the wires. A Hamilton newspaper gave currency to that phrase, demoralization. Two days after, Lieut.-Colonel Booker visited the reporter, and besought him to retract the imputation, saying “You know it was not I who said demoralized; it was that —— rascal Gilmore.”

THE SQUARE. _Ques._, by Lieut.-Col. Booker to Major Gilmore. “Were you satisfied with my conduct on the field?” _Ans._ “Col. Booker asked me the same question in Port Colborne, and I now give him the same answer that I did then, which was that I could see nothing in his conduct to disapprove of except with regard to the formation of the square, which I thought at that time was a mistake and I think so still.”

_Ques._ By Court. “Who gave the order to form square?” _Ans._ “Lieut.-Col. Booker gave the caution to look out for Cavalry, and I gave the command to form square.”

AMMUNITION OF Q. O. The paragraph beginning on page 77, and ending on page 78, in this chapter is inaccurate as respects the alleged non-supply of ammunition; but not as regards the omission to post sentries on the arrival of the Q. O. at Colborne. The misstatement made on authority which I trusted was unfortunate, yet the ammunition served at Toronto was inadequate to go into a locality near the presence of an enemy. The following evidence touches this highly important question:

_Ques._ To Alex Muir, Q. O. “How many rounds of ammunition had been issued to you?” _Ans._ “I received 5 rounds at Toronto before leaving; and 30 rounds at Port Colborne. I had 35 rounds.”

To _Ques._ of the Court to Major Gilmore; _Ans._ “No. 5 company were armed, about forty of them, with Spencer rifles, and for those rifles they had under thirty rounds each man; the remainder of the company were armed with long Enfields. The whole regiment had on average forty rounds of ammunition per man.” _Q._ by the court: “How long were they under fire when the right wing of the 13th were advanced to their relief?” _Ans._ “I could not form any idea as to the time.” Major Skinner, Adj. Henery, Capts. Askin, Grant, Watson, Ferguson, Lieut. Gibson, Private Urquart, Editor of Spectator, all say that the 13th were engaged about one hour.

DRILL OF THE Q. O. In reply to questions from the Court, Major Gilmore said;

“They were as a rule partially drilled, some men undrilled.
Recruits are joining every week. All the available men, drilled
and undrilled, were in the field. With the exception of one or two
days in May when the whole battalion was out skirmishing, I am
satisfied that half of the battalion had never fired a shot,” (with
blank cartridge). _Ques._ “What proportion had not fired with ball
cartridge?” _Ans._ “The proportion was about the same; one half.”
_Ques._ “What proportion of the regiment was composed of lads
under 20 years of age?” _Ans._ “I should say more than half the
regiment.” _Ques._ “Did you observe any difference in the demeanour
of the lads and the older soldiers going into action?” _Ans._
“No. Each were equally cool. I may state here that this was the
first occasion in which the whole regiment had the opportunity to
skirmish as a battalion. I also wish to state that I saw the right
wing of the 13th extend and advance in skirmishing order, and that
nothing could exceed the steadiness and regularity with which they
advanced.”

LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT LIMESTONE RIDGE.

TORONTO Q. O. RIFLES.

KILLED.—Ensign Malcolm McEachern, No. 5 Company, Sergeant H.
Matheson, No. 1, Private Christopher Alderson, No. 7, Private M.
Defries, No. 3, Private W. F. Tempest, No. 9, Private William
Smith, No. 2, Private J. H. Mewburn, No. 9, Private M. McKenzie,
No. 9, Corporal F. Lackie, No. 2.

WOUNDED.—Captain J. B. Boustead, No. 3 Company, Lieut. J. H.
Beaven, No. 3, Lieut. W. C. Campbell, No. 6, Ensign Fahey, No. 1,
Color Sergeant Forbes McHardy, No. 10, Private C. F. Bell, No. 5,
Private W. Vandersmissen, No. 9, Private Kingsford, No. 9, Private
John White, No. 10, Private Paul Robbins, No. 6, Private Thomas
Oulster, No. 1, Private William Thompson, No. 2, Private Charles
Winter, No. 3, Private Colin Forsyth, No. 10, Private Edward Copp,
No. 5, Private J. H. Rutherford, No. 6, Private E. J. Patterson,
No. 9, Private Joseph Lugsden, No. 4, Private Alexander Muir, No.
10, Private E. T. Paul, No. 9, Sergeant William Foster, No. 7,
Color-Sergeant John Tuck, York Rifles. Private Robert Cranston,
ditto.

HAMILTON 13TH—WOUNDED.

Private Edwin Hilders, No. 1 Company, Private S. Dallas, No.
3, Private J. G. Powell, No. 3, Private James Stewart, No. 3,
Lieut. Routh, No. 4, Private John Donnely, No. 5, Private Richard
Pentecost, No. 3, Private McKenzie, No. 4.

Private Morrison died of fatigue. Several suffered from sun stroke.

Welland Field Battery, at Fort Erie Village. Wounded: Capt. King,
leg amputated. Sergeant Bradley, and several others very severely.

FENIANS KILLED.—Nine bodies found on Limestone Ridge, one at French Creek. Several said to have been found dead near Fort Erie, and some bodies carried to Buffalo. Most of the wounded were carried away; two were brought prisoners to Colborne Hospital.

LIEUT.-COL. BOOKER’S REPORT OF THE COMBAT AT LIMESTONE RIDGE.

PORT COLBORNE, June 2, 1866.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that, in accordance with
instructions received from Colonel Peacocke, through Capt. Akers,
I proceeded by train at 5 a. m. to-day to Ridgway station on the
Buffalo and Lake Huron R. R., with the Queen’s Own, of Toronto,
Major Gilmore, say 480 men of all ranks; the York Rifles, Capt.
Davis; the Caledonia Rifles, Capt. Jackson; and the 13th Battalion
of Hamilton—together about 360 men—total of all ranks, say 840 men,
in order to form a junction with Col. Peacocke, at Stevensville, at
9 to 9.30 a. m. On arriving at Ridgway, I sent the Great Western
Railway train away; and as I could not obtain a horse or waggon
in the place for the conveyance of the force, I was compelled to
leave without the stores, and sent them back to Port Colborne at a
little before 8 a. m. We were feeling our way on the Stevensville
road, and were about three miles from that village, when our
advanced guard felt the enemy—Major Gilmore extended the Queen’s
Own in skirmishing order, in admirable style—the men advancing in
good spirits. They were supported and relieved, as required, by
the 13th Battalion of Hamilton and the Rifle companies from York
and Caledonia. After Major Gilmore had expended much ammunition,
he reported to me that his ammunition was failing. At 9.30, after
being engaged under a hot fire for an hour and a half, I observed
the enemy throwing back his right and reinforcing his left flank.
I immediately ordered up two companies in support, to counteract
the movement. At this moment I received a telegram by the hands
of Mr. Stovin, Welland Railway, on the field, informing me that
Col. Peacocke could not leave Chippewa before 7 o’clock, instead
of 5 a. m., the hour named by Capt. Akers on his behalf. The enemy
was strongly posted in the woods on the west of the garrison
road, the road forming the entrance as it were to a _cul de sac_.
We outflanked him, when he brought up his centre reserves and
outflanked us. We drove them, in the first place, over a mile, and
held possession of the rifle pits. A cry of cavalry from the front,
and the retreat of a number of men in our centre on the reserves,
caused me to form a square and prepare for cavalry. This mistake
originated from relieved skirmishers doubling back. I immediately
re-formed column, and endeavoured to deploy to the right. A panic
here seized our men, and I could not bring them again to the front.
I regret to say we have lost several valuable officers and men. I
estimate the strength of the enemy as greater than ours; and, from
the rapid firing, they were evidently armed with repeating rifles.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. BOOKER,
Lieut.-Col. Com. Vol. Militia.