Chapter XL (2)

After giving full weight to all the facts here set forth--and certainly each one enters as a factor into the question of man's freedom--the Book of Mormon doctrine stands true. There is such a quality of man's mind. He is conscious of it. Conscious of the power of deliberation; conscious of the existence of moral obligation pressing upon him; conscious of his own weakness that makes him feel unable to rise to the high level of his full duty; conscious of his need of external assistance; conscious of his will being made stronger by appealing to the counsel of his friends, and appealing to God for help through prayer; conscious of the fact that he is in different states of moral feeling at different times, owing, doubtless, to this appeal that he makes to external aids--yet, in the last analysis of it all, he remains conscious of the fact that what he does, not only can be, but is, a self-determining act, and he remains conscious of the power that he could do otherwise if he would. This consciousness and this freedom are the most stupendous facts in human existence, and upon their reality--upon their truth--depends all the glory of that existence. Arriving here the outlook concerning man's possibilities for the future is immense. Sir Oliver Lodge speaking of man, after arriving at this point in his development, the attainment of consciousness and free will, recently said:

On this planet man is the highest outcome of the process so far (i.
e., the process of development), and is, therefore, the highest
representation of Deity that here exists. Terribly imperfect as
yet, because so recently evolved, he is nevertheless a being which
has at length attained to consciousness and free-will, a being
unable to be coerced by the whole force of the universe, against
his will; a spark of the divine Spirit, therefore, never more to be
quenched. Open still to awful horrors, to agonies of remorse, but
to floods of joy also, he persists, and his destiny is largely in
his own hands; he may proceed up or down, he may advance towards
a magnificent ascendency, he may recede towards depths of infamy.
He is not coerced: he is guided and influenced, but he is free to
choose. The evil and the good are necessary correlatives; freedom
to choose the one involves freedom to choose the other. [46]

This is the doctrine then of the Book of Mormon: the existence in man as a quality of his mind or spirit freedom and power to will, to determine for himself his course. He may choose good or evil. The freedom of righteousness, or the bondage of sin. If man finds his will strengthened in favor of choosing the good by appealing for help to external aids, to God through prayer, and that help comes in the form of the grace of God, and becomes a factor in helping man into a state of righteousness, it should be remembered that the act of appealing for external help was the exercise of man's free agency. He willed to do good and sought help to carry out his determination; and the assistance of the grace of God so obtained in no way operates to destroy the freedom of man's will. In concluding this subject, it may be said that the Book of Mormon in an authoritative way settles conclusively the great theological question of the free agency of man.

W. H. Mallack, in his work on "The Reconstruction of Religious Belief" (1905), has a most fascinating chapter on human freedom [47] in which he illustrates on broad lines the universal though unconscious assumption of the fact of human freedom in both literature and history. Of the characters created by the great poets, he remarks: "They interest us as born to freedom, and not naturally slaves, and they pass before us like kings in a Roman triumph. Once let us suppose these characters to be mere puppets of heredity and circumstance, and they and the works that deal with them lose all intelligible content, and we find ourselves confused and wearied with the fury of an idiot's tale." On the criticism of historical characters he says: "All this praising and blaming is based on the assumption that the person praised or blamed is the originator of his own actions, and not a mere transmitter of forces." And further, all debating on the value of historical characters would be meaningless, "if it were not for the inveterate belief that a man's significance for men resides primarily in what he makes of himself, not in what he has been made by an organism derived from his parents, and the various external stimuli to which it has automatically responded." Our author also points out the truth that forgiveness itself among men (and he might well have extended his argument to the forgiveness God imparts to men also) assumes the fact of human freedom--else what is there to be forgiven! The believer in freedom says to the offending party, "I forgive you for the offense of not having done your best." The assumption is that the offender could have refrained from giving one offense--he had freedom and power to have done otherwise. One not believing in human freedom would say to the offending party: "I neither forgive nor blame you; for, although you have done your worst, your worst was your best also" & having no freedom, he was under no obligation; his action was indifferent, neither good nor bad; there was no blame or praise possible; he is neither a subject for mercy nor justice to act upon.

In the course of the discussion to which attention is called, our author has contributed an idea worthy of all acceptation and is valuable for the reason that it goes outside the beaten paths followed in the free will controversy: "When most people talk of believing in moral freedom, they mean by freedom a power which exhausts itself in acts of choice between a series of alternative courses; but, important though such choice, as a function of freedom is, the root idea of freedom lies deeper still. It consists in the idea, not that a man is, as a personality, the first and the sole cause of his choice between alternative courses, but that he is, in a true, even if in a qualified sense, the first cause of what he does, or feels, or is, whether this involves an act of choice, or consists of an unimpeded impulse. Freedom of choice between alternatives is the consequence of this primary faculty. It is the form in which the faculty is most noticeably manifested; but it is not the primary faculty of personal freedom itself."

I believe this fact in relation to man's freedom; that it is a quality capable of manifesting itself in other modes than choice between alternatives; that it may project an unimpeded line of conduct, and yet in this world its chief manifestations are in a choice between things opposite and we shall see later, according to the Book of Mormon, that conditions in this world are so ordained in the existence of opposites--antinomies--that man may exercise this quality of freedom in the choice of alternatives.

IX.

_The Atonement._

After giving an account of the fall of man, substantially as found in Genesis, the Nephite prophet Alma, is represented in the Book of Mormon as teaching his son Corianton the doctrine of the atonement, as follows:

###_Alma's Doctrine of Atonement_.

And now we see by this, that our first parents were cut off, both
temporally and spiritually, from the presence of the Lord; and thus
we see they became subjects to follow after their own will.

Now, behold, it was not expedient that man should be reclaimed
from this temporal death, for that would destroy the great plan of
happiness;

Therefore, as the soul could never die, and the fall had brought
upon all mankind a spiritual death as well as a temporal; that is,
they were cut off from the presence of the Lord, it was expedient
that mankind should be reclaimed from this spiritual death;

Therefore, as they had become carnal, sensual, and devilish, by
nature, this probationary state became a state for them [in which]
to prepare; it became a preparatory state.

And now remember, my son, if it were not for the plan of redemption
(laying it aside), as soon as they were dead, their souls were
miserable, being cut off from the presence of the Lord.

And now there was no means to reclaim men from this fallen state
which man had brought upon himself, because of his own disobedience;

Therefore, according to justice, the plan of redemption could not
be brought about, only on conditions, of repentance of men in this
probationary state; yea, this preparatory state; for except it were
for these conditions, mercy could not take effect except it should
destroy the work of justice. Now the work of justice could not be
destroyed; if so, God would cease to be God.

And thus we see that all mankind were fallen, and they were in the
grasp of justice; yea, the justice of God, which consigned them
forever to be cut off from his presence.

And now the plan of mercy could not be brought about, except an
atonement should be made; therefore God himself atoneth for the
sins of the world, to bring about the plan of mercy, to appease the
demands of justice, that God might be a perfect, just God, and a
merciful God also.

Now repentance could not come unto men, except there were a
punishment, which also was eternal as the life of the soul should
be, affixed opposite to the plan of happiness, which was as eternal
also as the life of the soul.

Now, how could a man repent, except he should sin? How could he
sin, if there was no law, how could there be a law, save there was
a punishment?

Now there was a punishment affixed, and a just law given, which
brought remorse of conscience unto man.

Now, if there was no law given--if a man murdered he should die,
would he be afraid he would die if he should murder?

And also, if there was no law given against sin, men would not be
afraid to sin.

And if there was no law given if men sinned, what could justice do,
or mercy either; for they would have no claim upon the creature?

But there is a law given, and a punishment affixed, and a
repentance granted; which repentance, mercy claimeth; otherwise
justice claimeth the creature, and executeth the law, and the law
inflicteth the punishment; if not so, the works of justice would be
destroyed, and God would cease to be God.

But God ceaseth not to be God, and mercy claimeth the penitent, and
mercy cometh because of the atonement; and the atonement bringeth
to pass the resurrection of the dead; and the resurrection of the
dead bringeth back men into the presence of God; and thus they are
restored into his presence, to be judged according to their works;
according to the law and justice;

For, behold, justice exerciseth all his demands, and also mercy
claimeth all which is her own; and thus, none but the truly
penitent are saved.

What! do ye suppose that mercy can rob justice? I say unto you,
nay! Not one whit. If so, God would cease to be God.

And thus God bringeth about his great and eternal purposes, which
were prepared from the foundation of the world. And thus cometh
about the salvation and the redemption of men, and also their
destruction and misery;

Therefore, O my son, whosoever will come, may come, and partake of
the waters of life freely; and whosoever will not come, the same is
not compelled to come; but in the last day, it shall be restored
unto him, according to his deeds. [48]

Summarizing the foregoing we have the following as the result: The effect of Adam's transgression was to destroy the harmony of things in this world. As a consequence of his fall man is banished from the presence of God--a spiritual death takes place and man becomes sensual, devilish, unholy, is cursed, we say, with a strong inclination to sinfulness. Man is also made subject to a temporal death, a separation of the spirit and body. Much might have been gained by this union of his spirit with his body of flesh and bone could it have been immortal, but that is now lost, by this temporal death, this separation of spirit and body. These conditions would have remained eternally fixed as the result of the operation of law--inexorable law, called "the justice of God," admitting of nothing else; for the law was given to eternal beings and by them violated, and man is left in the grasp of eternal justice, with all its consequences upon his head and the head of his progeny. And the justice of the law admitted the conditions, admitted that the penalties affixed should be effective, but this is justice--stern, unrelenting justice; justice untempered by mercy. But mercy must in some way be made to reach man, yet in a way also that will not destroy justice; for justice must be maintained, else all is confusion--ruin. If justice be destroyed--if justice be not maintained--. "God will cease to be God." Hence mercy may not be introduced into the divine economy of this world without a vindication of the broken law by some means or other, for divine laws as well as human ones are mere nullities if their penalties be not in force.

The penalty of the law then, transgressed by Adam, must be executed, or else an adequate atonement must be made for man's transgression. This the work of the Christ. He makes the atonement. He comes to earth and assumes responsibility for this transgression of law, and gathers up into his own soul all the suffering due to the transgression of the law by Adam. All the suffering due to individual transgression of law--the direct consequences of the original transgression--from Adam to the end of the world. The burden of us all is laid upon him. He will bear our griefs and carry our sorrows. He will be wounded for our transgressions, and be bruised for our iniquities. The chastisement of our peace will be upon him; on him is laid the iniquity of us all; by his stripes shall we be healed. [49] That is to say, having gathered into himself all the suffering and sorrows due to all the sinning that shall be in the world, he is able to dictate the terms upon which man may lay hold of mercy--by which mercy may heal his wounds--and these terms he names in the conditions of the gospel, the acceptance of which brings complete redemption. The Christ brings to pass the resurrection of the dead. The spirit and the body are eternally re-united; the temporal death--one of the effects of Adam's trangression--is overcome. There is no more physical death; the "soul" [50]--the eternally united spirit and body are now to be immortal as spirit alone before was immortal. The man so immortal is brought back into the presence of God, and if he has accepted the terms of the gospel by which he is redeemed from the effects of his own, as well as from Adam's transgression, his spiritual death is ended, and henceforth he may be spiritually immortal as well as physically immortal--eternally with God in an atmosphere of righteousness--the spiritual death is overcome.

Such I make out to be the Book of Mormon doctrine of the atonement, and the redemption of man through the gospel.

X.

__The Doctrine of Opposite Existences_._

Closely connected with the doctrine of the agency of man, the purpose of his existence and his redemption from the fallen state, is what I shall call the Book of Mormon doctrine of "opposite existences," what the scholastics would call "antinomies." The doctrine as stated in the Book of Mormon--the time of its publication--1830--remembered, especially when taken in connection with the consequences it supposes in the event of abolishing the existence of evil, is strikingly original and philosophically profound; and reaches a depth of thought beyond all that could be imagined as possible with Joseph Smith or any of those associated with him in bringing forth the Book of Mormon.

The statement of the doctrine in question occurs in a discourse of Lehi's on the subject of the atonement. The aged prophet represents happiness or misery as growing out of the acceptance or rejection of the atonement of the Christ, and adds that the misery consequent upon its rejection is in opposition to the happiness which is affixed to its acceptance:

For it must needs be [he continues] that there is an opposition
in all things. If [it were] not so * * * righteousness could not
be brought to pass; neither wickedness; neither holiness nor
misery; neither good nor bad. Wherefore [that is, if this fact
of opposites did not exist] all things must needs be a compound
in one; wherefore, if it [the sum of things] should be one body,
it must needs remain as dead, having no life, neither death, nor
corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense
nor insensibility. Wherefore, it must needs have been created for a
thing of naught; wherefore there would have been no purpose in the
end of its creation. Wherefore, this thing [i. e., the absence of
opposite existences which Lehi is supposing] must needs destroy the
wisdom of God, and his eternal purposes; and also the power, and
the mercy, and the justice of God. [51]

The inspired man even goes beyond this, and makes existences themselves depend upon this law of opposites:

And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no
sin. If ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is
no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness, there is no
happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness, there
be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not there is
no God. And if there is no God, we are not, neither the earth: for
there could have been no creation of things; neither to act nor to
be acted upon, wherefore, all things must have vanished away. [52]

This may be regarded as a very bold setting forth of the doctrine of antinomies, and yet I think the logic of it, and the inevitableness of the conclusion unassailable. In his work, "Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs" S. Baring-Gould says:

The world presents us with a picture of unity and distinction;
unity without uniformity, and distinction without antagonism. * * *
Everywhere, around us and within us, we see that radical antinomy.
The whole astronomic order resolves itself into attraction and
repulsion--a centripetal and a centrifugal force; the chemical
order into the antinomy of positive and negative electricity,
decomposing substances and recomposing them. The whole visible
universe presents the antinomy of light and darkness, movement and
repose, force and matter, heat and cold, the one and the multiple.
The order of life is resumed in the antinomy of the individual
and the species, the particular and the general; the order of our
sentiments in that of happiness and sorrow, pleasure and pain; that
of our conceptions in the antinomy of the ideal and the real; that
of our will in the conditions of activity and passivity. [53]

The existence of evil in the world has ever been a vexed problem for both theologians and philosophers, and has led to the wildest speculations imaginable. It will be sufficient here, however, if I note the recognition by high authority of the difficulties involved in the problem. Of those who have felt and expressed these difficulties, I know of no one who has done so in better terms than Henry L. Mansel in his contribution to the celebrated course of "Bampton Lecturers," in "The Limits of Religious Thought" (1858), in the course of which he says:

The real riddle of existence--the problem which confounds all
philosophy, aye, and all religion, too, so far as religion is a
thing of man's reason, is the fact that evil exists at all; not
that it exists for a longer or a shorter duration. Is not God
infinitely wise and holy and powerful now? and does not sin exist
along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power? Is God to
become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil
be annihilated to make room for his perfections to expand? Does the
infinity of his eternal nature ebb and flow with every increase
or diminution in the sum of human guilt and misery? Against this
immovable barrier of the existence of evil, the waves of philosophy
have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birthday of human
thought, and have retired broken and powerless, without displacing
the minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, without softening one
feature of its dark and rugged surface. [54]

This writer then proceeds by plain implication to make it clear that religion no more than philosophy has solved the problem of the existence of evil:

But this mystery [i. e., the existence of evil], vast and
inscrutable as it is, is but one aspect of a more general
problem; it is but the moral form of the ever-recurring secret
of the Infinite. How the Infinite and the finite, in any form of
antagonism or other relation, can exist together; how infinite
power can coexist with finite activity; how infinite wisdom can
coexist with finite contingency; how infinite goodnesss can coexist
with finite evil; how the Infinite can exist in any manner without
exhausting the universe of reality--this is the riddle which
Infinite Wisdom alone can solve, the problem whose very conception
belongs only to that Universal Knowledge which fills and embraces
the Universe of Being. [55]

In the presence of these reflections it cannot be doubted, then, that the existence of moral evil is one of the world's serious difficulties; and any solution which the Book of Mormon may give of it that is really helpful, will be a valuable contribution to the world's enlightenment, a real revelation--a ray of light from the "inner fact of things." Let us consider if it does this.

In view of the utterances of the Book of Mormon already quoted I am justified in saying that evil as well as good is among the eternal things. Its existence did not begin with its appearance on our earth. Evil existed even in heaven; for Lucifer and many other spirits sinned there; "rebelled against heaven's matchless King," waged war, and were thrust out into the earth for their transgression. [56]

Evil is not a created quality. [57] It has always existed as the back ground of good. It is as eternal as goodnesss; it is as eternal as law; it is as eternal as the agency of intelligence. Sin, which is evil active, is transgression of law; [58] and so long as the agency of intelligences and law have existed, the possibility of the transgression of law has existed; and as the agency of intelligences and law have eternally existed, so, too, evil has existed eternally, either potentially or active and will always so exist.

Evil may not be referred to God for its origin. He is not its creator, it is one of those independent existences that is _uncreate_, and stands in the category of qualities of eternal things. While not prepared to accept the doctrine of some philosophers that "good and evil are two sides of one thing." [59] I am prepared to believe that evil is a necessary antithesis to good, and essential to the realization of the harmony of the universe. "The good cannot exist without the antithesis of the evil--the foil on which it produces itself and becomes known." [60] As remarked by Orlando J. Smith, "Evil exists in the balance of natural forces. * * * * * * It is also the background of good, the incentive to good, and the trial of good, without which good could not be. As the virtue of courage could not exist without the evil of danger, and as the virtue of sympathy could not exist without the evil of suffering, so no other virtue could exist without its corresponding evil. In a world without evil--if such a world be really conceivable, all men would have perfect health, perfect intelligence, and perfect morals. No one could gain or impart information, each one's cup of knowledge being full. The temperature would stand forever at seventy degrees, both heat and cold being evil. There could be no progress, since progress is the _overcoming of evil_. A world without evil would be as toil without exertion, as light without darkness, as a battle with no antagonist. It would be a world without meaning." [61] Or, as Lehi puts it, in still stronger terms--after describing what conditions would be without the existence of opposites:--

Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore,
if it [i. e. the sum of things] should be one body [i. e.,
of one character--so called good without evil] it must needs
remain as dead, having no life, neither death, nor corruption,
nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor
insensibility. Wherefore, it [the sum of things] must needs have
been created for a thing of naught; wherefore there would have been
no purpose in the end of its creation. Wherefore, this thing [the
absence of opposites] must needs destroy the wisdom of God, and
his eternal purposes; and also, the power, and the mercy, and the
justice of God. [62]

As there can be no good without the antinomy of evil, so there can be no evil without its antinomy, or antithesis--good. The existence of one implies the existence of the other; and, conversely, the non-existence of the latter would imply the non-existence of the former. It is from this basis that Lehi reached the conclusion that either his doctrine of antinomies, or the existence of opposites, is true, or else there are no existences. That is to say--to use his own words--

If ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no
sin. If ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is
no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness, there be no
happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness, there
be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not, there is
no God, and if there is no God, we are not, neither the earth; for
there could have been no creation of things, neither to act nor to
be acted upon: wherefore, all things must have vanished away. [63]

But as things have not vanished away, as there are real existences, the whole series of things for which he contends are verities. "For there is a God," he declares, "and he hath created all things, both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them is; both things to act, and things to be acted upon." [64]

After arriving at this conclusion, Lehi, proceeding from the general to the particular, deals with the introduction of this universal antinomy into our world as follows:

To bring about his [God's] eternal purposes in the end of man,
after he had created our first parents * * * it must needs be that
there was an opposition; even the forbidden fruit in opposition
to the tree of life; the one being sweet and the other bitter;
Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for
himself. Wherefore man could not act for himself, save it should
be that he was enticed by the one or the other. [65] And I, Lehi,
according to the things which I have read, must needs suppose that
an angel of God, according to that which is written, had fallen
from heaven; wherefore he became a devil, having sought that which
was evil before God. And because he had fallen from heaven, and
had become miserable forever, he said unto Eve, yea, even that old
serpent, who is the devil, who is the father of all lies; wherefore
he said, Partake of the forbidden fruit, and ye shall not die, but
ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil. And after Adam and Eve
had partaken of the forbidden fruit they were driven out of the
garden of Eden, to till the earth. And they have brought forth
children; yea, even the family of all the earth.

Then follows Lehi's treatise upon the reason for the fall, the purpose of man's existence, which have already been noticed.

Summary of the Foregoing Doctrines.

This then is the order of things--(though in this summary the order in which the various doctrines have been presented is not strictly followed, but one more in harmony with the proper order of the related things; but which order could not well be set forth until the foregoing discussion of them was had):--

1. The intelligent "Ego" in man, which we have called an "Intelligence," meaning, however, not a quality but the "Ego" itself, is an eternal entity; uncreate and uncreatable--an essential, a necessary, self-existent being.

2. These "Intelligences" the begotten of God, spirits; so that men are of the same race with God, are of the same "essence" or "substance," and are the sons of God by virtue of an actual relationship.

3. There came a time in the course of the existence of these spiritual personages when an earth-existence, a union of the spiritual personage with a body of flesh and bone, became necessary for his further development, for his enlargement; an existence where good and evil were in actual conflict, where the mighty and perhaps awful lessons which such conditions have to teach could be learned.

4. There are eternal opposites in existences, light--darkness; joy--sorrow; pleasure--pain; sweet--bitter; good--evil; and so following. Evil is an eternal existence, the necessary co-relative of the good, uncreate and may not be referred to God for its origin.

5. The spirits of men came to earth primarily to obtain bodies through which their spirits may act through all eternity. They came to effect a union of spirit and element essential to all their future development and their joy and their glory; [66] secondly they came to obtain such experiences as this earth-life has to give--to be taught by the things which they suffer; learning the lessons that sorrow and sin and death have to teach, finding both the strength and weakness of their own natures--proving the fidelity, valor and honor of their own spirits; making proof of their worthiness for that exceeding great and eternal weight of glory which God has designed for those who overcome and in all things prove faithful.

6. To lead the way in this great work, one sufficiently developed for such a task--Adam--is appointed to come to earth to open the series of dispensations designed of God for man in his earth-probation. He introduced those changes in the harmony of things necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes of God in the earth-life of man--he fell that man might be; and not only "be," but have that being, under the very conditions that have since prevailed.

7. Evil was introduced into this world through the transgression of Adam, and man falls under the censure of eternal and inexorable justice.

8. Through the Atonement of Christ, however, man is freed from the effects of Adam's trangression. The resurrection redeems him from the temporal death--the separation of the spirit and body, and he is brought back into the presence of God.

9. Through the Atonement of Christ mercy also has been brought into the world's moral economy; and, as well as justice, operates upon man. God's righteous law has been given to man. Man is a free moral agent and may choose to obey the law, or may choose to follow after wickedness. If he choose the latter, he falls under the justice of the law.

10. Through the Atonement the privilege of repentance is granted, and mercy claims the truly penitent, rescuing him from the otherwise inexhorable claims of the law, and setting him in the way of salvation through obedience to the laws and ordinances of the gospel.

Such, in brief is the outline of the gospel of Christ in the Book of Mormon so far as it relates to the nature and eternal existence of man, the purpose of his earth-existence, the fall, the atonement, the existence of good and evil, and the development that shall come of contact with these forces.

In concluding this chapter, apart from the matter of originality in the doctrines set forth, which originality, be it remembered is one of the evidences here sought to be established as a sort of proof for the divinity of the book, I desire to call attention to another argument which these doctrines are capable of bearing; namely the nature of the doctrines themselves, the order in which they are set forth, and their deep philosophical character; and to the candid reader I submit this question: Was the unaided native intelligence of Joseph Smith, or the intelligence or learning of any of those associated with him in bringing forth the Book of Mormon, equal to the task of formulating the principles of moral philosophy and theology that are found in that book and discussed in this chapter? Was the intelligence or learning of Solomon Spaulding, or any other person to whom the origin of the book is ascribed, equal to such a task? There can be but one answer to that question, and the nature of it is obvious.

Beyond controversy neither the native intelligence nor learning of Joseph Smith can possibly be regarded as equal to such a performance as bringing forth the knowledge which the Book of Mormon imparts upon these profound subjects; nor can the intelligence or learning of those who assisted him in translating the book be regarded as sufficient for such a task. Nor was the intelligence and learning of any one to whom the origin of the book has ever been ascribed equal to such an achievement. Indeed the book sounds depths on these subjects not only beyond the intelligence and learning of this small group of men referred to, but beyond the intelligence and learning of the age itself in which it came forth. Therefore it is useless to ascribe the knowledge it imparts on these subjects to human intelligence or learning at all. What is said by it on these subjects, so full of interest to mankind, is a word truly from the "inner fact of things"--a message written by ancient prophets of America inspired of God to bear witness to the truth of these great things which it most concerns man to know.

Footnotes

1. Genesis iii.

2. I. Cor. xv: 21, 22; Romans v: 12-17.

3. Westminster Confession, chapter iv--of Creation--Section i.

4. In proof of this last declaration the expounder cites Col. i: 16: "All things were created by him [Christ] and for him."

Also Proverbs xvi: 4: 'The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.'

Also Rev. iv: 11: "For thou [the Lord] hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created;" and Rom. xi: 36: "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things." See Commentary on the "Confession of Faith," with questions for theological students and Bible classes, by the Reverend A. A. Hodge, D. D., Chapter iv. The reading of the passages will convince any one that if this is all the scripture proof that may be adduced in the way of an explanation of the purposes of God in creation, that what I have said in the text, that there is no direct, explicit, and adequate statement of the object of man's existence in holy writ is sufficiently vindicated.

5. Commentary on the Confession (Hodge), chapter iv.

6. Douay Catechism, chapter iii.

7. Ibid.

8. Gen. ii: 25.

9. Ibid iii: 7.

10. "Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression."--Tim. ii: 14.

11. Catholic Belief, p. 6. (Joseph Faa Di Bruno is the author.)

12. Catholic Belief, p. 330.

13. Douay Catechism, p. 13.

14. Buck's Theological Dictionary, p. 182.

15. Old Testament History (William Smith, LL. D.), chapter ii.

16. Westminster Confession, chapter vi, section 1.

17. Commentary on the Confession of Faith (A. A. Hodge), pp. 105-108.

18. Paine's Theological Works, "Age of Reason," p. 12.

19. See Ingersoll's Lectures, "Liberty of Man, Woman and Child," where the great orator, contrasts the story of the Fall given in the Bible with that of Brahma in the Hindoo mythology, and extravagantly praises the latter to the disparagement of the former.

20. See "A Short View of Great Questions" (Orlando J. Smith), chapter 10; also his work on "Eternalism."

21. John viii: 58.

22. John xvii.

23. Job xxxiii: 4-7.

24. Revelation xii.

25. Jude vi.

26. Jeremiah i: 5.

27. Heb. xii.

28. Those who wish to extend their investigation on the subject are referred to the author's work on "The Gospel," especially the section of Man's Relationship to Deity, found in both the second and third edition.

29. Ether iii.

30. John i: 2-14.

31. Doc. & Cov., section xciii.

32. I use the term "begotten" instead of "create" advisedly. I do not believe the spirit of man is "created" by God; I believe it is "begotten" of him, and in addition to its own native, underived inherent qualities, partakes also somewhat of the qualities or nature of him who begets it, hence an intelligence begotten of a spirit is a son of God by being begotten by a divine parent; by the nature of it also, since somewhat of the nature of the parent has been imparted to it. The distinction between a "created" thing and a being begotten is thus very clearly set forth by the Christian Father Athanasius: Let it be repeated that a created thing is external to the nature of the being who creates; but a generation (a begetting, as a Father begets a son) is the proper offspring of the nature. (Footnote, Shedd's "History of Christian Doctrine," Vol. I, p. 322.)

33. Luke iii: 38.

34. Alma xiii: 9.

35. Alma xi.

36. Alma xi: 9.

37. Rev. viii: 80. What means the scripture here: "The Lamb slain from the foundations of the world"--if it does not mean that the Savior's mission and work of atonement, and the mode of it, were known before the foundation of the world?

38. "Hedonism is the form of eudemonism that regards pleasure (including avoidance of pain) as the only conceivable object in life, and teaches that as between the lower pleasures of sense and the higher enjoyments of reason, or satisfied self-respect, there is no difference except in degree, duration, and hedonic value of the experience, there being in strictness, no such thing as ethical or moral value."--Standard Dictionary.

39. In Cicero's description of the Epicurean conception of the gods he says: "That which is truly happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another, nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor, because things which are liable to such failings must be weak and frail. * * * Their life [i. e., of the gods] is most happy and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasure. * * * Nothing can be happy that is not at ease." (Tusculan Disputations, The Nature of the Gods.)

40. II. Nephi ii: 23.

41. I. John iii: 4.

42. Pearl of Great Price, Book of Moses, ch. i: 39.

43. Or "the soul;" for, in the revelations of God in this last dispensation, the spirit and the body are called the "soul." "Through the redemption which is made for you is brought to pass the resurrection from the dead. And the spirit and the body is the soul of man. And the resurrection from the dead is the redemption of the soul." (Doc. & Cov. Sec. 88: 14-16.)

44. Alma xxix: 4.

45. II. Nephi. ii: 27.

46. Hibbert Journal, April, 1906, p. 656.

47. Chapter iv.

48. Alma 42. The same subject is treated in II. Nephi ii.

49. Isaiah liii.

50. Doc. & Cov., Sec. xxxviii: 15.

51. II. Nephi ii. It is a pleasure to note that this process of reasoning, remarkable as it is, and startling as it is in its conclusion, is in harmony with modern thought. Mr. Lester F. Ward, whose works I have already quoted in this chapter, by a closely analogous order of reasoning, reaches the same conclusion. This the passage: "The pleasure of 'doing good' is among the most delicious of which the human faculties are capable, and becomes the permanent stimulus to thousands of worthy lives. It is usually looked upon as the highest of all motives, and by some as the ultimate goal toward which all action should aspire. It should first be observed that the very act of doing good presupposes evil, i. e., pain. Doing good is necessarily either increasing pleasure or diminishing pain. Now, if all devoted themselves to doing good, it is maintained that the sufferings of the world would be chiefly abolished. Admitting that there are some evils that no human efforts could remove, and supposing that by united altruism all removable evils were done away, there would be nothing left for altruists to do. By their own acts they would have deprived themselves of a calling. They must be miserable since the only enjoyment they deemed worthy of experiencing could be no longer possible, and this suffering from ennui would be among those which lie beyond human power to alleviate. An altruistic act would then alone consist in inflicting pain on one's self for the sole purpose of affording others an opportunity to derive pleasure from the act of relieving it. I do not put the matter in this light for the purpose of discouraging altruism, but simply to show how short sighted most ethical reasoning is."

52. II. Nephi ii.

53. "Origin and Development of Religious Belief," Vol. II., pp. 22, 23.

54. Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, p. 197.

55. Ibid. pp. 197-8.

56. See Rev. xii: 7. Jude 6.

57. Lest some text-proofer should retort upon me and cite the words of Isaiah--"I make peace and create evil"--the only text of scripture ascribing the creation of evil to God--I will anticipate so far as to say that it is quite generally agreed that no reference is made in the words of Isaiah to "moral evil;" but to such evils as may come as judgments upon people for their correction, such as famine or tempest or war; such an "evil" as would stand in natural antithesis to "peace," which word precedes, "I create evil," in the text--"I make peace and create"--the opposite to peace, "The evil of afflictions and punishments, but not the evil of sin" (Catholic Comment on Isaiah 45:7). Meantime we have the clearest scriptural evidence that moral evil is not a product of God's: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man." That is to say, God has nothing to do with the creation of moral evil; "But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." (James i: 13-15). "The evil and the good are necessary co-relatives." (Sir Oliver Lodge in Hibbert Journal, April, 1906, p. 657.)

58. I. John iii: 4.

59. Eternalism, Orlando J. Smith, p. 205-6.

60. Scotus Erigena, quoted by Neander, "Hist. Christian Religion and Church," Vol. III. p. 465.

61. Eternalism, pp. 30, 31.

62. II. Nephi ii: 11.

63. II. Nephi ii: 13.

64. Ibid. ii: 14.

65. On such a proposition Dr. Jacob Cooper, of Rutgers College, at the head of an article on "Theodicy" (the justification of the divine providence by the attempt to reconcile the existence of evil with the goodnesss and sovereignty of God), says (August, 1903), "There must be an alternative to any line of conduct, in order to give it a moral quality. We have to deal with, not an imaginary, but a real world; not with a state of things wholly different from those by which character is developed. If there are to be such qualities as righteousness, virtue, merit, as the result of good action, there must be a condition by which these things are possible. And this can only be where there is an alternative which may be embraced by a free choice. If the work of man on earth is to build up character, if his experience is disciplinary, by which he constantly becomes better fitted for greater good and a wider sphere of action, then he must have the responsibility of choosing for himself a course different from one which appeals to the lower qualities in his nature."

66. Doc. & Cov., Sec. xciii: 33, 35.