Chapter III: Part 3

The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor, in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful masses. This was the Battle of Ypres.

In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle, we must hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry reached Roulers and Cortemark (Oct. 28) our territorial divisions from Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized a defensive position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us to prepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From Oct. 23 two British and French army corps were in occupation of this position, which was to be the base of their forward march in the direction of Roulers-Menin. The delays already explained and the strength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to a standstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle, Paschendaele, Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres was solidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled from Oct. 25 to Nov. 13, to the north, the east, and the south of Ypres. From Oct. 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on Oct. 31, we were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and finally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to two army corps. Between Oct. 30 and Nov. 6 Ypres was several times in danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to defend; but defended it was without a recoil.

REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE.

The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th this offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcements had to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on Nov. 12. By the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who advanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible in consequence of the fact that the French and British artillery had crowded nearly 300 guns on to these few kilometers of front.

Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack itself had been.

During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lost in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south of Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization of the position the inviolability of our front.

[The compiler of the report here adds a footnote saying that the bodies of more than 40,000 Germans were found on the battlefield during these three weeks of battle. The report next proceeds to summarize the character and results of the operations since the Battle of Flanders--that is, during the period Nov. 30-Feb. 1.]

Since the former date the French supreme command had not thought it advisable to embark upon important offensive operations. It has confined itself to local attacks, the main object of which was to hold in front of us as large a number of German corps as possible, and thus to hinder the withdrawal of the troops which to our knowledge the German General Staff was anxious to dispatch to Russia.

FEW SENT TO THE EAST.

As a matter of fact, the numbers transported to the eastern front have been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the western front, Germany has only been able to take four and one-half corps for the eastern front. On the other hand, climatic conditions--the rain, mud, and mist--were such as to diminish the effectiveness of offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken, which was another reason for postponing them. Still another reason lies in the fact that from now on the allied forces can count upon a steadily expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material, while the German forces have attained the maximum of their power, and can only diminish now both in numbers and in value. These conditions explain the character of the siege warfare which the operations have assumed during the period under review.

Meanwhile, it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the same results for the Germans as for us. From Nov. 15 to Feb. 1, our opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, did not succeed in taking anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreciable results.

[The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses between the allied and the German forces in France during the Winter campaign. The result he sums up as follows:]

1. A general progress of our troops; very marked at certain points.

2. A general falling back of the enemy, except to the northeast of Soissons.

To complete the balance it must be added that:

1. The German offensive in Poland was checked a month ago.

2. The Russian offensive continues in Galicia and the Carpathians.

3. A large part of the Turkish Caucasian army has been annihilated.

4. Germany has exhausted her resources of officers, (there are now on an average twelve officers to a regiment,) and henceforth will only be able to develop her resources in men to the detriment of the existing units.

5. The allied armies, on the contrary, possess the power of reinforcing themselves in a very considerable degree.

It may, therefore, be declared that in order to obtain complete success it is sufficient for France and her allies to know how to wait and to prepare victory with indefatigable patience.

The German offensive is broken.

The German defensive will be broken in its turn.

[It is evident from the report that the numbered German army corps are Prussian corps unless otherwise specified.]

THE FRENCH ARMY AS IT IS.

_LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--All of Part II., of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources, and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. Part II, deals with the conditions in the French Army, furnishing a most interesting chapter on this subject under the title, "The French Army as it Is."_

_The compiler of the report, beginning this part of his review on Feb. 1, says that the condition of the French Army is excellent and appreciably superior to what it was at the beginning of the war from the three points of view of numbers, quality, and equipment. Continuing, he says:_

In the higher command important changes have been made. It has, in fact, been rejuvenated by the promotion of young commanders of proved quality to high rank. All the old Generals, who at the beginning of August were at the head of large commands, have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war and others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the army has been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies. The result has been to lower the average age of general officers by ten years. Today more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps are less than 60 years of age. Some are considerably younger. A number of the army corps commanders are from 46 to 54 years of age, and the brigade commanders are usually under 50. There are, in fact, at the front extremely few general officers over 60, and these are men who are in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers.

MANY COLONELS PROMOTED.

This rejuvenation of the high command was facilitated by a number of circumstances, notable among which were the strengthening of the higher regimental ranks carried out during the three years preceding the war, as a result of which at the outset of the campaign each infantry regiment had two Lieutenant Colonels, and each cavalry and artillery regiment a Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, and also the system of promotion for the duration of the war. Many officers who began the war as Colonels now command brigades. Some are even at the head of divisions or army corps. Ability proved on the field of battle is now immediately recognized and utilized, and in this way it has been possible to provide in the most favorable manner for the vacancies created by the changes in command which were considered necessary in the first weeks of the war.

The higher grades of the French Army are inspired by a remarkable unity in the matter of military theory, and by a solidarity of spirit which has found striking expression in the course of the numerous moves of army corps from one part of the theatre of operations to another, which have been carried out since the beginning of the war.

The cavalry after six months of war still possesses an excess of officers. There are on an average thirty-six officers to a regiment instead of the thirty-one considered to be the necessary minimum. The artillery, which has suffered relatively little, has also an excess of officers, and is further able to count upon a large number of Captains and other officers, who before the war were employed in the arsenals or in technical research. Finally the reserve artillery officers have nearly all proved to be excellent battery commanders.

The losses in the junior commissioned ranks have naturally been highest in the infantry. There is, however, nothing like a want of officers in this arm. Many Captains and Lieutenants who have been wounded by machine-gun fire (such wounds are usually slight and quickly healed,) have been able to return speedily to the front. The reserve officers have in general done remarkably well, and in many cases have shown quite exceptional aptitude for the rank of company commanders. The non-commissioned officers promoted to sub-Lieutenancies make excellent section leaders, and even show themselves very clever and energetic company commanders in the field.

It must be remembered also that thanks to the intellectual and physical development of the generation now serving with the colors; and thanks, above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic spirit of our army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades and even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on Aug. 2 as privates, now wear the officers' epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements.

The state of our infantry on Jan. 15 was very satisfactory and much superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers, fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each regiment six of the twelve companies are commanded by Captains who are regular officers, three by Captains of the reserve and three by Lieutenants. Each company has at least three officers. The state of the army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest is declared to be exceptionally brilliant. The army is led by young, well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have acquired the art of war by experience.

2,500,000 FRENCH AT FRONT.

Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the front, and every unit is, or was on Jan. 15, at war strength. The infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the companies have a strength of 250 or more.

In other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are all up to, or above, regulation strength.

This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French Army over the Germans. While Germany has created a great number of new units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number, and has only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future requirements of the new units, as regards all ranks, without encroaching upon the reserves needed for the existing units.

At the same time, thanks to the depots in the interior of the country, the effectives at the front have been maintained at full strength. The sources of supply for this purpose were the remainder of the eleven classes of the reserves, the younger classes of the territorial army, and the new class of 1914. A large number of the men wounded in the earlier engagements of the war have been able to return to the front. They have been incorporated in the new drafts, providing these with a useful stiffening of war-tried men.

With regard to the supplies of men upon which the army can draw to repair the wastage at the front, we learn that there are practically half as many men in the depots as at the front, in other words about 1,250,000. Further supplies of men are provided by the class of 1915 and the revision of the various categories of men of military age previously exempted on grounds of health or for other reasons from the duty of bearing arms. As a result of this measure nearly half a million men have been claimed for the army, almost all of whom, after rigorous physical tests, have been declared fit for military service.

DRILLED BY CONVALESCENTS.

In the depots in which the new soldiers are being trained the services of many officers and non-commissioned officers discharged as convalescents after being wounded are utilized in order to give a practical turn to the instruction. There are still many voluntary enlistments, and with all these resources of men the army can count upon reinforcements soon to be available which will considerably augment its offensive power.

The quality of the troops has improved perceptibly since the beginning of the war. The men have become hardened and used to war, and their health--largely owing to the excellence of the commissariat--is extremely satisfactory. In spite of the severity of the Winter hardly any cases of disease of the respiratory organs have occurred, and the sanitary returns of the army show an appreciable improvement on those of the preceding Winter.

With regard to the reserves, experience has verified the dictum of the Serbian and Bulgarian Generals in the war of 1913, namely, that "two months in the field are necessary in order to get at the full value of reserves." Our infantry is now accustomed to the rapid and thorough "organization" of the defensive. In August it neither liked nor had the habit of using the spade. Today those who see our trenches are astounded. They are veritable improvised fortresses, proof against the 77-millimeter gun and often against artillery of higher calibre. During the last five months not a single encounter can be cited in which our infantry did not have the advantage over the German infantry. All the enemy's attacks have been repulsed, except to the north of Soissons, where their success was due to the flooded state of the Aisne and the carrying away of our bridges. Our attacks, on the other hand, have yielded important results, and have been carried out with plenty of spirit, although without the imprudence which cost us such heavy losses in August.

The cavalry has made remarkable progress. Throughout October this branch was called on to eke out the inadequate numbers of the infantry, and showed itself perfectly adapted to the necessities of fighting on foot. Several regiments of cavalry have been used as infantry, and, armed with rifles, have rendered the most valuable services.

The artillery has displayed a superiority in the use of its admirable material, which is recognized by the Germans themselves.

_LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--Further installments of the French official review of the condition of the French Army after six months of war have been obtained by The Associated Press. The sixth installment deals with material, artillery, transport, and supplies, and the seventh takes up the situation of the German Army and makes an analysis of the German forces in the field and available for service._

_The first chapter of the seventh installment, headed "The German Effort," opens with a statement as to the German forces at the beginning of the campaign. The writer says:_

The military effort of Germany at the outset of the campaign exceeded all anticipations. Her design was to crush the French Army in a few weeks under a tremendous mass of troops. Nothing was neglected to bring that mass together.

The number of German army corps in time of peace is twenty-five. When war began the German General Staff put in the field on the two theatres of operations: 1, as fighting troops, (active, reserve, Ersatz or Landwehr,) sixty-one army corps; 2, as troops to guard communications and territory, formations of the Landsturm.

In October six and a half new army corps made their appearance, plus a division of sailors--in all seven corps. From the end of November to the end of December there was only an insignificant increase, consisting of the division of sailors. In January, 1915, the number of fighting formations put into line by the German Army was therefore sixty-nine army corps, divided as follows:

Active corps, twenty-five and a half; reserve corps, twenty-one and a half; Ersatz brigades, six and a half; reserve corps of new formation, seven and a half, and corps of Landwehr, eight and a half.

GERMANY'S GREAT INITIAL EFFORT.

The immense effort thus made by Germany explains itself very well, if, having regard to the position of Germany at the opening of the war, one considers that of the Allies. Germany desired to take advantage of the circumstances which enabled her to make a simultaneous mobilization of all her forces--a mobilization which the three allied armies could not carry out so rapidly. Germany wished with the mass of troops to crush first of all the adversary who appeared to her the most dangerous. This effort, broken for the first time on the Marne, attained its maximum at the moment of the battle of Flanders, in which more than fifty army corps out of sixty-nine were pitted against the French, British, and Belgian Armies.

Here also the method followed by Germany is easily comprehensible. At the end of October the Russian danger was beginning to become pressing, and it was necessary to win a decisive victory in the western theatre of the war. It was imperative to give international opinion the impression that Germany remained in that quarter mistress of operations. Finally, it behooved her by this victory to gain the freedom to transport a large number of army corps to Poland. We have seen that the battle of Flanders, instead of being a success for Germany, was a marked defeat. This defeat was fraught with results, and it dominates the present position of the German Army. The plans above described of the German mobilization, which had their justification in view of a prompt victory, were calculated to become extremely perilous from the moment that that victory failed to be gained.

INITIATIVE LOST BY GERMANY.

From that moment, in fact, Germany lost the initiative and the direction of the war. And, furthermore, she was condemned to suffer the counter-effects of the enormous and precipitate effort which she had made in vain. From the point of view of her effectiveness and her regimental cadres, (basic organization,) she had undergone a wastage which her adversaries, on the other hand, had been able to save themselves. She had, in the words of the proverb, put all her eggs in one basket, and in spite of her large population she could no longer, owing to the immediate and sterile abuse which she had made of her resources, pretend to regain the superiority of numbers.

She was reduced to facing as best she could on both war fronts the unceasingly increasing forces of the Allies. She had attained the maximum of tension and had secured a minimum of results. She had thus landed herself in a difficulty which will henceforward go on increasing and which is made clear when the wastage which her army has suffered is closely studied.

WASTAGE OF GERMAN EFFECTIVES.

_Chapter II. of this section of the review bears the headline "Wastage of German Effectives."_

The wastage of effectives is easy to establish, it says. We have for the purpose two sources--the official lists of losses published by the German General Staff and the notebooks, letters, and archives of soldiers and officers killed and taken prisoners. These different documents show that by the middle of January the German losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men.

These figures are certainly less than the reality, because, for one thing, the sick are not comprised, and, for another, the losses in the last battle in Poland are not included. Let us accept them, however; let us accept also that out of these 1,800,000 men 500,000--this is the normal proportion--have been able to rejoin after being cured. Thus the final loss for five months of the campaign has been 1,300,000 men, or 260,000 men per month. These figures agree exactly with what can be ascertained when the variations of effectives in certain regiments are examined.

It is certain that the majority of the German regiments have had to be completely renewed. What, then, is the situation created by these enormous losses?

_This question is answered by a statement headed "German troops available for 1915."_

The total of German formations known at the beginning of January, says the review, represented in round numbers 4,000,000 men. According to the official reports on German recruiting, the entire resources of Germany in men amount to 9,000,000. But from these 9,000,000 have to be deducted men employed on railways, in the police, and in certain administrations and industries--altogether 500,000 men. The total resources available for the war were therefore 8,500,000. Out of these about one-half, say 4,000,000, are now at the front. The definitive losses represent at least 1,300,000 men. The available resources amounted, then, at the beginning of January, to 3,200,000 men.

GERMANY'S RESERVES UNTRAINED.

Of what are these resources composed? Chiefly of men who were untrained in time of peace, the trained reservists having almost all left the depots for the front. It has, moreover, to be noted that out of these 3,200,000 men there are, according to the statistics, 800,000 who are more than 39 years of age, and therefore of only mediocre military value. Thus there remain 2,400,000. Finally, the category of the untrained in peace comprises, according to the estimates of German military authorities themselves, one-quarter of inefficients.

The really valuable resources capable of campaigning are therefore just 2,000,000. These men, comprising the 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes, called out in anticipation, constitute--and this point cannot be too strongly insisted upon--the total of available resources for the operations during the twelve months of 1915. As to what the military value of these troops will be, considering the haste with which they have been trained, the formidable losses sustained in the battle of Flanders by the newly formed corps show very clearly. Their military value will be limited.

GERMAN LOSSES 260,000 A MONTH.

When it is remembered that, according to the German documents themselves, the definite loss each month is 260,000 men, it is manifest that the available resources for the year 1915 will not suffice to fill the gaps of a war of ten months.

It is then superabundantly established that in the matter of effectives Germany has reached the maximum of possible effort. If with the men at present available she creates, as it is certain that she is preparing to do at this moment, fresh formations, she will be preventing herself, if the war lasts another ten months, as is admissible, from being able to complete afresh her old formations. If she creates no new formations, she will have in 1915 exactly what is necessary and no more to complete the existing units afresh.

Bearing in mind the ways of the German General Staff, one may suppose that, disregarding the eventual impossibility of recompleting, it is still addressing itself to creating new formations. The weakness to which Germany will expose herself in the matter of effectives has just been set forth, and it is easy to show that this weakness will be still further aggravated by the wastage in the regimental orders.

PRAISES FRENCH "SEVENTY-FIVES."

_In the sixth installment, beginning with the field gun, the famous "seventy-fives," the compiler of the report, after rehearsing the splendid qualities of this weapon--its power, its rapidity of action, and its precision--points out that it possesses a degree of strength and endurance which makes it an implement of war of the first order._

It may be stated without hesitation [says the review] that our "seventy-five" guns are in as perfect condition today as they were on the first day of the war, although the use made of them has exceeded all calculations. The consumption of projectiles was, in fact, so enormous as to cause for a moment an ammunition crisis, which, however, was completely overcome several weeks ago.

The methodical and complete exploitation of all the resources of the country, organized since the beginning of the war, has enabled us to accumulate a considerable stock of fresh munitions, and an increasing rate of production is henceforth assured. We are thus sure of being able to provide without particular effort for all the needs of the campaign, present and future, however long the war may last, and it is this certainty which has enabled us to supply projectiles to several of the allied armies, among others, to the Serbian and Belgian armies. From the statements of German prisoners we have learned that the effectiveness of our new projectiles is superior to that of the old ones.

FRENCH HEAVY GUNS SUPERIOR.

Our heavy artillery was in process of reorganization when the war broke out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But today the rôles have been changed and our adversaries themselves acknowledge the superiority of our heavy artillery.

The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved in the fortresses. The very large number of heavy guns at the front represents only a part of the total number available for use. There is an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in the case of the field gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance. The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives and of all materials needed for the manufacture of shells.

With regard to small arms, hand grenades, bombs, and all the devices for lifetaking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into use, the position of the French troops is in every way favorable.

_There follows a passage on the development of the machine gun in this kind of warfare._

Owing to the extended use of this weapon, the number supplied to the various units has been appreciably increased, says the review. Not only is each unit in possession of its full regulation complement of machine guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been increased since Feb. 1 by one-third.

_The report next passes to the transport service, which, it says, has worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. This section of the review closes by referring to food supplies for the army, which are described as abundant._

_LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--The eighth installment of the French official review of the war, previous chapters of which have been published, takes up the German losses of officers, the wastage of guns and projectiles, and "the moral wastage of the German Army."_

_The chapter on losses of officers begins with the statement that the condition of the cadres, or basic organizations, in the German Army is bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession, has been enormously reduced, it says; and a report made in December showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were only 49 officers of the active army. The active regiments have at the present time, according to the review, an average of 12 professional officers; the reserve regiments, 9 to 10; the reserve regiments of new formation, 6 to 7; and it is to be remembered that these officers have to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units._

"If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months," it continues, "she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient."

FRENCH CONDITIONS IN CONTRAST.

_The French report points out that on the other hand, all the French regiments have been constantly kept at a minimum figure of eighteen professional officers per regiment. At the same time it admits that the commanders of German corps, commanders of active battalions, and the officers attached to the commanders of army corps are officers by profession._

_The French report then addresses itself to the wastage of material. Discussing the wastage of guns, it says:_

It is easy to ascertain the German losses in artillery. On Dec. 28 the Sixty-sixth Regiment of Artillery entrained at Courtrai for Germany twenty-two guns, of which eighteen were used up. This figure is extremely high for a single regiment.

The same facts have been ascertained as regards heavy artillery. On Dec. 21 and 22 seventy-seven guns of heavy artillery, which were no longer serviceable, were sent to Cologne. These movements, which are not isolated facts, show how ill the German artillery has resisted the ordeal of the campaign.

Other proofs, moreover, are decisive. For some weeks we have noted the very peculiar aspect of the marking on the bands of a great number of shells of the 77 gun. When these markings are compared with those of shells fired three months ago it is plain beyond all question that the tubes are worn and that many of them require to be replaced. This loss in guns is aggravated by the necessity which has arisen of drawing upon the original army corps for the guns assigned to the recently formed corps or those in course of formation. Several regiments of field artillery have, in fact, had to give up two batteries.

WEARING OUT OF MATERIAL.

These two phenomena--wearing out of material and drafts upon batteries--will inevitably result either in the reduction of batteries from six to four guns, a reduction of the number of batteries in the army corps, or the partial substitution for 77 guns of 9-centimeter cannon of the old pattern, the presence of which has been many times perceived at the front.

Furthermore, the German artillery lacks and has lacked for a very long time munitions. It has been obliged to reduce its consumption of shells in a notable degree. No doubt is possible in this respect. The statements of prisoners since the battle of the Marne, and still more since the battle of the Yser, make it clear that the number of shots allowed to the batteries for each action is strictly limited. We have found on officers killed or taken prisoner the actual orders prescribing positively a strict economy of munitions.

For the last three months, too, we notice that the quality of the projectiles is mediocre. Many of them do not burst. On Jan. 7, in the course of a bombardment of Laventie, scarcely any of the German shells burst. The proportion of non-bursts was estimated at two-fifths by the British on Dec. 14, two-thirds by ourselves in the same month. On Jan. 3 at Bourg-et-Comin, and at other places since then, shrapnel fell the explosion of which scarcely broke the envelope and the bullets were projected without any force. About the same time our Fourteenth Army Corps was fired at with shrapnel loaded with fragments of glass, and on several points of our front shell casings of very bad quality have been found, denoting hasty manufacture and the use of materials taken at hazard.

From numerous indications it appears that the Germans are beginning to run short of their 1898 pattern rifle. A certain number of the last reinforcements (January) are armed with carbines or rifles of a poor sort without bayonets. Others have not even rifles. Prisoners taken at Woevre had old-pattern weapons.

The upshot of these observations is that Germany, despite her large stores at the beginning, and the great resources of her industrial production, presents manifest signs of wear, and that the official optimism which she displays does not correspond with the reality of the facts.

MORAL WASTAGE.

_Under the caption "Moral Wastage of the German Army," the review continues:_

The material losses of the German Army have corresponded with a moral wastage which it is interesting and possible to follow, both from the interrogation of prisoners and the pocketbooks and letters seized upon them or on the killed.

At the beginning of the war the entire German Army, as was natural, was animated by an unshakable faith in the military superiority of the empire. It lived on the recollections of 1870, and on those of the long years of peace, during which all the powers which had to do with Germany displayed toward her a spirit of conciliation and patience which might pass for weakness.

The first prisoners we took in August showed themselves wholly indifferent to the reverses of the German Army. They were sincerely and profoundly convinced that, if the German Army retired, it was in virtue of a preconceived plan, and that our successes would lead to nothing. The events at the end of August were calculated to strengthen this contention in the minds of the German soldiers.

The strategic retreat of the French Army, the facility with which the German armies were able to advance from Aug. 25 to Sept. 5, gave our adversaries a feeling of absolute and final superiority, which manifested itself at that time by all the statements gleaned and all the documents seized.

At the moment of the battle of the Marne the first impression was one of failure of comprehension and of stupor. A great number of German soldiers, notably those who fell into our hands during the first days of that battle, believed fully, as at the end of August, that the retreat they were ordered to make was only a means of luring us into a trap. German military opinion was suddenly converted when the soldiers saw that this retreat continued, and that it was being carried out in disorder, under conditions which left no doubt as to its cause and its extent.

This time it was really a defeat, and a defeat aggravated by the absence of regular supplies and by the physical and moral depression which was the result. The severity of the losses sustained, the overpowering effects of the French artillery, began from this moment to be noted in the German pocketbooks with veritable terror. Hope revived, however, at the end of some weeks, and there is to be found in the letters of soldiers and officers the announcement of "a great movement" which is being prepared, and which is to lead the German armies anew as far as Paris.

LOSSES IN "BATTLE OF CALAIS."

This is the great "battle of Calais," which, contrary to the anticipations of the enemy, was in reality fought to the east of the Yser. The losses of the Germans, which during those ten days exceeded 150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000, produced a terrifying impression on the troops. From that moment prisoners no longer declared themselves sure of success. For a certain time they had been consoled by the announcement of the capture of Warsaw. This pretended success having proved to be fictitious, incredulity became general.

During the last two months the most intelligent of the prisoners have all admitted that no one could any longer say on which side victory would rest. If we think of the absolute confidence with which the German people had been sustained, this avowal is of great importance.

Letters seized on a dead officer speak of the imminence of a military and economic hemming-in of Germany. They discuss the possibility of Germany finding herself after the war with "empty hands and pockets turned inside out." There is no longer any question of imposing the conqueror's law upon adversaries at his mercy, but of fighting with the energy of despair to secure an honorable peace. An officer of the General Staff who was made prisoner on Jan. 18 said: "Perhaps this struggle of despair has already begun."

_There follows a chapter bearing the title, "The System of Lies," in which the review describes the methods by which it is alleged the German Government "made a sustained effort to create in the army an artificial state of mind based entirely upon lies and a scientific system of fables."_

SONNET ON THE BELGIAN EXPATRIATION.

By THOMAS HARDY.

[From King Albert's Book.]

I dreamt that people from the Land of Chimes
Arrived one Autumn morning with their bells,
To hoist them on the towers and citadels
Of my own country, that the musical rhymes

Rung by them into space at measured times
Amid the market's daily stir and stress,
And the night's empty starlit silentness,
Might solace souls of this and kindred climes.

Then I awoke; and, lo, before me stood
The visioned ones, but pale and full of fear;
From Bruges they came, and Antwerp, and Ostend,

No carillons in their train. Vicissitude
Had left these tinkling to the invaders' ear,
And ravaged street, and smoldering gable-end.

War Correspondence

A Month of German Submarine War

By Vice Admiral Kirchhoff of the German Navy

Under the heading, "A Month of U-Boat War," Vice Admiral
Kirchhoff of the German Navy discusses the German submarine
warfare against merchant shipping in its first month. The
article, appearing in the Hamburger Framdenblatt of March 19,
1915, is reproduced:

On March 18 a month had passed since the beginning of our sharp procedure against our worst foe. We can in every way be satisfied with the results achieved in the meantime! In spite of all "steps" taken before and thereafter, the English have everywhere had important losses to show at sea--some 200 ships lost since the beginning of the war, according to the latest statements of the Allies--so that even they themselves no longer dare to talk about the "German bluff."

On the new and greater "war zone" established by us, our submarines have known how to work bravely, and have been able, for instance, to operate successfully on a single morning on the east coast, in the Channel, and in the Irish Sea. We have heard of many losses of our opponents, and on the other hand of the subjugation of only two of our brave U-boats. Ceaselessly they are active on the coasts of Albion; shipping is paralyzed at some points; steamship companies--including also many neutral ones--have suspended their sailings; in short, our threat of a more acute condition of war "with all means at hand" has been fully fulfilled.

The "peaceful shipping," too, has taken notice of it and adjusted itself according to our instructions. The official objections of neutrals have died away without effect; throughout the world we have already been given right; the shipping circles of the neutral States are in great part holding entirely back. The empty threats that floated over to us from across the Channel, that the captured crews of German submarines will be treated differently than other prisoners--yes, as plain pirates and sea robbers--those are nothing but an insignificant ebullition of British "moral insanity." They are a part of the hypocritical cant without which, somehow, Great Britain cannot get along. If Great Britain should act in accordance with it, however, then we shall know what we, for our part, have to do!

German and probably English mines, too, have helped our submarines in clearing up among the English mercantile and war fleet. Many merchant ships warned long in advance have been compelled to believe in the warning, and with them frequently a great part of their crews--"without any warning whatever," as our opponents like to say.

All measures of defense, yes, even more significant, all measures of deception and boastful "ruses de guerre," and even all attempts to hush up the news of German accomplishments and whenever possible to suppress it completely--all these efforts have been futile. Our results surpass the expectations that had been cherished. Who knows how many accomplishments other than those which have been published may also have been achieved? Foreign newspapers report a large number of steamships overdue. From overseas likewise we receive favorable reports about the sinking of enemy ships. But the best is the news that our submarines have succeeded in sinking two English auxiliary cruisers and perhaps also one or two larger English transport ships with several thousand men on board.

The last announcement has filled us all with greatest satisfaction. This, our latest method of warfare, is "truly humane"; it leads more speedily to the goal than anything else, so that the number of victims will in the end be smaller after all. It brings peace to all of us sooner than the empty paper protests and crying to Heaven about violence and international law, law of the sea, and laws of humanity could do. In the innocent exalted island kingdom many a fellow is already striking; why should not even the recruit strike, who is also beginning to get a glimmer of the truth that there are no props in the ocean waves?

The more opponents come before the bows of our ships and are sunk, the better! Down with them to the bottom of the sea; that alone will help! Let us hope that we shall soon receive more such cheerful news.

Three Weeks of the War in Champagne

By a British Observer

_The following article, issued by the British Press Bureau, London, March 18, 1915, is from a British observer with the French forces in the field who has the permission of General Joffre to send communications home from time to time, giving descriptions of the work, &c., of the French Army which will be of interest to the British reader._

I propose to give some account of the operations which have been in progress for the last three weeks in Champagne. Every day since Feb. 15 the official communiqués find something to say about a district which lies midway between Rheims and Verdun. The three places which are always mentioned, which form the points of reference, are Perthes-lez-Hurlus, Le Mesnil-lez-Hurlus, and Beauséjour Farm. The distance between the first and the last is three and one-half miles; the front on which the fighting has taken place is about five miles; and the French have been attacking at one point or another in this front every day for the last three weeks. It is, therefore, an operation of a different kind to those which we have seen during the Winter months. Those were local efforts, lasting a day or two, designed to keep the enemy busy and prevent him from withdrawing troops elsewhere; this is a sustained effort, made with the object of keeping a constant pressure on his first line of defense, of affecting his use of the railway from Bazancourt to Challerange, a few miles to the north, and of wearing down his reserves of men and ammunition. It may be said that Feb. 15 marks the opening of the 1915 campaign, and that this first phase will find an important place when the history of the war comes to be written.

We must first know something of the nature of the country, which is entirely different to that in which the British Army is fighting. It is one vast plain, undulating, the hills at most 200 feet higher than the valleys, gentle slopes everywhere. The soil is rather chalky, poor, barely worth cultivating; after heavy rain the whole plain becomes a sea of shallow mud; and it dries equally quickly. The only features are the pine woods, which have been planted by hundreds. From the point of view of profit, this would not appear to have been a success; either the soil is too poor, or else it is unsuitable to the maritime pine; for the trees are rarely more than 25 feet high. As each rise is topped, a new stretch of plain, a new set of small woods appear, just like that which has been left behind.

The great Greek statesman who recently resigned as Prime Minister.

_(Photo from Medom Photo Service.)_]

Who, as Viceroy, rules England's Indian Empire during the critical period of the war.]

The villages are few and small, most of them are in ruins after the fighting in September; and the troops live almost entirely in colonies of little huts of wood or straw, about four feet high, dotted about in the woods, in the valleys, wherever a little water and shelter is obtainable. Lack of villages means lack of roads; this has been one of the great difficulties to be faced; but, at the same time, the movement of wagons across country is possible to a far greater extent than in Flanders, although it is often necessary to use eight or ten horses to get a gun or wagon to the point desired.

From the military point of view the country is eminently suitable for troops, with its possibilities of concealment, of producing sudden surprises with cavalry, and of manoeuvre generally. It is, in fact, the training ground of the great military centre of Châlons; and French troops have doubtless been exercised over this ground in every branch of military operation, except that in which they are engaged at the present moment.

What commander, training his men over this ground, could have imagined that the area from Perthes-lez-Hurlus to Beauséjour Farm would become two fortress lines, developed and improved for four months; or that he would have to carry out an attack modeled on the same system as that employed in the last great siege undertaken by French troops, that of Sebastopol in 1855? Yet this is what is being done. Every day an attack is made on a trench, on the edge of one of the little woods or to gain ground in one of them; every day the ground gained has to be transformed so as to give protection to its new occupants and means of access to their supports; every night, and on many days, the enemy's counter-attacks have to be repulsed.

Each attack has to be prepared by a violent and accurate artillery fire; it may be said that a trench has to be morally captured by gun fire before it can be actually seized by the infantry. Once in the new trench, the men have to work with their intrenching tools, without exposing themselves, and wait for a counter-attack, doing what damage they can to the enemy with hand grenades and machine guns. Thus the amount of rifle fire is very small; it is a war of explosives and bayonets.

Looking at the battle at a distance of about 2,000 yards from the enemy's line, the stillness of what one sees is in marked contrast to the turmoil of shells passing overhead. The only movement is the cloud of smoke and earth that marks the burst of a shell. Here and there long white lines are visible, when a trench has brought the chalky subsoil up to the top, but the number of trenches seen is very small compared to the number that exist, for one cannot see into the valleys, and the top of the ground is an unhealthy place to choose for seating a trench. The woods are pointed out, with the names given them by the soldiers, but it needs fieldglasses to see the few stumps that remain in those where the artillery has done its work. And then a telephone message arrives, saying that the enemy are threatening a counter-attack at a certain point, and three minutes later there is a redoubled whistling of shells. At first one cannot see the result of this fire--the guns are searching the low ground where the enemy's reserves are preparing for the movement, but a little later the ground in front of the threatened trench becomes alive with shell bursts, for the searching has given place to the building up of a wall of fire through which it is impossible for the foe to pass without enormous loss.

The attached map may enable us to look more closely at what has been achieved. The lowest dotted line, numbered 15, is the line of the French trenches on Feb. 15. They were then close up to the front of the German line with its network of barbed wire, its machine-gun emplacements, often of concrete, and its underground chambers for sheltering men from the shells. Each successive dotted line shows the line held by the French on the evening of the date written in the dotted line. Thus the total gain of ground, that between the most southerly and the most northerly dotted lines, varies between 200 yards, where the lines are close together northeast of Perthes, and 1,400 yards, half way between Le Mesnil and Beauséjour Farm. But the whole of this space has been a series of trenches and fortified woods, each of which has had to be attacked separately.

Some of the severest fighting on the western battle front took place in this little section of about four miles of trenches, lying between Rheimes and Verdun. For a whole month from Feb. 15, the attacks were kept up by the French forces almost continuously, and the sketch gives the graphic result of changes for three weeks of that time. Ostensibly the purpose of the French was to pierce the German line and cut the railway a few miles to the rear. Incidentally, the French aimed to keep their opponents busy, and thus prevent any reinforcements being sent to von Hindenburg in the east.

The total gain of ground--that between the most southerly and most northerly dotted lines--varies from 200 yards northeast of Perthes to 1,400 yards, half way between Le Mesnil and Beauséjour Farm. But the whole of this space has been a series of trenches and fortified woods, each of which had to be attacked separately.

The letters (A to G) in the sketch indicate the points of the severest fighting. A (the "little fort") was taken and lost three times before the French finally held it. B saw some of the stiffest encounters, the Germans attacking the hill nearly every day after the French captured it, and even the Prussian Guard being put in. The woods at C, D, and E were centres of terrific combats, in which trenching and mining were continuous tasks. The redoubt at F was captured only after large losses on both sides. At the extreme west is still another wood, (G.) which the French attacked three times before they were successful in getting a foothold there.]