Chapter IX: Fighting in the Caucasus (7)

Dr. Eduard Meyer has contributed an article to the Sueddeutsche Monatshefte (Munich) on "Ancient Italy and the Rise of the Italian Nation." Dr. Meyer is professor of history in the University of Berlin, and is a brother of Dr. Kuno Meyer who recently attracted much attention in this country by severing his connection with Harvard University because of a prize "war poem" written by one of the undergraduates. A postscript reflects Dr. Meyer's present feeling toward Italy's defection:

The views which I have presented in this article are the
fruit of long years of study and research; and I feel myself
constrained to state explicitly that they are in no wise
influenced by the events which we have experienced during
the last few weeks. But it may be that a short postscript is
necessary.

Italy has not won her present national unity by reason of
her own strength; she owes it to the combinations of the
changing world-situation and the victories of foreign
powers, which her statesmen have known how to use to the
best advantage.

According to Dr. Meyer, Italy's claim to be one of the great powers is not based on any actual ability to uphold that claim; it merely happens that her assertion has not been challenged.

She has claimed for herself the status of a great power on a
par with the other large nations of the world; but she has
not possessed the inner strength of herself to support such
a claim without the help of stronger powers.

In August, 1914, Italy had the opportunity to decide her
fate. If she could have made the choice then, if she could
have gone into the world-war with all the might that she
possessed and, staking her whole existence, have fought
toward the highest goal, she might have won for herself a
powerful and self-sufficient place in the world.

On account of his many utterances since the outbreak of the war, Ludwig Thoma's Maerz (Munich), a weekly founded by him, has attracted much attention. An article entitled "Italy's Defection," in a recent issue, is most bitter in tone, accusing Italy of long-standing intrigue and treachery.

We know that Italy went still further from the fact that at
the renewal of the alliance in 1912 in Paris she expressly
announced that she would not march against France. It will
be remembered how quick the French army command was to take
stock of relations on the southeastern border, with the
result that in the very first days of mobilization their
troops were called from the Savoy Alps and by the eighth of
August were giving battle on the Alsatian border.

But Italy still guarded the neutrality which she had
proclaimed and with apparent reasonableness she was able to
hold that the letter of the Triple Alliance did not compel
her to enter the conflict. Laughing in her sleeve she could
even give it out that her sympathetic neutrality would
sufficiently guarantee to her allies certain suspended
contracts of an economic nature. Neutral Italy furnished
Germany to a considerable extent with products of its own
land and others which were not unwelcome.

That the mobilization of an Italian army on France's borders
might have been able to decide the war as far back as
September, is a consideration which, in the face of this
hypocritical neutrality, one cannot face without driving
one's nails into one's flesh!

It was through the connivance of England that Italy weakly found herself forced to enter the war against her former allies.

Sir Edward Grey found the way to do it. Italy learned that
England was no longer in a situation to hold the Straits of
Gibraltar and the Suez Canal open and was obliged to take
over the control of Italian imports. Even before this
British agents had control of the port of Genoa and there
was no doubt that through most irritating measures on
England's part which skillfully concealed the motive behind
them, a blow would be struck at the very roots of Italy's
existence and famine would set in. Presently the Italian
politicians and the crown were confronted with a dilemma
which left them the choice only between war and
revolution....

Not every people has the political government which it
deserves; the Italian people are the victims of a
government, essentially undeserved but traditionally
faithless.

But Mars is now shaking the dice and behind the curtain of
the future Revolution stands waiting.

Apologies for English Words

An indication of the height to which the "Gott Strafe England" feeling has climbed in Germany is shown in the following announcement by the management of Die Woche (Berlin):

TO OUR READERS!

Many readers of Die Woche have taken offense at the words
"Copyright by ..." (in English) and demand that this English
formula be rendered hereafter in German. This desire,
springing from patriotic motives, is easily understood, but
unfortunately cannot be carried out for the form "Copyright
by ..." is demanded by the American copyright law in this
form. If we did not print these words in English, which is
the official language of the United States, our copyright in
America would be void and the protection both of ourselves
and our writers would be forfeited.

Germanic Peace Terms

[From the Budapest Correspondent of The London Morning Post.]

To the Revue de Hongrie, the only French paper in Budapest, Count Andrassy contributes an article for July entitled "Les garanties d'une paix durable," and discusses the peace terms the Central Empires are to put forward in the event of final victory. He objects to the idea of annexation or anything more than "boundary corrections," and says:

Our war is a defensive war, which will achieve its aim when
our enemies have been expelled from our territory and their
ring has been broken. This aim could be best served by
making peace with one or other of our enemies and winning
him over to our cause. This would be of immense advantage to
the future of civilization and ensure us against the horrors
of a prolonged war. A separate peace would be the best
chance for certain Powers to change their international
policy. To my mind the issues of this war will greatly
change the attitude of some hostile States toward us, and
will bring about more intimate relations between them and
ourselves, besides widening the foundations of the alliance
between Hungary and her allies. And this is to be the rock
upon which the European balance of power is to rest in the
future. Our war is not a war of conquest, and the boundary
changes of which some people speak are not the _sine qua
non_ of a good peace. Therefore I do not even wish to speak
about certain territorial alterations, which, nevertheless,
might be necessary.

Regarding the question of England and nationality, Count Andrassy says:

Victory no doubt affords us the right to demand the
alteration of the map of Europe, yet, this not being our aim
and not to our interest, we can be satisfied with certain
compensations, as no doubt our enemies would not spare us if
they were victorious. Lloyd George said that the States are
to be shaped in the future according to nationalities, which
means that the Monarchy is to be disrupted. An English
scholar not long ago expressed the same view, and, in fact,
in England this idea is being impressed upon the people.
This policy is sounded in a country which dominates so many
millions of alien nationalities. If England speaks in this
way, though she is not in direct conflict with us, what can
we expect from Russia or Italy? Everyone knows that Russia
wants Galicia, the Bukovina, Maramaros; Serbia wants Bosnia,
Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, and the Banat; Italy they
won to their side by promising her our territory;
Transylvania is promised to the one who cares to take it;
henceforth, if we wish to defend it, we shall have to
prepare for a new attack from another quarter. Yet nothing
would be more alien to our thoughts than that if victorious
we should annex foreign territory, for we would have
seriously to consider if such conquest would be to our
advantage or not. The same policy ought to be applied in
Germany. Though her enemies would not spare her either, she
must be cautious not to go too far in her appetites, and
should seek for monetary compensations. Most of all she has
to be careful not to claim territory, which would mean
everlasting unrest and a new irredentism. It would be a bad
policy even to touch the Balkans, for such interference
would sooner or later bring Russia back to the Balkans, and
the peoples there, menaced in their independence by us,
would turn to Russia. We would thus place nations used to
independence under alien rule, and such an act would neither
be a wise nor a paying policy.

As regards Italy, Count Andrassy has also a solution which is quite generous. He says:

We would not do well if we were influenced by just revenge
and turned our eyes on Italian territory. To force territory
from a country whose people are so patriotic would be a
source of weakness on our part. In the worst case, only
boundary corrections can be thought of, and no conquest.
Italy must recompense us by money and not territory, for not
the Italian people, but its Government, committed a breach
of faith against us.

France's Bill of Damages

The agricultural problem in France is the subject of an article by Professor Daniel Zolla in La Revue Hebdomadaire (Paris). Professor Zolla is a leader in the agricultural school at Grignon, and the main part of his article is a discussion of France's agricultural losses and how to repair them. He sums the present situation as follows:

At the end of May the enemy were occupying territory
amounting to about two million hectares. In this zone as in
the regions invaded though immediately evacuated, the
agricultural losses have been admittedly severe: harvests,
livestock, implements, fodder, have been stolen or
destroyed; the buildings, burned or ruined, will have to be
entirely rebuilt. The soil itself, ploughed with trenches,
dug up by shells, infested with weeds, has lost much of its
fertility....

In the invaded region which is one of the richest and most
fertile in all France, the farming capital amounts at the
least to five hundred francs per hectare, not counting the
value of the buildings and of the land itself. For a total
of two million hectares, the sum thus represented in the
personal advances of farmers reach or surpass a billion, for
in French Flanders and in Artois this minimum estimate of
five hundred francs is greatly exceeded.

Concerning future indemnification for these losses, Professor Zolla writes:

It is the entire country at which the enemy wished to strike
by ruining a certain number of the people; it is the country
which should repair the ruin and indemnify the losses. Never
will the principle of national solidarity apply with more
justice and reason. The interest of the state can demand, it
is true, that the victim who has become a creditor of the
country shall not exact immediate payment of the sums due
him. This is a question of the time needed to enable the
country to pay and the representatives of the nation must be
the judges of that.

But admitting the principle, it will suffice if it be known
that the Treasury accepts the liability; it will be
sufficient if certain annuities are promised and managed so
that the parties can procure through the ordinary avenues of
credit, the necessary indemnities.

This is the method which the National Assembly adopted in
1873. A sum of one hundred and eleven millions voted as
relief, was represented by twenty-six annuities including
interest at five per cent. and redemption.

Professor Zolla admits that France is going to encounter a serious difficulty in the scarcity of labor which is sure to follow the close of the war. It is not too early, he advises, to begin working on the solution of this problem so that France will be ready to meet it when it arises:

There are in the main, two methods by which the scarcity of
farm labor can be offset:

1. By multiplying the machines which replace manual labor,

2. By modifying our agricultural methods so that preference
is given to those which demand the least proportion of
manual labor....

All the associations which are fortunately so numerous in
our country, all the agricultural societies, all the
co-operative societies which are already formed, should
double their efforts to put at the disposition of their
members those implements which on account of their high
price are not available for the individual farmer.

Prices will rise after the war, but this, argues Professor Zolla, will be beneficial rather than otherwise.

High prices will be offset by large production: this excess
of production will, however, follow on the activity of the
rural producer, and that activity will be maintained and
increased by high prices which always insure large profits.

In short, the rise in price wall be most favorable to the
agricultural interests just at a time when the difficulties
of obtaining labor will come to swell the necessary expenses
of production. The crisis which might be in store is thus
dissipated and the agricultural situation remains much as it
was before the war--that is to say, very satisfactory.

The losses undergone will be considerable in the invaded
regions, the obstacles which the farmer must overcome will
be great but not insurmountable, but success will recompense
the valor and the hard labor of our countrymen. And to be
just we must not forget that this will be made possible by
the work of the French women in the fields.

A French Rejoinder

In the Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris), of which he is managing editor, M. Francis Charmes, of the Academie Francaise, replies to a speech made by von Bethmann-Hollweg before the Reichstag, in which the German Chancellor expressed sympathy for the deluded French soldiers, who had not an inkling of the true course which the war was taking. M. Charmes ironically remarks:

We do not publish, he [von Bethmann-Hollweg] claims, any of
the German dispatches, so that opinion is quite
unenlightened as to what is actually happening on the field
of battle.

One would think, according to M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, that
the German dispatches are a source on which one can rely
with full confidence, and one would imagine, too, since he
had thus reproached us, that the German newspapers published
the French dispatches.

As a matter of fact, they do not and if it is necessary to
hear both sides to know the truth then the Germans are quite
ignorant of it. They are indeed very far removed from
knowing it, and it is a constant surprise to our officers
and our soldiers to discover when they question their
prisoners, the profound illusions under which they labor.

Dr. von Bode's Polemic

Some time ago Dr. Wilhelm von Bode, the well-known director of the Berlin Art Museums and Germany's authority in matters of art, issued a justification of German conduct in Rheims and Louvain, which he supported by a review of Germany's world-contribution to art. "The German Science of Art and the War," was the title of the article. Jacques Mesnil, writing in the Mercure de France, presents a reply to Dr. von Bode's polemic.

He brands as infantile the reasoning by which Dr. Bode proves the German soldier incapable of destroying a work of art. The German professor stated that civilization, and with it art, could not have survived were it not for the protection of German militarism. M. Mesnil replies:

M. Bode should have been able to separate a little better
two things which have nothing to do with each other:
strategy and the history of art. He should have explained
the conduct of the soldiers by the service which is required
of them; he should have pointed out precisely the point of
view of the archaeologist as incompatible with that of the
warrior and he should have freed of responsibility those
who, loving the picturesque old cities and the pure
creations of artists, could not sympathize with those who
destroy them.

Far from this, he has invoked the merits of German science
to justify the outrages of the soldiery and in his eyes the
fact that German savants have added to the progress of
archaeology suffices to prove that the German army is
incapable of destroying works of art.

Examination of Professor von Bode's claim that Germany leads the world in the "science of art," would seem to M. Mesnil to show that the German art-scientist is little more than a painstaking classifier, a mere cataloguer.

Taken as a whole, the art historians in Germany are a lot of
excellent laborers, energetic and conscientious, who could
render valuable service were they well directed. But it is
precisely their direction which is at fault. Those among
them who play the role of leader do not know how to
distinguish the relative importance of the problems which
come to their consideration; in confused multitude of facts,
they follow a purely exterior and quite military order in
their classifications; in the same way that a man in the
army is a man only and that all the human units are in rigid
divisions, so for the apostles of "the science of art" a
fact is a fact and automatically falls under the head
destined for it.

"Carnegie and German Peace"

An article in La Revue (Paris), "Carnegie and the German Peace," would seem to indicate that France is not yet looking toward peace. The article is by Jean Finot himself, the well-known editor and publisher of La Revue, and it gives the pacifists short shrift indeed. The American peace propaganda, M. Finot characterizes as "the attempt at corruption," and he holds Mr. Carnegie responsible:

Unfortunately Mr. Carnegie endeavors to keep them [his
opinions regarding peace] alive by supporting them with
considerable sums of money for their diffusion abroad. A
movement for "a German peace" has thus sprung up in America
and it is taking on more and more disquieting
proportions....

Mr. Carnegie has been accused and not perhaps without
reason, of subsidizing many Germanophile publications and
thus of aiding in the work of corruption which Germany and
her agents are carrying on throughout the whole world.

The recent peace congress of women at The Hague comes in for some strong language:

The international congress of women pacifists seems to be
due to Mr. Carnegie's generosity. This poisoning of public
opinion, carried out systematically by his agents and his
money, has become particularly odious. We do not suspect the
honesty of his intentions, but we deplore his profound lack
of comprehension of the events which have been taking place
before his eyes.

Among the American women noted for their talent and
character, Miss Jane Addams occupies a prominent place. But
it seems that her sturdy honesty was not sufficient to
resist the temptation of putting herself at the heels of Mr.
Carnegie. We are convinced the charges of other than purely
disinterested motives against Miss Addams are wholly
unjustified. But she has participated in the women's
congress at The Hague under truly regrettable conditions.

M. Finot's references to Chautauqua and the part it plays in the preparation of American opinion are veiled but none the less suggestive:

The important role which the Chautauqua conferences play in
the United States is well known. These conferences of
teachers which have so profound an influence on American
opinion have been supported by Mr. Carnegie in the interests
of realizing this idea of a precipitate peace, of a German
peace. All manner of adventurers and seekers of easy
fortunes have gathered around this strange deviation of the
pacifist ideal represented by the multi-millionaire and the
men of his stripe.

Russia's Supply of Warriors

In an article headed "Ought the War to Last Long--and Can It Last Long?" V. Kuzmin-Karavaeff says in the Russian European Messenger for June:

It is, of course, impossible to say how long the war will
last. But the case is altered if the question be put in
another form: _Ought_ the war to last long, and _can_ it
last long? The ten months which have elapsed make it
entirely possible to answer it, for, in answering it, there
is no need to guess at the thoughts, wishes, and hopes of
the Germans which are bound up with the war.

In the eyes of Russia and her Allies the present war has as
its object the crushing and dispersing of "the nest of
militarism," constructed in the centre of Europe by the hand
of Bismarck and the vainglory of Wilhelm II. That was
clearly defined last autumn by our diplomatic department.
That is precisely the way in which it was and is defined by
all classes of the Russian people, not excluding those who
are represented by Kropotkin and Plekhanoff. The present war
became far more for Germany than a war for the integrity of
her territory, for her colonial interests, or for her
commercial supremacy, from the moment when three--now
four--great powers rose at her arrogant challenge. Germany
is everywhere attacking, but, in reality, she is conducting
a desperate war of defence for the organization of her
existence, which, for the space of forty years, has rested
on a nervous anticipation of war with her neighbors.
Germany's offensive is a strategical manoeuvre. As a
matter of fact, she is fighting like a wild animal
surrounded on all sides. And, of course, she will carry on
the war until the last degree of exhaustion is reached. She
has accumulated within her many forces--technical forces.
Mere technical forces cannot stand their ground in the end.
But no little time must still elapse. And the war _must_
continue for a long time still, if the "nest of militarism"
is to be annihilated.

But, on the other hand, _can_ it continue a long time? We
Russians have a complete right to say, with conviction: Yes.
Ten months of war have plainly demonstrated that we still
possess a land which is still intact, and personal and
economic forces.

To the east of the Dnieper and Moscow the war is hardly felt
at all. This is particularly true of the principal
foundations of our life--the peasant country parts numbering
their hundred millions. The villages have sent to the war
millions of young men, and even fathers of families, heads
of households. Many tears have already been shed in the
country, and there are many orphans, many cripples. But the
peasant countryside has not suffered economically. On the
contrary, after ten months of war and closed liquor-shops,
it has reconstructed itself and smartened itself up to a
noteworthy degree. The fields have been sown. From among the
huge mass only those laboring hands have been withdrawn for
the war which would not have remained at home in any case,
but would have been lured away to earn money elsewhere.

The same thing is observable also in the towns. The masses
in the towns have increased their deposits in the savings
banks tenfold, while consuming more meat than before the
war, and resorting less frequently to the loan banks.
Information made its way out of Germany long ago to the
effect that all the males there, with the exception of
decrepit old men and small children, have been called to the
army. The peculiar "crisis in men" in Berlin has frequently
served as a subject of jest in the humorous press.

In Russia, every railway station swarms with young, healthy,
powerful porters who offer their services; every large
restaurant has a host of waiters; the wharves on the Volga
and, in conclusion, the mere throngs on the streets bear
witness to the fact that nothing resembling the "crisis in
men" exists with us. Numerous as have been the soldiers who
have gone to the war, the supply of men who are capable of
bearing arms is still colossally great with us.
Consequently, we have the material to fill up losses in the
army. And that being the case, we can go on with the war for
a long time to come--for as long a time as may be necessary
to bring it to a proper ending.

A Former Cabinet Minister, and Leader of Pro-Ally Party in Rumania

(_Photo from Central News._)]

Leader of the Neutralist Party, who Succeeded Venizelos as Premier of Greece]

Austria and the Balkans

Germanic influences in the Balkan Peninsula are discussed by A. Pogodin in the magazine Russian Thought. Mr. Pogodin says:

Without having in view any acquisitions whatsoever in the
northern part of the Peninsula, Russia is deeply interested
in seeing to it that Germanic influence does not acquire
preponderance there, because that influence, in its turn,
has no aims save territorial acquisition. The Balkan
Peninsula is admitted to be the most influential camp of
Pan-Germanism for the colony desired by the Germanic world,
from which it is but a step to Central Asia. And it was this
plan that Russia was compelled to combat. Unfortunately, she
resisted too feebly, and our diplomacy betrayed an extremely
poor comprehension of Russian problems. Austria's snatching
appetite was fully revealed in the formula of partition of
the Peninsula into two spheres of influence: Austria was to
have Serbia and Bosnia, Russia the Bulgarian provinces of
the Ottoman Empire. We all know how that ended: Serbia was
abandoned by Russia at the Berlin Congress, and had no
choice but to throw herself into the arms of Austria, which
wrought fearful demoralization in the land. Tens of years
were required before little, tormented Serbia--which had
not, nevertheless, lost her freshness of spiritual power
"found herself," that is to say, turned again to Russia, and
did not reject her even during the period of the
persecutions of 1908 which followed. This constituted the
great service rendered to his people by the King of Serbia,
Peter. Serbia has not perished, has not fallen into ruin,
and has shown herself able to endure a war with Turkey, as
she is now bearing the incredible blows of Austria-Hungary.
But Bulgaria, which rejected Russia, has been seized in the
grip of internal disturbances; she stands distracted before
her Slavonic duty, and knows not whither she must go or why.
If, at the last moment, she has sufficient sense to find her
only way of salvation, which is in friendship with Slavdom,
that, again, will be to the credit of Russia.

That is why, at the present moment, when the last act of the
Balkan tragedy, begun long ago, is being played, we can look
history in the face with calm eyes. Whatever may be formed
after the end of this war, whether a Slavonic Federation, in
which Russia could hardly take much interest, since she
requires, first of all, the concentration of her own forces,
or a series of independent, separate Slavonic kingdoms, we
may say that, in having summoned the Slavs to unity, Russia
has not deceived them, has not led them along a false road
to destruction.

Italy's Publications in War-Time

Absolutely nothing is published in the Italian papers or reviews concerning military or naval operations until the result of a given movement is known. Meanwhile, what are Italians reading and what is the intellectual food given them to sustain the wonderful sentimental enthusiasm with which they welcomed the war?

Previous to Italy's declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, on May 24, the press in general dealt with the negotiations between the two Governments from the point of view of domestic politics, which gave foreigners the impression that Italy was only waiting to receive her price to remain neutral until the end of the war. Austrian intrigue and dilatoriness were alike criticized. Little was said about Germany in regard to Italy, although her military methods in Belgium and northern France, her raids on the defenseless coast towns of England, and her submarine activities in the War Zone were severely condemned. This censure, however, was entirely academic and objective. The reviews republished a quantity of English, French, Russian, and even American articles as to the causes of the war, and the illustrations which accompanied them could hardly be considered pro-Teutonic. Only the comic press--and this in spite of its augmenting circulation which should have indicated to observers the sentiment that was elsewhere suppressed--gave full vent to popular emotion.

The moment war was declared there was a complete change. To be sure the "Green Book" was published in numerous 20-cent editions and sold by the hundreds of thousands and the closing speeches of Italian and Austrian diplomats were given in full with comments, yet little time was wasted with explanations of the failure of the Italo-Austrian negotiations and the meaning of the Seventh Article of the Triple Alliance. The daily press, the weekly periodicals, and the monthly reviews suddenly changed their objective expositions of Germany's conduct in regard to others and began to expound, explain, and elucidate, in an intimate subjective manner, how that conduct affected Italy.

Austria was almost ignored. The anti-German riots at Milan and other cities, where thousands of dollars worth of property was systematically destroyed before the authorities could interfere, showed the volcano that had been lying dormant beneath the surface. Articles which must have been prepared months before suddenly appeared in the press and reviews showing how Germany had come to control the banks and steamship lines of the Peninsula and how German capital, under the guise of promoting Italian enterprises, had laid hold of vast industries whose profits went to fill the pockets of the Germans; and, worst of all, how the savings of Italian immigrants in America had gone, through the German-conducted banks, to enrich the same persons without any contingent benefit to Italians.

Indeed, it almost seemed as though the press and reviews alike had been organized as completely as had the army and navy for the prosecution of the war with the sole object in view of preventing Germany ever again from using the Peninsula as a territory for exploitation. The propaganda for _Italia Irredenta_ suddenly sank into insignificance beside the determination to throw off, once and for all, the German commercial, industrial, and financial yoke, revealing the abiding faith of the Italian people that their army would attend to the former as completely as desirable and without the advice and criticism of civilians. Faith in their King and their army and in their ultimate success is not a matter for argument among Italians.

Meanwhile, the staffs of all publications, from editors to compositors, have felt the weight of conscription--sacrifices they enthusiastically make for the common cause. Their pages may be fewer and some favorite contributors may be heard of no more, but they are sure that the public will bear with them. On the other hand, a new periodical has sprung into existence called La Guerra d'Italia nel 1915--The Italian War of 1915--the first number of which has just come to hand. Its introduction accompanied with several well-made portraits constructs the basis of Italy's action--how Italy having been tricked through a fancied fear of France and the apparent unresponsiveness of England into entering the Triple Alliance in 1882, had been forced to remain there, possibly protected thereby from actual Austrian aggression, but ever a prey to German exploitation. Then comes an analysis of the Italo-Austrian negotiations, conducted directly and through Prince von Buelow, the Special German Ambassador in Rome, showing why these negotiations could not possibly have succeeded. Like the Government itself the new periodical is in no haste to describe military operations.

The first review to devote almost its entire space to the war was La Vita Internazionale of Milan. The opening article is by the well-known publicist E.T. Moneta. He begins:

Without boast but with self-esteem secure, Italy has taken
her place in the combat among the nations which for ten
months have been fighting for the liberty of the people and
the cause of civilization. The enthusiasm with which this
announcement has been received in France, Russia, and
England, and especially in martyred Belgium, is enormous.
For they have all understood what decisive effect our army
would produce on the destiny of the Great War.

The fighters for liberty and civilization who have always
hoped for an ultimate victory, today feel the certainty of
that hope, and that the duration of the war with the loss of
millions of other lives will be shortened. For this reason,
from those governments and people, from their parliaments
and from their press, from workingmen's societies and from
institutions of learning there have come to our country warm
words of admiration and of social unity. All these things
form an added inspiration for us to do our best to hasten
the end of this slaughter of men.

Signor Moneta goes on to compliment the diplomacy of Premier Salandra for resigning from office and thus giving the people the opportunity to show through their demonstrations that they desired war and to silence once and forever the propaganda of Giolitti who had declaimed in vain that the people did not want war, as they could secure by negotiations unredeemed Italy--as though that were all.

Another article is by D. Giuseppe Antonini and is entitled "The German Madness." Its subject, full of quotations from Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi, is not new to Americans. For Italians it may come as a revelation. It demonstrates the formative influences which have found expression in what is called "Prussian Militarism," as an attitude of mind which believes in the supremacy of force over all things--over goodness, virtue, kindness, and all else that make life worth living. It declares that Prussian Militarism has so possessed all Germans that not only their moral but their logical point of view has become distorted, so that they behold nought but virtue in applying science to bring about Mediaeval results. The conflict, he declares, is between absolutism which pretends to be sufficient unto itself and democracy which receives its power from the people, and that the latter must win unless centuries of the power, by revolutions without number, for the benefit of the masses are to end in failure.

Paolo Baccari deals with "The Supreme Duty." He says that the intervention of Italy was not merely to complete Unification by uniting all Italians of the Peninsula and the Adriatic littoral under one flag and government, but to register herself as standing for justice, law, and humanity against organized barbarity, injustice, illegality, and inhumanity, which, if victorious, would not rest until it had conquered the world. He calls the peace propaganda at this time a "vile lie of conventionality" because its success could only mean the victory of those forces which all honest nationalities and persons condemn.

As to the other serious reviews, such as the Nuova Antologia and the Rivista d'Italia, their June numbers, aside from expounding Italy's relations to Germany, have not gone beyond academic discussion of the causes of the war and the economic phases as revealed by the budgets of France, England, and Russia, and the sacrifices that Italy must endure in order to make her a worthy ally of these countries, all putting forth their greatest efforts in the battle for the world's salvation.

There are in Italy a large number of popular, well illustrated, monthly magazines, which, taking it for granted that their readers have already been thoroughly instructed as to the diplomatic phases of the war, have started a campaign of education in regard to the war itself. There are articles contrasting the armies of the days of Garibaldi and the great King Victor Emmanuel with those of the present. There are also articles, historical and descriptive, sociological and economic, on Trieste, Trent, and other cities of Unredeemed Italy, and historical monographs showing the bonds that formerly bound Italy to England and to France which have now been cemented anew, free from all Teutonic influence.

Among the magazines of this class are the Secolo XX, the Noi e il Mondo, and La Lettura; all, whenever the occasion offers, deal generously and enthusiastically with Italy's allies.

In all this published matter one thing has been revealed since Italy entered the war. Previously all the Italian writers placed in the same category of contempt the alleged attempts that were being made to influence Italy by the Central Empires as well as by the Entente Powers and unblushingly declared that if Italy ever entered the war it would not be for the benefit of one party or the other but for the benefit of herself alone. Now they frankly confess that the Entente Powers made no attempt to influence Italy, knowing all the time that when she was ready she would line up on their side.

Sweden and the Lusitania

By SWEDISH ARTISTS AND PROFESSORS

Stockholm, May 10, 1915.

English people know that the Swedish nation is practically unanimous in supporting the Government in its policy of strict neutrality. Yet a large section of the people, whether the majority or not we cannot say, is anything but neutral in their feelings at the methods of warfare which have been adopted in this terrible war, and have culminated in the sinking of the Lusitania.

The misconception that war suspends all laws of humanity must prove fatal to the future of civilization and disastrous for that human solidarity that is of such vital interest to the smaller nations especially.

(Signed)

SVANTE ARRHENIUS, Professor. BARON ADELSWARD. VICTOR ALMQUIST, Chief Director for State Prisons. W. LECS, Professor. KNUT KJELLBERG, Professor. JULES AKERMAN, Professor. TORGNY SEGERSTEDT, Professor. ISRAEL HOLMGREN, Professor. G. KOBB, Professor. OTTOR ROSENBERG, Professor. GUNNAR ANDERSSON, Professor. GERHARD DE GEER, Professor. OLOF KINBERG, M.D. ALFRED PETREN, M.D. JOHN TJERNELD, barrister. TOR HEDBERG, author. HJALMAR SODERBERG, author. G. STJERNSTEDT, barrister. IVAN HEDQUIST, actor at Royal Theatre. IVAN BRATT, M.D. T. FOGELQUIST, Rector. MRS. EMILIA BROOME. MISS SIGNE HEBBA. CHRISTIAN ERIKSEN, sculptor. LUDVIG MOBERG, M.D. KARL NORDSTROM, artist. NILS KREUGER, artist. ARNOLD JOSEFSON, M.S. CARL ELDH, sculptor. MISS ALMA SUNDQUIST, M.D.

A Threatened Despotism of Spirit

By Gertrude Atherton

The subjoined article, appearing as a letter to THE NEW YORK
TIMES, was provoked by the appearance on hundreds of
billboards in New York of flaring appeals to American women
that they use their influence to prevent the further
exportation of arms and munitions to the enemies of Germany.

New York, July 5, 1915.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

As I do not belong to any of the suffrage or other woman's organizations in New York, may I say in your columns that for the honor of my sex, if for no other reason, I hope the Mayor will consent to the obliteration of those disingenuous posters addressing "American citizens," and so cunningly worded and signed as to produce an impression of representing the women of the United States? If the people that are spending their thousands so freely had come out frankly and stated that they were pro-German, and that the success of their propaganda would mean defeat for the Allies, short of ammunition, and victory for a nation that has nine-tenths of all the ammunition in Europe, then at least we should have the sheep separated from the goats; we could put it down to masculine influence over the weaker female vessel, which at least was trying to be honest, and let it go at that.

But I hold that such a poster, flaring from every billboard, is a defamation of patriotic American women, and a distinct blow to the cause of suffrage. It will not only antagonize men, who alone have the power to grant the franchise in those States still obdurate, but disgust thousands of women not yet won over to the cause, and far too intelligent not to know the precise meaning behind those lying and hypocritical words. For if that poster were really representative of American women it would mean that American women were traitors to their country, just as all pro-German American men, whatever their descent, are traitors, whether they realize it or not. What was the cause of the roar of indignation that went up all over the United States on Aug. 1? Anti-Germanism? Not a bit of it. If Russia had made the declaration of war the roar would have been as immediate and as loud. It was the spontaneous protest of the spirit of democracy against an arrogant autocracy that dared to plunge Europe into war and the world into panic, without the consent of the people; the manifest of a mediaeval power by an ambitious and unscrupulous group over millions of industrious, peace-loving men who had nothing to gain and all to lose.

It has been pointed out over and over again how diametrically opposed are the German and American ideals; therefore, it seems incredible that every American who champions the cause of a powerful and sublimely egotistic nation does not realize that what he hopes to see is not only the victory of the German arms in Europe, but the eventual destruction of democracy, the annihilation of the spirit of America as epitomized in the Declaration of Independence. I have not the least apprehension of immediate war with Germany, any more than of physical defeat at her hands did she, with the rest of Europe prostrate, make a raid on our shores; but it seems hardly open to question that with Europe Prussianized, we, the one heterogeneous race, and always ready to absorb and imbibe from the parent countries, should lose, in the course of half a century, our tremendous individual hustle, and gratefully permit a benevolent (and cast iron) despotism (not unnecessarily of our own make) to do our thinking, perhaps to select our jobs and apportion our daily tasks.

For that is what it almost amounts to now in Germany, and it is for this reason, no less than to escape military service, that so many millions of Germans have immigrated to this country. Unlike the vast majority of the bourgeois and lower classes, a kindly but stupid people, they were born with an alertness of mind and an energy of character which gave them the impetus to transfer themselves to a land where life might be harder but where soul and body could attain to a complete independence. Their present attitude is, however unconsciously, hypocritical, but it is not altogether as traitorous as that of the American born, who has not the excuse of that peculiar form of sentimentality which has fermented in Germans at home and abroad during this period of their Fatherland's peril. It is this curious and wholly German brand of sentimentality which is the cohering force in the various and extraordinarily clever devices by which modern Germany has been solidified. It is a sentimentality capable of rising to real exaltation that no other nation is capable of, and that alone should make the American pro-German pause and meditate upon a future United States where native individualism was less and less reluctantly heading for the iron jaws of the Prussianized American machine; and, furthermore, upon the weird spectacle of the real gladiatorial contest--German sentimentality wrestling in a death grapple with American downright unpicturesque common sense.

During the seven years that I lived in Munich I learned to like Germany better than any state in Europe. I liked and admired the German people; I never suffered from an act of rudeness, and I never was cheated out of a penny. I was not even taxed until the year before I left, because I made no money out of the country and turned in a considerable amount in the course of a year. When my maid went to the Rathaus to pay my taxes, (moderate enough,) the official apologized, saying that he had disliked to send me a bill, but the increased cost of the army compelled the country to raise money in every way possible. This was in 1908. The only disagreeable German I met during all those years was my landlord, and as we always dodged each other in the house or turned an abrupt corner to avoid encounter on the street, we steered clear of friction. And he was the only landlord I had.

I left Munich with the greatest regret, and up to the moment of the declaration of war I continued to like Germany better than any country in the world except my own.

The reason I left was significant. I spent, as a rule, seven or eight months in Munich, then a similar period in the United States, unless I traveled. I always returned to my apartment with such joy that if I arrived at night I did not go to bed lest I forget in sleep how overjoyed I was to get back to that stately and picturesque city, so prodigal with every form of artistic and aesthetic gratification. But that was just the trouble. For as long a time after my return as it took to write the book I had in mind I worked with the stored American energy I had within me; then for months and in spite of good resolutions and some self-anathema I did nothing. What was the use? The beautiful German city so full of artistic delight was made to live in, not to work in. The entire absence of poverty in that city of half a million inhabitants alone gave it an air of illusion, gave one the sense of being the guest of a hospitable monarch who only asked to provide a banquet for all that could appreciate. I look back upon Munich as the romance of my life, the only place on this globe that came near to satisfying every want of my nature. And that is the reason why, in a sort of panic, I abruptly pulled up stakes and left it for good and all. It is not in the true American idea to be too content; it means running to seed, a weakening of the will and the vital force. If I remained too long in that lovely land--so admirably governed that I could not have lost myself, or my cat, had I possessed one--I should in no long course yield utterly to a certain resentfully admitted tendency to dream and drift and live for pure beauty; finally desert my own country with the comfortable reflection: Why all this bustle, this desire to excel, to keep in the front rank, to find pleasure in individual work, when so many artistic achievements are ready-made for all to enjoy without effort? For--here is the point--an American, the American of today--accustomed to high speed, constant energy, nervous tenseness, the uncertainty, and the fight, cannot cultivate the leisurely German method, the almost scientific and impersonal spirit that informs every profession and branch of art. It is our own way or none for us Americans.

Therefore, if loving Germany as I did, and with only the most enchanting memories of her, I had not immediately permitted the American spirit to assert itself last August and taken a hostile and definite stand against the German idea (which includes, by the way, the permanent subjection of woman) I should have been a traitor, for I knew out of the menace I had felt to my own future, as bound up with an assured development under insidious influences, what the future of my country, which stands for the only true progress in the world today, and a far higher ideal of mortal happiness than the most benevolent paternalism can bestow, had in store for it, with Germany victorious, and America (always profoundly moved by success owing to her very practicality) disturbed, but compelled to admire.

The Germans living here, destitute as their race seems to be of psychology when it comes to judging other races, must know all this; so I say that they are traitors if they have taken the oath of allegiance to the United States. If they have not, and dream of returning one day to the fatherland, then I have nothing to say, for there is no better motto for any man than: "My country, right or wrong."

"Gott Mit Uns"

By C. HUNTINGTON JACOBS

[Harvard Prize Poem]

Professor Kuno Meyer, of the University of Berlin, resigned
his incumbency as Visiting Professor at Harvard University
during the next season because of this poem, which was
printed in _The Harvard Advocate_ of April 9th, last, and
won the prize in a competition for poems on the war
conducted by that publication. This announcement of it
appeared editorially: "Dean Briggs and Professor Bliss
Perry, the judges of the _Advocate_ war poem prize
competition, have awarded the prize to C. Huntington Jacobs,
1916."

No doubt _ye_ are the people: Wisdom's flame
Springs from _your_ cannon--yea from yours alone.
God needs _your_ dripping lance to prop His throne;
_Your_ gleeful torch His glory to proclaim.
No doubt _ye_ are the people: far from shame
Your Captains who deface the sculptured stone
Which by the labor and the blood and bone
Of pious millions calls upon His name.

No doubt _ye_ are the folk; and 'tis to prove
Your wardenship of Virtue and of Lore
Ye sacrifice the Truth in reeking gore
Upon your altar to the Prince of Love.
Yet still cry we who still in darkness plod:
"'Tis Antichrist ye serve and not our God!"

On the Psychology of Neutrals

By Friedrich Curtius

Friedrich Curtius, of Strassburg, had attained such
distinction at the beginning of the century that Prince
Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingfuerst, who succeeded Count
Caprivi as Chancellor of the German Empire, on his
retirement in 1900, asked Curtius to co-operate with him in
the preparation of the _Memoirs_ (New York, The Macmillan
Co., 1906) which have since become famous. But the joint
work was brought to a sudden end by Prince Hohenlohe's
death, and Friedrich Curtius devoted himself, for the next
six or seven years, to the completion of the unfinished
task. When the _Memoirs_ were finally published, first in
America and then in Germany, they were so outspoken as to
bring down on Prince Alexander Hohenlohe and Friedrich
Curtius the disfavour of the Kaiser. This article by Curtius
appeared originally in the Deutsche Revue, May, 1915.

"_All the world must hate or love; no choice remains. The Devil is neutral._"

So sang Clemens Brentano in the year 1813. Today, we once more realize that the attempt to remain neutral through a conflict which is deciding the history of the world not only brings great spiritual difficulties, but is even felt to be a downright moral impossibility, just as the poet saw it a hundred years ago. Legal neutrality is, of course, a simple thing. Every state can itself practice it, and impose it as a duty on its citizens. One may even think that modern states should go further in this direction than they do. The indifference of the Government toward the business transactions of its citizens with foreign states is a political anomaly, comprehensible in an age when foreign policy in war and peace was viewed as something that concerned the ruler only, but contradictory in a democratic age, when wars are peoples' wars. Today, in all civilized states, the Government is morally answerable for those activities of its subjects which have international results. The American policy which permits the supply of weapons to England but allows England to prevent the export of grain to Germany, is a bad neutrality, morally untenable, a mere passivity, which lacks the will to do right. Such a standpoint might exist in a despotically governed state, but in a democratic Republic it is incomprehensible. For, from a genuinely democratic point of view, it does not signify whether the government or the citizens intervene to help or to hinder in an armed conflict. If we venture to speak at the right time of the development of international law, this, before all, must be demanded: that neutral states shall forbid the export of weapons, and that belligerents shall not hinder the import of foodstuffs for civilian populations.