Chapter XIV: Part 14

As to the nature of these military tribunes, their magistracy is for us a subject of considerable obscurity.[108] Livy says of them, _eos juribus et insignibus consularibus usos esse_, and they are also called _tribuni militares consulari potestate_; but Dio Cassius, that acute observer, who himself had sat in the curule chair, says that the military tribunes were inferior to the consuls, and that not one of them had ever been granted a triumph, though many had performed deeds which were worthy of it. This is in perfect accordance with history. We also find that a consul was never appointed _Magister Equitum_, but that the military tribunes certainly were. From this it seems to be evident that the military tribunes were no _magistratus curules_, that is to say, none of those magistrates, as Gellius explains it, who were allowed to make use of a carriage (thus we have _Juno Curulis_, whose image was carried on a car). The consuls drove in carriages to the _Curia_; the full triumph was termed _triumphus curulis_, according to the Monumentum Ancyranum on which the number of the _triumphi curules_ of Augustus is given; different from this is the _Ovatio_.[109]--Moreover, the military tribunes never had any jurisdiction; but originally the censors, and afterwards the _Præfectus Urbi_ had one, the latter probably holding likewise the presidency in the senate. This magistracy also had been abolished by the decemviral legislation; but it now again makes its appearance. The consular power was weakened in this manner, and so it was afterwards by the Licinian law; for when at that time the consulship was divided between patricians and plebeians, the prætorship was separated from it, and established as a distinct magistracy. We may understand how it was, that the plebeians preferred the election of military tribunes, even when they were not taken from their own order: their power was at all events less. According to Livy’s account, it was the senate which decided in every instance, whether consuls or military tribunes were to be elected: it is more probable that it was the curies which determined it. The mistake may have been occasioned by the ambiguous word _patres_. The military tribunate is also of a wonderfully variable character. Sometimes, but seldom, we find three tribunes; more frequently, four; but from 347 or 348, regularly whenever they occur, six; once, as many as eight, among whom, however, the two censors are included. Of the four, one is generally _Præfectus Urbi_: so that in reality there are after all only three. The claim of the plebeians to be chosen among the military tribunes is never disputed; but after the first election it is almost always eluded. How this could be done is inconceivable; Livy’s explanation of it is silly. On the one hand, it is quite possible that a compromise was made, and that the patricians said, we consent to the weaker magistracy’s being established, but then it must be filled up from our ranks only; or else in the earlier times the preceding magistrate had the right of not accepting any votes (_nomina non accipere_) in favour of those who from different reasons were to be rejected; or again, if six military tribunes were elected, the curies afterwards gave the _imperium_ to the patricians only, and denied it to the plebeians. Yet it is incomprehensible in this last case how the plebeians could have allowed it. Unfortunately Dionysius fails us here, who, though he did not himself understand these relations, nevertheless faithfully recorded the facts as he found them: if we had him, the whole of this period would undoubtedly be clearer to us. After the last change, when six military tribunes always occur, we several times find the plebeians in a majority among them; and it is evident that it was then a settled rule that the number of six should always be full, and that without any further distinction between the two orders. This looks very much as if in the change the election had been transferred from the centuries to the tribes. It now depended only upon the honesty of the president whether he received the votes or not. That policy by which Italy became great in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, that wretched ideal of states-craft, is now displayed in the Roman history, especially in the division in the college of tribunes. This is one of the causes, which for some time checked the progress of Rome.

Times in which successful wars are carried on, as was now the case with Rome until the Gallic invasion, are exceedingly apt to lead subjects to acquiesce in what they otherwise would never have borne with. The name of the state was surrounded with a halo of glory; a great deal of booty was gained, and also many conquests; plebeians as well as patricians felt comfortable; and although the power was not much liked, matters were yet allowed to go on as they were. Rome recovered from the decline into which she had fallen since the _Regifugium_. Moreover the intermarriage allowed between the two orders, must have exercised a powerful influence: the families on both sides became more closely related; the patrician who, born of a plebeian mother, was in the senate, stood on an equal footing with the plebeians.

A greater, a lasting magistracy, and according to all appearance the first, the lustre of which far outshone that of the military tribunes, was the censorship. If we admit that it was instituted by the twelve tables, we can understand why Cicero also made the censors the first magistrates. He may have copied this from the laws of the twelve tables; only he must have left out something, as there they had yet a greater number of attributes. The consuls are said to have formerly had the functions of the censors; which is very probable from the almost kingly power of the consuls, and it is only to be wondered how they could have got through this immense amount of work. The Greek states also had τιμηταί, Athens alone excepted, and the Siceliote and Italiote towns had them as well; yet nowhere in Greece was their power so extensive as at Rome. According to the Roman law, the censors had to value and assess; accurate lists were kept of properties, of births and deaths, of newly admitted citizens. Yet we are to distinguish between two kinds of lists. The one was of persons, and was arranged according to names; Q. Mucius, for instance, with all his family and rateable property, stood under his name among the _Tribus Romilia_: his sons wearing the _toga virilis_ may perhaps have had each a distinct _caput_. The other list was topographical; in it the landed estates were registered according to the districts, for instance, the _Tribus Romilia_ in all its divisions. The ancients wrote on the whole much more than is generally imagined; this was done with a prolixity which was part of the forms of the state. In London, I saw a register of lands belonging to an Indian province,--in the translation, of course, as I do not understand a word of the Indian language,--which had a copiousness of detail of which we can scarcely form an idea. And it was the same among the ancients: the registers of mortgages at Athens were very prolix; and so, even in later ages, were the contracts before the curies at Rome. In the registers of the Roman censors, the division of the hides was very accurately marked down; under the _caput_ of every individual, his descent, tribe, station, property, &c. were entered. Now the censors had also the power of transferring people from one class to the other, as an honour or a disgrace; yet what were the qualities for which they pronounced the _ignominia_, as it is termed? Every one in Rome was to correspond to the definition of his station; a plebeian was necessarily an agriculturist, either a land-owner or a free day labourer. This rule was laid down positively; and still more strictly in its negative bearing, as no one who carried on a trade or business could be a plebeian. Whoever did so, was forthwith struck out of the list of the tribe; consequently this was not so much a personal _ignominia_, as a declaration that he had passed from one side to the other. But he who badly cultivated his field was likewise put out of the tribe, that is to say, he was declared to be _de facto_ no husbandman; and so was the _eques_ who kept his horse badly: this is the _notatio censoria_. Such a person was placed among the burghers of the pale (_ærarii_), because he was not worthy of holding his property. The ærarian, on the other hand, who distinguished himself, who acquired landed property, was placed as a mark of honour among the plebeians; the plebeian who distinguished himself, was transferred into the centuries of the plebeian knights. Foreigners, however, they could certainly not make citizens: for this there were fixed rules, or else the popular assembly conferred the right of citizenship by means of an extraordinary act. In a state, the changeable elements of which were widely different,--where the _Plebes_ was not an exclusive order, but was allowed to recruit itself; and where there existed among its ranks an aristocratic order of honour, that of the knights, which was not bound to the census; there must be some authority which assigns to every individual his station: for such an order of honour cannot be exclusive and unchangeable, owing to its very nature as an order of honour. One might say, that the decision about it ought to have been left to the people; yet this was not only a circuitous, but also a preposterous arrangement, as in all probability the censors,--who were chosen from the most distinguished persons, and who held their office under the fullest responsibility, whilst moreover one colleague might even impugn the acts of the other,--would be much fairer than the whole people, had it been called upon to make the selection. The senate also needed a careful supervision to fill up its vacancies, and to secure its respectability. It was indeed originally an assembly of the clans, every one of which had its representative senator; but when the clans began to dwindle away, there were taken from the whole order three hundred,--an hundred from each tribe; so that in consequence of the extinction of the clans, one clan might often number several votes, and another become altogether weak or degenerate. Afterwards the _lex Ovinia Tribunicia_[110] was passed, in which it is enacted that from the whole order, without regard to the _gentes_, the most worthy should be chosen. If it dates from the first times of the censorship, it proves that in those days the senate still consisted only of patricians, and that from all the three tribes the most worthy were taken. The statement that by Brutus, or Valerius Poplicola, plebeians had, under the name of _conscripti_, been already introduced into the senate, is either a fable, or it must be considered as quite a temporary arrangement. About the time of the migration of the commonalty, and likewise at the actual period itself, not a single plebeian could have been in the senate: towards the middle of the fourth century we can trace it for the first time. The senate now became a number of men chosen by the people, inasmuch as the magistrates were granted the privilege of voting in the senate, and the right of being elected into it on the publication of the new list; a right which also extended to the quæstors. Now, when in the year 346 the quæstorship was thrown open to both orders, I see in this the first occasion on which plebeians were admitted into the senate; and as from henceforth eight quæstors were appointed every year, the arbitrary sway of the censors must have been entirely put an end to. They might indeed exclude the plebeians; but as the senate consisted of no more than three hundred, and the censors, at the end of every _lustrum_, always saw forty men before them who had a claim to be elected into the senate, it is manifest that the senate could soon have become rather a plebeian than a patrician assembly. The power of the censors therefore declined in the course of time, like that of all the magistrates, with the exception of the tribunes: at first, only a censor could check the resolutions of his colleague; afterwards, the tribunes also took upon themselves to interfere with the determinations of the censors. It was formerly thought impossible that the censors should have had such a power as was granted them by the Lex Ovinia, or it was deemed detestable; yet they really had in the beginning an immense discretionary power. But, as in after times it was no more the two orders exclusively, but government and people who stood opposed against each other, the people set limits to the government, and the censors were also deprived of their arbitrary sway. To the patricians the censorial power had no reference; nor, with the then existing notions of the auspices, could any body become a patrician by adoption, though indeed this was done in after times.

Here the question now arises, were the censors authorized to exercise their power also with regard to morals? were they allowed to strike a bad man from the lists with a _nota censoria_? This I formerly denied, except it were perhaps in cases of downright infamy; yet in the newly discovered _excerpta_ from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a passage was found, which undeniably speaks of the right of the censor to take cognisance of any moral turpitude which could not be reached by the law; as for instance, heartlessness to parents, wives, or children, harshness towards slaves or neighbours. In fact, Dionysius in his time no more knew the censorship in its ancient state; yet he certainly gives us reason to believe that when he describes it, he rather sets before us the censorship of bygone times, than that of his own, which was generally known. It is therefore probable that the power of the censor had this great extent, the limits of which are still to be traced from the existing materials. The censorship of Gellius and Lentulus in Cicero’s days, was somewhat irregular.[111] Whether at that period already some tribes were _minus honestæ_, and others _honestiores_, cannot be decided. That afterwards the _tribus urbanæ_, particularly the _Esquilina_, were looked down upon, while the _Crustumina_ stood high, is certain; yet it would be silly to suppose that this was also the case in the earlier ages.

The censors were at first elected for five years (a _lustrum_); and thus, in the true spirit of its system, it seems to have been the object of the decemviral legislation with regard to all the magistrates, to apply cooling remedies against the political fever, as elections always excite the passions most. Whether Mam. Æmilius really limited the censorial power to eighteen months, and was therefore branded by his successor with the _ignominia_; or whether this is an account contained in the books of the censors, which refers an existing law to one particular person, cannot be decided: certain it is, that such books of the censors existed.

In the year 315, a famine and terrible scarcity broke out in Rome. Many Romans drowned themselves in the Tiber not to perish by hunger. On the whole, the price of corn in those times was endlessly fluctuating, just as in the middle ages; which gave rise to forestalling and regrating, especially as in Italy grain may be kept for such a long time under ground. The distress came quite unexpectedly, and therefore a _præfectura annonæ_ was established, which seems to have been a temporary magistracy. L. Minucius Augurinus was invested with this office. He did all he could to bring down the prices; he ordered the existing stores to be thrown open for sale at a compulsory rate, and had purchases made among the neighbouring people; yet his purveyances not only went on too slowly, but also the means which he employed did not answer: real help was only afforded by a rich plebeian knight, Sp. Mælius. This man had great quantities of grain bought up on his own account in Etruria and the country of the Volscians, and distributed it all among the poor. Any one who had done so much good, might in the ancient republics easily be suspected of having been actuated by questionable motives. Mælius therefore was charged with having attempted to gain over the people, that by their aid he might establish a tyranny. Minucius is said to have reported to the senate that many plebeians assembled in Mælius’ house, and that arms were conveyed thither. No one can now presume to decide whether this charge was well founded or not; at all events, such a conspiracy would have been madness in a man who was distinguished for nothing but his wealth, and who must have had the tribunes against him as well as the patricians. However this may be, he was looked upon as the head of a party; and in order to crush him, the senate and the curies appointed L. Quinctius Cincinnatus as dictator, who took Servilius Ahala for his master of horse. Cincinnatus, having occupied during the night the Capitol and the other strongholds, on the following morning set up his curule throne in the Forum, and summoned Mælius by Ahala before his tribunal. Mælius foresaw his fate: as no tribune could protect him against the dictator, he refused to appear, and mingled with the crowd of the plebeians. Then Servilius Ahala seized hold of him and stabbed him. This act is much admired by the ancients; but its merit is very problematical, as it may have been mere murder. The _Præfectus Annonæ_, according to a very plausible account, is said to have separated himself from the _Patres_, gone over to the _Plebes_, and to have been appointed as the eleventh tribune; and then within a few weeks to have entirely succeeded in bringing down the prices; which is a proof that the distress was rather an artificial one. The corn from the magazines of Sp. Mælius was confiscated, and distributed among the people. Servilius Ahala, as we are told by Cicero, was impeached by the _Plebes_ as a murderer, and withdrew into exile: whether he was recalled afterwards, is unknown to us. This gives the whole affair an ugly look. Mælius’ house was pulled down; the Æquimælium, the place where it had stood, was under the walls of the Capitol, and is now entirely buried in the rubbish which forms a mound at the foot of the hill. This is a point of some importance for the understanding of Roman topography.[112]

When the Valerian laws, as we have seen before, so far limited the old right of the consuls to enforce obedience, that any one sentenced by them to receive corporal punishment might appeal to his community, they were yet to be allowed a certain sphere of jurisdiction without appeal: otherwise their authority would have been reduced to a mere nothing. That power extended to fines, the fixing of which is also ascribed to Valerius. Yet this is not likely, as there is too positive an evidence in the law of the consuls Tarpeius and Aternius, passed by the centuries, in which the _multa_ was estimated in heads of cattle, as Cicero _de Republica_ expressly tells us. This would not have been possible, if the Valerian law had already fixed the limitation; or else the rulers must afterwards again have seized upon the absolute authority. On the whole, all that is mentioned of the Valerii is not to be trusted, as Valerius Antias, who reckoned himself of the Valerian house, invented a good deal about it, and the Valerii moreover were rather vain of their popularity. That law fixed two sheep and thirty oxen as the highest _multa_, with regard to which Gellius makes a very heedless statement; for he says that sheep were at that time so rare, that two of them were estimated as equal to thirty beeves, though he himself immediately afterwards informs us that a sheep was worth ten, and an ox a hundred _asses_. The explanation of the fact is simply this,--that the consuls were obliged to increase the amount of the fine only by degrees, that the way might always be left open for a return to obedience: he who did not make his appearance on the first day, was mulcted of a sheep; on the following day, of two; then of an ox; and so on. We know from Cicero of another circumstance besides, which proves to us how little other accounts are to be relied on. Only twenty-five years later, the value of these payments was fixed in money, and that at a moderate estimation. Cicero justly looks upon this as denoting a progress of individual liberty.

The number of the treasurers or masters of the exchequer, whose election was indeed formerly made by the king or the curies, but afterwards assigned by Poplicola to the centuries, was raised from two to four, to be taken alike from patricians and plebeians. At first the patricians still hinder the carrying out of this clause; but at a later period the plebeians make good their right. This progress was not a mere point of honour, but it was a reality; it was closely connected with the dearest interests of the _Plebes_, as they now shared in the administration of the common exchequer, which was no more _Publicum_ but _Ærarium_. By this means, as we have already remarked, the senate was now opened to the plebeians also, and they could be degraded from it by the power of the censors only.

A further advance to freedom was this, that about twenty years after the legislation of the decemvirs, the right of declaring war and peace passed from the curies to the centuries. That the curies originally had this right, we know from Dionysius; yet as the plebeians alone were bound to serve on foot, and the patricians withheld the booty from them, it was natural that the tribunes should have claimed for their order the right of deciding whether they would have war or not; and consequently the veto of the tribunes to a declaration of war is nothing else but a reservation of the rights of the _Plebes_. If the centuries had carried the resolution, the curies were of course obliged to confirm it; yet this was certainly not always the case, as the proposal originated with the senate, and it is not at all likely that the senate and the curies should not have agreed.

The existence of plebeian senators is now as clear as daylight, and it is expressly stated that P. Licinius Calvus sat in the senate. Whenever therefore an interrex was to be elected, it was no longer the _decem primi_ who met together,--for, they had lost their importance by the admission of the plebeians,--but all the patricians in the whole of the senate. This is what is meant by _Patricii coeunt ad Interregem prodendum_, and it might have been based even on the laws of the Twelve Tables. One can quite understand that the ancients might have known the laws of the Twelve Tables by heart, and yet not have perceived, that something different was written in them from what was afterwards the rule.

Thus then we have seen, how from the legislation of the decemvirs down to the conquest of the city by the Gauls, the development of free institutions at home steadily kept pace with the expansion of the state abroad; and hence it is manifest that the two were necessarily linked together.

The history of the Italian nations we know almost exclusively through the Romans; and yet that history would in fact be the only means for correctly understanding the foreign relations of Rome, as the account of these is very often not only defective, but altered moreover in a lying spirit. The decline of the state after the expulsion of the kings may have partly arisen from the fermentations at home, and partly from the quarrel with the Latins. Afterwards, however, the spread of the Etruscans in the prime of their strength from the North, and at the same time that of the Sabines and their colonies, exercise their influence. The Romans call the latter Sabellians; for _Sabellus_ is the general adjective-termination corresponding with _Sabinus_, like _Hispanus_ and _Hispellus_, _Græcus_ and _Græculus_, _Pœnus_ and _Pœnulus_, _Romus_ and _Romulus_; at a later period only the ending in _-lus_ had a diminutive meaning given it. _Sabellus_ is quite synonymous with Sabinus, except that according to usage, the name of Sabellians is given to the whole nation, and that of Sabines to the inhabitants of the small district. The spread of those nations was therefore the chief cause of the decline of Rome; otherwise the wars of Porsena would not have happened. If the Etruscans had spread in any other direction, and had not the Sabellians, inasmuch as they were pushed on themselves, been obliged to push on others, the Ausonian people also, particularly the Æquians, would not have been driven, as they were, to make conquests.

The period of the greatness of the Etruscans coincides with the middle of the third century of the city, according to a statement bearing the authority of Cato, that the Etruscan colony of Capua or Vulturnum was founded about the year 260, which falls within the time of that war in which the Romans were so hard pressed by the Veientines. At that time, the Etruscans, who by the Greeks are called Tyrrhenians, were the most formidable conquerors; yet a reverse came upon them when the people of Cumæ with the help of Hiero, towards the close of the third century (280), destroyed their naval power. The general fact only of that change can be asserted with certainty; the details of it are, alas! entirely lost to us; a considerable event in the world’s history here lies buried in darkness. About the same period also, their power on the banks of the Tiber is broken. On the other hand, the Sabines in the last half of the third century are often seen as enemies of the Romans; the earlier accounts of victories gained over them by Valerius are utterly apocryphal. Whether they were dangerous to the Romans, we will not decide here: yet undoubtedly wars took place with the Sabines, as well as with all the other people of the neighbourhood, though all the details about them are either fiction or poetry. Towards the end of the third century, however, the history becomes clearer and clearer, and we may discern the traces of the old annals. The last Sabine war is that which Valerius and Horatius victoriously carried on in the first year of the restoration of the consulship; it is told too circumstantially to be credited in all its parts; but certain it is, that from that time, for nearly a hundred and fifty years until Curius, the Sabines waged no war with the Romans. There must have been some very particular reason for this, and I find one in a treaty of which no other trace whatever is left, and in which isopolity was established between the two peoples: that isopolity existed between them, is attested by Servius on Virgil. About the year 310, we find a notice that the people of the Campanians was formed; that is to say, that at Vulturnum or Capua, the Etruscans received Samnites as ἔποικοι among them, and shared with them their territory. This is to us a proof of the advance of the Sabines in those parts, as the Samnites are a Sabine people. The Æquians and Volscians relax in their attacks on Rome; the Sabine wars are at an end; consequently we behold the period when the emigration of the Sabines towards the South leaves off, and the Ausonian mountaineers no more push forward. The Etruscans now at once stand still, which is natural in an oligarchically governed nation: when such a people has once settled down to rest, there is no example of its ever having been aroused again and gained fresh life. Thus we may link together all the facts which are confusedly told by the Romans.

During the time from 306 to 323, wars had almost entirely ceased. The account of the insurrection at Ardea in which the Romans had been called in, has something in it so strange, that we cannot build any thing upon it: it is nothing but a repetition of the story of the enemy’s army being surrounded by Cincinnatus. In the year 323, the war first breaks out again in good earnest. With regard to the Antiates, we do not know whether they took any share in it; as to the Ecetrans, we cannot doubt but that they did. The latter at that time joined the Æquians on the Algidus. Between Velitræ (which was Volscian), Tusculum, and the Alban Mount, the Roman armies, sent against them, lost a battle. A. Postumius Tubertus was therefore appointed dictator. This war is now described in a perfectly historical and accurate manner. Whether there be any truth in the tradition that A. Postumius heightened the power of his _imperium_ on the minds of those who were under his command by his ruthless treatment of his own son, we may leave undiscussed. The more general opinion is this, that Manlius followed his example; From the phrase _imperia Manliana_ no conclusion can be drawn; Livy’s argument against it is at all events worth nothing. Postumius led thither all the forces of the republic and the allies, he gave one army to the consul, and took the other himself: the former was posted on the road to Lanuvium, the latter, on that to Tusculum, below the point at which the two highways crossed each other. The Volscians and Æquians occupied separate camps: to the one the consul, to the other the dictator was opposed, the two hosts being, however, very near each other. The enemy during the night attacked the camp of the consul; in the meanwhile, the dictator, who was prepared for this, sent a detachment to seize the almost abandoned camp of the Volscians, and he himself led the greater part of his army to the help of the consul, and fell upon the enemy’s rear. These last were completely routed, all but one body, which cut its way through under the lead of the brave Vettius Messius.

This battle is one of those which are of importance in the world’s history. It broke the power of the Volscians of Ecetræ, and of the Æquians; the slaughter must have been frightful. The Æquians sued at once for peace, and were granted it for eight years; from that time, they were no more to be dreaded. After this, the Romans spread more and more; the places also which had been taken from them in the former wars by the Volscians and Æquians, were now recovered. Of these there are expressly mentioned, Lavici,[113] formerly one of the great Latin towns, Bolæ or Bola; Velitræ, Circeii, Anxur, Ferentinum, which had formerly been Hernican, and must now have been restored to the Hernicans, as it is always again met with among their places. Thus the Romans had advanced to the frontiers of Latium proper, even as far as under the kings. Moreover, at that time also, Setia, Norba, Cora, Signia, must have been retaken; and, as the Romans and Latins were now no more on an equal footing, they must likewise have come under the rule of the Romans alone. In the country of the Æquians, the Romans advanced as far as the lake Fucinus. The subjugation of the Volscians made it possible for them to carry on the terrible Veientine war. As in consequence of these conquests many indigent persons were provided for, Roman colonies were founded at Lavici and Velitræ, and restored at Circeii: in the latter place it was perhaps a Latin colony.

After a long interval, the agrarian law begins again to give rise to serious discussions in the year 345; before that, in the years between 30 and 40, it is once spoken of, but only slightly. The cause of this silence during the preceding years is not sufficiently explained. Some assignments of colonies indeed take place; but always in common with the Latins and Hernicans, and without any consequences for those who did not wish to give up their Roman home and their rights as citizens. The times of contentedness and discontent in history do not by any means correspond with the growth of political rights, but rather indeed with the stages of general prosperity: when things are decidedly flourishing, man enjoys life without troubling himself much about the state of political affairs. In Germany there was such a period just before the thirty years’ war; every kind of property improved in value, and matters at home went on very quietly: this was also the case in France under Henry IV. Such on the whole was then the condition of Rome; and hence we may perhaps best explain, why it was that for so long a time no violent internal commotions took place there. Yet when in such a state of things new energies have developed themselves, new claims also spring up, which then at once are fiercely urged. And thus it was now with the agrarian law. Hitherto the patricians had with great cunning kept the plebeians out of those honourable offices to which they had a right; often were consuls elected instead of the military tribunes, and these last again with less than their full number. But now decided claims began to be insisted upon. Rome’s humiliation abroad, owing to the wars of the Etruscans and Volscians, had ceased, the city had quickly risen by its conquests to a very high position, and under these circumstances the tribunes raised their voices for the men of their own order. The first occasion for this, the consequences of which must have been much more violent than Livy represents them, was afforded by the conquest of Lavici: a colony was demanded there, but the Roman senate refused it. The question is now no more about the _Lex Cassia_, but there is a special _lex tribunicia agraria_ brought by the tribunes before the tribes: it was demanded that a division of the _ager publicus_ should be made, and a tax again imposed on the patrician demesne. The latter clause was originally in all the agrarian laws; but the patricians had succeeded in evading their obligations. These warnings had directly no effect beyond this, that colonies of citizens were several times founded: these were exclusively Roman, and therefore called _coloniæ Romanæ_. After the conquest of Bolæ, an ill-fated military tribune, M. Postumius, had caused all the booty to be sold by auction for the benefit of the _publicum_ (_in publicum redigere_, for _publicum_ is the separate exchequer of the curies). This excited such an outburst of rage, that the soldiers rose against the quæstor and slew him. The military tribune, who had to judge the case, drove them to such despair, that they mutinied also against him, and stained their hands with his blood; which is the only instance of the kind before the times of Sylla. The senate chose to connive at a deed of which the guilt was but too evident. The consequences of this outbreak must have been very great, though Livy says nothing on the subject; for from that time only it never happens that there are less than six military tribunes, and the election seems to have been now transferred from the centuries to the tribes, as otherwise it would have been very thoughtless in Livy to have spoken of a _tribus prærogativa_. The curies conferred, as usual, the _imperium_, after the election had been made.

Rome now turned her arms against Veii, which was about two German miles and a half distant, and nearly one German mile in circumference: its boundary must have reached as far as the Janiculum. This city was a thorn in the side of Rome, and until she had overthrown this rival, she could never be great. Fidenæ, which is called an Etruscan town, but was a Tyrrhenian one, is represented from the earliest times, even under Romulus already, as being involved in war with Rome: it lay one German mile above Rome on the Tiber. It was either in 320 or 329, that the Fidenates rose against the Roman _coloni_ and expelled them. Two wars are related here, according to all appearances put in the wrong place: the detailed account occurs at least once too much; probably it belongs to the year 329. In 320, hostilities may likewise have taken place; this is at all events the time fixed upon by Diodorus, whom we may follow. We must look upon these _coloni_ as a garrison of settlers who had their own hides of land. Three Roman ambassadors appeared at Fidenæ; and the inhabitants were called upon to justify themselves, and to reinstate the _coloni_. This seemed to them so unreasonable, that they slew the ambassadors, and threw themselves into the arms of the king of Veii, Lars Tolumnius; for all the Etruscan towns had a regal government, the king being elected for life. Tolumnius came across the Tiber to their assistance; and since the Romans, as the conquerors of the Æquians and Volscians, were now formidable to the neighbours, the Capenates and Faliscans, Oscan tribes, who had maintained themselves in those parts against the Tyrrhenians, hastened likewise to help the Fidenates. This host struck terror into the Romans; it lay one mile from Rome, being separated from it by the Anio only. A dictator was appointed, and he chose the military tribune A. Cornelius Cossus as Magister Equitum. The battle was a lucky one, and Cornelius Cossus slew the Veientine king Tolumnius, to whose charge, no doubt unjustly, the murder of the ambassadors was laid. The emperor Augustus with regard to it made the remark to Livy, that Cossus, on the strength of these _spolia opima_, had taken upon himself consular dignity; for on the armour he had called himself consul. This is a later addition in Livy, which, however, is left quite detached, or otherwise he must have placed the event seven years later. After this victory, Fidenæ was taken and razed to the ground; the _ager Fidenas_ became _ager publicus_. With the Veientines a truce was made, which was quite seasonable for the Romans, as it enabled them to begin by completely crushing the Æquians and Volscians. Towards the end of the armistice, the Veientines sent to the other Etruscan peoples for aid against the Romans. Yet it was refused them, inasmuch as from another side, on the Apennines, a far more dangerous enemy had appeared, which like a horde of invading Turks destroyed every thing before it, namely the Gauls. The Etruscans advised the Veientines to try by all means to maintain the peace with the Romans: the demands of the latter may, however, have been too high,--perhaps they wanted the sovereignty over Veii, so that the Veientines were obliged to choose war as unavoidable. If we compare the account of the first Veientine war, seventy years before, the Veientines were then supported by the whole power of the Etruscans; but now their only remaining champions are the Capenates[114] and the Faliscans: in one single campaign indeed the people of Tarquinii come to their help. The Cærites were friends with the Romans, and therefore kept neutral: the Etruscans, it is true, were in the ascendant there; yet in the main the population may still have been Tyrrhenian. Rome was obliged to make the strongest efforts when arming herself for this struggle, and was supported in it by the Latins and Hernicans.

The derision with which Florus speaks of the _bella suburbana_, when saying, _De Verulis et Bovillis pudet dicere, sed triumphavimus_, is the sneer of a rhetorician, and we cannot find fault with him for finding these events rather uninteresting. Wars indeed which were fought within a narrow field, have not the same claims to our interest as one like that of Hannibal; still it was in these that the powers of Rome developed themselves. We will not treat this Veientine war with contempt, nor yet will we describe it with as much prolixity as Livy does; but we shall give a sketch of it in very brief outlines. To us, the spirit is of importance with which the Romans began it; inasmuch as they undertook it amid difficulties, which under the circumstances were not less than those of the first Punic war, for instance, and it was only by long perseverance that they could hope to bring matters to an issue. A city like Veii, which lay so near, and was so strong, could not be taken but by a blockade or a siege: when the Veientines were too weak in the field, they withdrew within their walls, against which the Romans could do nothing. One was now obliged, either to invest the town and force it to yield by hunger, or if needs be, by works, by mines; or else to try and reduce it by distress, fortifying a place in the neighbourhood (ἐπιτείχισις), as Decelea near Athens, and from thence devastating the country far and wide, and preventing its cultivation, so that the enemy are brought into such a strait of misery that they must strive by every possible means to get out of it. But to do this, inasmuch as they had to fear the neighbouring places, as Capena, Falerii, the Romans had to change their former mode of war. They had until then only undertaken short expeditions during a few of the summer months,--not unseldom but ten to twelve, nay even five to six days, especially in the times of the republic: under the kings it must have been different. There were from the earliest ages certain months of war, in which they mutually ravaged each other’s fields; thus it was among the Greeks, and so it is to this day among the people of Asia. On the frontiers of Georgia, Russia and Persia make war against each other for a couple of months every year; in the laws of Charlemagne the period is fixed during which the people are bound to service. During the intervals, the intercourse was more or less free; the time of the festivals especially was quite free, as, for instance, the common festivals of the Etruscans near the temple of the Voltumna, or that of the Ausonian people near the temple of Feronia. It was only for the stated period that the soldiers could be kept in the field, and as soon as it was over, they dispersed. The means of Rome for keeping up a large force were very much lessened since the Etruscan and Volscian wars: in former times the army was paid from the tithes which the possessors of the _ager publicus_ had to give. But since the _ager publicus_ was lost, every one marched out to war οἰκόσιτος, the men brought their stock of provisions from home, and what they wanted besides they tried to get by foraging: if this could not be done, the army had to return home again. It was owing to this that so very few sieges took place. But as it was now intended to carry on the war in right earnest, and not to lay down their arms until Veii were conquered, the army was to receive pay. This decree was perhaps connected also with a proposition for levying the tithes again from the _ager publicus_, and thence defraying the expense of the pay. There is some ground for the supposition, that in the earliest times already a _stipendium_ was very generally paid, in a statement that in the census of Servius Tullius the _equites_ received two thousand asses; without doubt, therefore, the _pedites_ also got something. I suppose that it was a hundred _asses_, whether the war lasted a longer or a shorter time; and that for this sum, the soldier had to find himself in arms and provisions. With such a system wars of conquest were incompatible, as in these the soldier must be entirely kept by the state; and this is the arrangement which was intended, when it is said that the Roman soldiers now first received a _stipendium_. It would be incorrect to take it for granted that formerly they had nothing given them; but there is a very great difference, between their receiving a small sum at once and their being paid by the day. It may be assumed, that the ærarians, as they were not obliged to serve in war, had always had to pay a war tax for the _pedites_, as the _orbi orbæque_ had for the equites; for, the plebeian could not have been loaded with the double burthen of serving with his body and with his goods.

The pay of the Romans was from of old a hundred _asses_ per month for one man, which was in a fair proportion to his wants. Such a pay is to be met with among the Athenians since Pericles’ days, but scarcely ever before. The pay of a hoplite at Athens was immense; in Rome, where the allies paid no contributions, it could not but be much less. The sum of one hundred _asses_ continued to be paid also in later times; when the _asses_ were made too light, they were calculated in silver at the rate of ten to one. Every third day, the soldier got a _denarius_ (as much as one drachma), which is two obols daily. The stipendium was considered as a unit; yet it was multiplied afterwards (_multiplex stipendium_: _Domitian_ added a _quartum stipendium_). But this is always to be understood of one month only. The excellent Radbod Hermann Schele makes the mistake here of drawing from authorities which are not worth any thing, the impossible conclusion that the _stipendia_ were _annua_, which would have been to no purpose whatever: his practical turn of mind failed him in this instance. The pay was only for the time when one was really in the field; if the war lasted for one year, a year’s pay was, of course, allowed. When Appius Claudius says in Livy, _annua æra habes, annuam operam ede_, this is likewise an incorrect opinion of Livy.

This innovation was of the utmost importance for the republic, as without a national army Rome could never have become great. If the money for the purpose could be supplied without entailing any fresh tax, it answered perfectly; but if the patrician did not pay the tithe from the _ager publicus_, or the revenue of the state was otherwise insufficient, the war was exceedingly burthensome for the plebeian, as the pay had to be defrayed by a property tax, and the service might last for an unusually long period. This injustice was an unavoidable necessity. That the plebeians had not been taxed before, was, very likely, owing to their inability to pay; but for twenty years Rome had been increasing in welfare, so that it now became possible, although new distress was thus created, and prosperity blighted, until there was even a return of the old system of oppression for debt. But, on the other hand, it also became possible, to keep an army in the field throughout the whole of the year.

About the same time, there was a change in the art of war. _Postquam stipendiarii facti sunt_, says Livy, _scuta pro clupeis habebant_; he seems to take it for granted that this alteration in the arms was called forth by the introduction of pay. The first step towards it may indeed have been already taken before the Gallic invasion.

The Romans entered upon the last Veientine war with the determination to conquer Veii. The republic, which had extended itself as far as Anxur, began to feel its own strength, as with the Sabines it was at least on friendly terms, and it had conquered the Æquians. How far the Latins took part in this war, is uncertain; their co-operation may not perhaps have reached beyond the Tiber. According to a statement which bears the appearance of truth, Circeii also was retaken by the Romans soon after Anxur: on the outskirts of the mountains, however, Privernum still maintained itself as a Volscian town. The weakness of the Ausonian peoples arose from the spread of the Samnites, and must have inclined them to make peace with the Romans. Thus Rome had leisure for permanently enlarging its territory, which in all probability it had no more to share with the Latins.

The last Veientine war had been followed by a twenty years’ truce. The Etruscans, like very many other nations of antiquity, had the custom of ending their wars only by armistices for a certain number of years, which were years of ten months. This may be proved by the fact, that in almost every instance hostilities break out again earlier than might be expected from the fixed number of years of twelve months, and never sooner than after the same number of years calculated at ten months. The truce between Rome and Veii was concluded in 330, and in 347 it had already run out (_induciæ exierant_, is the literal expression). The use of these years of ten months is on the whole very common among the Romans; such a year was reckoned for mourning, and for all matters connected with money and interest. In sales of corn a credit of ten months was an understood thing. Loans for a long term of years there were none; but all business was done for short periods, and on the security of personal credit, as debts on bills of exchange. The Veientines, quite contrary to what they did in former times, try to evade the war in every possible manner. Without doubt, Veii had formerly been the chief of many Etrurian towns; probably from its situation, as in the earlier wars the power of that city appears to have been very great. Yet the irruption of the Gauls had this effect with regard to the towns southward of the Apennines, as Arretium, Fæsulæ, &c., that they were summoned to assist their countrymen on the other side of the mountains. This assistance was fruitless. The loss was great, and Etruria shed its lifeblood in the plains of Lombardy. Tarquinii and Capena alone came to the help of Veii; and also the Æqui Falisci, not indeed as an Etruscan people, but because they considered Veii as their bulwark.

At first, the Romans thought that the war could be quickly brought to an end; they built strong forts in the _Ager Veientanus_, (which the Greeks call ἐπιτειχίζειν) as Agis did in the second half of the Peloponnesian war; and from thence they hindered the Veientines from tilling their fields, or they set fire to the ripe corn, so that famine and distress soon made their appearance in the town. This system of warfare is designated here by the term _obsessio_. Once only the Romans undertook a siege in the simple fashion of that age. Between two redoubts, and parallel with the wall of the town, a line of rubbish, sand bags, and fascines was thrown up; wooden scaffoldings (_plutei_) were then erected on both sides, in order to give the rubbish firmness; and, what was the chief difficulty, they were pushed further and further in advance. These wooden works were raised to about the height of the wall; bridges and scaling ladders were laid on it (_aggerem muro injungebant_); and then the machines were brought up, first the battering rams, in aftertimes the catapults and ballistæ,--for these, which in that age were yet unknown at Rome, were invented at Syracuse for Dionysius. The people of the town tried on their side to countermine. Yet the neighbouring nations defeated the Romans, and destroyed their works. Since then, several years passed without any camp being again pitched before Veii.

The war of Veii was for the ancients a parallel to that of Troy. They pictured to themselves another ten years’ siege, and a conquest quite as marvellous as that of Troy by the wooden horse. Yet not the whole of the war is poetical fiction; but the old lays were linked to detached historical points which they embellished, differing in this from the epics of the earliest history. By the side of these, there is an old annalistic narrative which is by no means incredible. The defeat of the tribunes Virginius and Sergius is historical; but the particulars concerning the Alban lake, and such like things, belong to the old poem. Whether this was written in prose or in verse is all the same to me. The account given was as follows.